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Abstract?
Whenever?a?common?goal?requires?coordinated?action?of?a?team,?leadership?facilitates?the?endeavor.?
Historically,?men? have? held?most? of? the? leadership? positions,? and? up? to? date,?women? are? still? a?
minority? in? top?level? business? positions.? Using? the? turnaround? game? in? controlled? laboratory?
experiments?and?varying?treatment?conditions,?we?investigate?whether?men?and?women?are?equally?
effective?leaders.?
The? first? chapter? reviews? research? from? three? different? perspectives:? coordination? games? in?
economic? laboratory? experiments? and? their? real?world? implications,? gender? studies? in? relation? to?
leadership?and?ongoing?trends,?and?studies?of?the?democracy?effect?related?to? leader?effectiveness?
and?gender?equality.?The?second?chapter?shows?with?a?basic?experiment?using?the?weak?link?game?
that?men?and?women?are?equally?effective?leaders,?no?matter?if?gender?is?revealed?or?not.?The?third?
chapter? considers? communication? styles? of? leaders? and? finds? that? despite? the? different? paths? in?
communication,? men? and? women? are? equally? effective? leaders.? The? fourth? chapter? varies? the?
selection?process?and?presents?a? replication?of? the?democracy?effect?on? leader?effectiveness? in? a?
laboratory?experiment?using? the? turnaround?game?as? studied?earlier?by?Brandts?et?al.? (2015).?The?
fifth? chapter? finds? that?women? are? elected? at? a? similar? rate? than?men? and? elected?women? are?
marginally? less?effective? leaders?than?elected?men,?although?the?gender?difference?disappears?with?
repeated? interaction.?The?broad? conclusion? is? that?organizations? can?benefit? from?both?employee?
participation?in?choosing?group?leaders?and?reconsidering?gender?imbalance?in?top?level?positions.?
? ?
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Abstrakti?
Kun? talousyksiköillä? on? yhteinen? päämäärä,? joka? edellyttää? koordinaatiota,? johtajuudella? on?
keskeinen? rooli.?Historiallisesti? suurin?osa? johtajista?on?ollut?miehiä,? ja?naisilla?on?nykyäänkin?vain?
murto?osa? johtopaikoista? liike?elämässä.? Tässä? työssä? käytämme? behavioraalisen? taloustieteen?
menetelmiä?kontrolloiduissa?kokeissa,? joiden?tavoite?on?tutkia? johtamiseen? liittyviä?tehokkuuseroja?
miesten?ja?naisten?välillä.?
Työn?ensimmäisessä?kappaleessa?luodaan?katsaus?alan?kirjallisuuteen?eri?näkökulmista.?Käymme?läpi?
kokeellisia?tuloksia?taloustieteellisesti?kiinnostavista?koordinaatiopeleistä?ja?tulosten?implikaatioista,?
sukupuolinäkökulmasta? tehtyjä? johtajuustutkimuksia? sekä? tutkimusta? siitä,? miten? niin? sanottu?
demokratiavaikutus? näkyy? johtamisen? tehokkuudessa? ja? sukupuolten? tasa?arvossa.? Työn? toisen?
kappaleen?päätulos?on,?että?sukupuolten?välillä?ei?ole?tehokkuuseroja?johtamisessa?riippumatta?siitä,?
onko? johtajan? sukupuoli? tiedossa? vai? ei.? Kolmannessa? kappaleessa? tutkitaan? johtajien? erilaisia?
kommunikaatiotapoja.?Sen?päätulos?on,?että?vaikka?miehet?ja?naiset?eroavat?kommunikaatiotapojen?
suhteen,?tämä?ei?johda?eroihin?tehokkuudessa.?Neljännessä?kappaleessa?tarkastellaan?erilaisia?tapoja?
valita? johtaja? ja? replikoidaan? tuloksia? demokratiavaikutuksen? merkityksestä? johtamisen?
tehokkuuteen.? Viidennessä? kappaleessa? havaitaan,? että? naiset? ja? miehet? valitaan? kokeellisissa?
tilanteissa? yhtä? usein? johtajiksi.? Valitut?miehet? ovat?marginaalisesti? tehokkaampia? johtajia,?mutta?
tämä? vaikutus? häviää? toistetuissa? tilanteissa.? Johtopäätöksenä? voidaan? esittää,? että? organisaatiot?
voivat?hyötyä,?jos?työntekijät?osallistuvat?ryhmän?johtajien?valintaan.?Sama?pätee,?kun?organisaatiot?
pohtivat?johdon?sukupuolijakaumaan.?
? ?
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Chapter?1?
Introduction?
The? thesis? is? subdivided? into? five? chapters.?Chapter?1? contains? the? introduction.?The? introduction?
chapter? is? further? subdivided? into? three? sections?describing? “Why”,? “How”?and? “What”?we? study,?
respectively,? and? a? literature? review? section.? Subsection? 1.1? outlines? the? motivation? and? the?
objectives?of?the?studies.?Subsection?1.2?describes?the?methods?we?used.?Subsection?1.3?summarizes?
our?results.?Subsection?1.4?contains?an?extended?literature?review?from?three?different?perspectives,?
guiding?the?reader?along?the?historic?paths?that?met?and?preceded?the?birth?of?this?thesis.?Chapters?2?
to?5?contain?the?studies?1?to?4,?respectively.?
1.1?Motivation?
We?study?gender?and?leadership?in?the?weak?link?game.?Why?do?we?use?the?weak?link?game?to?study?
leadership??Recently?I?watched?again?the?film?Dead?Poets?Society.?The?English?teacher?tells?the?boys?
to?walk?around.?Everyone?starts?to?walk?in?his?own?pace?and?own?style,?on?paths?independent?from?
each? other.? After? a?while? they? adapt? randomly? to? each? other? and? organize? into? a? line? pattern,?
walking?the?same?pace?and?taking?rhythmic?steps.?They?adapt?to?the?rhythm?of?the?traffic,?which? is?
more?than?the?sum?of?the?boys,?it?is?an?organizing?power.?It?leads? its?followers?by?an?invisible?hand?
they? believe? in.1?Why? do?we? follow??When? do?we? adapt,? and?when? is? it? efficient? to? give? up? our?
independence? in?decision?making? in?order? to? trust? the?credibility?of?a? leader??The?weak?link?game?
models?exactly?these?dynamics?of?an?organization.?It?models?a?problem?of?beliefs.?What?makes?the?
decision? maker? believe? that? others? will? follow? the? leader? as? well?? Such? beliefs? drive? whole?
economies.?On?the?macro?level,?the?game?can?model?interaction?between?a?political?leader?and?the?
followers,? and? on? the? micro? level,? it? can? model? the? organization? of? firms,? or? even? family? and?
friendship?structures,?being?relevant?in?everyday?life.?
The? weak?link? game? is? a? coordination? game.? Originally,? it? models? a? production? situation? in? an?
organization?where?individuals?are?interdependent,?and?the?lowest?performing?individual?determines?
group?performance?(Van?Huyck?et?al.?1990).?Therefore?the?game?was?named?“weak?link”?game.?The?
individuals? can? choose? among? different? effort? levels.? To? reach? an? equilibrium? solution,? all? group?
members?have?to?choose?simultaneously?the?same?effort?level.?The?game?has?multiple?equilibria,?one?
at? every? effort? level.? To? choose? the? highest? effort? level? is? the?most? efficient,? payoff?dominant?
outcome?for?all?group?members.?Though,?the?higher?the?individual?effort?level?choice?is,?the?riskier?it?
becomes,?since?the?possibility?increases?that?other?group?members?choose?a?lower?effort?level.?This?
strategic?uncertainty?can?undermine?efficiency?(Van?Huyck?et?al.?1990).?Very?risk?averse? individuals?
could?decide?to?secure?themselves?a?low?payoff?from?choosing?the?lowest?effort?level,?and?avoiding?
losses? from? coordination? failure.? Coordination? failure? and? realization? of? the? most? inefficient?
equilibrium? is?the?usual?outcome? in?weak?link?games? if?communication? is?not?possible?(Kriss?and?Eil?
2012).?Cheap?talk?between?players?improves?coordination?and?efficiency?(Blume?and?Ortmann?2007).?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1?The? term? “invisible?hand”?was? coined?by?Adam? Smith? in? the?Wealth?of?Nations,?when?he?described?basic?
market?functioning.?
2?
?
Centralized?communication?by?a?leader?decreases?the?costs?of?communication?and?is?more?effective?
than?expert?advice?(Brandts?and?Cooper?2007;?Brandts?et?al.?2014).?If?leaders?are?credible,?they?can?
use?communication?as?a?tool?to?make?group?members?choosing?higher?effort? levels,?and?reaching?a?
more?efficient?equilibrium?through?improved?coordination?(Brandts?and?Cooper?2007).?
As? real?world?examples,?one? could? think?of?any?production?process? that? is? incomplete?until?every?
worker? made? his? contribution,? and? moreover,? the? production? outcome? is? determined? by? the?
contribution? of? the? worst? performing? individual.? Best? quality? food? might? be? perceived? as? less?
valuable? if? it? is?served?unprofessionally;?an?assembly? line?will?not?be?used?by? its?full?capacity? if? low?
performing? line? workers? hinder? its? process;? reports? or? software? remain? incomplete? until? every?
worker?made? his? contribution;? in? case? of? network? investments,? the? investment? of? firms? into? the?
same? industry? pays? off? only? if? a? sufficient? number? of? firms? choose? to? invest;? the? adoption? of?
standards? or? overcoming? financial? crises? is? only? possible? if? a? large? enough? number? of? followers?
adapts?(Camerer?and?Knez?1997;?Brandts?et?al.?2015;?Heinemann?et?al.?2009).?
Why?do?we?study?the?gender?of? the? leader? in?the?context?of? leadership??Despite?many?changes? in?
regulations,?such?as?gender?quotas,?and?despite?an? increasing?number?of?qualified?women,?women?
are?still?a?minority? in?top?level?business?and?political?positions.?Gender?equality? is?a?major?concern?
for? some? politicians,? international? organizations,? and? the? general? public.? One? of? the? global?
sustainable?development?goals?of?the?United?Nations?is?the?economic?and?political?empowerment?of?
women? (United?Nations?2015).?Our? studies?contribute? to? the? scientific? insights?about? the?possible?
explanations?why?women? are?underrepresented? in? leadership? roles,?and?what? kind?of? changes? to?
expect? if?women?fill?empowering?positions.?Literature?already?showed?that?women?might?shy?away?
from? running? for? leadership? positions? because? the? underlying? system? is? not? democratic? or? not?
transparent? enough? (Kanthak? and?Woon? 2014).? There? is? also? evidence? that? top?down? selection?
procedures,?and?bottom?up?selection?procedures? in?competitive?environments,?favor?men?(Reuben?
et? al.? 2014;? Reuben? et? al.? 2012).? However,? political? science? literature? shows? that,? once?women?
candidate?for?a?leader?position,?bottom?up?selection?procedures?make?it?equally?likely?that?a?man?or?
a?woman?gets?elected? (Darcy?et?al.?1994;?Lau?and?Redlawsk?1997).? In?our? studies?we?are?curious,?
whether?this?also?holds?in?a?behavioral?laboratory?using?an?economic?context.?
Why? do?we? run? laboratory? experiments? to? study? the? gender? gap? in? top? positions?? Experimental?
gender?studies?get?often?criticized?because?gender? is?not?a?treatment?that?could?be?randomized?to?
the? individual,? but? we? can? randomize? the? gender? of? the? leader? in? each? group.? The? laboratory?
environment?enables?us?to?test?in?a?controlled?manner?whether?followers?react?differently?to?a?male?
and?a?female?leader.?Further,?the?laboratory?setting?can?exclude?alternative?explanatory?factors,?like?
competitiveness?or?competence,?enabling?us?to?focus?solely?on?the?factors?of?interest,?like?gender?of?
the? leader,?content?of? leader?communication,?or?selection?process.?The?disentangling?of?alternative?
explanations? is?source?of?a?high? internal?validity.?This?allows?us?to?answer?the?research?question?of?
whether?men?and?women?are?equally?effective? leaders.?The? insights?of?our?studies?might?be?useful?
for? organizations,? which? might? benefit? from? reconsidering? their? gender? imbalance? in? top?level?
positions.?
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1.2?Methods?
Technically,? we? did? a? highly? ambitious? job? in? a? very? short? time.? We? made? use? of? my? earlier?
experience? in? conducting? laboratory? experiments? and? programming? the? z?Tree? software? by?
Fischbacher.?We? strived? for? the?best? scientific?practices,?and?we? scheduled? the?programming? task?
and?conduction?of?experiments?as?tightly?as?possible.?The?first?study?was?run?in?February?2015?with?
120?participants,?the?second?study?was?run?in?March?2015?with?165?participants,?and?the?third?study?
was? run? in?May?2015?with?145?participants.?During? the? third?study,?we?collected?also?data? for? the?
fourth?study.?This?means,?that?one?spring?term?was?enough?to?design,?program?and?conduct?three?
experimental?studies?that?were?subdivided?into?four?individual?studies.?One?year?later,?by?May?2016,?
we?had?the?four?paper?drafts?ready?and?presented?our?results,?while?I?made?my?first?experiences?in?
writing?and?my?skills?accelerated?over?time.?The?fourth?study?was?analyzed?and?written?up?within?a?
month’s? time,?working? full? time? on? the? job.? To? achieve? a? high? level? of? efficiency?was? one? of?my?
personal?goals.?Our?research?proves?that?behavioral?economics?can?be?a?quick?and?accurate?tool?to?
test? policies? before? implication? in? the? field.?Moreover,? in? line? with? the? thesis? requirements? for?
studying? coherent? topics,? all? the? four? studies? investigate? leader? effectiveness? under? different?
treatment?conditions,?so?that?the?robustness?of?our?basic?result?is?confirmed?by?several?independent?
measurements,?further?improving?the?power?of?our?results.?
Besides? using? standard? econometric? methods,? we? make? use? of? a? rather? unusual? approach? in?
economics? for? the? statistic? analysis? of? the? treatment? effect:? we? use? the? mediation? analysis? to?
decompose?the?total?effect? into?channels?of? leader?and?follower?behavior?(MacKinnon?et?al.?2007).?
We?achieve?the?most?significant?results?in?our?third?study?in?Chapter?4.?The?use?of?the?mediation?and?
moderation?analysis,?and?structural?equation?modeling?becomes?more?and?more?popular?recently,?
both? in? economics? and?multidisciplinary? research? combined?with? economics? (Bollen? et? al.? 2008;?
Sahin? et? al.? 2013;?Krishnakumar? and?Chávez?Juárez?2015).?Newer? versions?of? STATA? already?have?
user?friendly?commands?for?such?analyses.?We?think?that?the?use?of?novel?econometric?methods?is?a?
step? forward? to?create?more?complex?behavioral?models,?shifting? research? focus? from? two?person?
relationships?to?group?dynamics?(Dohmen?2014).?The?weak?link?coordination?game,?for?example,?is?a?
promising?model?that?could?be?extended?by?more?hierarchical?levels,?or?adding?group?competition.2?
In?all?of?our?four?studies?we?use?variations?of?the?weak?link?game.?In?the?first?study,?groups?of?eight?
people?play?the?game,?while? in?the?other?studies?we?have?groups?of?five?people.?One?of?the?group?
members?is?assigned?to?be?the?leader?of?the?group.?Leaders?can?send?non?binding?pre?play?messages?
to?the?other?group?members,?which?we?refer?to?as?followers.?In?the?first?study,?we?focus?on? leader?
effectiveness.?In?the?second?study,?we?focus?on?message?content?and?communication?styles.?In?the?
third?study,?we? focus?on? the?selection?process,?and? in? the? fourth?study,?on? the?gender?differences?
related?to?the?selection?process.?Table?1.1?provides?an?overview?of?the?foci?of?our?studies?and?depicts?
the?explanatory?paths.?Gender?and? the?selection?process?can? influence? leader?behavior,?which?we?
observe?through?the?message?use.?The?message?use?can?influence?follower?behavior?and?thus?leader?
effectiveness.?Gender?and?the?selection?process?can?influence?leader?effectiveness?either?directly?or?
mediated?by?message?use.?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2?For?example,?Alonso?et?al.?(2008)?study?a?multi?divisional?organization?model,?and?Herrera?et?al.?(forthcoming)?
study?turf?wars.?
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Besides?our? interest? in? the?democracy?effect?on? leader?effectiveness,?we?are?curious?whether? the?
selection?process? affects? volunteering? for? the? leader?position.?Moreover,?we? test?which? channels?
mediate? the? democracy? effect? on? leader? effectiveness:? a? difference? in? leader? behavior? or? a?
difference? in? follower?behavior.?We?predict?that?elected? leaders?are?more?effective? than?randomly?
selected? leaders,?which? is?driven?by?elected? leaders?being?more?active?and? requesting? the?highest?
effort?more? often,? and? being? followed? to? a? greater? extent,? holding? constant? what? leaders? say.?
Further,?we?predict? that? the?overall? volunteering? frequency? is?higher?when? leaders? are? randomly?
selected.?
The?fourth?study? in?Chapter?5?uses?the?same?data?as?the?third?study.?Besides?the?between?subjects?
treatment?variation?of?the?leader?selection?process,?we?extend?our?analysis?by?including?data?about?
gender.? Our? observations? related? to? the? gender? of? the? leader? are? within?subjects? descriptive?
statistics,?because?the? leader?assignment? is?endogenous?and? is?collected?as?repeated?measurement?
in? the? same? group.?Our?main? interest? in? the? fourth? study? is? to? reveal? gender? differences? in? the?
effectiveness? of? leaders,? in? the? chance? to? get? elected,? and? in? the? volunteering? frequency,? by?
treatment?conditions.?We?predict?that?elected?men?are?more?effective?leaders?than?elected?women.?
Conditional?on?the?gender?rate? in?the?candidate?pool,?we?predict?that?men?are?elected?more?often?
than?women.?We?expect?that?men?volunteer?for?the?leader?position?more?often?than?women,?under?
both?treatment?conditions.?
Table?1.2?summarizes?the?predictions?and?objectives?of?the?four?studies?in?this?thesis,?previewing?our?
results,?whether?we?find?or?do?not?find?support?for?the?prediction.?We?also?indicate?related?studies.?
Table?1.2? Objectives?of?the?four?studies?
Prediction? Result? Study? Related?studies?
Men?are?more?effective?leaders?than?women.? No?support? 1,?2,?4? Eagly?et?al.?(2003)?
Elected?men?are?more?effective?leaders?than?elected?
women.?
Confirm? 4? ?
Men?request?higher?effort?than?women.? No?support? 1,?2,?4? Reuben?et?al.?(2012)?
Men?are?followed?to?a?greater?extent?than?women.? No?support? 1,?2,?4? Grossman?et?al.?
(2016)?
Leaders?with?an?“open?door”?are?more?effective?than?
leaders?who?do?not?receive?follower?input.?
No?support? 2? Kriss?and?Eil?(2012)?
Men?communicate?more?assertively,?while?women?
emphasize?more?often?teamwork.?
Confirm? 2? Merchant?(2012)?
Elected?leaders?are?more?effective?than?randomly?
selected?leaders.?
Confirm? 3? Brandts?et?al.?(2015)
Dal?Bó?et?al.?(2010)?
Volunteering?is?higher?in?case?of?elections,?compared?
to?random?selection.?
Confirm? 3? Andreoni?(1988)?
Men?volunteer?more?often?than?women?under?
random?selection.?
Confirm? 4? Kocher?et?al.?(2013)?
Men?volunteer?more?often?than?women?under?
election.?
No?support? 4? Kanthak?and?Woon?
(2014)?
Men?are?elected?more?often?than?women.? No?support? 4? Darcy?et?al.?(1994);?
Lau?and?Redlawsk?
(1997)?
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1.3?Summary?of?Results?
Our?general?finding? is?that?men?and?women?are?equally?effective? leaders.?However,?there? is?mixed?
evidence?about? leader?effectiveness? in? literature.?Eagly?et?al.? (2003)?find?that?women?have?a?small?
advantage? in? leadership? compared? to?men,?because?women?use?a?more?effective? leadership? style?
than?men.??In?contrast,?Grossman?et?al.?(2016)?find?that?men?are?more?effective?leaders?than?women,?
because?followers?find?men?to?be?more?credible.?We?find?that?followers?follow?their? leaders?to?the?
same? extent,? irrespective? of? gender.? Moreover,? men? and? women? send? equally? often? relevant?
messages.? It? seems? that?a?gender?difference? in?overconfidence,?as? found?by?Reuben?et?al.? (2012),?
does? not? affect? leader? behavior.? Even? endogenously? selected?men? and?women? become? equally?
effective?leaders?over?time,?so?that?our?general?result?is?valid?in?all?of?our?studies,?in?which?we?had?a?
total?of?430?participants.?
If?leaders?are?assigned?exogenously,?we?find?that?men?volunteer?for?the?leader?position?more?often?
than?women.?We?calculate?pecuniary?benefits?benchmarks? for?each?treatment?condition?given?the?
incentives?for?the?volunteering?decision?and?the?observed?pecuniary?benefits?of?leadership.?We?find?
that?men? volunteer?more? often? than? the? pecuniary? benefits? benchmark? as? they?might? be?more?
willing? to? contribute? to? the? public? good? of? having? a? beneficial? leader,? compared? to?women?who?
contribute?less?over?time.?Our?findings?are?most?related?to?Kocher?et?al.?(2013),?who?find?that?male?
leaders?are?more?likely?than?female?leaders?to?accommodate?other?regarding?preferences?even?if?the?
preferences?of?others?are?at?odds?with?the?preferences?of?the?leader.?If?leaders?get?elected,?we?find?
that?men?and?women?volunteer?equally?often.?The?higher? leader?effectiveness?under? the?election?
condition? is? likely? to? drive? the? volunteering? frequency? close? to? and? even? below? the? pecuniary?
benefits?benchmark.?Decreasing?willingness?to?contribute?to?the?public?good?over?time?is?in?line?with?
Andreoni? (1988).? Since? elections? in? our? design? are? transparent? and? costless,?we? do? not? find? the?
female?election?aversion,?for?which?Kanthak?and?Woon?(2014)?find?evidence.?
After?candidacy,?men?and?women?have?equal?chances?to?get?elected,?which?is?in?line?with?findings?in?
Darcy?et?al.?(1994)?and?Lau?and?Redlawsk?(1997).?Elected?leaders?are?more?effective?than?randomly?
selected? leaders,? and? this? finding? is? in? accordance? with? Brandts? et? al.? (2015),? who? show? the?
democracy?effect?using?the?turnaround?game,?a?variation?of?the?weak?link?game.?Moreover,?Dal?Bó?
et?al.?(2010)?show?the?democracy?effect?using?a?variation?of?the?prisoner’s?dilemma?game.?
In?contrast?to?Kriss?and?Eil?(2012),?we?do?not?find?that?leaders?with?an?“open?door”?would?be?more?
effective?than? leaders?who?do?not?receive?follower? input.? In?accordance?with?Merchant?(2012),?we?
find? that? men? communicate? more? assertively,? whereas? women? send? more? often? messages?
emphasizing? that? the? leader? is? an? equal? member? of? the? group.? Despite? the? different? paths? in?
communication?styles,?men?and?women?do?not?differ?in?leader?effectiveness.?
To?our?knowledge,?our?studies?are?among? the? first? to?use?a?weak?link?coordination?game? to?study?
gender? differences? in? leadership? in? economic? experimental? laboratories,? which? is? our? main?
contribution? to? literature.?Using? a?weak?link? game,?Dufwenberg? and?Gneezy? (2005)? study? gender?
differences?in?coordination?due?to?differences?in?the?fraction?of?men?and?women?in?a?team.?They?find?
some?small?differences?in?coordination?in?the?initial?periods?but?not?in?the?final?periods.?The?authors?
point?out? that? there?might?be? a? “bias? in? the? research? community? against? reporting?or?publishing?
results?that?document?the?absence?of?a?gender?effect”,?which?implies?that?there?is?a?“risk?of?bias?in?
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perceptions?regarding?the?magnitude?and? limits?of?gender?differences”.? In? light?of?their?statement,?
we?feel?encouraged?that?our?“no?effect”?findings?are?an?important?contribution?to?the?literature.?
Using? a? turnaround? game,? Grossman? et? al.? (2016)? study? gender? differences? in? leadership? and?
attribution? of? coordination? failure.? They? find? that?men? have? a? stronger? impact? on? followers? and?
receive? better? evaluations? than?women.?However,? there? are? some? aspects?which?differ? from?our?
work.?Leaders? in?Grossman?et?al.?(2016)?are?session? leaders?and?not?group? leaders.?Group? leaders?
are? actively? bound? to? the? organization,? rowing? in? the? same? boat? like? their? followers,?which?
increases? their? credibility? naturally.? In? contrast,? session? leaders? are? not? playing? the? game?
together?with?their?followers,?which?means?that,?although?the?earnings?of?the?leader?depend?on?
the?choices?of?followers,?the?earnings?of?followers?are?not?affected?by?the?actions?of?the?leader.?
The?session?leader?provides?only?“scripted?guidance”?on?how?to?play?the?game?best.?In?this?sense,?
the?messages?of?session? leaders?might?be?perceived?more? like?exogenous?“expert?advice”,?and?
Brandts? et? al.? (2014)? showed? earlier? that?messages? of? the? endogenous? group? leader? are?more?
people?oriented? and? effective? than? the? expert? advice.? The? expert? advice? in? Brandts? et? al.? (2014)?
contains?a?detailed?explanation?of?the?causes?of?the?coordination?failure,?similar?to?Fischbacher?and?
Gächter? (2010),? combined?with? an? advice? on? how? to? prevent? coordination? failure.? Brandts? et? al.?
(2014)? find? that? the?expert?advice?has?a? similar?effect? like? simply? starting?over? in? the? turnaround?
game,?whereas?group?leaders?have?the?greatest?impact.?
Although?session?leaders? in?Grossman?et?al.?(2016)?are?referred?to?as? leaders,?they?could?not?freely?
decide?about?the?content?of?the?messages.?They?were?provided?with?“talking?points”?which?they?had?
to?present?in?their?own?words.?The?talking?points?contained?the?personal?pronoun?“we”,?even?though?
that?the?leader?was?not?actively?part?of?the?group.?The?talking?points?specifically?appeal?to?the?self?
interest?of?the?players,?which?can?be?seen?as?a?feature?of?the?so?called?transactional?leadership?style,?
which?has?more?often?been? found? to?be?a?masculine? style? (Eagly?et?al.?2003).? Finally,?one?of? the?
talking?points?was?formulated?in?an?assertive?way,?even?reminding?of?the?negative?consequences?for?
others?and?the?self?if?somebody?behaves?as?a?weak?link.?Since?men?tend?to?be?more?assertive,?they?
might?present?the?talking?points?more?credible,?whereas?less?assertive?women?who?do?not?alter?the?
prescribed? style? of? the? talking? points?might? be? perceived? as? less? credible.? The? authors? find? that?
initially? there? are? no? gender? differences? in? performance,?which?means? that? almost? all? followers?
follow?their?leaders?to?the?same?extent,?irrespective?of?gender.?But?later,?the?performance?of?groups?
with?female?session?leaders?declines?stronger?than?that?of?male?session?leaders,?which?might?be?due?
to?a?less?credible?voice?with?less?echoes?in?later?periods.?
Session? leaders?had?to?talk? in? front?of?their?audience,?which?might?bias?the?results.? In?the?real?
world,?leaders?self?select?at?least?into?candidacy?for?a?leadership?position,?which?means?that?we?
can?assume?that?real?world? leaders?embrace?presenting? in?front?of?an?audience.?Speeches?and?
gestures? in?front?of?an?audience?can?contain?more?or? less?charismatic? leadership?style?features?
(Eagly?et?al.?2003;?Conger?and?Kanungo?1998).?Using?a?field?experiment?with?“temporary?workers?
who? have? to? prepare? envelopes? for? a? fundraising? campaign”? and? “are? exposed? to? speeches? that?
differ? in? the?number?of? charismatic? elements”,?Antonakis? et? al.? (2015)? show? that? charisma?has? a?
performance?effect.3?There?is?an?ongoing?debate,?how?to?define?charisma?in?a?gender?neutral?way,?or?
whether?charisma?has?different?features?for?men?and?women.?However,?if?we?assume?that?men?see?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
3?The?leader’s?speeches?were?delivered?by?the?same?trained?actor.?
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leadership? tasks?as?part?of? their?gender? identity,? they?might?act?more?naturally?and?charismatic? in?
front?of?an?audience,?besides?being?perceived?perhaps?as?more?charismatic?and?credible.?Therefore?
there?might?be?many?interacting?factors?that?could?drive?the?difference?in?follower?reactions,?group?
performance,?and?evaluations.?
In?order?to?distill?the?gender?effect?from?other?subject?specific?features,?participants?in?our?study?do?
not? interact?directly?with?each?other.?Instead,?they?choose?a?profile?picture.?We?created?12?generic?
profiles?for?each?gender,?using?the?profile?creator?website?pickaface.net?(see?Figure?B1? in?Appendix?
3B).?All?pictures?have?similar?features.?We?use?profile?pictures?to?preserve?anonymity?whilst?revealing?
gender.?We?opted?for?pictures?that?also?contain?other?cues?such?as?race?and?hairstyles?to?reduce?the?
chance?of?experimental?demand?effects?and?distract?participants?from?discerning?the?purpose?of?the?
study?Zizzo? (2010),?which? can?potentially? lead? to? intentional? changes? in?behavior?Camerer? (2011).?
Compared?to?Grossman?et?al.?(2016),?who?reveal?the?person?of?the?leader,?it?seems?that?a?decrease?
in? anonymity? increases? the? gender? effect? as,? even? if? followers? do? not? have? stereotype? beliefs?
themselves,?they?might?assume?that?others?have?such?beliefs.?
Our?studies?aim?at?using?a?basic?design?for?the?experiments,?which?makes?the?studies?consistent,?
enabling?comparison?of?the?results.?We?find?the?“no?effect”?result?repeatedly?in?all?our?studies,?
even?after?we?gradually?build?in?more?complex?elements,?like?the?message?content,?the?selection?
process,?and?volunteering.?In?sum,?we?find?no?economic?reason?why?women?should?not?participate?
with?equal?shares?in?leadership,?and?we?believe?there?is?even?more?potential?for?future?research?in?
using?the?weak?link?and?turnaround?games?to?study?leadership?and?gender.?Our?findings?also?call?
for?caution?as?gender?differences?in?leader?effectiveness?studied?and?existent?in?one?context?cannot?
be?generalized?to?other?contexts.?
1.4?Literature?Review?
In?the?following?three?subsections?we?review?earlier?research?studies?using?either?similar?methods,?or?
studying?similar?topics?than?we?do.?In?subsection?1.4.1?we?review?weak?link?coordination?games?used?
in?the?experimental?laboratory.?In?subsection?1.4.2?we?give?an?overview?about?gender?studies?using?
experimental? methods,? and? in? subsection? 1.4.3? we? provide? a? brief? review? about? literature?
investigating? the? democracy? effect? using? various?methods? in? the? laboratory? and? the? field.? In? all?
subsections,?we?briefly?relate?the?scientific?insights?to?relevant?up?to?date?problems.?
1.4.1?Review?of?Weak?Link?Games?in?Light?of?Their?Implications?
Game?theory?models?social? interaction,?conflict?or?cooperation,?by?games.?Games?can?be?classified?
into?symmetric?and?asymmetric?games.? In?case?of?symmetric?games?all?players?have?the?same?role?
and?face?the?same?payoff?structure,?so?that?payoffs?depend?only?on?the?own?choice?and?the?choice?of?
other?players,?but? is? independent?of?who? is?playing? the? game.? In? contrast,?players? in? asymmetric?
games?are?assigned?to?different?roles?with?different?strategies.?The?ultimatum?game?and?the?dictator?
game?are?commonly?studied?examples?of?asymmetric?games.?The?weak?link?coordination?game?that?
we? study? is? a? symmetric,? non?zero? sum? game,? alongside?with? other? coordination? games? and? the?
prisoner’s?dilemma?game.?The?prisoner’s?dilemma?game?models?a?social?dilemma,?when?cooperation?
is? Pareto? efficient? and? in? the? best? interest? of? all? players,? but? defecting? has? a? payoff?dominant?
9?
?
incentive?and?is?thus?the?only?pure?strategy?Nash?equilibrium.4?Similarly,?the?donation?game?and?the?
public?good?game?are?also?widely?used?experimental?tools?to?study?cooperation?and?free?riding.?
Coordination?games?model?situations?in?which?players?can?realize?higher?payoffs?by?making?mutually?
consistent?decisions.?The?classical?coordination?games?have? two?players?and? two?strategies,?which?
can?be?extended? to?more?players?and?more? strategies.?The? so?called?pure? coordination?game?has?
only?one?pure?strategy?Nash?equilibrium.?If?the?players?prefer?the?same?Nash?equilibrium?outcome,?
they?have?a?pure?or?common?interest,?which?Pareto?dominates?other?outcomes.?However,?if?players?
have?indifferent?preferences,?the?coordination?game?can?have?multiple?pure?strategy?Nash?equilibria,?
which?are?all?Pareto?efficient.?One?could?think?of?two?alternative?standards,?or?social?norms,?when?it?
does? not?matter?which? standard? is? chosen,? as? long? as? the? players? choose? the? same? standard.? A?
common? example? is? to? choose? the? side? of? the? road? upon?which? to? drive.? A? pure? strategy? Nash?
equilibrium? that? is? adopted? by? all? players? is? an? evolutionarily? stable? strategy.? In? contrast,?mixed?
strategy? Nash? equilibria? are? not? evolutionary? stable,? since? they? are? Pareto? dominated? by? pure?
strategy? Nash? equilibria.5?As? a? third? type? of? coordination? situations? players? can? have? conflicting?
interests.?The?battle?of?sexes?models?such?situations.?The?players?prefer? the?common?activity?over?
the? individual? activity,? but? they? differ? in? their? preferences? of?which? common? activity? to? choose.?
Finally,?the?fourth?type?of?coordination?situations? is?modeled?by?the?stag?hunt?game,?when?players?
can?benefit? if?they?coordinate?their?actions?and?cooperate.?Even?though?all?players?prefer?the?same?
payoff?dominant?outcome,?coordination?might?fail,?because?each?player?can?choose?a? less?efficient,?
but?also? less? risky?alternative?outcome? that? is? independent? from? the? choice?of?other?players.?The?
riskiness? of? the? efficient? outcome? roots? in? strategic? uncertainty? about? the? choice? of? others.? The?
extension?of?the?stag?hunt?game?to?a?multiplayer?situation?is?the?minimum?effort?or?weak?link?game?
that?we?study.6?
The?game? is?played?by? N ?players?organized? into?groups.?The?players?engage? in?a? joint?production?
activity? where? inputs? are? highly? complementary.? Each? player? chooses? independently? and?
simultaneously?an?effort?level,? ieffort .?The?group?outcome?is?determined?by?the?effort?of?the?lowest?
performing?player,? ? ?min 1 2min , ,..., Neffort effort effort effort? .?The?payoff?of?player? i ?in?the?group?
is?given?by?the?equation?(Kriss,?Blume?and?Weber?(forthcoming?b)):?
?? ? ? ? ? ? ????????? ? ? ? ??????? ?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
4?A? pure? strategy?Nash? equilibrium?means? that? players? choose? the? same? strategies,? and? the? strategies? are?
Pareto?efficient?for?each?of?the?players?in?any?case.?
5?If?a?player?plays?a?pure?strategy,?his?choice? is?deterministic?for?any?situation.?He?plays?the?pure?strategy?for?
sure.?The?set?of?pure?strategies?available?to?the?player?is?the?strategy?set?of?that?player.?If?the?player?assigns?a?
probability? to? each? pure? strategy,? so? that? he? chooses? among? pure? strategies? at? random,?he?plays? a?mixed?
strategy.?Basically,?the?player?chooses?randomly?a?deterministic?path?through?the?game?tree.?In?contrast,?if?the?
player?assigns?a?new?probability? to?each?pure?strategy?at?each? information?set,?he?plays?a?behavior?strategy?
with?a?stochastic?path.?
6?In?contrast,?game?theory?also?models?situations?when?coordination?has?negative?externalities.?The?hawk?dove?
game?is?a?popular?example?for?a?two?player?anti?coordination?game,?and?its?extension?for?more?players?is?the?
crowding?game.?Game?theory?also?uses?discoordination?games,?when?one?of?the?players?aims?for?coordination,?
while?the?other?one?has?an? incentive?to?avoid?coordination.?Examples?are?matching?pennies?and?rock?paper?
scissors.?
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where?w ?is?the?fixed?payoff?component,?b ?is?the?player’s?share?of?the?group?outcome,?and?c ?is?the?
player’s?cost?of?effort.?Since?effort?is?costly,?players?prefer?not?to?waste?effort?and?to?choose?exactly?
the?minimum?of?others’?efforts.?On?the?other?hand,?as?long?as?b c? ,?all?players?benefit?from?higher?
output,? thus? from?coordination?on?a?higher?effort? level.?Table?1.3?presents? the?payoff?structure?of?
the?weak?link?game?as?it?was?originally?studied?by?Van?Huyck?et?al.?(1990).?The?game?has?seven?effort?
levels,?and?the?payoff?parameters?are? 60w ? ,? 20b ? ,?and? 10c ? .?
Table?1.3? Payoff?structure?of?the?weak?link?game?
? Minimum?effort?chosen?in?the?group?
Effort?
choice?
of?the?
player?
? 7? 6? 5? 4? 3? 2? 1?
7? 130? 110? 90? 70? 50? 30? 10?
6? ? 120? 100? 80? 60? 40? 20?
5? ? ? 110? 90? 70? 50? 30?
4? ? ? ? 100? 80? 60? 40?
3? ? ? ? ? 90? 70? 50?
2? ? ? ? ? ? 80? 60?
1? ? ? ? ? ? ? 70?
?
Given? the?other?players’?minimum?effort? contribution,? the?equilibrium? solution?of? the? game? is? to?
choose?exactly?the?same?effort?level.?No?player?has?an?incentive?to?deviate?from?choosing?the?group?
minimum? effort? level.? If? a? player?would? choose? a? higher? or? a? lower? effort? level? than? the? others’?
minimum?effort?level,?he?would?make?a?loss?relative?to?others.?Thus?the?diagonal?in?the?payoff?matrix?
represents? the? equilibrium? solutions,?which? are? all?pure?strategy?Nash? equilibria.? The? equilibrium?
points?can?be?Pareto?ranked.?All?players?agree?that?simultaneously?choosing?the?highest?effort?level?is?
the?most?efficient,?payoff?dominant?outcome,?which?yields?130?for?each?player.?However,?there?is?no?
guarantee? that?all?players?will?make? the?same?choice,?and?players?cannot?predict? the?outcome? for?
sure.?Players? face?a?problem?of?beliefs?concerning? the?choice?of?others.7?Moreover,? the?higher? the?
individual? effort? level? choice? is,? the? riskier? it? becomes,? since? the? possibility? increases? that? other?
players?might?choose?a?lower?effort?level.?Van?Huyck?et?al.?(1990)?called?this?phenomenon?strategic?
uncertainty,?which?can?undermine?efficiency?in?favor?of?safety.?A?very?risk?averse?player?could?secure?
a?low?payoff,?70,?from?choosing?the?lowest?effort?level,?and?avoiding?losses?from?coordination?failure.?
The? rational?decision?maker?has? to? choose? among? conflicting?equilibrium? solution?points?pending?
between?safety?and?social?cooperation.?As?noted?in?Van?Huyck?et?al.?(1990),?since?each?player?has?a?
unique?best?response,?standard?equilibrium?refinements,?such?as?trembling?hand?perfect?equilibrium,?
do?not?reduce?the?set?of?equilibria.?Therefore?the?authors?proposed?an?equilibrium?selection?theory?
complementing?the?theory?of?equilibrium?points.?The?rational?decision?maker?might?choose?among?
the? equilibrium? points? due? to? various? equilibrium? selection? principles? related? to? their? own?
preferences?and?affected?by?expectations?about?others’?actions?(Heinemann?et?al.?2009;?Van?Huyck?
et?al.?1990).?Deductive?selection?principles?“select?equilibrium?points?based?on?the?description?of?the?
game”?(Van?Huyck?et?al.?1990),?therefore?these?principles?arguably?apply?in?the?early?periods?of?the?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
7?Yoshida?et?al.?(2010)?show?in?a?neuroscience?study?using?the?stag?hunt?game,?that?humans?use?brain?regions?
identified?for?mentalizing?to?encode?the?uncertainty?of?inference?about?other?players’?strategies.?Besides?trying?
to? understand? the? mental? representation? of? others,? humans? also? calculate? the? degree? of? executive?
sophistication.?Executive?sophistication?means?recursive?inferences:?“the?representation?of?others’?belief?about?
our?intentions,?their?model?about?our?belief?about?their?intentions,?and?so?on”.?
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repeated?game,?before?a? long?history?of?play? is?established.?The?efficiency?principle,?or?concept?of?
payoff?dominance,? is?one?deductive? selection?principle,?based?on? the?efficiency?of? an?equilibrium?
point.? Another? related? deductive? selection? principle? is? the? security? principle,? or?maximin? action,?
based?on?the?risk?dominance?of?an?equilibrium?point.?An?action?is?secure?when?it?delivers?the?largest?
payoff?given? that? the?worst?possible?outcome? is? selected? (Von?Neumann?and?Morgenstern?1972).?
Risk?dominance?and?payoff?dominance?are?equilibrium?refinements?defined?by?Harsanyi?and?Selten?
(1988).?Inductive?selection?principles?can?be?applied?if?information?from?previous?periods?is?available,?
and?earlier?experiments?using?the?weak?link?game?already?showed?strong?history?dependence?in?case?
of?repeated?interactions?(Brandts?and?Cooper?2006a,?2006b).?
Using? experimental? methods,? Van? Huyck? et? al.? (1990)? provided? evidence? for? a? pattern? in? the?
behavior? under? strategic? uncertainty.? The? authors? showed? that? the? secure,? but?most? inefficient,?
equilibrium?gets?realized?in?the?laboratory?without?pre?play?communication,?suggesting?that?decision?
makers?are?more?likely?to?play?according?to?the?security?principle,?rather?than?the?efficiency?principle.?
Cooper?et?al.?(1992)?found?similar?experimental?evidence?using?the?two?player,?two?action?stag?hunt?
game.?Extending?insights?based?on?the?stag?hunt?game,?Kriss?et?al.?(forthcoming?a)?showed?that?the?
mere?option?of?costly?communication?instantly?improves?coordination?among?two?players.?Moreover,?
for?the?seven?action?weak?link?game,?the?number?of?players?is?an?important?moderating?factor.?Van?
Huyck?et?al.? (1990),?and?Weber?et?al.? (2001)? found? that?pairs?of?players?have?a?higher? chance? to?
coordinate?on?the?efficient?equilibrium,?whereas?large?groups?almost?surely?fail?to?coordinate.?Thus,?
the?higher? the?number?of?players,? the? less? intimate? the?game?becomes,?and? the?more? severe? the?
trust?dilemma?grows.?
The?stag?hunt?game?and?the?weak?link?game?model?a?very?basic?dilemma?between?self?reliance?and?
trust? into? others.? This? conflict? might? be? even? more? fundamental? to? living? organisms? than? the?
prisoner’s?dilemma,?modeling?the?conflict?between?self? interest?and?trust.?Players?of?the?prisoner’s?
dilemma? clearly? cannot? expect?others? to?be? friendly? and? give?up? their? selfish?business.? Since? the?
prisoner’s?dilemma? is?based?on?betrayal,?gathering?and?hiding? information?might?be?crucial? to?win?
the?game.?However,?the?stag?hunt?game?is?about?development?that?is?only?possible?if?players?learn?to?
rely? on? each? other? in? situations? when? all? players? can? win.? In? terms? of? intelligence,? increase? of?
transparency,? feedback? and? communication? only? improve? the? outcome.8?Nature? provides? many?
examples?of?stag?hunt?games.?In?the?animal?world,?the?coordination?of?bees,?ants,?or?slime?molds,?or?
the?carousel?feeding?of?orcas?can?be?observed.?The?stag?hunt?situation? itself?was?first?described?by?
Jean?Jacques?Rousseau.?David?Hume?brought?up?the?examples?of?two?individuals?rowing?a?boat?and?
two?neighbors?draining?a?meadow? (Skyrms?2004).?These?metaphors?might?as?well?describe?equally?
shared?joint?ventures?or?free?trade?agreements.?
From? an? evolutionary? perspective,? the? stag? hunt? game? could? be? seen? as? the? conflict? between?
independent?decision?making?and?adaptation.?A?newborn,?self?reliant,? independent?decision?maker?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
8?Several?studies?support?this?view:?In?general,?Alonso?et?al.?(2008)?show?that?information?sharing?can?decrease?
uncertainty?and?improve?outcomes?under?decentralization.?Using?a?weak?link?game,?Blume?and?Ortmann?(2007)?
show?that?communication?between?players?improves?coordination?and?efficiency.?Extending?the?insights?using?
a? weak?link? game,? Kriss? and? Eil? (2012)? show? that? too? much? information? sharing? might? in? fact? increase?
uncertainty?in?the?weak?link?game?where?strategic?uncertainty?is?a?key?problem.?The?authors?find?that?limiting?
the? visibility? of? follower? communication,? being? visible? to? the? leader? only,? actually? improves? coordination.?
However,?the?interests?of?players?are?aligned?and?common?transparent?knowledge.?
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either?adapts? to? the?prevailing?evolutionarily? stable? strategy,?or?he? loses?by?exerting?more?or? less?
effort?than?others.9?An?example? for?the? former? is?Galileo?Galilei,?or?any? inventor?who?precedes?his?
time?and?is?misunderstood.?An?example?for?the?latter?is?individuals?who?do?not?believe?that?putting?
effort? into? personal? development? can? integrate? them? to? the? societal? average? during? the? given?
lifetime.10?The? example?of? the? inventor? and? visionary? illustrates?how? effort?put? into?development?
opens? up? new? and? higher? coordination? equilibria.11 ?Schumpeterian? inventors? are? not? simply?
destructive,? rather? demanding? of? others? to? put?more? effort? into? learning.? As? soon? as? the? new?
equilibrium?becomes?common?knowledge?and?enough?followers?believe?that?this?higher?equilibrium?
can? be? achieved,? leadership? can? bring? change,? or? “turnaround”.? However,? to? manage? the?
“turnaround”?is?a?challenging?task?in?spite?of?the?strong?history?dependence?in?the?game.?The?term?
“corporate? turnaround? game”? was? first? coined? in? Brandts? and? Cooper? (2006a),? who? studied?
managerial?interventions?that?can?induce?a?turnaround?after?a?history?of?failure?to?coordinate?on?the?
efficient?equilibrium.?Commonly?used?intervention?tools?are?incentive?changes?and?communication.?
Brandts? and? Cooper? (2007)? showed? that? communication? is?more? effective? than? leaders? varying?
financial?incentives?endogenously.?Later,?Brandts?et?al.?(2015)?showed?that?communication?remains?
more?effective?than?incentives,?even?if?interventions?are?varied?exogenously?in?a?controlled?setting.?
Precondition? for? leader? effectiveness? is? credibility?of? the? leader:?players?have? to?believe? that? the?
other?players?will?follow?the?leader.12?The?chances?that?a?leader?will?be?followed?by?others?is?higher?if?
the?player?believes?that?the? leadership? is?“appropriate,?proper?and? just”,?which? is?the?definition?of?
legitimate? authority? (Tyler? 2006).? A? leader? can? prove? legitimacy? by? competence,? for? instance? by?
sending? relevant? communication? content,? and? through? a? successful? group? history.? Besides?
competence,? the? selection? process? of? the? leader? can? be? important,? as? Brandts? et? al.? (2015)?
demonstrated?with? the? democracy? effect? on? leader? effectiveness.? The? power? of? the? democracy?
effect?roots?in?the?direction?of?the?selection?process.?Instead?of?an?exogenous?top?down?assignment,?
elected? leaders? rise?bottom?up? and? remain?more? connected? to? the? group? and? the? followers?who?
voted?for?them.?The?majority?of?the?group?members?acknowledged?the? leader?and?expressed?their?
support?in?the?elections,?and?this?makes?elected?leaders?more?legitimate.?In?a?similar?setting,?Brandts?
et?al.?(2014)?compared?exogenous?expert?advice?to?communication?by?the?leader,?and?found?that?the?
latter?is?more?effective,?even?though?the?expert?advice?included?an?explanation?of?the?coordination?
failure? and? an? advice? how? to? prevent? it.? The? group? has?more? skepticism? towards? advisers? than?
leaders.? It?would?be?an? interesting? future?study,? to? find?out?whether?preference? for?authority,? like?
studied? in?Bartling? et? al.? (2014),? is? connected? to? such? aversion? towards? external? information? and?
external,?top?down?decision?making.?Leaders,?who?get?assigned?from?above,?might?be?perceived?and?
might?act?as?rulers,?trying?to?influence?others’?decision?making,?instead?of?being?perceived?and?acting?
as?credible?coordination?devices,?being?part?of?the?common?developmental?process.?
The?credible?leader?unites?the?followers?by?uniting?their?beliefs?into?a?common?goal.?As?the?example?
of? the? inventor? illustrates,? striving? for? a? commonly? known? goal? might? awake? goal?oriented?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
9?The?concept?of? the?evolutionarily?stable?strategy? is?an? inductive?equilibrium?refinement,? first? introduced? in?
Maynard?Smith?(1972).?
10?Patience?and?self?control?become?relevant?in?this?context.?On?the?macroeconomic?level,?Dohmen?et?al.?(2015)?
show,?that?patience?is?related?to?country?level?development.?
11?Another?example?of?upwards?shifting?standards?is?Olympic?Games.?
12?Leader?effectiveness?roots?in?both?the?communication?content?sent?by?the?leader?and?the?credibility?of?the?
leader?as?a?source?of?the?content.?
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competition.13?The?dynamics?of? such? competition? is?well?known? in?economics:? it? is? rewarded?with?
monopoly? positions,? and? eventually? transformed? into? a? new? standard,? higher? level? coordination?
equilibrium?with? zero? extra? profits.? Thus,? from? an? evolutionary? perspective,?market? forces?might?
invisibly? guide? economies,? as? well? as?micro?level? groups,? towards? higher? coordination? levels.? If?
adaptation? already?drives?outcomes,?why? is? the? coordination?of? action? important?? Srikanth? et? al.?
(2014)? define? “coordination? as? an? outcome? in? which? interacting? individuals? achieve? reciprocal?
predictability?of?action”.?Without?coordinated?action,?adaptation?processes?drive?outcomes?towards?
the? lowest? level? equilibrium,? and? uncertainty? remains? high.? Blume? and?Ortmann? (2007)? showed?
experimentally? that? if? communication? is?mandatory? in? the? weak?link? game,? players? achieve? the?
highest? level?of? coordination,?whereas? if?players?have?no?possibility? to? communicate,? they? fail? to?
achieve?the?Pareto?efficient?outcome.?Kriss?et?al.?(forthcoming?b)?ran?a?similar?experiment?using?the?
weak?link? game,? but? their? treatment? introduced? costly? and? voluntary? communication,? which? is?
unsubsidized,?partially? subsidized,?or? fully? subsidized?by? the?organization.?Although? it?would?have?
been?efficient? for? the?players? to?use?communication?under?each? treatment?condition,? the?authors?
found?that?only?fully?subsidized?communication?is?used?94?percent?of?all?observations,?yielding?high?
minimum? effort? levels,? whereas? small? costs? of? communication? already? decrease? the? use? of?
communication?to?20?25?percent?of?all?observations.?Accordingly,?the?average?minimum?effort?levels?
remain? low.? The? authors? point? out? that? their? results? are? consistent? with? earlier? evidence? of?
“coordination? neglect”,? which? is,? due? to? Heath? and? Staudenmayer? (2000),? “the? tendency? to?
underestimate?the?difficulty?of?coordination?and?assume?that?mechanisms?to?help?facilitate?efficient?
coordination? are? unnecessary”.? Heath? and? Staudenmayer? describe? organizational? coordination?
problems? as? task? division? and? reintegration? of? the? components,? and? they? claim? that? lay? theories?
focus?more?on? labor?division? than?on? integration,?and?often? fail? to?use?ongoing?communication? to?
achieve?efficient?integration.?The?authors?reason?that?“the?‘curse?of?knowledge’?makes?it?difficult?to?
take?the?perspective?of?another?and?communicate?effectively”,?especially?the?more?specialists?with?
diverse?backgrounds?are?expected?to?work?together.?
When?is?“coordination?neglect”?more?severe??Srikanth?et?al.?(2014)?propose?that?diverse?groups?lack?
a?“common?ground”,?and?this?is?the?reason?that?diverse?groups?experience?more?often?coordination?
failure,? in? terms?of? poor? performance,? low? trust,? and? interpersonal?problems.?A? common?history?
clearly?creates?a?common?culture,?common?language,?and?most?probably?also?creates?common?goals?
and? similar?expectations.?The?homogeneity? in?backgrounds,?beliefs,?and?developmental?processes?
eases?coordination,?and?therefore?it?gets?more?likely?that?homogenous?groups?succeed?in?hunting?a?
stag.?Turning?back?to?the?evolutionary?perspective,?it?is?obvious?that?more?successful?groups?develop?
faster,?and?open?up?new?higher?level?equilibria.?One?prominent?example,?also?often?used?by?Joseph?E.?
Stiglitz,? for? the? transition? from? a? low? effort? culture? to? a?high? effort? culture? is? the?developmental?
history?of?South?Korea.14?South?Korea?escaped?poverty,?and?transformed?from?a?rice?grower?to?a?high?
tech? country.?One? reason? for? its? success?was? its?homogenous? society,?which?obviously? facilitated?
coordination.?Another?reason?was?the?“miracle?of?hard?work”.?The?miracle? in? it?was?the?commonly?
shared?belief?in?the?envisioned?goal.?A?common?belief?is?more?than?a?motivating?force:?it?facilitates?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
13?In?a?goal?oriented?competition,?individuals?compete?with?their?achievements?of?a?certain?goal,?like?who?was?
faster?in?absolute?terms,?whereas?in?interpersonal?competition,?individuals?compete?to?beat?others,?like?being?
faster?relative?to?the?neighbor.?
14?Transformation?countries?in?Eastern?Europe?and?developing?countries?are?other?examples?for?successes?and?
failures?during?transition.?
14?
?
integration?of?previously?divided?tasks.?It?facilitates?simultaneous?collective?action?that?is?required?to?
hunt?the?stag.?
Players?of?the?game?can? inherit?culture,? language,?values,?and?beliefs?to?next?generations,?keeping?
the? group? on? the? successful? developmental? path.15?But?what? happens? if? the? group? grows,? and? if?
outsiders? wish? to? join? to? a? successful? group?? The? review? paper? by? Kriss? and? Weber? (2013)?
summarizes? research? evidence? concerning? organizational? change.? The? authors? outline? the?
importance?of?different?tools?to?manage?growth.?Weber?(2006)?suggested?to?implement?slow?growth?
and? to? provide? new? entrants? with? information? on? group? history.? The? author? found? that? such?
managed?growth?ensures? that?small?groups,?which?coordinated?on?high?effort? levels,?can?maintain?
efficient? coordination? even? after? the? number? of? group?members? gradually? reached? 12,?whereas?
groups? that? start?up?with?12?members?are?predestined? to? fail.?Salmon?and?Weber? (2011)?expand?
these? insights,? and? experiment?with? integrating? entrants? into? high?performing? groups,?while? the?
entrants?come?from?groups?with?a?failure?history,?having?played?the?game?on?a?low?equilibrium.?The?
authors?found?that?slow?growth,?an?entry?quiz,?and?the?combination?of?these?two?tools?work?equally?
well.? For? the? entry? quiz,? entrants? get? trained,? and? during? the? quiz? they? demonstrate? their?
understanding?of?the?production?game?and?the?group?history.?Similarly?to?the?“coordination?neglect”,?
Weber? (2006)? showed? that?many? leaders? are? not? aware? of? the? need? for? slow,?managed? growth.?
Leaders?often?engage?in?a?“too?fast”?growth?process,?which?leads?to?coordination?failure.?
Besides?slow?growth,?organizations?might?grow?by?merger.?Since?mergers?are?rather?a?rapid?kind?of?
growth,?research?has?put?emphasis?on?studying?the?process?of?integration.?Knez?and?Camerer?(1994)?
showed? in? the? laboratory? that? the?minimum? effort? level? in? the?merged? group? converges? to? the?
minimum? effort? level? in? the? lower? performing? group.? Thus,? instead? of? increasing? the? overall?
minimum?effort? level?of?the?two?groups,?merger?decreases? it.?The?high?performing?group?does?not?
push?the? low?performing?group?upwards,?rather?the? low?performing?one?pulls?the?high?performing?
one?downwards.?Extending? these? insights?using?a?novel?experimental?design,?Weber?and?Camerer?
(2003)?study?cultural?conflict?in?merging?organizations.?Group?members?have?to?develop?a?common?
language? in?order?to?coordinate?their?actions?and?fulfill?the?experimental?production?task.?Through?
repeated? experience? and?development?of? the? common? code,? the? group?becomes? gradually?more?
efficient.?After?several?periods,?groups?with?independently?and?differently?evolved?languages?merge.?
The?merged?organization? loses?efficiency,?since?group?members?have?to?spend?time?on? integration,?
for?instance,?on?learning?each?others’?codes.?The?authors?also?asked?participants?about?their?beliefs,?
and? they? reveal? that? group?members? underestimate? the? challenge? of? integration? and? are? overly?
optimistic? concerning? the? after?merger? efficiency.? Such? underestimation? is? in? line? with? the?
phenomenon?of?“coordination?neglect”.?On?top?of?that,?group?members?of?the?two?merging?groups?
blamed? each? other? for? the? decrease? in? efficiency? and? earnings,? instead? of? realizing? the? energy?
consuming?challenge?of?integration.?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
15?In?this?context,?inheritance?is?continuous?and?means?adaptive?learning?of?public?knowledge,?rather?than?goal?
oriented,?private? training?of? successors.? ?As?Chaudhuri? et? al.? (2009)? show?using? a?weak?link? game,?publicly?
available? advice? facilitates? intergenerational? coordination? more? than? private? advice.? Public? advice?
communicates? the? knowledge?of? the? group,?whereas?private? advice?might?be? the? source?of?mistrust,?or?of?
disturbance?of?self?reliance?during?the?personal?developmental?process.?These? insights?also?support?the?view?
that?more?transparency?leads?to?higher?coordination?levels.?
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In?a?recent?paper,?Riedl?et?al.?(2015)?explore?new?cures?for?integration?problems.?The?authors?show?
that?freedom?of?neighborhood?choice?overcomes?coordination?problems?in?the?weak?link?game,?and?
the? results? are? robust? even? to? a? substantial? increase? in? group? size.? Exclusion? of? neighbors?who?
provide?low?effort?is?an?effective?mechanism?to?enforce?efficient?coordination.?
Coordination? failure?might?not?only?cause?group?members?to?blame?each?other,?but?also?to?blame?
their? leader.?Weber?et?al.? (2001)? study? the?misattribution?of?cause? in? the? turnaround?game.?They?
assign? leaders? to? large? groups? that? previously? failed? to? coordinate.? The? leaders? can? use?
communication? to? encourage? players? and? to? induce? a? turnaround.? The? situation? created? in? the?
laboratory? is?unmanageable,?no?matter?what?messages? leaders?send.?The? leaders?naturally?fail?due?
to?the?size?of?the?group,?but?players?blame?their? leader?for? inefficacy,?and?they?are?even?willing?to?
pay?to?replace?the?leader.?Nevertheless,?in?some?situations?leadership?and?unified?control?is?just?an?
illusion,?and?the?mass?of?followers?might?drift?along?biased?beliefs?and?misunderstandings.?
Misattribution?of?cause,?and?blaming?each?other? roots? in?biased?beliefs,?and?blame?might?develop?
into?anger?and?hatred.?Studies?of?integration?are?not?only?relevant?to?predict?outcomes?of?real?world?
company?mergers,?but?also?to?predict?macroeconomic?outcomes,?for?instance?outcomes?of?migration,?
globally?or?within?a?union,?like?the?European?Union.?In?light?of?the?insights?based?on?studies?using?the?
weak?link? game,? reestablishing? borders? and? policies? trying? to? protect? the? group?internal?
developmental?stage?make?sense.?On?the?one?hand,?game?theory?seems?to?predict?that?integration?is?
likely?to?fail,?but?on?the?other?hand,?economic?theory?predicts?that?free?trade?and?economic?unions?
lead? to? higher? payoffs? for? all? players.? The? global? melting? pot? is? an? unstoppable? process,? and?
technology?accelerated? its? speed.?Humans? face?new?global?problems? threatening? their?well?being,?
and,? since? the? problems? can? only? be? solved? together,? societal? and? organizational? problems? have?
priority.?Preserving?old?borders?will?not?be?an?efficient?strategy?on?the? long?run.? Instead,?managed?
growth? seems? to?be? a?better? answer.? If? the? speed? of? integration? is? fast,? like? in? case?of?mergers,?
establishing?common? level?of?understanding?and?education?would?be?the?desirable?policy.?Exits?out?
of? political? and? economic? unions,? exclusions,? or? reinforcing? borders? are? tools? to? slow? down? or?
enforce?the?global?integration?process,?but?they?also?strengthen?country?level?integration?processes.?
The?protection?of?useful?developmental?homogeneity?might?be?confused?with?racism,?especially,? if?
players? start? to? blame? each? other? based? on? biased? beliefs.? In? order? to? avoid? the? possibility? of?
suboptimal? self?destructing? outcomes? none? of? the? players? strived? for? originally,? leadership? and?
communication?should?make?a?clear?difference?by?increasing?transparency?and?ensuring?the?personal?
right?to?learn?and?to?develop?on?the?highest?level?in?any?country.?
1.4.2?Review?of?Gender?Studies?in?Relation?to?Leadership?
In? ancient? times? and?most? societies,?men?went? for? hunting? the? stag.? Hunting? required? physical?
strength?and?was? riskier? for?pregnant?or?breastfeeding?women.?Compared? to?women,?men?had?a?
comparative?advantage? in?hunting.?As?a?consequence,?men?and?women?of?the?village? lived? in? labor?
division?and?task?integration?with?each?other,?which?can?be?seen?as?another?stag?hunt?game?at?home.?
To? facilitate? coordination? in? stag?hunt?games,? leaders?as? coordination?devices?were?assigned,?and?
they?often?simply?enforced?coordination.?In?patriarchal?societies,?men?dominated?women?not?only?at?
home,?but? in?many?other? societal?aspects.?Historically,?men?held?most?of? the? leadership?positions?
(Day?2014).?In?this?subsection?we?will?review?studies?investigating?explanations?for?the?gender?gap?in?
leadership?positions.?
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Are?men?better?leaders,?and?do?they?have?a?comparative?advantage?for?leadership?tasks,?or?do?men?
and?women? only? perceive? a? societal? pressure? to? fulfill? gender? identity? expectations? of? others? or?
expectations? they?believe?others?have?? In?a?review?paper,?Bertrand? (2011)?overviews?both?gender?
differences? in?preferences,?and?differences? in?gender? identity.?The?author?reviews?studies?showing?
stable? gender? differences? in? risk? attitudes,? attitudes? towards? competition,? social? preferences,?
attitudes? towards? negotiation? and? other? personality? traits.? Concerning? risk? attitude,? Croson? and?
Gneezy? (2009)? point? at? systematic? gender? differences? in? the? reaction? to? risk.? Women? might?
experience?more?stress?and?negative?emotions? in?risky?situations,?which?can?affect?the?utility?from?
the?risky?choice?(Brody?1993;?Fujita et?al. 1991;?Loewenstein?et?al.?2001).?Besides?the?direct?effect?of?
risk?aversion,?women?might?underestimate?probabilities?of?gains?and?overestimate?probabilities?of?
losses,? further? affecting? the? utility? from? a? risky? choice? (Fehr?Duda? et? al. 2006;? Flynn? et? al.? 1994;?
Spigner? et? al.? 1993;? Silverman? and? Kumka? 1987).? Gender? differences? in? the? attitudes? towards?
competition?might?take?part?in?explaining?the?gender?gap?in?top?level?positions,?since?most?of?these?
positions?are?achieved? in? very? competitive?environments.? In?an?experimental? study,?Gneezy?et?al.?
(2003)?show?that?more?competitive?environments? increase?the?performance?of?men,?but? lower?the?
performance?of?women,?even?if?both?genders?are?equally?effective?in?non?competitive?environments.?
The?authors?also? show? that? their? findings?are? stronger? in?mixed?gender?environments,?while?men?
and? women? are? similarly? competitive? in? single?sex? environments.? Combining? field? data? from? a?
television? game? show? called? the? “The?Weakest? Link”?with? laboratory? evidence,?Antonovics? et? al.?
(2009)?show?that?the?gender?gap?in?competitiveness?disappears?with?increasing?stakes.?In?the?game?
show?players?compete? for? large?sums?of?money,?and? in? the? laboratory,? the?stakes?varied?between?
$20? and? $100.? The? authors? also? find? that? in? competitions? of? the? game? show? the? gender? of? the?
opponent?does?not?matter?for?the?competitiveness?of?women.?Leadership?of?an?organization?can?be?
considered?as?a?high?stake,?so?that?real?world?candidacy?for?top?positions?might?not?be?affected?by?
gender? differences? in? competitiveness.? Vandegrift? and? Yavas? (2009)? study? the? robustness? of? the?
gender?gap?in?competitiveness?if?learning?about?absolute?and?relative?performance?is?possible.?They?
find? that? repetition? decreases? the? gender? gap,? suggesting? that? in?many? real?world? environments?
women?might?be?as?competitive?as?men.?
The?next?issue?Bertrand?(2011)?reviews?very?extensively?is?negotiation?for?higher?compensation?and?
promotion.?Women?negotiate? for?others,?but? they?negotiate?much? less? for? the? self? (Bowles?et?al.?
2005).?Bowles?et?al.?(2007)?show?that?one?driver?for?this?phenomenon? is?that?men?and?women?are?
evaluated?differently? if?they?negotiate?for?higher?compensation.? In?their?study,?the?bias?was?driven?
by? male? evaluators,? who? gave? systematically? worse? evaluations? to? women? than? men,? keeping?
constant? that? both?men? and? women? initiated? a? negotiation.?Male? evaluators?made? the? biased?
evaluations,? even? though? that? they? perceived? both? women? who? negotiated? and? who? did? not?
negotiate? as? equally? able.? Female? evaluators? made? gender?balanced? evaluations.? Similarly,?
psychological?studies?show?that?women?who?negotiate?for?themselves?in?a?stereotypically?masculine?
way?are?evaluated?as?socially?less?competent?(Rudman?1998;?Rudman?and?Fairchild?2004).?Research?
has?also?linked?the?gender?differences?in?negotiation?to?the?gender?gap?in?compensations?and?in?top?
level?positions,?holding?performance? constant? (Greig?2008;?Blackaby?et?al.?2005;?Säve?Söderbergh?
2009).?
One? example? for? other? personality? differences? that?might? affect? the? career? of?men? and?women?
differently?is?behavioral?problems.?Behavioral?problems?might?be?the?higher?rate?of?attention?deficit?
hyperactivity? disorder? (ADHD)? among? boys,? or? higher? arrest? rates? and? school? suspension? among?
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teenage?boys?(Szatmari?et?al.?1989;?Goldin?et?al.?2006).?Bertrand?(2011)?reviews?briefly?some?of?the?
explanations?for?behavioral?problems,?and?most?of?the?potential?sources?are?differences?in?the?speed?
of? brain? developmental? processes.? From? an? evolutionary? perspective,? it?might? be? that?men? and?
women?differ?in?the?way?they?make?decisions,?and?such?differences?might?already?show?up? in?early?
childhood.?The?stag?hunter?became?task?oriented?and?assertive,?and?the?village?people?(most?of?the?
women? and? some? of? the?men)? became?more? empathizing,? relationship?oriented,? and? expressive?
(Bem?1974;?Bem?1993;?Merchant?2012).?The?environment?can?further?encourage?and?reinforce?such?
stereotype?expectations.?As?a?consequence,?boys?might?rebel?more?than?girls?against?rules?of?adults,?
which?would?explain?observed?behavioral?problems.?In?a?recent?study?using?37?year?longitudinal?data?
from? Sweden,? Obschonka? et? al.? (2013)? link? early? rule?breaking? behavior? in? adolescence? with?
entrepreneurship? in? adulthood.? Early? non?conform? behavior,? taking? unusual,? risky? routes,?
questioning?of?standards?and?boundaries,?and?resisting?on?agency? is?often?correlated?with?novelty?
seeking,?and?might?be?one?possible?path?towards?innovative,?visionary?entrepreneurship.?Obschonka?
et? al.? find? many? early? rule?breakers? among? male? entrepreneurs,? but? not? among? female?
entrepreneurs.?Their?finding?supports?the?view?that?women?might?have?a?different?leadership?style,?
and?a?different?developmental?path? than?men.?Girls?have? less?behavioral?problems,?and?even? if? it?
seems?that?they?are?more?submissive,?they?outperform?men?by?college?attendance?and?educational?
achievement? (Bertrand? 2011;?Goldin? et? al.? 2006).? Learning? is? becoming? a? female? advantage? in? a?
changing?world.?
What?exactly?are?the?global?societal?changes?nowadays??Depending?on?the?place?of?the?change,?we?
could? classify? the? change? in? employment,? the? change? in? education,? and? the? change? at? home,?
although?these?areas?are?intertwined.?This?classification?is?roughly?the?same?as?used?in?Goldin?(2006).?
The?author?reviews?the?U.S.?history?of?changes?from?the?appearance?of?independent?female?workers,?
through?easing?the?constraints?on?married?women’s?work,?and?expansion?of?female?labor?force,?until?
the? increase? in?college?attendance?and?graduation? rates,? the?change? in? identity?and? relationships,?
and?finally?the?increase?of?female?leadership.?The?U.S.?history?is?a?bottom?up?emancipation?history?in?
a?developed?democratic?framework.?In?contrast,?other?cultures?go?through?different?developmental?
paths,? often? in? a? top?down? direction.? In?many? developing? countries,? international? organizations?
support?the?education?of?girls,?which?then?empowers?women?and?promotes?female?leadership,?and?
finally?has?an?effect?on?economic?growth?and?political?institutions?(Sperling?et?al.?2015).?Sidani?et?al.?
(2015)? study? how? patriarchal? structures? and? assignment? of?women? to? nurturing? roles?within? the?
family?inhibit?real?change?in?female?leadership?in?Lebanon.?Kim?et?al.?(2015)?study?the?effects?of?top?
down?diversity?management? in?the?highly?male?dominated,?performance?oriented?society?of?South?
Korea.? They? find? that? women? perceived? diversity? management? as? more? favorable? than? men,?
although? there? was? no? difference? between? men? and? women? in? organizational? commitment.?
Organizational?commitment?and?diversity?management?measures?boosted?job?performance.?
The?change? in?employment? is?based?on? the?gradual?change? in? technology.?Technology?erased? the?
need?for?jobs?requiring?physical?strength?or?risk?taking.?Conditional?on?capital? investment,?men?and?
women?could?be?equally?effective?in?hunting?modern?“stags”.?The?traditional?labor?division?between?
men?and?women?lost?rational?reason?and?is?not?efficient?anymore.?What?remained?from?the?original?
stag? hunt? game? is?male? leadership.? It? is?mostly?men?who? occupy? positions?with? decision?making?
authority?and?the?influence?over?compensation?and?promotion?of?others?(Smith?2002;?Eagly?and?Carli?
2003).? Concerning? decision? making? rights,? Bartling? et? al.? (2014)? show? theoretically? and?
experimentally? that? humans? intrinsically? value? authority,? and? this? affects? the? optimal? authority?
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delegation?across?different?games.?In?other?words,?the?previously?efficient?stag?hunt?game?between?
men?and?women?lost?the?common?agreement,?and?since?men?kept?decision?making?rights,?the?value?
of? authority? became? relevant? and? turned? the? game? over? time? into? a? prisoner’s? dilemma? game.?
Coordination? based? on?male? leadership? is? still? Pareto? dominating? the? non?cooperation? outcome,?
however,? strategies?are?not?anymore?about?cooperating?or?not,?but? rather?about?decision?making?
rights?over?the?self?versus?over?others.16?In?line?with?the?change?of?the?underlying?game,?the?female?
intrinsic? value? of? authority? and? the? female? desire? for? participating? in? leadership? increases.? This?
increase?is?mediated?by?both?the?increased?experiential?understanding?of?the?game?and?the?change?
in?education.?The?change?in?education?generates?a?high?return?in?form?of?human?capital?in?women,?
which?should?be?used?efficiently,?instead?of?forcing?women?to?the?housewife?role,?either?directly?or?
indirectly,? by? expecting? them? to? fulfill? stereotype? gender? roles.? Educated? women? become?
empowered? and? start? to? fight? for? their? right? to? make? their? own? decisions,? primarily? at? home.?
Educated?women? learn?about?family?planning,?they?marry? later,?they?get?their?first?child? later,?they?
live?healthier,?and?they?increase?their?chances?for?finding?a?paid?job?(Sperling?et?al.?2015).?Children?of?
educated?women?are?more?likely?to?become?educated?as?well,?to?earn?more,?and?to?achieve?higher?
levels?of?well?being?and?satisfaction.?These?changes?at?home?are?the?precondition?for?escaping?the?
poverty? trap? from?bottom?up.?Moreover,?children?of?educated?women,?especially?sons,?encourage?
their?partners?to?learn?and?work,?reinforcing?a?process?towards?efficient?gender?equality?(Fernández?
et?al.?2004).?
What?are?the?new?challenges?in?a?socially?and?organizationally?changing?world??Technological?change?
opens?up?new?developmental? stages? in? the? stag?hunt,?or?weak?link?game.?The?new? levels? require?
reconsideration?of?the?former?gender?based?labor?division,?on?the?family?level?as?well?as?on?highest?
organizational? levels.?The?nature?of? the? leader? task?changes:?hierarchy,? traditional?power? sources,?
controlling?others,?enforcing?coordination,?and?old?motivational? tools? lose? importance,?while? labor?
division? becomes? more? flexible? and? overlapping,? and? efficient? coordination? requires? better?
integration? of? complex,? globally? interdependent? work? (Eagly? and? Carli? 2003;? Heath? and?
Staudenmayer? 2000).?More? interdependence? requires? communication? and? networking? skills.? The?
change? in? the? leader? task?opens?up?new?possibilities? for? typically? interpersonally?and? integration?
oriented? women? striving? for? leadership? positions? (Eagly? and? Carli? 2007;? Borghans? et? al.? 2005;?
Borghans?et?al.?2008).17?
How?do?women? lead?? In?a?meta?analysis?comparing?male?and?female? leadership?styles,?Eagly?et?al.?
(2003)? classify? three? leadership? styles.? These? styles? are? based? on? leader? behavior,? and? are?
independent? of? the? organizational? environment.18?Transformational? leaders? are? future?oriented,?
innovative? leaders,?who?empower?their?followers?to?contribute?more?capably?to?their?organization.?
They?often?act?as? role?models,? they?emphasize? the? importance?of? the?organization’s?mission,? they?
exhibit?optimism?and?excitement?about?goals?and? future? states,?and? they?attend? to? the? individual?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
16?The?female?player?either?cooperates?and?accepts?male?leadership,?or?defects,?breaks?up,?and?keeps?authority?
over?own?decisions.?The?male?player?either?cooperates?and? leads?the?other?player,?or?defects?and?stays?self?
interested,?while?keeping?authority?over?own?decisions.?
17?There?are?many?studies?showing?how?gender?roles?shape?labor?market?outcomes.?In?the?papers?Fortin?(2008)?
and? Fortin? (2009)? the? evolution? of? women’s? identity? about? the? self? is? linked? to? labor?market? outcomes,?
whereas?Charles?et?al.?(2009)?shows?that?the?gender?role?attitudes?of?the?median?men?drive?the?outcomes.?
18 ?Earlier? classification,? like? “democratic?autocratic”? or? “participative?directive”? leadership,? was? not?
independent?of?the?organizational?environment.?
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needs?of?their?followers,?focusing?on?their?development?and?mentoring.?Transactional?leaders?appeal?
to? the? self?interest?of? their? followers? in? that? they?establish?exchange? relationships?with? them:? the?
transactional? leader? clarifies? the? followers’? responsibilities,? and? rewards? followers? if? they? meet?
objectives? or? corrects? them? for? failing? to?meet? objectives.? The? transactional? leadership? style? has?
three?subcategories:?contingent?reward,?active?management?by?exception,?and?passive?management?
by?exception.?Contingent?reward?provides?rewards?if?follower?performance?meets?objectives.?Active?
management?attends? to? followers?only? if? they? fail? to?meet?objectives.?Passive?managers?wait?until?
problems? get? serious? and? intervene? only? then.? Both? transformational? and? transactional? leaders?
recognize? their? pivotal? role? and? take? responsibility? for? the? leadership.? In? contrast,? the? third?
leadership? style? defines? leaders? who? lack? recognition? of? their? situation? and? authority,? and? let?
followers?do?as? they?want.?The? laissez?faire? leader? is? frequently? absent,? lacks? involvement?during?
critical?junctures,?and?generally?fails?to?take?responsibility?for?managing.?Eagly?et?al.?(2003)?find?that?
the? transformational? leadership? style? is? positively? related? to? effectiveness,? and? female? leaders,?
compared?to?their?male?counterparts,?use?more?often?the?transformational?style.?
Eagly? and? Carli? (2003)? show? that? although? women? have? some? advantages? in? leadership,? since?
“women?are?more?likely?than?men?to?lead?in?a?style?that?is?effective?under?contemporary?conditions”,?
they?also?“suffer?some?disadvantages? from?prejudicial?evaluations?of? their?competence?as? leaders,?
especially?in?masculine?organizational?contexts”.?More?recently,?as?mentioned?above,?Grossman?et?al.?
(2016)?show,?using?a?turnaround?game?in?a?laboratory?experiment,?men?are?more?effective?leaders,?
and?they?receive?better?evaluations?and?get?higher?rewards?from?their?followers?than?women.?The?
authors?conclude?that?followers?do?not?perceive?women?as? leaders,?and?female? leaders?do?not?get?
the?same?attention?and?respect?as?their?male?counterparts.?Eagly?et?al.?(1992)?review?studies?on?the?
evaluation?of?male?and?female?leaders?and?managers.?They?find?that?female?leaders?get?devalued?if?
their? leadership? style?was? stereotypically?masculine,? like? autocratic? or? directive,? or? if? the? female?
leader?occupied?a?male?dominated?role,?or?if?the?evaluators?were?men.?Eagly?and?Karau?(2002)?show?
that? female? disadvantage? from? discriminatory? processes? arises? from? “the? incongruity? of? the?
traditional?female?role?and?many?leader?roles”.?However,?the?stereotype?beliefs?about?gender?roles,?
and?especially?the? image?of?women,?are?subject? to?the?ongoing?modern?social?change,?so?that?the?
female?disadvantage?decreases?over?time.?At?the?individual?level?and?cultural?level,?women?change,?
they?become?more?educated?and?more?competent,?and?at?the?organizational?level,?the?leader?tasks?
change? in? favor? of? female? advantage,? “appointments? of? female? leaders? have? come? to? symbolize?
progressive?organizational?change”?(Eagly?and?Carli?2003;?Eagly?and?Carli?2004).?
The?need? to?symbolize?organizational?change? is?naturally?higher? if? the?organization? is? in?need?of?a?
change,?for? instance,? if?the? leader?task? is?especially?risky.?Glass?and?Cook?(2016)?focused?their?study?
on? the? conditions? under?which?women? are? promoted? to? top? positions.? The? authors? found? that,?
compared?to?men,?women?are?more?likely?to?be?promoted?if?the?leader?position?is?highly?risky,?that?is,?
if?a?previously?male?leader?failed?and?left?a?bad?history?for?his?female?successor.?Consequentially,?the?
female?leader?often?lacks?the?support?by?followers,?or?she?lacks?the?authority?to?reach?her?strategic?
goals,?which? in? turn?often? leads? to?repeated? failure.?The?evidence? in?Glass?and?Cook? (2016)?shows?
that?women? are? often? “the? expendables”?within? an? organization,?which? also? points? to? literature?
finding?that? it? is?often?men?who?stick?to?old?stereotype?gender?roles?and? inhibit?societal?change?by?
resistance?behavior?(Charles?et?al.?2009;?Folke?and?Rickne?2012;?Esteve?Volart?and?Bagues?2012).?
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Who?is?a?better?leader??This?is?the?most?basic?question?that?matters?in?the?debate.?Men?and?women?
differ?in?their?leadership?styles?and?leadership?literature?points?to?the?fact?that?there?is?an?“economic?
pressure? that? favors? gender? equality”? (Eagly? and? Carli? 2003).? As? Besley? et? al.? (2013)? show,? the?
“mediocre?man”?faces?a?crisis?by?gender?quotas.?Nevertheless,?women?still?have?to?face?prejudice?on?
their? path? towards? a? leadership? role.? In? democracies,?women? have? the? free? choice? to? promote?
gender?equality.?The?old?societal?developmental?equilibrium? is?disappearing?and?changing?already,?
while? the?new?equilibrium? is?not? reached? yet.?Bertrand? (2011)? reviews? in? a? separate? chapter? the?
declining? well?being? of? women.? Having? lost? balance? in? the?modern? world?might? be? one? reason?
behind?that?phenomenon.?Once?gender?equality?gets?accepted?widely?and?gender?roles?get?flexible,?
the?disputes?will?settle?and?men?and?women?will?arrive?on?a?higher?developmental?stage,?a?higher?
equilibrium?level?in?a?complex?coordination?game.?
1.4.3?Review?of?Studies?on?the?Democracy?Effect?Related?to?Leadership?and?Gender?Equality?
By?democracy?effect?we?mean?a?behavioral?effect?triggered?by?democratic? institutions.?Democratic?
institutions? can? affect? the? choice? of? policies,? and? they? can? affect? behavior? towards? acting?more?
cooperative?and?pro?social?(Dal?Bó?et?al.?2010).?Thus,?democratic?institutions?have?an?effect?on?both?
the?outcomes?of?coordination?games?and?gender?equality.? In?this?subsection?we?will?briefly?review?
literature?related?to?the?intersection?of?democracy?with?coordination?and?gender?equality.?
Well?functioning?democratic?institutions?are?crucial?for?female?emancipation,?and?to?enable?women?
to?make?their?own?decisions.?In?some?parts?of?the?world,?for? instance?India,?women?are?still?traded?
like?goods?when?their?fathers?make?decisions?about?their?marriage?at?early?age.?In?a?well?functioning?
democracy,?women?do?not?only?decide?themselves?whom?to?marry,?but?it?is?commonly?expected?to?
see?a?representative?share?of?women?in?leadership?positions,?both?in?politics?and?business.?However,?
it? is?still?men?who? fill?most?of? the?top?positions.?Economically,? it?would?be?optimal? to? increase?the?
number?of?women?participating? in? leadership,?since?highly?competent?women?challenge?mediocre?
men,?as? shown? in?a? study?by?Besley?et?al.? (2013)?analyzing? the?effect?of?a?gender?quota?policy? in?
Sweden.?Moreover,?the?education?of?women?increases?and?becomes?a?female?leadership?advantage,?
and?Besley?et?al.? (2011)?show?that?more?highly?educated? leaders?enhance?growth.?Nevertheless,?a?
row?of?studies?finds?evidence?for?discrimination?against?women?striving?for?top?positions?in?politics.?
Using?data?from?Spain,?Esteve?Volart?and?Bagues?(2012)?find?evidence?that?parties?nominate?female?
candidates? strategically? to? riskier? positions? on? the? ballot,? sacrificing?women?who? entered? due? to?
gender?quotas.19?The?phenomenon?of?women?being?expendable? is?similar?to?the?findings?described?
in?Glass? and? Cook? (2006)? using? data? on? CEOs.?Using? Swedish? data,? Folke? and? Rickne? (2012)? find?
further? support? for? a?negative?bias? against?women? in? the?promotion?process? for?more? influential?
positions? in?the?political?hierarchy.?The?authors?find?that?the?negative?bias? is?the?main?reason?for?a?
high?turnover?rate?of?women?in?Swedish?municipalities,?while?men?continue?to?rule?in?the?top?levels?
of? power? and? influence? female? careers.? In? a? later? paper,? comparing? gender? inequality? to? racial?
inequality,?Folke?and?Rickne?(2014)?show?that?women?face?a?“glass?ceiling”?throughout?their?careers,?
while?minorities? are? challenged? by? a? “sticky? floor”? early? in? their? career,? but? the? disadvantages?
decrease?over?time.?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
19?The? negative? bias? against? women? roots? in? a? party? bias,? rather? than? a? voter? bias.? Both? earlier? and?
contemporary?studies?find?consistently?that?once?women?run,?they?get?elected?with?the?same?frequency? like?
men?(Darcy?et?al.?1994;?Lau?and?Redlawsk?1997;?Kanthak?and?Woon?2014).?
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Since?it?would?be?efficient?not?to?discriminate?women,?one?might?ask?who?are?the?men?who?rule?and?
why? is? it? in?their? interest?to? inhibit?female?participation? in? leadership.?Using?data?from?Sweden,?Dal?
Bó? et? al.? (2015b)? examine?who? becomes? a? politician.? The? authors? assume? that? elites? are?more?
educated,?and?they?ask?whether?“democracy?can?attract?competent? leaders,?while?attaining?broad?
representation”.?By?investigating?field?data?about?municipal?politicians,?they?find?that?politicians?are?
more?competent?leaders?than?the?represented?population?and?the?well?educated?leaders?represent?
the?elite.?However,?this? is?not?necessarily? inefficient?for?democracies,? if?we?consider?the?findings? in?
Besley? et? al.? (2011)? showing? that? growth? can? be? linked? to? educated? leaders.? If?we? assume? that?
educated?leaders?are?interested?in?a?“growing?pie”,?we?could?also?assume?that?they?would?not?decide?
against?competent?female?candidates.?Therefore,?one?explanation?for?observing?few?female?leaders?
might?be?mediocre?men?realizing?that?female?candidates?make?the?competition?fiercer?for?them,?and?
bullying?might?have?effects.?Another?explanation?might?be?that?elite?clans?are?more?likely?to?inherit?
elitism?to?sons?rather?than?daughters,?since?children?of?daughters?might?enrich?the?in?law?clan,?and?
highly?educated?daughters?might?also?be?more? likely?not? to?marry?or? to?divorce.20?In?other?words,?
gender? inequalities? are? still? present? at? the? family? level,? and? across? social? classes,? and? this? fact?
remains?correlated?to?gender?inequality?in?democratic?representation.?
However,?we?could?also?assume?that?educated?leaders?are?aware?of?the?economic?weak?link?game?in?
democracies.?Based?on?this?knowledge,?their?leader?task?could?be?thought?of?as?being?“coordination?
devices”? (Kriss? and? Eil? 2012).? As? coordination? devices,? instead? of? keeping? access? to? high? quality?
education?for?the?elite,?one?of?their?main?goals?should?be?to?provide?high?quality?education?to?the?
public,? in?order?to?homogenize?people? in?the?highest?possible?developmental?stage.21?On?the?other?
hand,?educated?leaders?might?not?have?an?incentive?to?homogenize?the?population?in?education.?Due?
to?Alesina? and? Reich? (2015),? homogeneity?might? be? risky? for? democracies,? since? it? increases? the?
likelihood?of?revolutions?and?radicalism.?Therefore?democracies?might?prefer?the?power?equilibrium?
of?“divide?and?rule”?and?a?balance?between?homogeneity?and?heterogeneity.?In?light?of?the?weak?link?
game,?which?shows?that?homogeneity?in?beliefs?and?understanding?is?necessary?for?more?predictable?
planning? and? successful? coordination,? heterogeneity? might? not? only? mean? the? protection? of?
individual?freedom?and?diversity,?but? it?might?mean?the? lack?of?resolutions?to? inequalities?between?
genders,? races,? or? rich? and? poor.? Categories,? that? are? closely? related? to? educational? and?
developmental?differences,?and?differences?in?the?right?to?make?decisions?about?own?careers.?
Leadership,?like?the?control?over?others,?or?the?control?over?development?and?growth,?is?an?illusion?
in?most?coordination?games,?no?matter?who?the?leader?is?(Weber?et?al.?2001).?In?line?with?this,?Collier?
and?Hoeffler? (2015)? revisit?earlier? results? finding? that? “elections?discipline? leaders? to?deliver?good?
economic?performance”.?Using?a?new?global?data?set?with? information?whether?elections?are? free?
and? fair,? the?authors? show? that? leaders?do?not?matter?as? long?as?elections?are? free?and? fair.?One?
intuitive?explanation?could?be?that?voters?trust?that?their? leaders?are?competent,?and?on?aggregate?
they?vote?randomly,?so?that?two?major?parties?run?head?to?head.? In?a?well?functioning?democracy,?
the? population? coordinates? on? growing? levels,? while? competent? leaders? lead? and? competent?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
20?Many?regulations?of?civil?law?are?still?based?on?patriarchal?views.?
21?Democratic?leaders?ideally?have?to?listen?to?the?less?educated?and?the?poor,?especially,?if?these?groups?are?in?
majority.?Only? their?own? representatives?are? legitimate? to?express?what? they?need? to?enable? them? to? solve?
their?problems?by?their?own?authority,? in?bottom?up?processes.?Since?schooling? improves?problem?solving,? it?
should?be?promoted?(Sperling?et?al.?2015).?
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economic? actors? do?what? they? know? best? to? keep? the? economy? growing.22?However,? Collier? and?
Hoeffler?(2015)?also?show?that?making?use?of?“illicit?tactics”?during?elections?is?widespread,?and?the?
cost? for? the? use? of? illicit? tactics? is? the? neglect? of? the? original? leader? task,? the? delivery? of? good?
economic? performance.? Even?worse,? Kanthak? and?Woon? (2014)? recently? showed? in? a? laboratory?
experiment? that? women? candidate? in? elections? only? if? elections? are? costless? and? completely?
transparent?and?honest,?which?means?that?women?might?shy?away?from?candidacy?after?they?learn?
about?ongoing?illicit?tactics?of?the?party.23?So?there?is?a?probability?that?the?modern?societal?change?
might?not?result?in?sustainable?development?with?respect?to?gender?equality.?
Will?inequality?grow,?preserving?old?identities,?or?will?the?melting?pot?result?in?a?new,?global?common?
identity??A?new? identity?could?be?a?gender?neutral,?race?neutral,?multicultural,?multi?religious,?and?
wealth?independent?identity?of?people?who?prefer?to?learn?from?each?other?and?from?their?failures,?
rather?than?blame?each?other?for?failures.?
? ?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
22?Democracies? with? free? and? fair? elections? are? highly? transparent,? which? creates? a? framework? of? trust?
necessary?for?the?successful?functioning?of?the?“laissez?faire”,?or?the?“invisible?hand”?of?economic?coordination.?
Transparency?can?be?seen?as?a?share?of?knowledge,?homogenizing?the?population?in?information?and?beliefs.?
23?In?another?laboratory?experiment,?Rivas?(2013)?showed?that?women?are?less?corrupt?than?men.?Even?though?
an?increase?of?female?participation?in?leadership?might?result?in?less?corruption,?such?a?change?will?not?occur?if?
women?do?not?run?for?leader?positions.?
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Chapter?2?
Men?and?Women?Are?Equally?Effective?Leaders?
2.1?Introduction?
Women? are? still? a? minority? in? top?level? business? positions.? Besides? explanations? about? gender?
differences?in?risk?preferences,?attitude?towards?competition?and?negotiation,?or?social?preferences?
(Bertrand?2011),?a?potential?explanation?for?this?gender?gap? is?that?men?are?more?effective? leaders?
than?women.24?With? this? study,?we? test?whether? there?are?differences?between?male?and? female?
leaders? in?how? effective? they? are? in? generating? coordination?between? followers.?Could? it?be? that?
male? leaders?are?better?at?recognizing?their?pivotal?role??Could? it?be?that?male? leaders?are?socially?
more?credible?and?that?followers?follow?male?leaders?to?a?greater?extent??Or?could?it?be?that?there?
are?no?gender?differences?in?this?regard??The?insights?of?our?study?are?useful?for?organizations.?If?we?
confirm?that?male? leaders?are?more?effective,?this?suggests?that? it? is?efficient?to?have?more?men? in?
top?level? positions.? On? the? other? hand,? if? we? do? not? find? a? gender? effect,? this? suggests? that?
organizations?might?benefit?from?reconsidering?their?gender?imbalance?in?top?level?positions.?
To? investigate?our? research?question,?we? run?a? laboratory?experiment?using?a?minimum?effort? (or?
weak?link)? coordination? game.? This? game? is? a? simple? tool? to? study? leadership? in? a? controlled?
laboratory? setting.?The?game?models? coordination?within?organizations? (firms),?where?players?are?
interdependent? and? jointly?engage? in?production? (Van?Huyck?et? al.?1990).?The? lowest?performing?
player?determines?group?performance.?Prominent?examples?are?“the?assembly? line? that?moves?no?
faster? than? the? slowest? line?worker,? collaborative? reports?or? software? that? is? incomplete?until? the?
final?contribution?is?finished,?and?perceptions?of?overall?product?quality?that?is?often?sensitive?to?the?
worst?performing?feature”?(Brandts?et?al.?2015),? like?best?quality?food?might?be?undervalued? if? it? is?
served?unprofessionally.?Another?example? is? investment?of?firms? into?the?same? industry,?when?the?
investment?only?pays?off?if?a?sufficient?number?of?firms?choose?to?invest,?like?network?investments,?
adoption?of? standards,?and?overcoming? financial?crises? (Heinemann?et?al.?2009).?Examples?can?go?
well?beyond?industrial?organization,?like?efficient?coordination?of?smallest?societal?units?(couples?and?
families),?or?of?largest,?even?global?unions?(European?Union,?United?Nations).?Although?all?members?
share?the?same?preferences,?namely?to?coordinate?on?the?highest?effort? level,?strategic?uncertainty?
may? still?undermine?efficiency? (Van?Huyck?et?al.?1990).?Each?member?has? to?bear? risk? in?order? to?
benefit?the?group?collectively?(Kriss?and?Eil?2012).?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
24?Throughout?the?paper,?we?use?the?term?“effectiveness”?to?refer?to?the?leader’s?successfulness.?An?effective?
leader? is?both?efficient?and?credible.?With?“efficiency”?we?refer?to?the?performance?of?the? leader,?which?the?
leader?has?under?control.?For?example,?leaders?who?work?harder,?are?abler,?and?send?more?relevant?messages?
are?more?efficient.?With? respect? to? the?group,?groups,?who?coordinate?on? the?same?effort? level,?are?said? to?
coordinate?more? efficiently.?With? “credibility”? we? refer? to? the? beliefs? of? the? followers? that? the? leader? is?
followed?by?others?as?well.?The? follower,?who?believes?that?the? leader? is?credible,?will? follow?the? leader.?For?
example,?elections,?incoming?follower?messages,?or?being?male?can?increase?leader?credibility,?but?such?factors?
are?not?necessarily?under?the?control?of?the?leader.?Credible?leaders?are?followed,?no?matter?what?the?message?
is,?whereas?effective?leaders?achieve?the?best?and?most?desired?outcome?with?their?groups.?
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Coordination? failure? and? failure? to? coordinate? on? the? efficient? equilibrium? are? the? standard?
outcomes?in?minimum?effort?coordination?games?if?communication?is?not?possible?(Van?Huyck?et?al.?
1990).? Costless,? non?binding? pre?play? communication? (cheap? talk)? between? players? improves?
coordination? and? efficiency? (Blume? and? Ortmann? 2007).? However,? in? real? organizations?
communication?between?all?workers?is?typically?unfeasible,?for?example?because?it?would?entail?large?
costs.?Brandts?and?Cooper?(2007)?show,?that?organizational?hierarchy?can?provide?a?partial?solution.?
Leaders? can? improve? coordination? and? efficiency? by? using? costless? communication? (Brandts? and?
Cooper?2007).?We?tie?our?work?up?to?Kriss?and?Eil? (2012)?who?study?centralized?communication? in?
the?minimum?effort?coordination?game,?and?we?allow?randomly?selected? leaders?to?use?cheap?talk?
towards? their? followers.? In? their? paper,? Kriss? and? Eil? view? leaders? as? “coordination? devices”,?
facilitating?coordination?problems?by?using?costly?and?non?binding?pre?play?communication?towards?
followers.?They?find?that? leaders?gain?credibility?when?they?receive? input?messages?from?followers,?
visible? only? to? the? leader,? and? thus? leader? messages? are? more? effective? in? that? case.? In? our?
experimental? design,? messages? are? costless,? and? it? is? only? leaders? who? can? use? pre?play?
communication.?Followers? cannot? send?messages? to? their? leaders.? Leaders? can? suggest?a?numeric?
effort? level? to? their? followers.?Since?we?are?curious?whether?we? find?a?gender?difference? in? leader?
effectiveness,?we?use? the?simple,?numeric,?one?way?communication?and? the? randomization?of? the?
leader?assignment?as?tools?to?study?our?research?question.?The?treatment?variations?are?the?gender?
of? the? leader?and?whether? the?gender?of? the? leader? is? revealed? to? the? followers?or?not.?Note,? the?
game?does?not? require?any? special?ability? (for?example,? like? the?ability? to? solve?math? tasks)?when?
participating.? This? way? we? exclude? the? possibility? that? followers? judge? their? leaders? based? on?
competencies?other?than?their?ability?to?coordinate?the?actions?of?others.?
There? is? a? broad? literature? on? experiments? using?minimum? effort? coordination? games.? For?most?
recent?reviews?see?Kriss?and?Weber?(2013)?and?Devetag?and?Ortmann?(2007),?and?for?some?recent?
studies?see?Riedl?et?al.?(2015)?studying?neighborhood?choice?as?a?booster?for?efficiency,?Brandts?et?al.?
(2015)?studying?election?as?a?tool?to?improve?leader?legitimacy?and?effectiveness,?Kriss?and?Eil?(2012)?
studying?different?modes?of?communication?in?the?game,?Chen?and?Chen?(2011)?proposing?a?“group?
contingent?social?preference?model”?and?studying?how?social? identity?affects?equilibrium?selection,?
Kamijo?et?al.? (2015)?studying?a?mechanism?to?overcome?coordination?failure?and?Heinemann?et?al.?
(2009)? proposing? a?method? to?measure? strategic? uncertainty.? However,? not?many? among? these?
papers?study?gender.?One?exception?is?Grossman?et?al.?(2016)?who?find?that?randomly?selected?male?
leaders?have?a?stronger?impact?on?the?behavior?of?followers?than?female?leaders.?Another?exception?
is?Dufwenberg?and?Gneezy?(2005)?who?study?gender?differences? in?coordination?due?to?differences?
in?the?fraction?of?men?and?women?in?a?team.?They?find?some?small?differences?in?coordination?in?the?
initial?periods?but?not?in?the?final?periods.?In?contrast,?our?focus?is?more?on?the?interaction?between?
the? leader?and? the? followers? in?organizational?hierarchies.?We?expect?male? leaders? to?send?higher?
message?values?than? female? leaders,?and,?when?gender? is?observed,?we?predict?that? followers?will?
follow?male?leaders?to?a?greater?extent.?
We?find?female? leaders?to?send?riskier?messages?than?male? leaders? if?gender? is?not?revealed.? If?we?
reveal?gender,?male?and? female? leaders?do?not?differ? in? their?message? sending?behavior.?Further,?
male?and?female? leaders?are?followed?by?an?equally?high?share?of?followers.? In?other?words,?there?
are? no? gender? differences? in? leader? effectiveness.?We? think? that? our? “no? effect”? findings? are? an?
important? contribution? to? the? literature.? In?particular,?as?pointed?out?by?Dufwenberg?and?Gneezy?
(2005),?because? there?might?be?a?“bias? in? the? research?community?against? reporting?or?publishing?
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results?that?document?the?absence?of?a?gender?effect”,?which?implies?that?there?is?a?“risk?of?bias?in?
perceptions?regarding?the?magnitude?and?limits?of?gender?differences”.?
2.2?Experimental?Design?and?Procedures?
Our?experimental?design? leans?on? the?design?used? in?Kriss?and?Eil? (2012)?and? in?Van?Huyck?et?al.?
(1990).?Each?experimental?session?consists?of?20?periods.?At?the?beginning?of?a?session,?participants?
are?randomly?matched?into?groups?of?eight?and?are?informed?that?their?group’s?composition?will?not?
change?throughout?the?session.?
2.2.1?Minimum?Effort?Coordination?Game?with?Leadership?
In?each?period,?every?participant? i ?in?group? k ?has?to?choose?simultaneously?an?effort? level? ieffort ?
by?picking?a?number?between?1?and?7.?Participant? i ’s?earnings?are?equal?to:?
??? ? ????? ? ????? ? ??????? ? ??? ? ??????????,?
where? minkeffort ?denotes? the?minimum? effort? chosen? by? any? participant? in? group? k .? To? facilitate?
calculations,?we?provide?participants?with?an?Earnings?Table,?reproduced?here?as?Table?2.1.?At? the?
end?of? each?period,?participants? are? informed?of? their? earnings? and? the? group’s?minimum? effort.?
Participants? cannot? observe? others’? effort? choice,? which? makes? it? more? difficult? to? escape?
coordination?failure?(Brandts?and?Cooper?2006b).?
Table?2.1? Earnings?table?
? Minimum?effort?chosen?in?the?group?
Your?
effort?
? 7? 6? 5? 4? 3? 2? 1?
7? 0.60? 0.50? 0.40? 0.30? 0.20? 0.10? 0.00?
6? ? 0.575? 0.475? 0.375? 0.275? 0.175? 0.075?
5? ? ? 0.55? 0.45? 0.35? 0.25? 0.15?
4? ? ? ? 0.525? 0.425? 0.325? 0.225?
3? ? ? ? ? 0.50? 0.40? 0.30?
2? ? ? ? ? ? 0.475? 0.375?
1? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.45?
?
The?game?has?multiple?equilibria:?every?effort?level?if?simultaneously?chosen?by?all?participants?in?the?
same? group? is? an? equilibrium? solution.? The? equilibrium? points? are? strictly? Pareto?ranked.? If? all?
participants?choose?the?highest?effort?(7),?then?the?highest?payoff?obtains?for?everyone?(0.60).?Thus?
this? is? the?most?efficient,?payoff?dominant?outcome? for?each?participant.?However,? if?participants?
cannot?use?communication?to?coordinate?their?actions,?and?since?multiple?equilibria?are?possible?and?
are?common?knowledge,? it? is?uncertain?which?equilibrium? strategy?other?decision?makers?will?use?
(Van?Huyck?et?al.?1990).?The?higher?the?individual?effort?level?choice?is,?the?riskier?it?is.?A?more?risk?
averse?participant?can?ensure?a?payoff?of?0.45?by?choosing?the?lowest?effort?(1).?Since?the?game?has?
no?unique?equilibrium?solution,?rational?decision?makers?face?an?equilibrium?selection?problem?and?
might?choose?among?the?equilibrium?points?due?to?various?equilibrium?selection?principles?related?to?
their?own?preferences?and?affected?by?expectations?about?others’?actions?(Heinemann?et?al.?2009).?
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Deductive?selection?principles?“select?equilibrium?points?based?on?the?description?of?the?game”?(Van?
Huyck?et?al.?1990),? therefore? these?principles?arguably?apply? in? the?early?periods?of? the? repeated?
game,?before?a? long?history?of?play? is?established.?The?“efficiency?principle”,?or?concept?of?payoff?
dominance,? is? one? deductive? selection? principle,? based? on? the? efficiency? of? an? equilibrium? point.?
Another?deductive? selection?principle? is? the? “security?principle”,?or?maximin?action,?based?on? the?
riskiness?of?an?equilibrium?point.?An?action?is?secure?when?it?delivers?the?largest?payoff?given?that?the?
worst?possible?outcome?is?selected?(Neumann?and?Morgenstern?1972).?Inductive?selection?principles?
can? be? applied? if? information? from? previous? periods? is? available? and? earlier? experiments? already?
provided?evidence? for?a? strong?history?dependence? in? case?of? repeated? interactions? (Brandts?and?
Cooper?2006a).?
In?our?design,?we?randomly?assign?one?participant?in?each?group?to?take?the?role?of?the?leader,?which?
leaves? the?other?group?members?as? followers.?Leaders?can?have?different? tools? to?move? followers?
away? from? following? the?“security?principle”? towards?more?efficient?coordination.?Commonly?used?
tools?are?incentive?changes?and?communication.?Brandts?et?al.?(2015)?showed,?varying?interventions?
exogenously? in? a? controlled? setting,? that? communication? is?more? effective? than? incentives,?while?
Brandts?and?Cooper?(2007)?showed?earlier,?that?communication?is?more?effective?even?if?leaders?can?
vary?financial?incentives?endogenously.?
We? allow? leaders?only? to?use?pre?play? communication.?Messages? are? costless? and? voluntary.?The?
leader? can?either? send?a?numeric?message? (“7”,? “6”,? “5”,? “4”,? “3”,? “2”,? “1”),?or?no?message? (“No?
suggestion”).?The?leader’s?message?is?visible?to?all?group?members?and?is?sent?in?each?period?before?
group?members?make?their?decisions.?Messages?are?non?binding?in?that?not?following?a?message?has?
no?direct?effect?on?earnings.?The? leader? remains? as?part?of? the? group,? that? is,? leaders? also?make?
effort?level?decisions?and?face?the?same?incentives?as?followers.?
Each?session?is?divided?into?two?parts.?Part?1?consists?of?periods?1?to?10?and?Part?2?of?periods?11?to?
20.?Participants?know?the?session?has?two?parts?but?are?not?given?the?specific?instructions?of?Part?2?
until?they?reach?that?part.?In?Part?1,?the?leader?is?assigned?at?the?beginning?of?period?1,?and?holds?the?
position?until? the?end?of?period?10.? In? the? instructions? for?Part?2,?we? inform?participants? that? the?
difference?between?Part?1?and?Part?2? is?that?the?previous? leader?of?Part?1?reverts?to?being?a?group?
member,? and? a? new? leader? is? randomly? assigned? for? Part? 2.? The? new? leader? is? assigned? at? the?
beginning?of?period?11,?and?holds?the?position?until?the?end?of?period?20.?The?new? leader? is?of?the?
opposite?gender?as?the?leader?in?Part?1.?The?payoff?structure?of?the?game?remains?the?same?in?both?
parts,?and?we?do?not?change?the?composition?of?the?groups.?
2.2.2?Treatments?
In?this?study?we?use?a?2x2?("two?by?two")?mixed?factorial?design.?The?two?factors?are:?gender?of?the?
leader?and?whether?gender?of?the?leader?is?observable.?The?first?treatment?variation,?the?gender?of?
the? leader,? is? a?within?subjects? variation,? because?we? repeat? the? role? assignment? in? Part? 2.? The?
second?treatment?variation,?whether?the?gender?of?the? leader? is?observable,? is?a?between?subjects?
variation.?Participants?are?randomly?assigned?either?to?the?Gender?Revealed?treatment?which?reveals?
the?gender?of? the? leader?within? the?group,?or? to? the?Gender?Not?Revealed? treatment?which? is? the?
control?treatment?that?does?not?reveal?gender.?
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To?reveal?information?about?gender,?participants?had?to?choose?a?profile?picture?they?identified?with.?
This?occurred?after?they?consented?to?take?part?in?the?study?but?before?they?read?the?instructions?to?
avoid?strategic?selection?of?profile?pictures.?We?created?12?generic?profiles?for?each?gender?using?the?
profile? creator?website? pickaface.net? (see? Figure? B1? in?Appendix? 3B).?All? pictures? have? the? same?
clothing,?facial?expression,?face?form,?and?eye?color.?We?varied?hair?length,?hair?color,?skin?color,?and?
did?small?modifications?to?the?lips,?nose,?eyes,?and?hairstyle?to?match?generic?racial?features.?We?use?
profile? pictures? to? preserve? anonymity?whilst? revealing? gender.?We? opted? for? pictures? that? also?
contain?other?cues?such?as?race?and?hairstyles?to?distract?participants?from?discerning?the?purpose?of?
the?study?(Zizzo?2010),?which?can?potentially?lead?to?intentional?changes?in?behavior?(Camerer?2011).?
Camerer? (2011)? names? two? conditions? for? the? existence? of? strong? experimenter? demand? effects.?
First,?participants?must?have?a?belief?of?what?prediction?we?favor,?and?second,?they?must?be?willing?
to?sacrifice?part?of?their?earnings?to?help?prove?our?prediction?as?they?perceive?it.?If?we?assume?that?
participants?correctly?guess?that?we?study?gender,?and?they?might?even?be?aware?of?the?commonly?
known?fact?that?women?are?a?minority?in?leadership?positions,?they?could?guess?that?our?prediction?is?
related?to?the?credibility?of?male?leaders.?If?they?would?try?to?favor?us,?they?would?follow?men?more?
often,?and?if?the?majority?of?participants?think?the?same?way,?following?men?more?often?would?even?
be? in? line?with? the? incentives?and? rational? to?do.? If? this?were? true,?we?would? indeed? find?a?strong?
gender? gap? in? effectiveness,? making? us? careful? when? interpreting? results.? On? the? other? hand,?
revealing?gender?could?induce?participants?to?follow?female?leaders?more?often,?even?if?they?sacrifice?
part?of?their?earnings,?only?to?behave? in?a?more?“socially?desirable”?way,?because?they?might?think?
we?or? the?other?group?members?expect? them? to?do? so.?Such?a?demand?effect?would?go? into? the?
opposite?direction?than?our?true?prediction,?weakening?the?gender?effect?that?we?may?find,?and?thus?
would?be?of?less?concern?for?the?interpretation?of?results.?Further,?even?if?participants?would?follow?
men?or?women?more?often,?we?doubt?that,?in?spite?of?the?financial?incentives,?they?would?sabotage?
leaders? of? the? opposite? gender? just? to? favor? the? experimenter.? Depending? on? the? treatment?
condition,? we? display? the? profile? picture? of? leaders? along? with? their? messages? visible? to? their?
followers.?
2.2.3?Predictions?
Our?main? interest? in? this? study? is? to? reveal? whether? there? are? any? differences? in? effectiveness?
between?male?and?female?leaders.?In?the?minimum?effort?coordination?game,?the?effectiveness?of?a?
leader? depends? on? the?minimum? effort? level? chosen? by? followers? and? the? number? of? followers.?
Therefore?effective?leaders?are?those?who?are?credible?to?their?followers?and?who?request?high?effort?
levels.?Accordingly,?possible? gender?differences? in? leader? effectiveness? can?have? two?origins:?one?
origin?in?the?message?content?(such?as? leader?behavior)?and?one?origin?in?leader?credibility?(such?as?
how? followers? perceive? their? leaders).? The? following? predictions? are? proposed? for? explaining? any?
differences?in?the?effectiveness?of?male?and?female?leaders:?
Prediction? 1? (leader? behavior? and?message? content):?Male? leaders? are? expected? to? send? higher?
message?values?than?female?leaders,?irrespective?of?whether?the?treatment?reveals?the?gender?or?not.?
Justifications? for? this? prediction? are? earlier? findings? about? gender? differences? in? risk? preferences?
(Bertrand?2011)? and?overconfidence? (Reuben? et? al.?2012).?Men?being?more? risk? loving? and?more?
overconfident?might?tend?to?request?and?choose?the?higher?and?riskier?effort?levels,?and?they?might?
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overestimate? the? number? of? their? followers? irrespective? of?whether? gender? is? observed? or? not.?
Leaders,?who?cannot?observe?the?gender?composition?of? the?group,?might?perceive?a?high? level?of?
similarity?with?followers?(for?example,?because?others?are?students?as?well,?or?simply?because?others?
participate? in? the? same? experiment),? and? therefore? they? will? increase? projection? and? reduce?
stereotyping?when?guessing?followers’?intentions?in?the?given?strategic?interaction?(Ames?et?al.?2012),?
which?will? lead? to?male? leaders? requesting?more?often? risky?high?effort? levels? (which? is? the?action?
they?would? themselves? choose).? If? there? are? any? differences? in? the?message? content,? then? these?
differences?should?already?be?observed?in?Gender?Not?Revealed,?and?should?be?present?persistently?
in?Gender?Revealed.?
Prediction? 2? (follower?behavior?and? leader? credibility):? Followers? follow?male? leaders? to?a?greater?
extent? than? female? leaders,?and? trivially,?any?differences? in? leader? credibility? show?up?only? in? the?
treatment?where?gender?is?revealed.?
We?derive?this?prediction?based?on?the?fact?that?men?have?historically?held?most?of?the? leadership?
roles?in?society,?so?that?followers,?who?expect?others?to?consider?men?to?be?better,?more?competent,?
and?more?credible?leaders?(Day?2014),?might?rationally?adapt?to?the?supposed?bias.?The?prediction?is?
further?justified?by?an?earlier?paper?by?Reuben?et?al.?(2014)?showing?that,?in?an?experimental?market,?
stereotypes?make?both?male?and?female?participants?twice?more?likely?to?hire?a?man?than?a?woman?
when?no?other? information? is?available?than?a?candidate’s?appearance?(which?makes?gender?clear),?
despite?the?fact?that?on?average?both?genders?perform?equally?well.?Therefore?the?assumption?that?
men?will?be?followed?to?a?greater?extent?than?women?might?hold?even?though?that?a?“leader?like”?
image? (such? as?being?male,?or?dressing? and? acting?masculine)?may,? in? fact,?have? little? to?do?with?
effective? leadership? (Day? 2014).?Moreover,? Grossman? et? al.? (2016)? showed,? using? the?minimum?
effort?coordination?game,?that?followers?are?more?likely?to?follow?men?than?women,?holding?leader?
messages?constant.?These?insights?further?justify?the?prediction.?
2.2.4?Procedures?
The? experiment?was? conducted? at? the? Columbia? Experimental? Laboratory? in? the? Social? Sciences?
(CELSS)?at?Columbia?University?in?February?2015.?Participants?were?recruited?through?ORSEE?(Greiner?
2015)?and?the?experiment?was?programmed?with?z?Tree?(Fischbacher?2007).?We?ran?9?sessions,?each?
in?the?afternoon.?One?session?lasted?around?45?minutes.?Every?participant?signed?a?written?consent?
form.? Earnings?were? expressed? in? dollars.? The? show?up? fee?was? $5.00? and? the? average? earnings?
across?sessions?equaled?$14.50.?
Participants?were?seated?randomly.?Before?period?1,?and?before?reading?the?instructions,?everybody?
answered?a?short?general?questionnaire?about?gender,?race,?age,?years?of?study,?and?major?field?of?
studies.?Next,?participants?had?to?choose?a?profile?picture?(see?Figure?B1?in?Appendix?3B).?
We?had?separate?instructions?for?Part?1?and?Part?2,?and?participants?read?the?instructions?only?prior?
to?each?part.?To? facilitate?calculations? for? the?participants,?we?handed?out?printed?versions?of? the?
instructions?for?Part?1,?which?contained?the?Earnings?Table?showing?how?earnings?were?determined.?
The? same? table?applied? in?Part?2.? Instructions?were?displayed?on? the?computer? screens?and?were?
read?aloud?by?the?experimenter.?After?reading?the? instructions?for?Part?1,?participants?completed?a?
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payoff?quiz? to?check?whether?everybody?understood? the?game’s?payoff?structure.? Instructions?and?
screenshots?can?be?found?in?Appendix?1B.?
Although? in? literature?the?most?common?context?for?the?minimum?effort?coordination?game? is?that?
of?workplaces,?we?avoided? this?context?and? terms? like?“firm”,?“employee”,?and?“manager”.? In?our?
instructions,?we?use?an?abstract?context?as?we?wanted?participants?to?focus?solely?on?the?incentives.?
The?group?was?simply?referred?to?as?“group”?and?individual?group?members?as?“group?member”.?The?
leader?was?called?“message?sender”.?Following?Brandts?et?al.?(2015),?we?did?not?use?the?term?“effort”?
because?of?its?strong?connotation.?Instead,?we?asked?participants?to?choose?a?“number”.?
Leaders?could?enter?their?messages?by?checking?one?of?the?following?options:?“7”,?“6”,?“5”,?“4”,?“3”,?
“2”,?“1”,?“No?suggestion”.?The?message?was?displayed?to?each?group?member?on?the?decision?and?
feedback? screens.? In? addition,?depending?on? the? treatment? condition,? the? leader’s?profile?picture?
was?displayed?along?with?the?message.?Participants? in?Gender?Revealed?knew?from?the? instructions?
that?their?profile?pictures?might?be?displayed.?
After?participants?made?their?effort?choice,?we?elicited?their?belief?concerning?the?number?of?other?
group?members?who?will? follow? the? leader’s?message?by?asking? in?each?period?“Out?of? the? seven?
other?participants? in?your?group,?how?many?will? follow? the?Message?Sender’s? suggestion,?namely?
how?many?will?choose?‘X’?”?Instead?of?“X”?we?replaced?the?actual?message.?Participants?could?enter?
guesses?from?0?to?7.?We? incentivized?belief?questions?with?$0.05?for?every?correct?guess.?Table?2.2?
summarizes?the?sequence?of?events?in?the?experiment.?
At? the? end? of? each? period,? participants? saw? their? effort? choice,? the? group?minimum? effort,? their?
earnings? in? that?period,?and? their?accumulated?earnings.?Participants?could?not?observe? individual?
effort?choices.?
At?the?end?of?the?experiment?participants? filled? in?a? final?questionnaire.?We?asked?participants? for?
their? subjective?evaluations?of? the?group’s?performance,? the? leaders’?performance,?and? the?other?
group?members’?performance? for?each?part.?Specifically,? first?we?asked? “Please? rate?your?group’s?
performance?in?Part?1”.?Participants?could?indicate?their?answer?on?a?scale?from?1?for?“very?poor”?to?
5?for?“very?good”.?Second?we?asked?“How?much?do?you?agree/disagree?with?the?following?statement:?
‘My? group’s? performance? in? Part? 1? is? mostly? due? to? the? judgment? of? the? Message? Sender.’”?
Participants? could? indicate? their? answer? on? a? scale? from? 1? for? “completely? disagree”? to? 5? for?
“completely?agree”.?Third?we?asked?“How?much?do?you?agree/disagree?with?the?following?statement:?
‘My?group’s?performance? in?Part?1? is?mostly?due? to? the? judgment?of? the?other?Group?Members.’”?
Again,?participants?could? indicate?their?answer?on?a?scale?from?1?for?“completely?disagree”?to?5?for?
“completely?agree”.?We?also?asked?which?role?assignment?(“Message?Sender”?or?“Group?Member”)?
participants?would?prefer?if?they?could?choose?(“If?you?were?to?play?again?and?you?could?choose?your?
role,?which?role?would?you?choose?”).?Finally,?we?asked?a?general?risk?attitude?question? (“How?do?
you?see?yourself:?are?you?generally?a?person?who?is?fully?prepared?to?take?risks?or?do?you?try?to?avoid?
taking?risks?”),?where?participants?could?indicate?their?willingness?to?take?risks?on?a?scale?from?0?for?
“not?at?all?willing?to?take?risks”?to?10?for?“very?willing?to?take?risks”?(Dohmen?et?al.?2011).?
Upon?completion?of? the? final?questionnaire,?participants?were?shown? their?earnings?separately? for?
each?part?and?summed?for?the?two?parts,?and?total?earnings?including?earnings?for?correct?guesses.?
Participants?were?thanked?and?paid?individually?for?their?participation.?
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Table?2.2? Timeline?of?the?experiment?
Periods? Part?1?(periods?1?10)? Part?2?(periods?11?20)?
Before?period?1? Demographics? ?
Choice?of?the?profile?picture?
Before?period?1?and?11? Instructions?for?Part?1? Instructions?for?Part?2
Payoff?quiz?
Role?assignment? Role?assignment?
In?each?period? Message?sending?
Effort?choice?
Belief?question?
Feedback?screen?
After?period?20? ? Final?questionnaire?
?
2.3?Results?
130?subjects?showed?up?to?our?study.?We?allowed?only?a?multiple?of?eight?people?to?participate,?so?
that?120?subjects?participated?in?total,?with?a?balanced?overall?gender?distribution?of?60?men?and?60?
women.?In?Gender?Revealed,?we?had?56?participants?in?7?groups?with?3?male?and?4?female?leaders?in?
Part?1.?In?Gender?Not?Revealed,?we?had?64?participants?in?8?groups?with?4?male?and?4?female?leaders?
in?Part?1.?
In? the? following,? we? will? present? the?main? treatment? effects? on?minimum? effort? and?message?
sending?behavior?(section?2.3.1),?descriptive?statistics?of?the?first?period?(section?2.3.2),?and?detailed?
analysis?of?follower?and?leader?behavior?by?treatment?conditions?(sections?2.3.3?and?2.3.4).?
2.3.1?Treatment?Effects?
This?section?analyzes?the?effect?of?leaders?on?the?group’s?ability?to?coordinate?on?the?highest?effort.?
Panel?A?of?Figure?2.1?shows?the?aggregate?treatment?effects?on?group?minimum?effort?in?each?period.?
The?average?minimum?effort?across?groups?does?not?differ?by?the?revelation?treatment,?which?means?
that? revealing?gender?or?not?does?not?matter? for? the?average?minimum?effort? level.?On? the?other?
hand,?gender?matters?for?the?average?minimum?effort? level.? In?Part?1,?groups? led?by?men?perform?
better.? In? Part? 2,? groups? overtaken? by? women? keep? historic? minimum? effort? levels? achieved?
previously?with?male? leaders,?whereas?groups?overtaken?by?men?decline? in?performance.?Overall,?
groups?led?by?women?do?better.?Panel?B?of?Figure?2.1?shows?the?aggregate?treatment?effects?on?the?
suggestion?of?seven? in?each?period.?Initially,?hidden? leaders?suggest?more?often?seven?than? leaders?
whose? gender? is? revealed.? The? difference? in? suggesting? seven? across? revelation? conditions?
disappears? over? all? periods.? Initially,? female? leaders? request?more? often? seven? than? their?male?
counterparts.?Later?in?Part?1,?when?men?become?more?effective?leaders,?the?difference?in?suggesting?
seven?between? genders?disappears.?Throughout?Part?2,? female? leaders? request? again?more?often?
seven?than?their?male?counterparts.?Thus,?over?all?periods,?women?request?more?often?seven?than?
men.?
? ?
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Figure?2.1? Aggregate?treatment?effects?
A.?Effect?on?minimum?effort? B.?Effect?on?message?sending?behavior?
?
In?line?with?the?graphical?analysis,?we?run?random?effects?generalized?least?squares?(GLS)?regressions,?
which?we?report?in?Table?2.3.?The?dependent?variable?in?Models?1?and?2?is?the?group?minimum?effort,?
so?we?collapse?the?data?by?group?and?period,?estimate?the?models?using?group?level?regressions,?and?
correct?standard?errors? for?clustering?at? the?group? level.?The?explanatory?variables? in?Model?1?are?
indicator? variables? for? the? revelation? treatment? and? the? gender? of? the? leader.? The? revelation?
treatment?has?no?effect?on?minimum?effort?and?thus?on?leader?effectiveness.?Groups?led?by?women,?
rather? than?men,? do? better? by? 0.47? effort? units? (p? =? 0.03).? However,? the? coefficient? for? female?
leadership?decreases?and?loses?significance?if?we?control?for?leader?messages,?as?we?do?in?Model?2.?
Table?2.3? Aggregate?treatment?effects?
? Model?1? Model?2? Model?3?
n?=?300? n?=?300? n?=?300?
Dependent?variable? Minimum?effort? Minimum?effort? Seven?
Gender?revealed? 0.03?
(1.46)?
0.09?
(1.24)?
?0.06?
(0.21)?
Female?leader? 0.47**?
(0.22)?
0.29?
(0.21)?
0.17**?
(0.07)?
Suggesting?seven? ? 1.08***?
(0.40)?
?
Constant? 3.14***?
(0.96)?
2.63***?
(0.69)?
0.47***?
(0.13)?
Notes.? For? the? estimations? of?Models? 1&2?we? collapse? by? group? and? period,? and? use? group?level? random?
effects?GLS?regressions.?The?models?contain?300?observations?over?20?periods?and?15?groups.?For?Model?3?we?
use? a? subject?level? regression,? and? the? model? contains? 300? observations? of? 15? leaders? over? 20? periods.?
Standard?errors? (in?parentheses)?are?corrected?for?clustering?at?the?group? level.?***Statistically?significant?at?
the?1%?level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?
Using?Model? 3,?we? analyze? differences? between? the? revelation? conditions? and?male? and? female?
leaders?in?suggesting?seven.?The?model?contains?only?observations?of?leaders?and?we?use?a?subject?
level? regression,?while? correcting? standard?errors? for? clustering?at? the?group? level.?The? revelation?
treatment?has?no? significant? effect?on? suggesting? seven,? although?hidden? leaders? request? slightly?
more?often?seven.?Men?and?women?differ?in?leader?behavior?as?women?request?by?0.17?more?often?
seven? than?men? (p?=?0.02).?Although?not? reported,?we?analyze?whether? leaders? follow? their?own?
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suggestion?to?play?seven,?and?we?find?that?male?and?female?leaders?follow?their?risky?suggestions?to?
the?same?extent,?choosing?an?effort? level?of?around?four?on?average? (see?Table?A1? in?Appendix?1A?
containing?descriptive?statistics?for?all?the?20?periods?of?the?experiment).?
Next,? as? reported? in? Table? 2.4,?we? look? for? treatment? effects? on? group?minimum? effort? and? the?
suggestion?of?seven?by?treatment?conditions,?adding?interaction?variables?to?the?models?from?Table?
2.3?above.?The?dependent?variable? in?Models?1?and?2? is?the?group?minimum?effort,?so?we?collapse?
the? data? by? group? and? period,? estimate? these?models? using? group?level? regressions,? and? correct?
standard?errors? for? clustering?at? the?group? level.?As?explanatory?variables? in?Model?1?we?use? the?
interaction? of? the? revelation? treatment? and? the? gender? of? the? leader.? In? Gender?Not?Revealed,?
female? leaders?are?more?effective? than? their?male? counterparts?by?0.63?effort?units? (p?=?0.05).? In?
Gender?Revealed,? female? leader?effectiveness?decreases?by?more? than?50%,?compared? to?Gender?
Not?Revealed,?and?the?gender?difference?in?leader?effectiveness?loses?significance?(p?=?0.27?based?on?
the? post?estimation? test).? However,? any? gender? difference? in? Gender?Not?Revealed? can? only? be?
perceived? by? followers? through? the?message? content.? Therefore?we? extend?Model? 1? and? add? in?
Model?2?the?suggestion?of?seven?as?a?control.?The?coefficient?for?having?a?female?leader?in?Gender?
Not?Revealed?decreases?to?0.35?and?is?not?significant?any?more.?
Table?2.4? Treatment?effects?by?treatment?conditions?
? Model?1? Model?2? Model?3?
n?=?300? n?=?300? n?=?300?
Dependent?variable? Minimum?effort? Minimum?effort? Seven?
Gender?revealed? 0.19?
(1.42)?
0.15?
(1.20)?
0.05?
(0.23)?
Female?leader? 0.63**?
(0.32)?
0.35?
(0.30)?
0.26**?
(0.11)?
Revealed?female?leader? ?0.34?
(0.42)?
?0.12?
(0.43)?
?0.21*?
(0.13)?
Suggesting?seven? ? 1.06***?
(0.40)?
?
Constant? 3.06***?
(0.96)?
2.61***?
(0.70)?
0.43***?
(0.14)?
Notes.? For? the? estimations? of?Models? 1&2?we? collapse? by? group? and? period,? and? use? group?level? random?
effects?GLS?regressions.?The?models?contain?300?observations?over?20?periods?and?15?groups.?For?Model?3?we?
use? a? subject?level? regression,? and? the? model? contains? 300? observations? of? 15? leaders? over? 20? periods.?
Standard?errors? (in?parentheses)?are?corrected?for?clustering?at?the?group? level.?***Statistically?significant?at?
the?1%?level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?
In? Model? 3,? we? analyze? differences? between? male? and? female? leaders? who? request? seven? by?
revelation?conditions.?The?model?contains?only?observations?of? leaders?and?we?use?a?subject?level?
regression,?while?correcting?standard?errors?for?clustering?at?the?group? level.?As?expected?from?the?
previous?models,?non?revealed? female? leaders?are?by?0.26?more? likely? to?suggest?seven? than? their?
male?counterparts?(p?=?0.02).?In?Gender?Revealed,?male?leaders?increase?by?0.05?and?female?leaders?
decrease?by?0.21? the? frequency?of?requesting?seven,?and? thus? the?gender?difference? in?requesting?
seven? is?not? significant? (p?=?0.36?based?on? the?post?estimation? test).?We? conclude? this? section?as?
follows.?
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Conclusion? 1:? Any? differences? in? leader? effectiveness? between?male? and? female? leaders? can? be?
explained? as? mediated? effects? through? the? leaders’? message? sending? behavior.? In? Gender?Not?
Revealed,?women? send?more?often? riskier?high?effort?level? suggestions? to? their? followers,?and? they?
succeed?with?this?strategy.?In?Gender?Revealed,?we?find?no?differences?in?the?messages?of?male?and?
female?leaders.?Men?and?women?are?equally?effective?leaders.?
2.3.2?Descriptive?Statistics?of?the?First?Period?
This? section? analyzes?descriptive? statistics?of?all?experimentally?observed? variables?by?all? the? four?
treatment?conditions?in?period?1.?The?first?period?of?the?experiment? is?of?special?interest?and?could?
yield? important? additional? insights,? since? observations? in? that? period? are? independent? from? any?
history,?whereas? in? later? periods? participants? have? already? information? about? previous? outcomes?
which?might? influence? their?decision?making.?Table?2.5?below? contains? the?observations? from? the?
first? period? of? the? experiment.?We? use? non?parametric?Wilcoxon? rank?sum? tests? to? test? gender?
differences?by?the?revelation?treatment,?and?differences?across?revelation?conditions?by?the?gender?
of?the?leader.?
In?the?first?period?every? leader?recognizes?the?pivotal?role?and?uses?the?chance?to?send?a?message.?
Although? female? leaders? request? higher? effort? than? male? leaders,? the? rank?sum? tests? yield? no?
significant?results?(p?=?0.13?in?Gender?Not?Revealed?and?p?=?0.27?in?Gender?Revealed).?Nevertheless,?
we? can?observe? some?differences? in? leader?behavior.?Male? leaders?do?not? change? their?message?
sending? strategy?across? revelation? conditions.?On?average,? they? request? four.?On? the?other?hand,?
female? leaders?change?their?behavior?to?a?small?extent.? In?Gender?Not?Revealed,?all?female? leaders?
request?the?highest?effort?(7),?but?in?Gender?Revealed?they?become?more?careful,?even?though,?they?
still? request?higher?effort? (6)? than?male? leaders.?The? leaders’?own?effort?choices?are?close? to? their?
suggestions,?except?maybe?for?female?leaders?in?Gender?Revealed.?In?that?treatment?female?leaders?
choose? their?own? effort? level?by? 0.75? units? lower? than? their?own? suggestion.? Their? followers? are?
seemingly?somewhat?reluctant?to?follow?the?suggestions?as?well.?The?difference?between?the?initial?
suggestion?and?the?group?effort?level?is?0.47?units.?
Data? seems? to? tell?us? that? the? revelation?of? the?profile?picture? increases?uncertainty?and? induces?
both? leaders?and? followers? to?act?more?cautiously.?Participants?might? try? to?guess? the?goal?of?our?
study,? so? that?both? followers? and? leaders? get?distracted? to? some? degree? from? the? game?play.? In?
Gender?Revealed,?the?share?of?followers? is? lower:?17?percentage?points? lower?for?male? leaders?and?
10?percentage?points? lower? for? female? leaders,? compared? to?Gender?Not?Revealed,?but? rank?sum?
tests? yield?no? significant? results? (p? >? 0.36)? (see? also? Figure?A2? in?Appendix?1A).? Even? though? the?
actual?share?of?followers?does?not?differ?across?revelation?conditions,?group?beliefs?about?the?share?
of?followers?are?significantly?lower?in?Gender?Revealed:?18?percentage?points?lower?for?male?leaders?
(p?=?0.01)?and?13?percentage?points?lower?for?female?leaders?(p?=?0.01).?Followers?seem?to?trust?less?
if?more?information?about?the?leader?is?revealed.?However,?followers?do?not?differentiate?due?to?the?
gender?of?the? leader?across?revelation?conditions?(p?>?0.18).?Moreover,?groups?have?quite?accurate?
beliefs? about? the? share? of? followers.? In? Gender?Revealed,? we? find? no? stereotype? bias? in? group?
expectations? (p?=?0.53? if? testing? for? the?difference? in?group?overestimations?by? the?gender?of? the?
leader).?Overestimations?by?the?groups?are?closer?to?zero?than?estimations?by?leaders,?which?is?also?
what?wisdom?of?the?crowd?findings?suggest?(Galton,?1907).?
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Table?2.5? Descriptive?statistics?of?the?first?period?
?
Gender?Not?Revealed Gender?Revealed?
Male?leader?
n?=?4,?n?=?32?
Female?leader
n?=?4,?n?=?32?
Male?leader
n?=?3,?n?=?24?
Female?leader
n?=?4,?n?=?32?
No?message?sent?
0?
(0.00)?
0?
(0.00)?
0?
(0.00)?
0?
(0.00)?
Every?leader?sent?a?message.?
Suggestion?
4?
(3.05)?
7?
(0.00)?
3.67?
(2.55)?
6?
(1.24)?
p?=?0.13? p?=?0.27?
Males:?p=1.00;?Females:?p=0.13?
Mean?effort?
(group?average)?
4.38?
(3.02)?
6.44?
(1.61)?
4.46?
(2.57)?
5.53?
(1.87)?
p?=?0.00? p?=?0.22?
Males:?p?=?0.87;?Females:?p?=?0.00?
Mean?effort?
(leader)?
4?
(3.46)?
7?
(0.00)?
4?
(3.00)?
5.25?
(1.50)?
p?=?0.13? p?=?0.58?
Males:?p?=?1.00;?Females:?p?=?0.05?
Min.?effort?
2.5?
(2.64)?
2.5?
(1.52)?
3?
(2.89)?
3.75?
(2.82)?
p?=?0.74? p?=?0.84?
Males:?p?=?0.82;?Females:?p?=?0.54?
Mean?earnings?
0.35?
(0.25)?
0.19?
(0.18)?
0.39?
(0.20)?
0.39?
(0.23)?
p?=?0.00? p?=?0.78?
Males:?p?=?0.64;?Females:?p?=?0.00?
Share?of?
followers?
0.88?
(0.34)?
0.88?
(0.34)?
0.71?
(0.46)?
0.78?
(0.42)?
p?=?1.00? p?=?0.58?
Males:?p?=?0.37;?Females:?p?=?0.51?
Guessed?share?of?
followers?(group?
average)?
0.84?
(0.31)?
0.92?
(0.21)?
0.66?
(0.35)?
0.79?
(0.26)?
p?=?0.33? p?=?0.19?
Males:?p?=?0.01;?Females:?p?=?0.01?
Guessed?share?of?
followers?(leader)?
0.96?
(0.07)?
1?
(0.00)?
0.71?
(0.38)?
0.61?
(0.14)?
p?=?0.32? p?=?0.48?
Males:?p?=?0.24;?Females:?p?=?0.01?
Overestimation?
(group?average)?
?0.25?
(2.36)?
0.28?
(1.78)?
?0.33?
(2.53)?
0.03?
(2.06)?
p?=?0.20? p?=?0.53?
Males:?p?=?0.72;?Females:?p?=?0.20?
Overestimation?
(leader)?
0.75?
(0.96)?
1?
(0.00)?
0.00?
(2.00)?
?1.25?
(1.71)?
p?=?0.51? p?=?0.37?
Males:?p?=?0.58;?Females:?p?=?0.05?
Notes.? The? table? reports? the?mean,? standard?deviation? (in?parentheses),? and?p?values?of?non?parametric?
Wilcoxon? rank?sum? test? results.?We? test? for? treatment?differences?with? the?null?hypothesis? that? the? two?
samples? come? from? the? same? population.? The? suggestion? variable? contains? only? positive? numeric?
suggestions?and?has?missing?values?if?no?message?was?sent.?The?belief?variables?contain?missing?values?if?the?
question?was?omitted?during?the?experiment?due?to?leaders?who?sent?no?message.?Overestimation?refers?to?
the?number?of? followers,? instead?of? the?share.?Since?observations?are? independent? in? the? first?period,?we?
collapse?the?data?only?when?testing?group?level?variables,?which?are:?suggestion,?minimum?effort,?and?share?
of?followers.?
?
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Leaders? in?Gender?Not?Revealed?hold?optimistic?beliefs?about?the?share?of?their?followers,?whereas?
leaders? in?Gender?Revealed?seem?to?be?more?careful?concerning?their?beliefs.?Compared?to?female?
leaders,? we? do? not? find? that? male? leaders? would? significantly? overestimate? the? share? of? their?
followers?across? revelation? conditions? (p?>?0.31).?On? the?other?hand,? female? leaders? change? their?
beliefs? across? revelation? conditions? (p? =? 0.01).? In? Gender?Not?Revealed? they? overestimate? the?
number?of?followers?by?1?person,?whereas?in?Gender?Revealed?their?overestimation?flips?180?degrees?
and? they?underestimate?by?an?even?higher?extent?of?1.25?persons.?Women?might?either?not? trust?
followers?to?follow?them,?or?not?trust?in?the?popularity?of?their?suggestions?once?gender?is?revealed.?
Anyhow,? in?Gender?Revealed,?women?become?more? careful? in? their?beliefs,? suggestions? and?own?
effort?choices.?
Usually? in? the?minimum? effort? coordination? game,? if? centralized? communication? is? possible,?we?
would?expect?to?see?high?group?average?effort,?high?minimum?effort?and?high?average?earnings?as?a?
consequence?of?high?suggestions?(Kriss?and?Eil?2012).?Instead,?especially?in?Gender?Not?Revealed,?we?
find? that? female? leaders? requesting? seven? lead? their?groups? into? coordination? failure,?and? thus? to?
losses?and?the?outstandingly?low?mean?earnings?of?$0.19?in?the?first?period.?Mean?earnings?of?those?
women?led?groups?differ?significantly?across?revelation?conditions?(p?=?0.00)?and?compared?to?male?
leaders?(p?=?0.00).?In? line?with?the?severe? losses,?women? initially?overestimate?the?number?of?their?
followers,? and? adjust? their?beliefs?by? learning? in? later?periods? (see?Panel?B? in? Figure?2.2? showing?
overestimation?by? leaders?under?different?treatment?conditions).?The?severe? initial? failure?reminds?
followers?of?the?riskiness?to?follow?a?high?suggestion,?and?experiencing?an?unsuccessful?first?period?
history?might? explain?much? of? the? overall? results? of? later? periods.? In?Gender?Revealed,? the?more?
careful?suggestions?of?women?result?in?balanced?outcomes?reaching?periodic?earnings?of?$0.39?with?
no?difference?in?leader?effectiveness?between?male?and?female?leaders?throughout?the?rest?of?the?20?
periods?(see?Panel?A?in?Figure?2.2?showing?group?mean?effort?by?treatment?conditions).?
Figure?2.2? Treatment?effects?by?treatment?conditions?in?all?20?periods,?averaged?into?quartiles?
A.?Effect?on?group?mean?effort? B.?Effect?on?overestimation?of?the?number?of?
followers?by?the?leader?
?
Although?both?men?and?women?in?Gender?Revealed?seem?to?be?more?careful,?the?change?in?female?
behavior?might?drive?our?results.?One?explanation?for?our?observations?could?be?that?female?leaders?
are?more? eager? than?male? leaders? to? reach? the? very? best? outcome,? so? that? they? start?with? high?
ambitions? and? request? the? highest? possible? effort? (Kay? and? Shipman? 2014).?However,? once? their?
profile?picture? is?revealed,?they?become?more?uncertain,? in?a?sense? lose?confidence,?about?how?to?
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judge? the? number? of? their? followers,? and? they?make?more? careful? (less? risky)? decisions.? Another?
explanation?for?the?change?in?female?leaders’?behavior?across?the?revelation?conditions?could?be?that?
revealing?the?profile?picture?makes?the?leader’s?interaction?with?the?group?more?personal,?and?since?
females? are?more? sensible? for? such? experiences? it? could? increase? the? female? leader’s? sense? of?
responsibility?towards?the?group?and?concern?about?the?welfare?of?followers.?Hence?they?make?more?
careful?(less?risky)?decisions,? instead?of?following?assertive?(or?even?perfectionist)? leader?ambitions,?
so?that?they?accept?even?medium?levels?of?coordination,?not?risking?that?the?worst?possible?scenario?
takes?place.?
2.3.3?Follower?Behavior?
This? section?analyzes?how? followers? react? to? their? leaders’? suggestions,?and?whether? the?different?
strategies?of?male?and?female?leaders?result?in?similar?leader?credibility?across?revelation?conditions.?
Before?starting? the?main?analysis,?we? first?analyze? the?aggregate?effects?of? leader?suggestions?and?
early?period?group?outcomes?on?effort.?Our?goal?is?to?show?the?leader’s?impact?on?follower?behavior?
and?the?history?dependence?in?the?minimum?effort?game.?We?run?subject?level?random?effects?GLS?
regressions?with? individual?effort?as?the?dependent?variable?and?message?value?as?the?explanatory?
variable,?combining?all?our?data? from?both? revelation?conditions?and? irrespective?of? the?gender?of?
the?leader.?We?exclude?observations?from?periods?1?and?2?as?we?include?the?numeric?message?values?
and?historic?minimum?effort?values?in?these?periods?as?additional?explanatory?variables.?In?Model?1?
we?add?the?first?period?suggestion?only,?in?Model?2?we?also?add?the?second?period?suggestion,?and?in?
Model?3?we?add?the?first?and?second?period?group?minimum?effort?as?well.?Table?2.6?contains?the?
estimation?results.?
Table?2.6? Effect?of?message?values?and?minimum?effort?levels?in?initial?periods?
DV:?effort?
18?periods?
n?=?2160?
?Model?1? Model?2? Model?3?
No?message?sent? 1.46***?
(0.19)?
1.43***?
(0.18)?
1.31***?
(0.18)?
Suggestion? 0.62***?
(0.03)?
0.58***?
(0.03)?
0.46***?
(0.04)?
1st?period?suggestion? ?0.11**?
(0.05)?
?0.28***?
(0.04)?
?0.26***?
(0.08)?
2nd?period?suggestion? ? 0.24***?
(0.03)?
?0.04?
(0.04)?
1st?period?minimum?effort? ? ? 0.17**?
(0.08)?
2nd?period?minimum?effort? ? ? 0.39***?
(0.09)?
Constant? 1.76***?
(0.31)?
1.62***?
(0.29)?
1.60***?
(0.38)?
Notes.?All?models?are?estimated?by?subject?level?random?effects?GLS?regressions?and?contain?2160?
observations?of?120?subjects?over?18?periods.?Periods?1?and?2?are?excluded?from?the?regressions.?
Standard? errors? (in? parentheses)? are? corrected? for? clustering? at? the? individual? level.?
***Statistically?significant?at?the?1%? level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%? level,?*statistically?
significant?at?the?10%?level.?
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We?find?that?the?leader’s?suggestion?is?a?significant?predictor?of?effectiveness?in?all?three?models:?the?
higher? the? suggestion? the?higher? the?average?group?effort,?which? is? in? line?with?earlier? findings? in?
literature?(Cooper?2007).?A?one?unit?higher?first?period?suggestion?has?a?significant?negative?effect?on?
effectiveness? in?all? three?models.?From?Model?2?we? can? see? that?although?a?one?unit?higher? first?
period?suggestion?destroys?effectiveness?by?0.28?units,?a?one?unit?higher?suggestion? in? the?second?
period?increases?effectiveness?by?0.24?units.?However,?the?result?for?the?second?period?suggestion?is?
not? robust? if?we? include? the?minimum? effort? levels? of? the? first? two? periods? in?Model? 3.? Group?
performance?history?in?early?periods?affects?outcomes?significantly,?which?confirms?the?effect?of?the?
inductive?selection?principle?in?the?game.?We?can?observe?that?strategies?of?starting?with?low?effort?
level?suggestions? in?the?first?period?and? later? increase?of?suggestions?(usually? in?the?second?period)?
worked?well.?
2.3.3.1?Gender?Not?Revealed?
Next,?we?run?subject?level?random?and?fixed?effects?GLS?regressions,?restricted?to?follower?behavior?
only.? Table? 2.7? summarizes? the? regression? results? in? Gender?Not?Revealed.?We? cluster? standard?
errors?at?the?individual?level.?The?dependent?variable?is?individual?effort?in?all?four?models.?
In?Model? 1,? the? explanatory? variables? are? the? gender? of? the? leader,? interaction? variables? of? the?
gender?of?the? leader?and?a?dummy?which?takes?the?value?of?1? if?the? leader?sent?no?message?and?0?
otherwise,?and?interaction?variables?of?the?gender?of?the?leader?and?the?message?value.?The?gender?
of? the? leader? in?Gender?Not?Revealed? is?only? a? control? variable,?which? allows?us? to? compare? the?
estimation?results?across?revelation?conditions.?Trivially,?we?expect?to?find?no?gender?differences?in?
the?effects?of?sending?no?message?or?another?message?than?zero.?In?Gender?Not?Revealed,?followers?
could?have?perceived?any?difference?between?male?and? female? leaders?only? through? the? leaders’?
message?sending?behavior,?as?a?difference?in?message?values.?Indeed,?we?find?that?the?coefficient?for?
having? a? female? leader? who? requests? zero? is? not? significant.? According? to? the? results? of? the?
corresponding?post?estimation?tests,?the?effects?of?sending?no?message?or?sending?another?message?
than? zero? do? not? differ? by? the? gender? of? the? leader.?Moreover,? the? post?estimation? test? on? the?
gender?difference? in? total?effects? is?not?significant? (p?=?0.39).? In?Gender?Not?Revealed,? there? is?no?
difference?in?follower?behavior?when?following?male?or?female?leaders.?
If?the?message?value? increases?by?one?unit,?the?follower?effort? increases?significantly?by?0.60?units,?
for?both?male?and?female?leaders.?Sending?no?message?has?a?significant?positive?coefficient?for?both?
male?and?female?leaders,?telling?that?it?is?better?to?send?no?message?than?to?send?a?low?suggestion.?
The? cutoff? for? both?male? and? female? leaders? is? at?message? value? “5”.? Although? sending? a? low?
suggestion?results?in?a?lower?average?group?effort?level,?a?low?suggestion?improves?coordination?on?
the?lower?effort?level,?which?again?increases?mean?group?earnings.?Therefore,?considering?earnings,?
it?can?still?be?useful?to?send?low?messages?as?well.?
In?Model?2,?we?extend?Model?1?and?add? interaction?variables?of?the?gender?of?the? leader?and? the?
previous? minimum? effort.? The? previous? minimum? effort,? or? group? history,? is? an? important?
explanatory?variable? in?the?minimum?effort?coordination?game,?since?group?members?get?feedback?
about?this?variable? in?each?period.?The?previous?minimum?effort?has?a?significant?positive?effect?on?
follower?effort,?in?case?of?both?male?and?female?leaders.?Followers?led?by?women?rely?more?on?group?
history?than?followers?led?by?men.?The?post?estimation?test?reveals?that?the?difference?between?the?
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effects?is?significant?(p?=?0.01).?In?line?with?this?difference,?we?find?that?the?difference?in?the?effects?
of?message?content?increases,?compared?to?the?results?of?Model?1.?The?effect?of?sending?a?one?unit?
higher?message?value?decreases? stronger? for? female? rather? than?male? leaders.?The? coefficient? for?
male? leaders?drops? from?0.60? to?0.50,?whereas? for? female? leaders? it?drops? from?0.60? to?0.30.?The?
post?estimation?test?result?becomes?significant?(p?=?0.04).?Similarly,?if?leaders?send?no?message,?the?
effect?sizes?shrink?for?female?leaders?more?and?the?post?estimation?test?results?become?significant?(p?
=?0.08).?It?seems?as?if?followers?led?by?women?would?rely?more?on?group?history?than?on?the?leader’s?
suggestion.?
Table?2.7? Follower?behavior?if?gender?is?not?revealed?
DV:?effort?
Random?effects? Subject?fixed?
effects?
Model?1? Model?2? Model?3? Model?4?
n?=?1120? n?=?1120? n?=?1120? n?=?1120?
Female?leader? ?0.09?
(0.18)?
?0.07?
(0.13)?
?0.16?
(0.14)?
?0.18?
(0.20)?
Gender?x?No?message?sent??
Male?leader? 2.71***?
(0.63)?
2.55***?
(0.65)?
2.48***?
(0.66)?
2.47***?
(0.34)?
Female?leader? 2.23***?
(0.40)?
1.36***?
(0.37)?
1.14***?
(0.40)?
1.18***?
(0.25)?
Post?estimation?test? p?=?0.44? p?=?0.08? p?=?0.06? p?=?0.00?
Gender?x?Suggestion?
Male?leader? 0.60***?
(0.04)?
0.50***?
(0.07)?
0.50***?
(0.07)?
0.46***?
(0.03)?
Female?leader? 0.60***?
(0.04)?
0.30***?
(0.06)?
0.26***?
(0.06)?
0.28***?
(0.04)?
Post?estimation?test? p?=?0.84? p?=?0.04? p?=?0.01? p?=?0.00?
Gender?x?Previous?minimum?effort?
Male?leader? ? 0.47***?
(0.07)?
0.47***?
(0.07)?
0.39***?
(0.04)?
Female?leader? ? 0.69***?
(0.06)?
0.74***?
(0.06)?
0.62***?
(0.06)?
Post?estimation?test? ? p?=?0.01? p?=?0.00? p?=?0.00?
Gender?x?Difference?between?previous?message?and?previous?minimum?effort?
Male?leader? ? ? ?0.05?
(0.05)?
?0.04?
(0.03)?
Female?leader? ? ? 0.06?
(0.05)?
0.07**?
(0.03)?
Post?estimation?test? ? ? p?=?0.08? p?=?0.01?
Constant? 1.21***?
(0.16)?
0.16*?
(0.09)?
0.22**?
(0.09)?
0.58***?
(0.16)?
Notes.?Subject?level? random?and? fixed?effects?GLS? regressions.?All?models? contain?1120?observations?of?56?
followers? in?20?periods.?Standard?errors? (in?parentheses)?are?corrected? for?clustering?at?the? individual? level.?
***Statistically?significant?at?the?1%?level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?
the?10%?level.?For?the?post?estimation?Wald?tests?of?linear?hypotheses?we?report?p?values.?
?
In?Model?3,?we?extend?Model?2?by?adding?interaction?variables?of?the?gender?of?the?leader?and?the?
difference?between? the?previous?message?value?and? the?previous?minimum?effort.?The?difference?
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between? the? leader’s? previous?message? and? the? group’s? previous?minimum? effort? tells? us? how?
effective? the? leader?was? in? the? previous? period.? The? higher? the? value? of? this? variable,? the?more?
severe?the?coordination?failure?and?the?less?effective?the?leader?was.?Followers?can?observe?previous?
leader?effectiveness,?which?might? influence?their?beliefs?about?the?credibility?of?the? leader.?We?are?
curious?how?followers?react?to?a?change? in?the?previous?period’s? leader?effectiveness?and?how?this?
affects? the? other? explanatory? variables.? If?male? leaders? lose? support? by? one? unit,? follower? effort?
slightly?decreases?by?0.05,?but?this?coefficient?is?not?significant.?If?female?leaders?lose?support?by?one?
unit,?follower?effort?slightly? increases?by?0.06,?but?again?this?coefficient? is?not?significant.?Based?on?
the?post?estimation?test,?the?difference?between?the?effects?is?significant?(p?=?0.08).?In?other?words,?
previous?leader?effectiveness?has?no?explanatory?power,?although?female?leaders?appear?as?still?tried?
to?be? followed.?The?effects?of?group?history?remain?stable?and? the?difference?between? the?effects?
remains?significant?(p?=?0.00),?compared?to?the?results?of?Model?2.?Similarly,?the?effects?of?message?
value?remain?stable?and?the?difference?between?the?effects?becomes?even?more?significant?(p?=?0.01).?
Thus,? we? can? observe? that? followers? rely? more? on? group? history? than? on? the? female? leader’s?
suggestion,? although? gender? is? hidden.? One? obvious? reason? for? this? observation? is? that?women?
request?higher?effort?than?men,?even?after?a?failure?to?coordinate?on?the?requested?effort?level.?
Male?and? female? leaders?differ? in? their?message? sending? strategy.?From?Panel?B? in?Figure?2.2?and?
Figures?A3?and?A2?in?Appendix?1A,?it?gets?graphically?obvious?that?female?leaders?fail?to?adjust?their?
suggestions? to? the? established? group? history:? the? minimum? effort? in? their? groups? is? low,? their?
suggestions? are?high,?but? the? share?of? their? followers? is? low? as?well.?Once? followers? experienced?
coordination?failure,?they?are?less?willing?to?follow?high?suggestions.?Female?leaders?seem?to?ignore?
group?history,?and?we?will? further?explore? this?behavior? in? the? section?on? leader?behavior.?Group?
history? is? important? to? a? smaller? extent? in? the? groups? lead? by?male? leaders.?However,? followers?
follow?male? leaders’?changing?suggestions? in?a?robust?and?significant?manner.?As?we?will?see? in?the?
section?on?leader?behavior,?this?can?be?explained?by?male?leaders?being?more?willing?to?switch?their?
suggestions?even?to?a?lower?level,?in?order?to?optimize?group?earnings?that?way.?
Finally,? in?Model?4?we?estimate?the?regression?of?Model?3?with?subjects?fixed?effects?to?control?for?
everything?else?concerning?participants,?like?race,?age,?years,?field?of?studies,?willingness?to?take?risk,?
and? other? subject?specific? variables?we? did? not? ask? for? during? the? experiment.?We? find? that? our?
results? remain? robust.?We? conclude? that?we? find? support? for? Prediction? 2,?namely? that?men? and?
women?are?followed?to?the?same?extent?if?gender?is?hidden.?
2.3.3.2?Gender?Revealed?
In?this?section?we?repeat?the?previous?subject?level?random?and?fixed?effects?regressions,?this?time?
for?the?treatment?condition?where?gender?was?revealed.?Table?2.8?contains?the?results.? In?Gender?
Revealed,? there? are? two? sources? for? gender? differences? perceived? by? the? followers:? the?message?
sending?strategy?of?the?leader?and?the?gender?information?revealed?by?the?profile?pictures.?In?order?
to?separate?these?effects,?we?control?in?all?the?four?models?for?the?message?values?and?whether?any?
message? was? sent.? Holding? leader? messages? constant,? we? compare? whether? followers? behave?
differently?based?on?the?leader’s?gender.?
In?Model?1,?we?find?that?followers?significantly?decrease?their?effort?contribution?by?0.34?(p?=?0.00)?if?
they? are? led? by?women,? rather? than?men,?who? request? zero.? The? effects? of? an? increase? in? the?
40?
?
message?value?do?not?differ?significantly?by?the?gender?of?the?leader?(p?=?0.78).?If?the?message?value?
increases?by?one?unit,?the?follower?effort?significantly?increases?by?0.83?and?0.84?units?respectively.?
Sending?no?message?has?significant?positive?coefficients?for?both?male?and?female? leaders,?who?do?
not?differ?in?effects?on?followers?compared?to?each?other?(p?=?0.12).?Moreover,?the?post?estimation?
test?on?the?gender?difference? in?total?effects? is?far?from?significant? (p?=?0.76).? In?Gender?Revealed,?
there?is?no?difference?in?follower?behavior?when?following?male?or?female?leaders,?which?is?similar?to?
Gender?Not?Revealed.?
Table?2.8? Follower?behavior?if?gender?is?revealed?
DV:?effort?
Random?effects? Subject?fixed?
effects?
Model?1? Model?2? Model?3? Model?4?
n?=?980? n?=?980? n?=?980? n?=?980?
Female?leader? ?0.34***?
(0.10)?
?0.19**?
(0.08)?
?0.20**?
(0.09)?
?0.14?
(0.14)?
Gender?x?No?message?sent??
Male?leader? 0.89***?
(0.22)?
0.75***?
(0.23)?
0.76***?
(0.24)?
0.86***?
(0.23)?
Female?leader? 1.30***?
(0.18)?
0.77***?
(0.21)?
0.77***?
(0.22)?
0.83***?
(0.18)?
Post?estimation?test? p?=?0.12? p?=?0.96? p?=?0.97? p?=?0.90?
Gender?x?Suggestion?
Male?leader? 0.83***?
(0.03)?
0.62***?
(0.08)?
0.61***?
(0.08)?
0.65***?
(0.04)?
Female?leader? 0.84***?
(0.04)?
0.45***?
(0.08)?
0.45***?
(0.08)?
0.45***?
(0.03)?
Post?estimation?test? p?=?0.78? p?=?0.10? p?=?0.09? p?=?0.00?
Gender?x?Previous?minimum?effort?
Male?leader? ? 0.37***?
(0.08)?
0.37***?
(0.08)?
0.44***?
(0.06)?
Female?leader? ? 0.56***?
(0.08)?
0.57***?
(0.08)?
0.66***?
(0.07)?
Post?estimation?test? ? p?=?0.05? p?=?0.04? p?=?0.00?
Gender?x?Difference?between?previous?message?and?previous?minimum?effort?
Male?leader? ? ? 0.01?
(0.04)?
0.04?
(0.03)?
Female?leader? ? ? 0.01?
(0.04)?
0.01?
(0.02)?
Post?estimation?test? ? ? p?=?0.98? p?=?0.49?
Constant? 0.57***?
(0.09)?
0.12*?
(0.07)?
0.12*?
(0.07)?
?0.28?
(0.27)?
Notes.? Subject?level? random? and? fixed? effects?GLS? regressions.?All?models? contain? 980? observations? of? 49?
followers? in?20?periods.?Standard?errors? (in?parentheses)?are?corrected?for?clustering?at?the? individual? level.?
***Statistically?significant?at?the?1%?level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?
the?10%?level.?For?the?post?estimation?Wald?tests?of?linear?hypotheses?we?report?p?values.?
?
In?Model?2,?we?add? interaction? variables?of? the?gender?of? the? leader?and? the?previous?minimum?
effort.?Similarly,?like?in?Gender?Not?Revealed,?the?previous?minimum?effort?has?a?significant?positive?
effect?on? follower?effort,? in?case?of?both?male?and? female? leaders.?Again,? followers? led?by?women?
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rely?more?on? group?history? than? followers? led?by?men.? The?post?estimation? test? reveals? that? the?
difference?between?the?effects?is?significant?(p?=?0.05).?In? line?with?this?difference,?we?find?that?the?
difference?in?the?effects?of?message?value?increases,?compared?to?the?results?of?Model?1.?The?effect?
of?sending?a?one?unit?higher?message?value?decreases?stronger?for?female?rather?than?male?leaders,?
and?the?post?estimation?test?result?becomes?significant?(p?=?0.10).?The?coefficient?for?male? leaders?
drops?from?0.83?to?0.62,?whereas?for?female?leaders?it?drops?from?0.84?to?0.45.?Like?in?Gender?Not?
Revealed,?followers?led?by?women?might?rely?more?on?group?history?than?on?the?leader’s?suggestion,?
although?the?gender?gap?in?message?value?effects?is?smaller?in?Gender?Revealed?(27%)?than?it?was?in?
Gender?Not?Revealed?(40%).?
In?Model?3,?we?add?interaction?variables?of?the?gender?of?the?leader?and?the?difference?between?the?
previous?message?value?and? the?previous?minimum?effort,? to?which?we?also? referred?as?previous?
leader? effectiveness.? Like? in? Gender?Not?Revealed,? the? previous? leader? effectiveness? has? only?
insignificant?small?effects?on?follower?effort.?The?effects?are?the?same?with?male?and?female?leaders?
(p?=?0.98).?The?effects?of?group?history?remain?stable?and?the?difference?between?the?effects?remains?
significant? (p?=?0.04),?compared? to? the? results?of?Model?2.?Similarly,? the?effects?of?message?value?
remain?stable?and?the?difference?between?the?effects?remains?significant?(p?=?0.09).?
Finally,?in?Model?4,?we?estimate?the?regression?of?Model?3?with?subjects?fixed?effects?to?control?for?
everything?else? concerning?participants.?We? find? that? the? coefficient? for? the?gender?of? the? leader?
decreases? to? ?0.14? and? is? not? significant? anymore? (p? =? 0.32).? The? effect? of? the?message? value?
increases? for?male? leaders?and?the?standard?errors? for?both?male?and? female? leaders?decrease,?so?
that? the?difference? in?message?value?effects? is?magnified? (p?=?0.00).?The?other? results?of?Model?3?
remain?robust.?From?the?fixed?effects?regression?it?gets?clear?that,?just?like?in?Gender?Not?Revealed,?it?
is?the?message?value?and?the?group?history?which?matter?the?most?for?the?effort?choice?of?followers,?
and? the?effects?of? the?message?value?and? the?group?history?differ? significantly?between?male?and?
female?leaders.?
Like?we?speculated?above,?gender?might?have? its?main?effect?through?the?chosen?message?sending?
strategy? of? the? leader,? like? which? suggestion? to? send? first? and? whether? to? switch? to? another?
suggestion?later.?In?the?descriptive?section?we?found?that?female?leaders?start?in?the?first?period?with?
requesting?higher?effort? levels? than?male? leaders,?under?both? revelation?conditions? (Table?2.5).? In?
Gender?Revealed,?women? send? on? average? lower,?more? careful? suggestions? than? in?Gender?Not?
Revealed,?and?this?could?explain?why?we?observe?a?smaller?gender?gap?in?the?message?value?effects.?
On? the? other? hand,? looking? at? follower? behavior? in? the? first? period? (Table? 2.5),? it?might? be? that?
revealing?information?about?the?leader?makes?it?easier?to?establish?initial?trust?in?the?first?period,?and?
therefore?the?riskier?high?value?messages?sent?by?female?leaders?are?easier?to?follow.?Since?history?is?
naturally?significant?in?this?game,?the?higher?early?messages?are?supposed?to?support?female?leader?
effectiveness.? Indeed,?we? find? that? the?effect?of? group?history?matters?more? for? followers? led?by?
women.?Male? leaders’?willingness? to? switch? to? a? lower?message? and? optimize? earnings? that?way?
similarly?supports?male?leader?effectiveness.?Sending?any?suggestion,?even?a?low?message?of?only?1,?
gets?more? attractive? relative? to? sending? no?message? at? all:? the? coefficients? for? not? sending? any?
message?are?much?lower?than?in?the?control?treatment.?
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We?conclude?that?we? find?no?support? for?Prediction?2,?namely?that?men?are? followed?to?a?greater?
extent?than?women?in?Gender?Revealed.?Instead,?we?find?that?men?and?women?are?followed?to?the?
same?extent.?
In?addition?to?the?analysis?above,?but?not?reported? in?the?table,?we?also?analyze?follower?behavior?
related?to?a?suggestion?to?play?seven?after?a?previous?period?of?failure.?After?a?failure?period,?leader?
effectiveness?matters? the?most:? only? effective? leaders? can?move? their? followers? to? overcome? a?
history?of?coordination?failure?and?to?turn?around?the?game?play?to?a?higher?minimum?effort? level.?
For?this?analysis,?we?collapse?the?data?by?group?and?period,?and?run?group?level?random?effects?GLS?
regressions?with?standard?errors?corrected?for?clustering?at?the?group?level.?The?dependent?variable?
is?followers’?minimum?effort?and?the?explanatory?variables?are?interaction?variables?of?the?revelation?
treatment,?the?gender?of?the? leader,?and?a?dummy? for?requesting?seven.?We? find?that?under?both?
revelation?conditions,?men?and?women?are?followed?to?the?same?extent?after?a?failure?period.?
Conclusion?2:?We? find?only?partially?support? for?Prediction?2.?Men?and?women?are? followed? to? the?
same?extent,?both?in?Gender?Not?Revealed?and?Gender?Revealed.?
2.3.4?Leader?Behavior?
This? section? analyzes? how? the? leaders? react? to? the? observed? behavior? of? their? followers,? namely?
group?history,?and?which?are?the?different?strategies?of?male?and?female?leaders.?Figure?2.3?depicts?
the?mean?message?value?by?treatment?conditions.?The?figure?shows?that?female? leaders?send?both?
initially? and? on? average? higher? suggestions? than? their? male? counterparts,? in? both? revelation?
conditions.?
Figure?2.3? Mean?message?values?by?treatment?conditions?in?quartiles?of?all?20?periods?
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2.3.4.1?Gender?Not?Revealed?
To?analyze?leader?behavior,?we?run?subject?level?random?effects?GLS?regressions?restricted?solely?to?
observations? of? leaders? in? each? period.? Table? 2.9? contains? the? results? for? Gender?Not?Revealed.?
Standard?errors?are?clustered?at?the?individual?level.?The?dependent?variable?is?the?message?value?in?
all?four?models.?
Table?2.9? Leader?behavior?if?gender?is?not?revealed?
DV:?message?
Random?effects?
Model?1? Model?2? Model?3? Model?4?
n?=?160? n?=?160? n?=?160? n?=?160?
Female?leader? 1.38?
(1.10)?
0.00?
(0.78)?
?0.09?
(0.72)?
?2.77?
(1.69)?
Gender?x?Previous?message?
Male?leader? ? 0.63***?
(0.12)?
0.81***?
(0.07)?
0.89***?
(0.06)?
Female?leader? ? 0.68***?
(0.12)?
0.81***?
(0.08)?
0.90***?
(0.08)?
Post?estimation?test? ? p?=?0.74? p?=?0.99? p?=?0.94?
Gender?x?Difference?between?previous?message?and?previous?minimum?effort?
Male?leader? ? ? ?0.75***?
(0.10)?
?0.98***?
(0.07)?
Female?leader? ? ? ?0.31*?
(0.18)?
?0.26?
(0.19)?
Post?estimation?test? ? ? p?=?0.03? p?=?0.00?
Gender?x?Previous?guessed?share?of?followers?
Male?leader? ? ? ? ?2.60**?
(1.27)?
Female?leader? ? ? ? ?0.06?
(0.87)?
Post?estimation?test? ? ? ? p?=?0.10?
Constant? 3.78***?
(0.79)?
1.43***?
(0.43)?
1.32***?
(0.45)?
3.31**?
(1.35)?
Notes.?Subject?level?random?effects?GLS?regressions.?All?models?contain?160?observations?of?8? leaders? in?20?
periods.?Standard?errors? (in?parentheses)?are?corrected? for?clustering?at?the? individual? level.?***Statistically?
significant?at?the?1%?level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
For?the?post?estimation?Wald?tests?of?linear?hypotheses?we?report?p?values.?
?
In?Model? 1,? the? only? explanatory? variable? is? the? gender? of? the? leader.? The? coefficient? for? being?
female? is?1.38,?but?not? significant? (p?=?0.21).?Although? female? leaders? send?higher?messages? than?
their?male? counterparts,?male?and? female? leaders?do?not? send? significantly?different?messages? to?
their?followers.25?
In?Model?2,?we?extend?Model?1?by?including?interaction?variables?of?the?gender?of?the?leader?and?the?
previous? message? value.? The? previously? sent? message? value? has? significant? positive? effects? on?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
25?If?we?modify?Model?1?by? clustering? at? the? group? level,?we? find? that? the? coefficient?of?1.38?has? a? robust?
standard?error?of?0.71?and?is?significant?(p?=?0.05),?which?means?that?female?leaders?send?significantly?higher?
suggestions?than?their?male?counterparts.?This? is?also? in? line?with?the?findings? in?Table?2.4?and? in?Table?A1? in?
Appendix?1A.?
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message?value,?and?the?effects?do?not?differ?based?on?the? leader’s?gender?(p?=?0.74).?The?effect?of?
the?gender? indicator?disappears?after?adding? the? interaction? term,?which?means? that? leaders?who?
previously?sent?zero?do?not?differ?by?gender?and?will?keep?suggesting?zero.?
In?Model?3,?we?extend?Model?2?by?adding?interaction?variables?of?the?gender?of?the?leader?and?the?
difference?between? the?previous?message?value?and? the?previous?minimum?effort,?which?we?also?
referred?to?as?previous?leader?effectiveness.?The?previous?leader?effectiveness,?which?can?be?seen?as?
the?previous?experience?of?the?leader,?might?influence?the?message?value.?We?find?that?male?leaders,?
who?experienced? coordination? failure,? significantly? reduce? the?message?value?by?0.75,?while? their?
female? counterparts? significantly? reduce? the?message? value? by? only? 0.31.? In? other?words,?male?
leaders? react? stronger? to? a? previous? experience? of? coordination? failure? and? they? adjust? their?
suggestion?to?group?history?more?than?their?female?counterparts.?The?difference?in?leader?reactions?
is?significant?(p?=?0.03).?
We?can?also?graphically?observe?the?gender?difference?in?message?sending?strategies.?If?we?compare?
Panel?A? of? Figure? 2.2?with? Figure? 2.3,?we? can? see? that? female? leaders? persistently? stick? to? send?
message? values?higher? than? the?average?group?effort,?whereas?male? leaders?are?more? flexible? to?
adapt?to?the?group’s?average?effort?level.?The?strategy?of?male?leaders?minimizes?individual?losses?by?
switching? their? suggestions? to? coordination? on? a? lower? effort? level? after? a? failure? period,? or? by?
switching?to?a?higher?suggestion?after?initial?trust?is?established?at?a?lower?level.?Since?followers?try?
to?avoid?losses,?suggestions?of?male?leaders?are?followed?more?often.?The?strategy?of?female?leaders?
focuses?on? the? group? as? a?whole? and? tries? to? reach? the?maximum? effort? level? equilibrium?which?
yields?the?highest?earnings?for?all.?However,?to?try?longer?to?reach?the?highest?effort?level?even?after?
a?failure?history?is?risky?for?all?group?members.?Since?group?history?can?be?interpreted?as?a?feedback?
from?the?group,?in?this?sense,?female?leaders?have?a?“thick?skin”?(Kriss?and?Eil?2012).?
In?Model?4,?we?extend?Model?3?by?adding?interaction?variables?of?the?gender?of?the?leader?and?the?
leader’s?previous?estimation?about?the?share?of?followers,?which?we?also?refer?to?as?leader’s?previous?
belief.?The? leader’s?belief? in? the?previous?period?has?a? significant?negative?effect?on? the?message?
value,?but?only? in?case?of?male? leaders.?Male? leaders,?who?believe?that?the?share?of?their?followers?
increased?from?0%?to?100%,?request?by?2.60?units?lower?effort.?To?follow?a?lower?suggestion?is?less?
risky,?so?that?leaders?naturally?feel?more?assured?that?they?will?be?followed?if?they?assume?others?to?
be?risk?averse.?This?observation?is?in?line?with?the?explanation?that?male?leaders?seem?to?act?on?the?
behalf?of?the?sum?of?their?followers:?the?more?they?think?they?are?followed,?the?less?risky?messages?
they?send,?and?the?more?flexibly?they?adjust?their?messages?to?group?history.?The?previous?beliefs?of?
female? leaders?have?nearly?no?effect?on?the?message?value.?The?gender?difference? in?the?effects?of?
previous?beliefs?is?significant?(p?=?0.10).?
We?conclude?that?we?find?no?support?for?Prediction?1?in?Gender?Not?Revealed.?
2.3.4.2?Gender?Revealed?
We?repeat?the?same?sequence?of?regressions?from?above?for?Gender?Revealed.?Table?2.10?contains?
the?results.?
? ?
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Table?2.10? Leader?behavior?if?gender?is?revealed?
DV:?message?
Random?effects?
Model?1? Model?2? Model?3? Model?4?
n?=?14? n?=?14? n?=?14? n?=?14?
Female?leader? 0.57?
(1.42)?
0.80?
(0.56)?
0.78*?
(0.43)?
?1.43?
(1.59)?
Gender?x?Previous?message?
Male?leader? ? 0.80***?
(0.12)?
0.94***?
(0.05)?
0.93***?
(0.05)?
Female?leader? ? 0.66***?
(0.13)?
0.82***?
(0.04)?
0.86***?
(0.11)?
Post?estimation?test? ? p?=?0.43? p?=?0.05? p?=?0.58?
Gender?x?Difference?between?previous?message?and?previous?minimum?effort?
Male?leader? ? ? ?0.65**?
(0.28)?
?0.64**?
(0.29)?
Female?leader? ? ? ?0.69***?
(0.10)?
?0.46***?
(0.17)?
Post?estimation?test? ? ? p?=?0.90? p?=?0.57?
Gender?x?Previous?guessed?share?of?followers?
Male?leader? ? ? ? 0.26?
(0.87)?
Female?leader? ? ? ? 2.17?
(1.69)?
Post?estimation?test? ? ? ? p?=?0.31?
Constant? 3.80***?
(1.10)?
0.66*?
(0.37)?
0.48?
(0.33)?
0.30?
(1.12)?
Notes.?Random?effects?GLS?regressions.?All?models?contain?14?observations?of?7?groups.?Standard?errors? (in?
parentheses)?are? corrected? for? clustering?at? the? individual? level.?***Statistically? significant?at? the?1%? level,?
**statistically? significant? at? the?5%? level,? *statistically? significant? at? the?10%? level.? For? the?post?estimation?
Wald?tests?of?linear?hypotheses?we?report?p?values.?
?
In?Model?1,?similarly?to?the?findings? in?Gender?Not?Revealed,?we?find?that,?although?female? leaders?
send?higher?messages?by?0.57,?compared? to? their?male?counterparts,?male?and? female? leaders?do?
not?send?significantly?different?messages?to?their?followers?(p?=?0.69).26?
From?Model? 2,? similarly? to? the? findings? in? Gender?Not?Revealed,? we? can? see? that? the? previous?
message?value?has?significant?positive?effects?on?message?value,?and?the?effects?do?not?differ?based?
on? the? leader’s? gender? (p? =? 0.43).? The? effect? of? the? gender? indicator? increases,? but? remains?
insignificant?(p?=?0.15),?after?adding?the?interaction?term,?which?means?that?leaders?who?previously?
sent?zero?do?not?significantly?differ?by?gender,?but?will?slightly?increase?the?message?value?they?send.?
In?Model?3,?just?like?in?the?analysis?above,?we?extend?Model?2?by?adding?interaction?variables?of?the?
gender?of?the? leader?and?the?previous?experience?of?the? leader.?Now?we?see?a?somewhat?different?
picture? than? in? Gender?Not?Revealed.? Again,? both? male? and? female? leaders,? who? experienced?
coordination?failure,?significantly?reduce?the?message?value,?but?male?and?female?leaders?in?Gender?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
26?If?we?modify?Model?1?by? clustering? at? the? group? level,?we? find? that? the? coefficient?of?0.57?has? a? robust?
standard?error?of?0.31?and?is?significant?(p?=?0.07),?which?means?that?female?leaders?send?significantly?higher?
suggestions? than? their? male? counterparts.? Compared? to? Gender?Not?Revealed,? the? difference? in? message?
values?between?male?and?female?leaders?is?smaller.?
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Revealed?react?in?the?same?way?to?a?previous?experience?of?coordination?failure?and?they?are?willing?
to? adjust? their? suggestion? to? group? history? to? the? same? extent? (p? =? 0.90).? In? exchange,? and? in?
comparison?to?Model?2,?the?effects?of?the?previous?message?value?become?significantly?different?for?
male?and?female?leaders?(p?=?0.05),?showing?a?stronger?effect?with?male? leaders.?The?coefficient?of?
being?a? female? leader?who?previously?sent?zero? is?0.78?and?significant? (p?=?0.07),?so? that?message?
values?are?additionally?higher?if?suggested?by?these?women,?rather?than?their?male?counterparts.?
We?could?also?interpret?the?results?of?Model?3?as?none?of?the?leaders?having?a?“thicker?skin”?against?
a?group?history?of?coordination?failure.?Both?male?and?female? leaders?are?quite?flexible?to?adapt?to?
the? group’s? average? effort? level? after? a? failure? history.? In? addition,? women? seem? to? be? more?
consistent?than?men,?thus?the?lower?effect?of?the?previous?message?value.?
In?Model?4,?we?extend?Model?3?by?adding?interaction?variables?of?the?gender?of?the?leader?and?the?
leader’s?previous?belief?about?the?share?of?followers.?The?effects?of?the?leader’s?previous?belief?are?
positive? for? both?male? and? female? leaders,? and? this?means? that? if? leaders? believe? to? have?more?
followers,?they?send?a?suggestion?with?a?higher?value.?Although?the?belief?effect?is?larger?for?women,?
the?coefficients?are?not?significant?and?the?gender?difference? in?the?effects? is?not?significant?either.?
The? fact? that? the? leader’s?previous?belief?has?no? significant?effect?on? the?message? value?possibly?
mirrors?that?both?male?and?female? leaders?get?more?careful? in?Gender?Revealed.?The?observations?
from?Table?2.5?in?the?descriptive?section?support?this?view.?Neither?male?nor?female?leaders?send?too?
risky?suggestions?in?the?first?period?if?their?profile?picture?is?revealed.?
Even?though?less?pronounced,?we?can?observe?the?same?message?sending?strategies?than?in?Gender?
Not?Revealed.?Male?leaders?follow?the?strategy?of?minimizing?losses.?First?they?try?to?establish?trust?
on?a?lower?level?of?coordination,?and?later?they?try?to?turn?around?the?early?group?history?when?they?
switch? to? a?higher? level? suggestion.? Female? leaders? follow? a?more? ambitious? strategy.? They? send?
riskier?high?level?suggestions?right?from?the?start?and?they?try?to?keep?a?“thick?skin”.?Although?we?do?
not?have?many?observations,?we?can?observe?that? in?Gender?Revealed?only?1?of?4?ambitious? initial?
trials?fails?and?turnarounds?are?unsuccessful,?whereas?in?Gender?Not?Revealed?5?of?6?ambitious?initial?
trials? fail? and? 2? turnarounds? are? successful? (Table? A2? in? Appendix? 1A).? Data? tells? that? the?male?
strategy?works?well?if?gender?is?hidden,?but?it?is?less?efficient?in?Gender?Revealed.?Obviously,?if?more?
information?is?revealed?about?the?leader,?it?gets?less?necessary?to?establish?initial?trust?and?to?follow?
a? less? risky? strategy.? Accordingly,? female? leaders? are?more? efficient?with? their?message? sending?
strategy? in?Gender?revealed,?compared?to?Gender?Not?Revealed.? It?might?be?easier?for?followers?to?
follow? an? early? period,? risky? suggestion? if? they? get? more? information? about? the? leader.? More?
information?might?increase?credibility.27?
The?fact?that?hidden?female?leaders?have?to?bear?more?coordination?failures?as?a?result?of?more?risky?
suggestions?might? seem,? at? first? glance,? to? be? in? contradiction?with? earlier? findings? in? literature,?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
27?In?order?to?test?the?speculation?that? leader?credibility? is?higher? in?Gender?Revealed,?we?run?a?subject?level?
random?effects?GLS?regression?with?followers’?effort?as?the?dependent?variable.?Independent?variables?are?the?
revelation?treatment?and?the?interaction?of?the?revelation?treatment?and?the?message?value.?If?we?pool?male?
and?female?leaders?together,?we?find?that?leader?credibility?is?boosted?in?Gender?Revealed,?since?the?result?of?
the?post?estimation?test?for?the?difference?between?conditions?is?significant?at?the?10%?level.?If?we?restrict?our?
regression?by?gender?of? the? leader,?we? find? that? the? result? is?driven?by?boosted? female? credibility.? Female?
leaders?are?more?credible?if?gender?is?revealed,?and?the?post?estimation?test?yields?a?p?value?of?0.03.?Of?course,?
the?observed?gender?differences?in?credibility?might?be?influenced?by?initial?actions?and?leader?strategy.?
47?
?
suggesting?to?start?with?the?highest?and?most?risky?suggestion? in?the?first?period? in?order?to?have?a?
chance?to?establish?a?history?of?high?group?minimum?effort?levels?(Kriss?and?Eil?2012;?Brandts?et?al.?
forthcoming).?However,? to? turn?around?outcomes?after?a? severe? failure?experience? is?harder? than?
doing? so?after?a? first?period?of? successful? coordination?on?a? low? level,?which? speaks? for? the?male?
strategy.? Justifying? the? female? strategy,?we? have? also? observed? that? ambitious? leaders? get?more?
credible?and?successful?if?gender?is?revealed.?Thereby?the?effectiveness?of?the?female?strategy?gives?
reason? to? think? that? if?male? leaders?would? send?more?often? riskier?high?level? suggestions? in?early?
periods,?they?could?improve?the?performance?of?their?groups?in?Gender?revealed.?
We?conclude?that?we?find?no?support?for?Prediction?1?in?Gender?Revealed.?
Conclusion?3:?We?find?no?support?for?Prediction?1?in?none?of?the?revelation?conditions.?If?gender?is?not?
revealed,?female?leaders?send?higher?suggestions?than?their?male?counterparts.?If?gender?is?revealed,?
male?and?female?leaders?do?not?differ?in?behavior.?
2.3.5?Other?Variables?and?Controls?
Finally,? we? analyze? whether? followers? evaluate? their? leaders? differently? based? on? gender? and?
whether?they?prefer?the?leader’s?role,?if?they?could?choose?the?role?assignment.?For?this,?we?use?data?
from?the?final?questionnaire?described?above.?
Evaluation?of?the?leaders?
Based?on?the?periodic?mean?earnings?(Figure?A4?in?Appendix?1A),?the?share?of?followers?(Figure?A2?in?
Appendix?1A),?and? the? failure? to?adapt? to?group?history,?we?would?expect? that? female? leaders? in?
Gender?Not?Revealed?would?be?blamed? the?most?by? followers,?and? this? is? indeed?what?we? see? in?
Figure?2.4.?The?figure?depicts?the?evaluation?of?leaders?in?percentages?by?treatment?conditions.?
Figure?2.4? Evaluation?of?the?leader?by?treatment?conditions?
?
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To?ease?comprehension,?we? interpret? the?original?answer?keys?as?“very?poor”? for?1,?“poor”? for?2,?
“average”?for?3,?“good”?for?4,?and?“very?good”?for?5.?We?compare?evaluations?of?male?and?female?
leaders?using?two?sample?Wilcoxon?rank?sum?(Mann?Whitney)?tests?by?revelation?treatment.?Table?
A4? in? Appendix? 1A? contains? the? results.? Female? leaders? in? Gender?Not?Revealed? receive? worse?
evaluations? than? their?male?counterparts? (p?=?0.03).?Male? leaders?get?on?average?an?evaluation?of?
2.97,?and?female?leaders?get?2.49,?irrespective?of?the?revelation?treatment.?
To?put?our?analysis?on?statistically?firmer?grounds,?we?restrict?the?data?to?follower?observations?and?
run?subject?level?random?effects?GLS?regressions?to?test?the?effect?of?a?leader’s?gender,?the?group’s?
performance? measured? by? group? minimum? effort,? and? the? leader’s? message? on? the? leader’s?
evaluation.?Standard?errors?are?clustered?at?the?individual?level.?Table?2.11?contains?the?results.?
Table?2.11? Evaluation?of?the?leader?by?revelation?conditions?
DV:?evaluation?of?the?
leader?
Gender?Not?Revealed? Gender?Revealed?
n?=?112? n?=?98?
(1)? (2)? (3)? (4)? (5)? (6)?
Female?leader? ?0.51***?
(0.16)?
?1.07***?
(0.28)?
?0.27?
(0.94)?
?0.44*?
(0.24)?
?1.22***?
(0.36)?
?2.06?
(1.91)?
Gender?x?Minimum?effort?
Male?leader? ? 0.24***?
(0.05)?
0.20?
(0.19)?
? ?0.01?
(0.07)?
0.82***?
(0.20)?
Female?leader? ? 0.35***?
(0.06)?
0.47***?
(0.06)?
? 0.22***?
(0.07)?
?0.51?
(1.30)?
Post?estimation?test? ? p?=?0.04? p?=?0.16? ? p?=?0.00? p?=?0.32?
Gender?x?No?message?sent?
Male?leader? ? ? ?8.89*?
(4.68)?
? ? ?3.59*?
(1.99)?
Female?leader? ? ? ?1.88?
(1.48)?
? ? ?5.79?
(4.56)?
Post?estimation?test? ? ? p?=?0.21? ? ? p?=?0.68?
Gender?x?Suggestion?
Male?leader? ? ? ?0.03?
(0.22)?
? ? ?0.90***?
(0.20)?
Female?leader? ? ? ?0.29**?
(0.14)?
? ? 0.71?
(1.55)?
Post?estimation?test? ? ? p?=?0.29? ? ? p?=?0.31?
Constant? 3.03***?
(0.17)?
2.30***?
(0.25)?
2.73***?
(0.35)?
2.95***?
(0.20)?
2.98***?
(0.32)?
3.90***?
(0.43)?
Notes.?Subject?level? random?effects?GLS? regressions?after?collapsing?by?subject?and?part.?Models?of?Gender?
Not?Revealed? (Gender?Revealed)? condition? contain?112? (98)?observations?of?56? (49)? followers?over?2?parts.?
Standard?errors?(in?parentheses)?are?corrected?for?clustering?at?the?individual?level.?***Statistically?significant?
at?the?1%?level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?For?the?post?
estimation?Wald?tests?of?linear?hypotheses?we?report?p?values.?
?
Models?1?and?4?are?the?basic?estimations,?containing?only?a?dummy?for?having?a?female?leader?in?the?
respective? treatment.? In?Gender?Not?Revealed,? female? leaders?get?by?0.51?worse?evaluations? than?
male?leaders?(p?=?0.00).?In?Gender?Revealed,?female?leaders?get?by?0.44?worse?evaluations?than?male?
leaders?(p?=?0.07).?
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In?Models?2?and?5,?we?include?interaction?variables?of?the?gender?of?the?leader?and?group?minimum?
effort.?Group?history?might?affect?leader?evaluations,?and?we?are?curious?whether?the?effect?of?group?
history? is? the?same? for?male?and? female? leaders.? In?Gender?Not?Revealed,?we? find? that?a?one?unit?
increase?of?group?history?significantly? increases?the?evaluation?of?male? leaders?by?0.24?and?that?of?
female? leaders? by? 0.35.? In? Gender?Revealed,? we? find? that? a? one? unit? increase? of? group? history?
decreases?the?evaluation?of?male?leaders?by?0.01,?which?is?not?significant,?and?significantly?increases?
the?evaluation?of?female?leaders?by?0.22.?Thus,?the?evaluations?of?female?leaders?with?an?increasing?
history? improve? significantly?more? than? the? evaluations? of? their?male? counterparts? (p? =? 0.04? in?
Gender?Not?Revealed,?and?p?=?0.00?in?Gender?Revealed).?Nevertheless,?there?seems?to?be?a?trace?of?
discrimination? in? Gender?Revealed.? In?Model? 5,? when? groups? underperform,? female? leaders? get?
evaluated? significantly?more? harshly? than? their?male? counterparts? (p? =? 0.00),?whereas? if? groups?
perform?good,?female?leaders?still?get?significantly?lower?evaluations?than?their?male?counterparts?(p?
=?0.00),?so?that?women?do?not?get?the?same?positive?credit?for?leading?good?performing?groups?like?
men.?
In?Models?3?and?6,?we? include? interaction?variables?of? the?gender?of? the? leader?and? the?previous?
message?value,?and?a?dummy? indicating?whether?no?message?was?sent,?respectively.?The?effects?of?
the?message?content?on?leader?evaluations?do?not?differ?by?the?gender?of?the?leader,?in?none?of?the?
revelation?conditions.?Further,?the?effects?of?group?history?do?not?differ?any?more?by?the?gender?of?
the? leader,?under?none?of? the? revelation? conditions.? In?Gender?Not?Revealed,? the? female? leader’s?
evaluation? robustly? and? significantly? increases? with? an? increase? in? group? performance? and?
significantly? decreases? with? an? increase? in? message? value.? The? male? leader? significantly? loses?
evaluation?points? if?he?fails?to?send?any?message.?In?Gender?Revealed,?the?male? leader’s?evaluation?
significantly? increases?with? an? increase? in? group?performance? and? significantly?decreases?with? an?
increase? in?message?value?and?a?change? to?sending?no?message.?The? female? leader’s?evaluation? is?
not?significantly?affected?by?any?of?the?plausible?explanatory?variables.?
Role?preference?
In?Gender?Revealed,?both?male?and?female?participants?prefer?the?leader?role?over?the?follower?role?
(Table?A4?and?Figure?A5?in?Appendix?1A).?In?Gender?Not?Revealed,?only?male?participants?prefer?the?
leader?role.?Female?participants?are?indifferent?between?the?two?roles,?which?could?be?explained?by?
the? sensibility? (focus? on? empathy)? of? females? concerning? the? leader’s? hard? situation? under? that?
treatment?condition.?
2.4?Conclusion?and?Discussion?
The?main? contribution?of?our? study? is? to? show?with? a? simple? experiment? that? although?men? and?
women?might?differ?in?their?leader?strategies,?there?is?no?evidence?that?either?men?or?women?would?
be?better?leaders.?If?gender?is?not?revealed,?women?request?more?often?risky?high?effort?levels?than?
men,?and?they?succeed?with?this?strategy.?If?gender?is?revealed,?men?and?women?do?not?differ?in?the?
likelihood?of?requesting?the?highest?effort,?and?they?are?equally?effective? leaders.?Men?and?women?
are? equally? credible? to? their? followers,? no?matter? if? gender? is? revealed? or? not.? The? only? trace? of?
stereotype? follower? skepticism? towards? female? leaders? is? in? Gender?Revealed,?when?women? get?
evaluated?harsher?than?men?for?a?given?group?performance,?which?finding?is?in?line?with?Grossman?et?
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al.? (2016).?However,?such?an?effect? is?counterbalanced?by?women? requesting?slightly?higher?effort?
than?men.?The?higher?effectiveness?of? the? female?strategy?gives? reason? to?believe? that?men?could?
improve?the?performance?of?their?groups?by?requesting?more?ambitious?effort?levels.?
The? results? should? be? interpreted? carefully? because? of? the? low? number? of? observations? in? the?
laboratory?experiment,?which? influences? the?power?of? the? results.?Another?concern? related? to? the?
laboratory? experiment,?which? cannot? be? ruled? out,? is? a? potential? negative? experimenter? demand?
effect? that? could? have? been? awakened? when? participants? chose? a? profile? picture.? As? one?
consequence,? followers? could?have? followed?women? to?a?greater?extent?and?evaluated? them? less?
harshly,?which?the?data?does?not?really?support.?However,?as?another?consequence,?female?leaders?
could?have?become?alerted? to?act?more?assertive?and? request? risky?high?efforts,?compensating?an?
expected? low? share?of? followers,?which? behavior? is? indeed? found.? Since? a? negative? experimenter?
demand?effect?works? in?the?opposite?direction?to?the?experimental?objectives,? it?would?strengthen?
the? interpretation? of? the? results? as?weak? evidence? supporting? the? predictions? of?men? requesting?
more?often?higher?effort?levels?than?women?(Zizzo?2010;?Camerer?2011).?On?the?other?hand,?women?
might?be?alerted? in? the? field?as?well,?but? to?prove? this? speculation? remains?an?open?question? for?
future?research.?
Yet?another?possible?shortcoming?of?the?data?might?be?that?the?experiment?was?run?with?students?
preparing?to?become? leaders,?and?therefore?they?might?not?have?behaved? like?a?random?sample?of?
the?population?and?no?gender?effect?was?found.?In?this?context,?Cooper?(2007)?already?showed?that?
experienced?managers? do? better? to? overcome? coordination? failure? than? undergraduate? students.?
Moreover,? the? group? creation? in? the? study? might? have? had? an? effect? on? the? findings.? Several?
economic?studies?have?already? found?enhancing?effects?of?social? identity?on? individual?behavior? in?
strategic?decision?making?situations?(Charness?et?al.?2007;?Chen?and?Chen?2011;?Eckel?and?Grossman?
2005).?Female?participants?might?have?been?more?sensible?to?the?perception?of?a?group?entity.?Such?
a?perception?can?affect?preferences?over?outcomes? (Charness?et?al.?2007),? it?can?suppress?private?
interest? relative? to? team? interest? (Eckel?and?Grossman?2005),?and? it? can? increase?other?regarding?
preferences? (Chen?and?Chen?2011).? It?could?have?shifted?female? leader?behavior?towards?the?risky?
payoff?dominant?strategy,?despite?the?fact?that?women?are?considered?to?be?more?risk?averse?than?
men.?At?the?same?time,?male?leader?behavior?could?have?been?shifted?towards?the?other?regarding?
and?secure?strategy,?which?minimizes?individual?losses?for?all?group?members.?
Based?on?effectiveness,?gender?should?not?matter?for?an?assignment?to?a?leadership?position.?What?
remains? an?open? question? is?whether? the? female? leadership? style?has? its?origin? in? group? identity?
perceptions,? which? might? be? stronger? in? family? businesses? or? mission?driven? organizations.?
Concerning?the?existing?gender?gap? in?top?positions,?we?have? to? look? further? for?explanations,? like?
differences? in? communication? strategies? if?we? allow? for? free? form? suggestions,? or? differences? in?
selection?procedures.?
? ?
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Chapter?3?
Gender,?Communication?Styles,?and?Leader?Effectiveness?
3.1?Introduction?
Gender?equality?is?a?major?concern?for?some?politicians,?international?organizations,?and?the?general?
public.? In?many?parts?of? the?world?girls?and?women?have? limited?access? to?education,?health?care,?
and?the?labor?market,?and?they?have?limited?rights?to?individual?decision?making?and?representation?
in? political? and? economic? decision?making? processes.? Gender? gaps? in? labor? force? participation,?
compensation,? and? career?development? are? still? a? concern? in?Western? societies? as?well.?Globally,?
about? three? quarters? of? working?age? men? participate? in? the? labor? force,? compared? to? half? of?
working?age?women? (ILO?2013;?OECD?2016).?The?global?gender?pay?gap? is?around?15?20%,?and?the?
annual?pay?for?women?reached?only?today?the?amount?men?were?earning?ten?years?ago?(OECD?2014;?
Eurostat? 2014;? World? Economic? Forum? 2015).? While? gender? parity? is? reached? in? university?
attendance,?the?gender?gap? in?taking?skilled?roles? is?25%,?and?the?gender?gap? in? leadership?roles? is?
huge?with?72%?(World?Economic?Forum?2015).?One?of?the?global?sustainable?development?goals?of?
the?United?Nations? is?the?economic?and?political?empowerment?of?women?and? to?close?significant?
gender? gaps? in? terms? of? labor?market,? compensation,? and? access? to? and? control? over? decision?
making,?as?well?as? to? support?women? in?participating?more? fully? in?political?processes,? spheres?of?
public?life,?and?in?taking?on?more?leadership?roles?(United?Nations?2015).?
Our? study? contributes? to? the? scientific? insights? about? the? possible? explanations?why?women? are?
underrepresented?in?leadership?roles,?and?what?kind?of?changes?to?expect?if?women?fill?empowering?
positions?(Goldin?2002;?Akerlof?and?Kranton?2005;?Eagly?and?Johannesen?Schmidt?2007;?Wang?et?al.?
2011;? Dezs?? and? Ross? 2012).?We? study? the? interaction? of? followers? and? leaders? in? a? laboratory?
experiment? using? the? turnaround? game,? a? variation? of? the? weak?link? (or? minimum? effort)?
coordination? game? (Brandts? and? Cooper? 2007).? In? particular,? we? study? whether? there? are? any?
differences? in? the?way?male?and? female? leaders?communicate? to?their? followers,?and?whether? this?
affects?their?effectiveness.28?
The? basic? weak?link? game? by? Van? Huyck? et? al.? (1990)? models? a? coordination? problem? in? an?
organizational? setting,? where? a? group? of? players? engages? in? a? joint? economic? activity? with?
complementarities.? Players? choose? their? individual? effort? contribution? simultaneously,? and? the?
lowest?performing?player,?the?“weak?link”,?determines?the?performance?of?the?organization.?Classical?
examples?are?“the?assembly? line?that?moves?no?faster?than?the?slowest? line?worker”,?collaborative?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
28?Throughout?the?paper,?we?use?the?term?“effectiveness”?to?refer?to?the?leader’s?successfulness.?An?effective?
leader? is?both?efficient?and?credible.?With?“efficiency”?we?refer?to?the?performance?of?the? leader,?which?the?
leader?has?under?control.?For?example,?leaders?who?work?harder,?are?abler,?and?send?more?relevant?messages?
are?more?efficient.?With? respect? to? the?group,?groups,?who?coordinate?on? the?same?effort? level,?are?said? to?
coordinate?more? efficiently.?With? “credibility”? we? refer? to? the? beliefs? of? the? followers? that? the? leader? is?
followed?by?others?as?well.?The? follower,?who?believes?that?the? leader? is?credible,?will? follow?the? leader.?For?
example,?elections,?incoming?follower?messages,?or?being?male?can?increase?leader?credibility,?but?such?factors?
are?not?necessarily?under?the?control?of?the?leader.?Credible?leaders?are?followed,?no?matter?what?the?message?
is,?whereas?effective?leaders?achieve?the?best?and?most?desired?outcome?with?their?groups.?
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work? that? is? incomplete? until? the? final? contribution? is? finished,? “perceptions? of? overall? product?
quality? that? is? sensitive? to? the?worst?performing? feature”,?network? investments,? and? adoption?of?
standards? (Brandts?et?al.?2015;?Heinemann?et?al.?2009).?The?weak?link?game?has?multiple?Pareto?
ranked?Nash?equilibria?on?every?effort? level?that? is?simultaneously?chosen?by?all?players.?The?most?
efficient,?payoff?dominant? equilibrium? is? reached? if? all?players? contribute? the?highest? effort? level.?
However,?the?higher?the?individual?effort?level?choice,?the?riskier?the?decision?is,?since?it?is?uncertain?
what?other?players?choose.? If?other?players?contribute? less?effort,?a?higher?effort?contribution?gets?
devalued,?while?the?costs?of?effort?remain?unchanged.?In?order?to?avoid?costs?of?coordination?failure,?
the?player?could?choose?the?lowest?effort?level,?which?is?a?secure?option.?The?secure?option?yields?a?
lower?payoff?than?what?could?be?gained?if?all?players?choose?simultaneously?the?highest?effort?level.?
Thus,?the?main?feature?of?the?weak?link?game?is?the?trade?off?between?the?payoff?dominant?and?the?
secure? equilibrium,? and? strategic? uncertainty? about? the? choices? of? others? can? undermine?
coordination?on?the?efficient?effort?level?(Van?Huyck?et?al.?1990).?
The?turnaround?game? introduces?organizational?hierarchy?to?the?weak?link?game,?after?a?failure?to?
coordinate?on?the?efficient?equilibrium?(Brandts?and?Cooper?2007).?Therefore,?the?turnaround?game?
has?two?parts.?In?the?first?part,?groups?of?players?have?to?coordinate?repeatedly?in?a?basic?weak?link?
game.?Usually?groups?establish?a?failure?history?and?induce?coordination?on?an?inefficient?equilibrium?
during?this?initial?phase?of?the?turnaround?game?(Brandts?and?Cooper?2006a).?In?the?second?part,?the?
turnaround?game?introduces?leadership,?and?leaders?can?have?different?instruments?at?their?disposal,?
like?varying?earnings?bonuses?and?communication.?The?task?of?the?leaders?is?to?try?the?“turnaround”,?
leading?the?group?from?the?inefficient?low?effort?equilibrium?to?the?efficient?high?effort?equilibrium.?
The?turnaround?is?harder?to?achieve?if?the?group?experienced?a?failure?history?(Devetag?and?Ortmann?
2007).?
In?our?design,?leaders?are?selected?randomly?and?we?reveal?the?gender?of?the?leader.?Leaders?can?use?
communication.?Communication?is?voluntary?and?non?binding?(cheap?talk),?and?the?messages?are?of?
free? form.? Our? treatment? variations? consist? of? the? gender? of? the? leader,? and? whether? the?
communication?is?one?way?or?two?way.?One?way?communication?means?that?we?allow?only?leaders?
to? send?public?messages?visible? to?all?of? their? followers.?Two?way? communication?means? that?we?
allow? first? followers? to?send?private?messages? to? their? leaders,?while? these? follower?messages?are?
only?visible?for?the?leader,?and?subsequently?we?allow?leaders?to?send?public?messages?visible?to?all?
of? their? followers.? Both? communication? conditions?model? a? centralized? organizational? structure.?
Under?the?one?way?communication?condition?the?direction?of?communication?is?top?down?only,?for?
example,? if? a? headquarters? gives? unified? orders? to? the? division? managers.? Under? the? two?way?
communication?condition? the? leader?keeps?an?“open?door”?and?subordinates?or?division?managers?
have?the?possibility?to?privately?inform?their?leader?before?receiving?unified?orders.?
One?of?the?closest?papers?to?our?work?is?Kriss?and?Eil?(2012).?Using?a?weak?link?game?and?assignment?
of?a?leader,?who?can?use?communication,?the?authors?vary?three?communication?conditions:?follower?
messages? are?not?possible? (one?way? communication),? visible?only? to? the? leader? (private? two?way?
communication),? or? visible? to? all? group?members? (public? two?way? communication).? All?messages?
have? a? low? cost.29?The? authors? find? that? private? follower? communication? to? the? leader? leads? to?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
29?In? a? related? study,? Kriss? et? al.? (forthcoming?b)? show? that? even? small? costs? can? reduce? the? use? of?
communication.? Due? to? Heath? and? Staudenmayer? (2000),? people? tend? to? underestimate? the? difficulty? of?
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greater? leader?credibility?and?more?efficient?coordination?than?prohibited?follower?communication,?
and?prohibited? follower? communication? leads? to?more?efficient? coordination? than?public? follower?
communication.?Public?visibility?of?follower?messages?and?public?disagreement?among?followers?can?
undermine? leader? communication? trying? to? induce? common?beliefs?and?efficient? coordination.?An?
authoritarian? leader? could? prohibit? follower? communication,?which?would? lead? to? an? increase? in?
leader?credibility.?However,?some?followers?might?still?not?rely?on?others?following?the?leader?as?well,?
since? a? leader?message?without? any? follower? input? is? only? a? suggestion? or? request,? and? cannot?
credibly?claim?to?represent?follower?intentions.?Limiting?the?visibility?of?follower?messages?instead?of?
prohibiting? those,? improves? coordination.? The? authors? call? the? possibility? of? private? follower?
communication? “open? door”? or? “suggestion? box”? of? the? leader.? The? “open? door”? facilitates? for?
followers? to? recognize? their? leader?as?a? “coordination?device”,?who? can?hear? the? followers?and? is?
perceived? to? have? the? support? of? the? group,? and? this? makes? leaders? more? credible? and? more?
influential.?Those?leaders?who?recognize?their?pivotal?role?and?that?the?“open?door”?improves?leader?
credibility?can?use?this?fact?to?send?messages?suggesting?the?highest?effort?level?aiming?for?maximum?
effectiveness.? Though,? incoming? follower? messages? suggesting? low? effort? levels? might? also?
undermine? the?confidence?of? the? leader? to? take?advantage?of? the?boosted? influence?by? the?“open?
door”.?Kriss?and?Eil?say?that?leaders?whose?messages?are?more?a?consequence?of?follower?input?lack?
“thick? skin”.? The? authors? assume? that? successful? real?world? leaders? develop? such? a? “thick? skin”,?
which?enables?them?to?“appropriately?disregard?counterproductive? input?while?still?recognizing?the?
broader?value?of?communication?within?the?organizational?hierarchy”.?
Another? close? paper? to? our?work? is? Cooper? (2007),?who? studies? communication? strategies,? and?
compares? the?behavior?of?experienced?managers? and?undergraduate? students.? The?proportion?of?
men?in?his?study?was?much?higher?among?the?experienced?managers?than?the?undergraduates.?The?
scarcity?of?women?in?Cooper’s?study?reflects?the?male?dominated?manager?population.?Cooper?finds?
that? experienced? managers? are? more? likely? to? use? the? “good”? communication? strategy,? and?
therefore? they? are? more? effective? leaders.? The? “good”? communication? strategy? is? simple:?
“specifically?request?a?high?effort?and?point?out?the?mutual?benefits?of?high?effort”.?Participants? in?
our?study?can?also?send?any?kind?of?free?form?text?messages.?As?a?consequence?we?collect?data?on?
communication?styles?and?this?enables?us?to?conduct?a?rich?analysis?of?the?message?content.?We?lean?
our?message?content?analysis?on?the?systematic?scheme?invented?by?Brandts?and?Cooper?(2007).?We?
add? gender?specific? coding? aspects? based? on? the? stereotypes? of?men? tending? to? be?more? task?
oriented? and? assertive,? and?women? to?be?more? relationship?oriented? and? expressive? (Bem? 1974;?
Bem?1993;?Merchant?2012).?
We?also?analyze?the?message?content?based?on?the?classification?of? leadership?styles? in?Eagly?et?al.?
(2003).? Eagly? et? al.? conducted? a?meta?analysis? of? 45? studies? and? classify? three? leadership? styles:?
transformational,? transactional,? and? laissez?faire? leadership? style.? The? transformational? leadership?
style?was? first? described? by?Burns? (1978)? and? elaborated? by?Bass? (1985,? 1998).? Transformational?
leaders?are? future?oriented,? innovative? leaders,?who?empower? their? followers? to? contribute?more?
capably?to?their?organization.?They?often?act?as?role?models,?they?emphasize?the?importance?of?the?
organization’s?mission,? they? exhibit? optimism? and? excitement? about? goals? and? future? states,? and?
they?attend?to?the?individual?needs?of?their?followers,?focusing?on?their?development?and?mentoring.?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
coordinating?each?others’?actions?and?they?undervalue?communication.?To?exclude?such?an?effect,?we?have?no?
message?costs?in?our?design.?
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Many?features?of?the?transformational? leadership?style?are? in?common?with?charismatic? leadership?
(Conger?and?Kanungo?1998).?Transformational?leaders,?in?our?context,?would?emphasize?the?mutual?
benefit?argument?and?being?part?of?the?group?along?with?sending?a?high?effort?level?suggestion.?
Leadership?researchers?contrasted?the?transformational?style?to?the?transactional?style?(Burns?1978;?
Avolio? 1999;? Bass? 1998).?While? the? transformational? leadership? style? focuses? on? the? individual?
development?of?followers,?creating?human?capital?and?making?use?of? it,?the?transactional?style? is?a?
classic,?more?conventional?leadership?style.?Transactional?leaders?appeal?to?the?self?interest?of?their?
followers? in?that?they?establish?exchange?relationships?with?them:?the?transactional? leader?clarifies?
the?responsibilities?of?the?follower,?and?rewards?followers?if?they?meet?objectives?or?correct?them?for?
failing? to?meet? objectives.? The? transactional? leadership? style? has? three? subcategories:? contingent?
reward,? active? management? by? exception,? and? passive? management? by? exception.? Contingent?
reward? provides? rewards? if? follower? performance?meets? objectives.? In? the? context? of? our? study,?
positive?feedback,?for?example,?could?be?seen?as?contingent?reward.?Active?management?attends?to?
followers?only?if?they?fail?to?meet?objectives.?One?example?in?our?study?are?leaders?who?start?to?send?
social?banter?after?the?group?reached?a?high?effort?level,?instead?of?repeating?seemingly?unnecessary?
messages.?Passive?managers?wait?until?problems?get?serious?and?intervene?only?then.?As?an?example?
in?our? study,?we? could? think?of? a? leader?who? sends?no?message? in? the? first?message?period,?but?
intervenes? later.?Both? transformational? and? transactional? leaders? recognize? their?pivotal? role? and?
take?responsibility?for?the?leadership.?In?contrast,?the?third?leadership?style?defines?leaders?who?lack?
recognition? of? their? situation? and? authority,? and? let? followers? do? as? they?want.? The? laissez?faire?
leader? is? frequently?absent,? lacks? involvement?during? critical? junctures,?and?generally? fails? to? take?
responsibility? for?managing.? In?our? study,? this? type?would?either? send?no?message?or?only?banter,?
without?trying?the?turnaround.?
Eagly? et? al.? find? that? leader? effectiveness? relates? positively? to? transformational? leadership? and?
contingent?reward?behavior?as?a?subcategory?of?transactional?leadership?style.30?Other?subcategories?
of?transactional?leadership,?namely?active?and?passive?management,?and?the?laissez?faire?leadership?
style? relate? negatively? to? the? performance? of? the? organization.? According? to? Eagly? et? al.,? earlier?
studies?on? leadership?styles?before?1990?distinguished?democratic?and?autocratic? leadership?styles?
(Lewin?and?Lippitt?1938;?Vroom?and?Yetton?1973).?Democratic?leaders?allow?followers?to?participate?
in? decision? making,? whereas? autocratic? leaders? discourage? their? followers? from? participating? in?
decision? making.? However,? the? democratic?autocratic? classification? of? leadership? style? does? not?
describe? leader? behavior,? and? the? implications? for? leader? effectiveness? depend? much? on? the?
organizational? structure,? for? example,? whether? participation? in? decision? making? is? feasible? and?
allowed? (Foels? et? al.? 2000;?Gastil? 1994;?Vroom? and? Yetton? 1973).? Therefore? the? above?described?
contemporary?classification?is?more?suitable?to?be?linked?to?leader?effectiveness.?
Eagly?et?al.?(2003)?show?small?gender?differences? in? leadership?styles.?The?authors?find?that?female?
leaders? engage?more? often? than?male? leaders? in? transformational? leadership? and? in? contingent?
reward? behavior? as? part? of? the? transactional? leadership? style,? and? both? styles? predict? leader?
effectiveness.? These? findings? are? in? line? with? earlier? research? findings? and? claims? of? a? female?
leadership?advantage?(Sharpe?2000;?Bass?et?al.?1996;?Lowe?et?al.?1996).?Later,?Eagly?and?Johannesen?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
30?Concerning? charismatic? leadership,? Antonakis? et? al.? (2015)? show? in? a? field? experiment? that? charismatic?
speeches? have? a? performance? effect:? workers? increase? their? costly? effort? input? and? generate? higher? firm?
output.?
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Schmidt?(2007)?reviews?research?and?meta?analyses?from?the?1950s?up?to?date.?The?authors?find?that?
even? if? gender? differences? in? leadership? styles? are? small,? they? are? important.? In? a?meta?analytic?
review?of?25?years?of?research,?Wang?et?al.?(2011)?find?that?the?transformational?leadership?style?is?
effective? in?most?organizational?context,?and?women,?who?engage? in?such? leader?behavior,?gain?at?
least?some?advantage.?In?a?panel?data?investigation?of?U.S.?corporations,?Dezs??and?Ross?(2012)?find?
a?positive?performance?effect?of?female?representation?in?top?management?teams,?yet,?only?in?firms,?
whose?strategies?focused?on?innovation,?facing?complex?challenges.?
In?our?study,?transformational?leaders?use?the?“good”?communication?strategy?as?defined?in?Cooper?
(2007).?Cooper?points?out,? that? “good”? communication? is? likely? to?be? effective.?We? find? that? the?
suggestion?of?the?highest?effort?level?combined?with?assertive?content?and?expressions?of?being?part?
of? the? group? are? the? most? relevant? message? contents? inducing? effectiveness.? Although? men?
communicate?more?often?assertively?than?women?and?women?with?an?“open?door”?send?more?often?
content?emphasizing?that?the?leader?is?coequally?part?of?the?group,?we?find?no?gender?difference?in?
the?use?of?relevant?message?content.?Moreover,?men?and?women?are?equally?credible?and?equally?
effective?leaders,?and?thus?we?find?no?reason?why?women?should?not?fill?more?of?the?top?positions.?
Our? findings? further? suggest? that? there?will? be? a? change? on? the? global? stage? in? the?way? leaders?
interact?and?communicate?with?followers?if?women?would?fill?more?top?positions.?
3.2?Experimental?Design?and?Procedures?
Each? experimental? session? consists? of? 26? periods.?At? the? beginning? of? a? session,? participants? are?
randomly?matched? into? groups? of? five? and? are? informed? that? their? group’s? composition?will? not?
change? throughout? the? session.? In? each? period,? every? participant? i ?in? group? k ?simultaneously?
chooses?an?effort?level? ? ?0,10,20,30,40ieffort ? .?Participant? i ’s?earnings?in?a?period?are?equal?to:?
??? ? ??? ? ? ? ??????? ? ? ? ??????????,?
where? minkeffort ?is? the?minimum?effort? chosen? in? the?group.?To? facilitate? calculations,?we?provide?
participants?with?an?Earnings?Table,?reproduced?as?Table?3.1.?At?the?end?of?each?period,?participants?
are?informed?of?their?earnings?and?the?group’s?minimum?effort.?Participants?cannot?observe?others’?
effort? choice,?which?makes? it?more? difficult? to? escape? coordination? failure? (Brandts? and? Cooper?
2006b).?
Each?session?is?divided?into?two?parts.?Part?1?consists?of?periods?1?to?8?and?Part?2?of?periods?9?to?26.?
Participants?know?the?session?has?two?parts?but?are?not?given?the?specific?instructions?of?Part?2?until?
they?reach?that?part.?
In? Part? 1,? participants? play? the?weak?link? game?without? a? leader.?Using? the?weak?link? game? in? a?
laboratory?experiment,?Van?Huyck?et?al.?(1990)?show?that?decision?makers?are?more?likely?to?play?the?
game? according? to? the? “security? principle”,? rather? than? the? “efficiency? principle”.? The? efficiency?
principle?suggests?the?selection?of?the?payoff?dominant?equilibrium,?that?is,?everybody?in?the?group?
chooses?40?and?earns?240.?The?security?principle?suggests?the?selection?of?the? largest?payoff? in?the?
worst?possible?outcome,?which?is?to?select?200,?assuming?that?0?will?be?the?minimum?effort.?Brandts?
et?al.? (2015)?explain? in?more?detail?why? it? is?hard? to?achieve?efficient?coordination?with? the?given?
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payoff?structure.?For?example,?suppose?that?the?decision?maker?considers?an?effort?choice?of?either?0,?
which?yields?a?certain?payoff?of?200,?or?10,?which?yields?a?risky?payoff?of?210?if?everyone?else?in?the?
group?also?chooses?10?and?150?otherwise.?A?risk?neutral?decision?maker?would?have?to?expect?that?
the? probability? of? a? simultaneous? effort? choice? of? 10? is? at? least? 5/6? to?make? the? choice? of? 10?
attractive.?Since?effort? levels?are?chosen? independently,? the?decision?maker?would?have? to?expect?
that?everyone?else?in?the?group?chooses?10?with?a?probability?of?more?than?95%,?which?means?that?
the?decision?maker?would?have? to?be? almost? sure? that? each? and?every?other? group?member?will?
choose? the?higher?effort? level?as?well.?Thus,? the?parameters?of? the?payoff?equation?are?chosen? to?
make? it? almost? certain? that? by? the? end? of? the? eighth? period? all? groups? are? coordinating? on? an?
inefficient? equilibrium,?which?makes? the? introduction? of? a? leader?more?meaningful? (Brandts? and?
Cooper?2006a;?Brandts?et?al.?2015).?
Table?3.1? Earnings?table?
? ? Minimum?effort?chosen?in?the?group?
? ? 40? 30? 20? 10? 0?
Your?
effort?
40? 240? 180? 120? 60? 0?
30? ? 230? 170? 110? 50?
20? ? ? 220? 160? 100?
10? ? ? ? 210? 150?
0? ? ? ? ? 200?
?
Part?2? introduces? leaders.?At?the?beginning?of?period?9,?one?participant? in?each?group? is?randomly?
assigned?to?be?the?group’s? leader,?which? leaves?the?other?group?members?as?followers.?The? leader?
holds?the?position?until?the?end?of?the?session.?Every?three?periods,?which?we?refer?to?as?message?
cycle,? the? leader?has? the?option? to?send?a?written?message?visible? to?all? followers.?The?message? is?
sent?before?effort?choices?are?made.?Leaders?can?write?anything?they?wish,?including?nothing,?except?
for? content? that? can?be?used? to? identify? them.?Messages? are?non?binding? in? that?not? following? a?
message? has? no? direct? effect? on? earnings.? Leaders? make? effort? decisions? and? face? the? same?
incentives?as?followers.?
3.2.1?Treatments?
The?study?uses?a?2x2?between?subjects?factorial?design.?The?two?factors?are?whether?followers?can?
send?messages? and? the? gender? of? the? leader.?We? randomly? assigned? groups? to? one? of? the? four?
treatment?conditions.?
The?first?treatment?variation?is?whether?there?is?One?way?or?Two?way?communication.?In?One?way,?
followers?cannot?send?any?messages,?only?leaders?can?do?so.?In?Two?way,?each?follower?can?send?a?
written?message? visible? to? the? leader? only.? The?message? is? sent? before? leaders? can? send? their?
messages.?Followers?can?write?anything?they?wish,? including?nothing,?except?for?content?that?could?
be?used?to?identify?them.?
The?second? treatment?variation? is? the?gender?of? the? leader.?By? randomly?assigning? the? leadership?
position? we? randomly? vary? the? leader’s? gender? across? the? groups.? To? reveal? information? about?
gender,?participants?had? to? choose?a?profile?picture? they? identified?with.?This?occurred?after? they?
consented?to?take?part?in?the?study?but?before?they?read?the?instructions?to?avoid?strategic?selection?
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of?profile?pictures.?We?created?12?generic?profiles?for?each?gender,?using?the?profile?creator?website?
pickaface.net?(see?Figure?B1?in?Appendix?3B).?All?pictures?have?the?same?clothing,?facial?expression,?
face?form,?and?eye?color.?We?varied?hair?length,?hair?color,?skin?color,?and?did?small?modifications?to?
the? lips,? nose,? eyes,? and? hairstyle? to?match? generic? racial? features.?We? use? profile? pictures? to?
preserve?anonymity?whilst?revealing?gender.?We?opted?for?pictures?that?also?contain?other?cues?such?
as?race?and?hairstyles?to?distract?participants?from?discerning?the?purpose?of?the?study?(Zizzo?2010),?
which? can? potentially? lead? to? intentional? changes? in? behavior? (Camerer? 2011).?We? displayed? the?
profile?pictures?of?leaders?along?with?their?messages?visible?to?their?followers.?
3.2.2?Procedures?
The? experiment?was? conducted? at? the? Columbia? Experimental? Laboratory? in? the? Social? Sciences?
(CELSS)?at?Columbia?University? in?March?2015.?Participants?were?recruited?through?ORSEE? (Greiner?
2015)?and? the?experiment?was?programmed?with? z?Tree? (Fischbacher?2007).?We? ran?10? sessions,?
each? in? the? afternoon.?One? session? lasted? around? 60?minutes.? Every?participant? signed? a?written?
consent?form.?Earnings?were?expressed? in?points?and?were?converted?to?dollars?at?a?rate?of?$1?per?
345?points.31?Average?earnings?equaled?$15.75.?
Participants?were?seated?randomly.?Before?period?1,?and?before?reading?the?instructions,?everybody?
answered?a?short?general?questionnaire?about?gender,?race,?age,?years?of?study,?and?major?field?of?
studies.?Next,?participants?had?to?choose?a?profile?picture?(see?Figure?B1?in?Appendix?3B).?
We?had?separate?instructions?for?Part?1?and?Part?2,?and?participants?read?the?instructions?only?prior?
to?each?part.?To? facilitate?calculations? for? the?participants,?we?handed?out?printed?versions?of? the?
instructions?for?Part?1,?which?contained?the?Earnings?Table?showing?how?earnings?were?determined?
in? each? period.? The? same? table? applied? in? Part? 2.? Instructions?were? displayed? on? the? computer?
screens? and? were? read? aloud? by? the? experimenter.? After? reading? the? instructions? for? Part? 1,?
participants? completed? a?payoff?quiz? to? check?whether? everybody?understood? the? game’s?payoff?
structure.?Instructions?and?screenshots?can?be?found?in?Appendix?2B.?
The? game? was? described? using? a? workplace? context? to? be? in? line? with? earlier? papers,? ease?
comprehension?of?the?task,?and?enrich?the?wording?and?analysis?of?the?free?form?messages?(Cooper?
2007;?Brandts?et?al.?2015).?As?in?Brandts?et?al.?(2015),?individual?group?members?were?referred?to?as?
“employees”,?and? they?were? told? that? they?were?working? for?a? “firm”.?The? leader?was? called? the?
“manager”.?Following?Brandts?et?al.? (2015),?we?did?not?use?the?term?“effort”?because?of? its?strong?
connotation.?Instead?we?asked?participants?to?think?of?each?period?as?a?“workweek”?lasting?40?hours?
and?choose?how?many?hours?to?devote?to?the?firm’s?“bonus?project”.?
Participants?could?enter?their?messages? into?a?chat?box,?and?they?could?either?click?on?a?button?to?
send?the?message?or?click?on?a?button?labeled?as?“Send?no?suggestion”.?The?leader’s?message,?along?
with? the? leader’s?profile? picture,?was? displayed?on? all? screens? throughout? the? three?periods?of? a?
message?cycle.?In?Two?way,?followers?could?see?the?leader’s?profile?picture?already?on?their?message?
entering?screens?and?follower?messages?were?displayed?without?followers’?profile?pictures?and?only?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
31?In?each?session,?we?allowed?only?a?multiple?of?five?people?to?participate?in?the?study.?People?who?showed?up?
but?did?not?participate?were?paid?a?show?up?fee?of?$5.00.?Participants?played?without?a?show?up?fee,?in?order?
to?incentivize?them?more.?
58?
?
on? the? leader’s?message?screen.?Participants?knew? from? the? instructions?of?Part?2? that? the?profile?
picture?of?the?leader?will?be?displayed.?
In?Part?2,?after?participants?made?their?effort?choice,?we?elicited?their?belief?concerning?the?number?
of? other? group?members?who?will? follow? the? leader’s?message? by? asking? “Out? of? the? four? other?
participants?in?your?firm,?how?many?will?follow?the?Manager’s?suggestion?”?Participants?could?enter?
guesses?from?0?to?4,?or?they?could?indicate?“Not?applicable”?for?cases?where?the?leader?did?not?make?
any?suggestion.?Belief?questions?were?only?asked?in?the?first?period?of?each?message?cycle.?Table?3.2?
summarizes?the?sequence?of?events?in?the?experiment.?
Table?3.2? Timeline?of?the?experiment?
? One?way?communication? Two?way?communication?
Before?period?1? Demographics?and?choice?of?profile?picture?
Instructions?for?Part?1?and?payoff?quiz?
Periods?1?8? Effort?choice?
Feedback?screen?
Before?period?9? Instructions?for?Part?2?
Random?assignment?of?the?leader?role?
Periods?9?26? ? Followers?send?message?to?the?leader?
(every?third?period)?
Leader?sends?message?to?the?followers?(every?third?period)?
Effort?choice?
Belief?question?(every?third?period)?
Feedback?screen?
After?period?26? Final?questionnaire?
?
At? the? end? of? each? period,? participants? saw? their? effort? choice,? the? group?minimum? effort,? their?
earnings? in? that?period,?and? their?accumulated?earnings.?Participants?could?not?observe? individual?
effort?choices.?
At? the? end? of? the? experiment? participants? filled? in? a? final? questionnaire.?We? asked? which? role?
assignment?(“Manager”?or?“Employee”)?participants?would?prefer?if?they?could?choose?(“If?you?were?
to? play? Part? 2? again? and? you? could? choose? your? role,? which? role? would? you? choose?”).? After?
reminding? the? individual?average?earnings?of?the?participant? in?Part?2,?we?asked? for?the?subjective?
evaluation?about?the?performance?of?the?leader?on?a?five?point?scale?from?“completely?disagree”?to?
“completely? agree”? (“How?much? do? you? agree/disagree?with? the? following? statement:?My? firm’s?
performance?in?Part?2?is?mostly?due?to?the?judgment?of?the?Manager.”).?Finally,?we?asked?a?general?
risk?attitude?question?(“How?do?you?see?yourself:?are?you?generally?a?person?who?is?fully?prepared?to?
take?risks?or?do?you?try?to?avoid?taking?risks?”),?where?participants?could?indicate?their?willingness?to?
take?risks?on?a?scale?from?0?for?“not?at?all?willing?to?take?risks”?to?10?for?“very?willing?to?take?risks”?
(Dohmen?et?al.?2011).?
At?the?end?of?the?experiment,?participants?were?shown?their?earnings?separately?for?each?part?and?in?
total.?Participants?were?thanked?and?paid?individually?for?their?participation.?
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3.3?Predictions?
The?main? interest? in? this? study? is? to?show?whether?men?and?women?differ? in? leader?effectiveness?
across?communication?conditions?and?which? channels?explain? leader?effectiveness:?a?difference? in?
leader?behavior?or?a?difference? in? follower?behavior.?Naturally,?all?predictions? refer? to?behavior? in?
Part?2.?
Kriss?and?Eil? (2012)?already?showed? that? incoming? follower?messages? increase? leader?credibility? in?
Two?way,? compared? to?One?way.?Holding? leader?message? content? constant,?an? increase? in? leader?
credibility?is?likely?to?increase?leader?effectiveness.?Therefore?the?first?prediction?is:?
Prediction?1:?Minimum?effort?in?Two?way?is?higher?than?in?One?way.?
Since?men?have?historically?held?most?of?the?leadership?roles?in?society,?followers?might?hold?biased?
stereotype? beliefs? that? consider?men? to? be? better,?more? competent? and?more? credible? leaders?
(Ridgeway?2001;?Day?2014;?Goldin?2002;?Akerlof?and?Kranton?2005).?Reuben?et?al.?(2014)?show?that,?
in?an?experimental?market,?stereotypes?make?both?male?and?female?participants?twice?more?likely?to?
hire?a?man? than?a?woman?when?no?other? information? is?available? than?a? candidate’s?appearance?
(which?makes?gender? clear),?despite? the? fact? that?on?average?both?genders?perform?equally?well.?
Grossman?et?al.? (2016)?show,?using? the? turnaround?game,? that? followers?are?more? likely? to? follow?
men? than?women,?holding? leader?messages?constant.?Even? if? followers?do?not?hold?biased?beliefs?
themselves,?it?might?be?rational?to?adapt?to?the?supposed?bias?if?they?expect?others?to?follow?men?to?
a?greater?extent?than?women.?Further,?in?Two?way,?followers?might?send?for?the?same?reason?lower?
effort? level? suggestions? to? female? rather? than?male? leaders.? The? low? follower? suggestions?might?
affect? leaders?negatively?(Kriss?and?Eil?2012),?but?even? if? leaders? ignore?the?follower?messages,?the?
followers,?who?sent?the?low?suggestions,?might?doubt?the?leaders’?credibility?more?if?leaders?request?
a? high? rather? than? low? effort? level.? Thus,? in? Two?way,? the? leader? credibility? of?men,? rather? than?
women,?might?be?boosted?more.?
Prediction? 2:? In?both?One?way?and? Two?way,?male? leaders?are? followed? to?a?greater? extent? than?
female?leaders.?In?Two?way,?the?gender?gap?is?larger.?
Leaders?will?tend?to?send?messages?in?line?with?their?own?effort?choices?at?least?in?the?first?period?of?
the? three?period?message? cycles.?Otherwise? leaders?would? not? get? feedback? on? their? credibility,?
because?they?could?not?rule?out?that?they?are?the?only?ones?who?do?not?follow?their?own?message.?In?
this?sense,?leaders?face?an?exploration?cost.32?Further,?leaders?who?do?not?follow?their?own?message?
would?lose?credibility?already?in?the?first?period.?Since?a?possible?loss?in?earnings?in?the?first?period?is?
less?severe?than?the?loss?of?credibility?for?all?the?coming?periods,?leaders?face?a?cost?of?screwing?up?
others.33?Given?that?requesting?and?choosing?a?high?effort?level?is?risky?and?requires?high?credibility,?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
32?Leaders? can?minimize? the?exploration? cost? if? they? communicate? a? conditional? strategy,? for?example,? that?
they?will?follow?their?own?message?in?the?first?period?of?the?message?cycle,?but?they?will?stop?doing?so?if?others?
do?not?follow?as?well.?
33?In? a? recent? related?paper,?Cooper? et? al.? (2016)? study? the? “social? credibility”?of? leaders? in? an? experiment?
where?leaders?try?to?induce?followers?to?invest?in?a?joint?venture.?The?authors?find?that?“leaders?manage?social?
credibility? by? forgoing? potentially? profitable? requests? for? investment? in? order? to?make? it?more? likely? that?
subsequent?recommendations?to?invest?are?followed”.?Leaders?in?our?study?might?also?recognize?the?need?to?
build? up? credibility,? which? is?more? than? having? other? regarding? preferences.? For? example,? less? confident?
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more? risk? averse?or? less? confident? leaders?might? request? and? choose? a? low? effort? level,?whereas?
leaders?who? are?more?willing? to? take? risks,?or?who? are?overconfident? about? the?number?of? their?
followers,?or?both,?are?also?the?ones?who?will?request?and?choose?high?effort?levels.?Men?have?been?
shown?to?be?more?willing?to?take?risks?and?to?be?more?overconfident?(Reuben?et?al.?2012;?Reuben?et?
al.?(in?press);?Dohmen?et?al.?2011).?Therefore:?
Prediction?3:?In?both?One?way?and?Two?way,?male?leaders?request?more?often?the?highest?effort?level?
than?female?leaders.?
If?Predictions?2?and?3?hold:?
Prediction?4:? In?both?One?way?and?Two?way,?men?are?more?effective? leaders?than?women.? In?Two?
way,?the?gender?gap?is?larger.?
Merchant? (2012)?provides?an?overview?on?gender?differences? in? communication? styles?and?points?
out? that?men?and?women?have?different?purposes?when?using?communication.?Women?value? the?
process?of?communication?itself,?whereas?men?view?communication?as?a?tool?to?reach?a?certain?goal.?
Women?use?communication?to?enhance?social?connections,?while?men?exert?dominance?and?remain?
goal?oriented.? In? interactions,?women? tend? to?be?more?social,?while?men?value? independence?and?
remain?unemotional?and?less?attached?to?conversations.?Therefore,?the?language?that?women?use?is?
more? expressive? and? polite,?while?men? use? a?more? assertive? and? dominating? language,? signaling?
status?and?overconfidence.?Merchant?(2012)?shows?that?gender?differences?in?communication?styles?
are?often?persistent?in?leadership?styles?as?well.?
Eagly?et?al.? (2003)?classify?three? leadership?styles:?transformational,?transactional,?and? laissez?faire?
leadership? style,? described? in? more? detail? in? the? introduction.? In? our? context,? transformational?
leaders?would?request?a?high?effort?level?and?emphasize?the?mutual?benefit?argument?and?being?part?
of?the?group.?We?call?such?“transformational”?messages?“relevant?messages”,?since?Eagly?et?al.?find?
that? leader? effectiveness? relates? positively? to? the? transformational? leadership? style,? and? Cooper?
(2007)? also? finds? the? same?message? strategy? leading? to? effectiveness.? Transactional? leaders,?who?
engage? in?contingent? reward?behavior,?would? request?a?high?effort? level? in?an?ordering?style,?give?
more?often?positive?feedback,?and?encourage?their?followers?with?positive?emotional?content,?rather?
than?long?explanations.?Both?transformational?and?transactional?leaders?recognize?their?pivotal?role?
and? are? likely? to? communicate? assertively.? Eagly? et? al.? (2003)? show? small? gender? differences? in?
leadership? styles.? The? authors? find? that? female? leaders? engage?more? often? than?male? leaders? in?
transformational? leadership? and? in? contingent? reward? behavior? as? part? of? the? transactional?
leadership?style.?
Prediction?5:?Male?leaders?send?assertive,?goal?oriented?messages?and?clear?orders?more?often?than?
their? female? counterparts.? Female? leaders? send?more? often? relevant?messages? containing?mutual?
benefit?arguments,?along?with?encouraging,?positive?emotional?content?and?expressions?emphasizing?
that?the?leader?is?an?equal?member?of?the?group?(using?the?personal?pronoun?“we”?more?often).?We?
expect? that? these? gender? differences? in? communication? and? leadership? styles? are? stable? across?
communication?conditions.?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
leaders,?who?intend?to?choose?a?low?effort?level,?can?stay?credible?if?they?prevent?their?followers?from?losses?by?
requesting?a?low?effort?level.?
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3.4?Results?
184?subjects?showed?up?to?the?study.?We?allowed?only?a?multiple?of? five?people?to?participate,?so?
that?165?subjects?participated?in?total,?with?an?overall?gender?distribution?of?67?men?and?98?women,?
which? is? a? gender? ratio? of? 4:6? and? corresponds? to? the? gender? ratio? in? the? subject? pool? and? the?
university?as?a?whole.? In?One?way,?we?had?80?participants? in?16?groups?with?8?male?and?8? female?
leaders,?and?in?Two?way?we?had?85?participants?in?17?groups?with?8?male?and?9?female?leaders.?
3.4.1?Treatment?Effects?
We?start?our?analysis?by?looking?at?the?treatment?effects?on?leader?effectiveness?in?the?four?different?
treatment? conditions.?Figure?3.1?depicts? the?group?minimum?effort?by? treatment? conditions? in?all?
periods.? In?periods?1?to?8,?without?a? leader,?31?of?the?33?groups?converged?to?the?most? inefficient?
effort? level,?so? the? first?part?of? the? turnaround?game? reliably? induced? failure? to?coordinate?on? the?
efficient?equilibrium?(Brandts?and?Cooper?2006a).?The?second?part?of?the?turnaround?game?started?
in?period?9,?when?all? leaders? successfully?managed? the? turnaround?on?average?at? least?above? the?
minimum? effort? level? of? 20.? Graphically,?male? leaders?who? receive? follower?messages? are?more?
effective?than?their?female?counterparts,?or?leaders?in?One?way.?
Figure?3.1? Treatment?effects?by?treatment?conditions?
?
Table? 3.3? summarizes? the? results? from? regressions? containing? aggregate? treatment? effects? and?
comparing?treatment?conditions.?For?the?estimations?we?use?group?level?random?effects?generalized?
least? squares? (GLS)? regressions.? Both?models? contain? 594? observations? over? 18? periods? and? 33?
groups.?We?correct?standard?errors?for?clustering?at?the?group?level.?The?dependent?variable?is?group?
minimum? effort? in? both? models.? Model? 1? contains? two? indicator? variables,? one? for? the?
communication?treatment?and?one?for?the?gender?of?the?leader,?as?explanatory?variables.?Minimum?
effort? is? by? 2.95? units? higher? in? Two?way? rather? than? One?way,? thus? leaders? are? slightly?more?
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effective? if? they?receive? input? from? followers,?but? this?difference? is?not?statistically?significant.?The?
difference? between? male? and? female? leaders? has? a? similar? magnitude.? Male? leaders? achieve?
minimum?effort? levels?higher?by?3.09?units,?compared? to? their? female?counterparts.?However,? this?
difference?is?not?significant?either.?
Table?3.3? Treatment?effects?
? Model?1? Model?2?
? Aggregate?treatment?
effects?
Effects?by?treatment?
conditions?
n?=?594? n?=?594?
Dependent?variable? Minimum?effort? Minimum?effort?
Two?way?communication? 2.95?
(5.44)?
5.90?
(7.71)?
Female?leader? ?3.09?
(5.41)?
?0.14?
(8.42)?
Two?way,?female?leader? ? ?5.73?
(10.83)?
Constant? 30.64***?
(5.10)?
29.17***?
(6.11)?
Notes.? For? the? estimations?we? use? group?level? random? effects? GLS? regressions.? Both?models?
contain?594?observations?over?18?periods?and?33?groups.?Standard?errors? (in?parentheses)?are?
corrected? for? clustering? at? the? group? level.? ***Statistically? significant? at? the? 1%? level,?
**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?
Model?2?contains?the?same? indicator?variables?for?the?two?treatments?as?Model?1,?and?we?add?the?
interaction? of? the? two? indicator? variables.? In? Two?way,? male? leaders? are? by? around? 5.9? more?
effective?than?female? leaders,?but?although?this?difference? is?noticeable? in?economic?terms,? it? is?far?
from? significant.?None?of? the?pairwise?post?estimation? tests? reveals?any? significant?difference? (p?>?
0.38?for?all?four?tests).?Neither?men,?nor?women?differ? in?their?effectiveness?across?communication?
conditions.?Also,?compared?to?each?other,?men?and?women?do?not?differ?in?effectiveness?if?tested?by?
communication?conditions.?We?conclude?this?section?as?follows.?
Conclusion?1:?We?find?no?support?for?Prediction?1.?Minimum?effort?in?Two?way?and?One?way?does?not?
differ.?We? find?no?support? for?Prediction?4.?Across?communication?conditions,?men?and?women?are?
equally?effective?leaders.?
3.4.2?Leader?Behavior?
In? this? section? we? present? the? message? content? analysis? and? compare? leader? behavior? across?
treatment? conditions.? Additional? summary? statistics? are? available? in? Table? A1? in? Appendix? 2A,?
containing? information?about? the?average?message?value,? the? frequency?of?suggesting? the?highest?
effort?level,?forty,?and?whether?any?message?was?sent.?Figure?A1?in?Appendix?2A?contains?figures?on?
the?distribution?of?the?numeric?message?content.?Concerning?the?message?content?analysis,?Table?A2?
in?Appendix?2A?contains?the?full?list?of?all?coded?message?categories,?while?Table?3.4?contains?often?
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occurring?message?categories?of?our? interest.34?Both? tables? indicate?description?and?examples,?and?
the?percentage?(frequency)?of?all?observations,?including?cases?when?the?leader?sent?no?message.?All?
variables?are?coded?as?binary:?variables?take?the?value?of?1?if?the?message?contains?a?certain?category?
and?0?otherwise.?The?message?coding?was?carried?out?by?the?author?and?is?available?upon?request.?
Table?3.4? Categories?of?messages?for?content?analysis?
Category? Description?and?examples? Frequency?in?
leader?
messages?
Frequency?in?
follower?
messages?
n?=?198? n?=?408?
No?message?sent? ? 0.131? 0.331?
Forty? Suggestion?to?choose?40? 0.788? 0.586?
Positive?emotional?
content?
Commendation,?encouragement? 0.465? 0.279?
Mutual?benefit?argument? Explanation?refers?to?mutual?benefit? 0.182? ?
Being?part?of?the?group? Using?the?pronoun?“we”,?“us”? 0.323?
Assertive?style? Confident,?not?aggressive,?not?passive? 0.687?
Order? Clear?order,?no?reasoning,?no?explanations? 0.429?
Follower?order? Followers?tell?the?leader?what?to?do,?as?an?
order?(e.g.?“say”,?“tell”,?but?not?“let’s?
choose”)?
? 0.152?
?
Our? content? analysis? is?based?on? the? scheme? in?Brandts?et? al.? (2015).? If? a?message? is? ambiguous?
concerning?its?numeric?value,?we?indicate?this?in?the?variable?for?ambiguous?content,?however?such?
messages?are?rare.35?Compared?to?Brandts?et?al.?(2015),?we?do?not?include?the?category?for?appeals?
to? mutual? trust,? but? we? include? social? banter.? Instead? of? including? categories? for? positive? and?
negative?feedback,?we?include?positive?and?negative?emotional?content.?Such?content?might?refer?to?
previous?performance,?for?example,?thanking?others?or?praising?team?work,?but? it?can?also?refer?to?
the? future?choice,? for?example,?encouraging?words?or?desperate?words?spreading?uncertainty.?We?
include?new?categories?such?as?the?conditional?strategy,?which?makes?sense? if?participants?have?to?
send?messages?for?three?sequential?periods.?
Several?categories?are?coded?only?for?leaders.?Based?on?the?insights?in?Cooper?(2007)?and?in?Brandts?
et? al.? (2015),?we? code? especially? for? the?mutual? benefit? argument? if? an? explanation? emphasizes?
collective? action? and? the? resulting? benefit? for? each? group?member.?We? code?whether? the? leader?
emphasizes?being?part?of? the?group,?whether? the?content? is?assertive,?whether? it?contains?orders,?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
34?Among? the? variables? for? any? explanation? and?mutual? benefit? argument,?we? include? the?mutual? benefit?
argument,?since?it?is?considered?to?be?more?relevant?for?leader?effectiveness?(Cooper?2007).?
35?When?translating?the?message?content?to?numeric?values,?we?distinguish?ambiguous?and?indecisive?content.?
Ambiguous? content? is? ambiguous? to? interpret.? Indecisive? content? is? clear? to? interpret,? but? the? leader?
communicates?own?doubts,?so?that?the?message?contains?several?parallel?options,?for?example?“choose?20?or?
higher”?or?“choose?30?or?40”.?Such?content?is?interpreted?as?indecisive,?but?not?necessarily?as?ambiguous,?if?we?
assume? that? participants? are? risk? averse,? and? choose? the? lower? suggestion? when? receiving? the? uncertain?
message?content.?For?example,?if?the?suggestion?says?to?choose?“20?or?higher”,?we?coded?the?numeric?message?
content?as?20,?not?ambiguous,?but? indecisive;? “work?more?hours”? is? interpreted?as?40,?ambiguous,?but?not?
indecisive?(since?the?leader?might?have?had?a?clear?goal?in?mind,?but?communicated?in?a?way?that?is?ambiguous?
to? interpret);?and? “devote? the? same?number?of?hours”?without? any?history? in?period?9? is? interpreted? as?0,?
ambiguous,?but?not?indecisive.?
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and?whether? it? is?more? requesting?a? favor.?We?also?code?whether? the? leader?blames?others? for?a?
coordination? failure,? and? has? a? laissez?faire? style,? in? the? sense? that? the?message? content? is? not?
explicitly?concerned?with?leading?the?followers.36?In?Two?way,?we?code?whether?the?leader?refers?to?
follower?messages.?One? category? is? coded?especially? for? followers.? Specifically,?whether? followers?
send?orders?and?try?to?rule?their?leaders?in?a?persuasive?style.?
We? run?Wilcoxon? rank?sum? tests,?after? collapsing? the?data?by?group,? to? compare?averages?of? the?
message? content? variables? across? treatment? conditions.? In? Two?way,? leaders? seems? to? be?more?
active,?in?that?they?send?any?message?(p?=?0.00),?request?more?often?forty?(p?=?0.01),?communicate?
more?positively? (p?=?0.01),?more?assertively? (p?=?0.01),?and?express?more?often? to?be?part?of? the?
group?(p?=?0.03).?In?both?One?way?(p?=?0.66)?and?Two?way?(p?=?0.14),?men?and?women?are?equally?
likely?to?suggest?forty.?In?both?One?way?(p?=?0.01)?and?Two?way?(p?=?0.01),?men?communicate?more?
assertively?than?women.?Women?in?Two?way,?rather?than?One?way,?express?more?often?to?be?part?of?
the?group?(p?=?0.01).?Positive?emotional?content?is?sent?more?often?in?Two?way,?rather?than?One?way?
(p? =? 0.01),? and? equally? often? by? both?men? and?women.? The?mutual? benefit? argument? shows? no?
differences,?neither?across?communication?conditions,?nor?by?gender?of?the?leader.?Orders?are?sent?
slightly?more?often?in?Two?way,?rather?than?One?way,?but?the?difference?is?not?significant?(p?=?0.14).?
Men?send?marginally?more?often?orders?than?women?(p?=?0.10),?but?separately?in?One?way?(p?=?0.40)?
and?Two?way?(p?=?0.12),?the?gender?difference?is?not?significant.?In?Two?way,?we?find?that?followers?
use?positive?emotional?content?and?orders?to?the?same?extent?towards?male?and?female?leaders,?but?
these?contents?occur?rarely.?Moreover,?followers?suggest?forty?to?the?same?extent?towards?male?and?
female?leaders.?
We? conduct?a? correlation?analysis? to? reveal? the? relations?of? the?often?occurring?message? content?
categories? (see? Table?A3? in?Appendix? 2A).? Suggesting? forty? is? positively? correlated?with? all? other?
categories,?so?that?none?of?the?other?message?categories?has?an?independent?effect.?The?correlation?
coefficient? for? assertive? style? is? the? highest? (0.72),? second? highest? is? positive? emotional? content?
(0.46),? followed? by? sending? orders? (0.30),? being? part? of? the? group? (0.20),? and? finally? the?mutual?
benefit?argument? (0.18).?The?mutual?benefit?argument?has?a? low,?negative?correlation? to?positive?
emotional? content? (?0.12),? which? makes? sense? if? we? assume? that? more? explanation? might? be?
necessary? in?groups?that?need?a?turnaround,?and? in? line?with?a?previous?coordination?failure,?some?
negative? emotions? might? be? expressed.? Some? assertive? leaders? are? likely? to? express? positive?
emotions? (0.32),?and?others?are? likely? to? send?a? clear?order?without?any?explanation? (0.45).37?The?
mutual? benefit? argument? is? highly? correlated?with? being? part? of? the? group? (0.49),?which? is? not?
surprising.? Leaders,?who? try? to? help? their? groups?with? explaining?mutual? benefits,? often? express?
coequality?with?the?group,?rather?than?standing?above?the?group.?
Figure?3.2?depicts?those?categories?that?we? find?so? far?to?be?most? interesting?as?carrying?potential?
gender?differences? in?communication?and? leadership?style:? the?suggestion?of? forty,?assertive?style,?
expressions?of?being?part?of?the?group,?and?orders.?
? ?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
36?The? laissez?faire? style? is? positively? and? highly? correlated? with? negative? emotional? content,? ambiguous?
content? and? excuses,? and? it? is? negatively? correlated?with? assertive? style.?However,?we? observe? only? a? low?
number?of?laissez?faire?leaders,?and?exclude?this?leadership?style?from?the?further?analysis.?
37?The?correlation?coefficient?of?sending?orders?and?expressing?positive?emotions?is?only?0.11.?
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Figure?3.2? Frequency?of?message?content?categories?by?treatment?conditions,?over?periods?
Suggestion?to?choose?forty? Assertive?style?
Being?part?of?the?group?(transformational?style)? Orders?(transactional?style)?
?
Being? part? of? the? group? represents? a? feature? of? the? transformational? leadership? style,? whereas?
orders?represent?a? feature?of?the?transactional? leadership?style.? Initially? the? frequency?of?orders? is?
very?low?in?any?of?the?treatment?conditions.?After?establishment?of?a?group?history,?the?frequency?of?
orders?increases?in?all?treatment?conditions.?The?opposite?is?true?for?being?part?of?the?group,?which?
has?a?decreasing?trend.? It?seems?that?the?transformational?style? is?only?used?during? initial?periods,?
probably?until?high?effort?levels?are?reached,?and?later,?leaders?tend?to?become?more?transactional,?
handling?their?task?by?simple?messages?like?“keep?choosing?40”.?Of?course,?this?might?be?related?to?
our?design.?After?a?successful?turnaround,?it?is?unnecessary?for?credible?leaders?to?repeatedly?suggest?
the? same.?Similarly,? in? real? life,? teams? that? face? less?novelty?during? the?production?process?might?
require? the? transactional,? rather? than? the? innovative? transformational? leadership? style? to? sustain?
high?performance.?Assertive?style?and?forty?have?stable?trends?over?time?in?all?treatment?conditions.?
Based?on? the? insights? from? the? analysis? above,?we? create? three?new? variables? for? the?use? in? the?
subsequent?analysis:?assertive?forty,?forty?as?team,?and?relevant?message.?For?all?new?variables,?we?
combine?other?message?content?always?with? forty,?because?our?main? interest? is? to?explain? leader?
effectiveness?and?forty?is?the?main?driver?of?effective?leadership?(Cooper?2007).?Since?assertive?style?
is?highly?correlated?with?forty,?we?combine?these?two?variables?to?“assertive?forty”.?Separately,?we?
also?combine?forty?with?being?part?of?the?group?to?“forty?as?team”.?Moreover,?we?combine?forty?with?
both?assertive?style?and?being?part?of?the?group?to?“relevant?message”,?which?represents?important?
features?of?the?transformational?leadership?style?(Eagly?et?al.?2003).?Figure?A2?in?Appendix?2A?depicts?
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relevant?messages,?and?shows?that? leaders?use?relevant?messages?more?often? in?periods?9?and?12,?
rather?than?later,?when?credibility?is?already?established.?For?the?combined?content?variables?we?use?
the?sum?of?the?codings.?For?example,?when?we?combine?forty?with?assertive?style,?we?create?a?new?
binary?variable? that? takes? the?value?of?1? if? the?message?contains?both? forty?and? is?assertive?and?0?
otherwise.?
Next,?we? analyze? the? explanatory? factors? of? the? leaders’?message? content.?We? run? subject?level?
random?effects?GLS?regressions?on?message?content.?We?run?the?same?sequence?of?regressions?for?
four?dependent?variables,?which?are:?forty,?assertive?forty,?forty?as?team,?and?relevant?message.?We?
correct?standard?errors?for?clustering?at?the?group? level.?The?regressions?contain?198?observations,?
which?correspond?to?the?leaders?in?the?33?groups?over?all?the?6?message?periods.?In?the?basic?models,?
presented? in? Table? 3.5,? we? use? as? explanatory? variables? the? interaction? of? the? communication?
treatment?and?the?gender?of?the?leader.?The?treatment?coefficients?in?all?basic?models?are?far?from?
significant.? Results? of? pairwise? post?estimation? tests? are? also? far? from? significant,? except? for? the?
model?of?assertive?forty.?In?Two?way,?men?are?slightly?more?likely?to?send?an?assertive?suggestion?to?
choose?forty?than?women,?and?this?result?is?close?to?significance?(p?=?0.11).?
Table?3.5? Explanatory?factors?of?message?content:?basic?models?
Dependent?
variable:?
Model?1? Model?2? Model?3? Model?4?
Forty? Assertive?forty? Forty?as?team? Relevant?message?
n?=?198?
Two?way? 0.19?
(0.16)?
0.21?
(0.17)?
0.04?
(0.11)?
0.04?
(0.11)?
Female? ?0.04?
(0.19)?
?0.23?
(0.19)?
?0.08?
(0.11)?
?0.13?
(0.11)?
Two?way,?female? ?0.06?
(0.22)?
0.00?
(0.24)?
0.08?
(0.15)?
0.07?
(0.15)?
Constant? 0.73***?
(0.14)?
0.69***?
(0.14)?
0.29***?
(0.09)?
0.27***?
(0.09)?
Notes.? For? the? estimations?we? use? subject?level? random? effects?GLS? regressions.?We? collapse? the? data? by?
leader?and?three?period?message?cycles.?All?models?contain?198?observations?over?6?message?periods?and?33?
groups.? Standard? errors? (in? parentheses)? are? corrected? for? clustering? at? the? group? level.? ***Statistically?
significant?at?the?1%?level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?
Subsequently,?we? run? a? sequence?of? regressions? to? analyze? the? effects?of? group?history,? leaders’?
beliefs? about? their? own? effectiveness,? previous?message? content,? and? successfulness? of? previous?
message? content? on? leader?messages.?We? add? each? variable,? one? at? a? time,? to? the? basic?model?
described? above,? both? separately? and? in? interaction?with? the? communication? treatment? and? the?
gender?of? the? leader.? In? the? following?paragraphs?we?report?our?results?and?present?one? table? for?
each?additional?explanatory?variable.?
We?study?group?history?effects?using?the?average?group?minimum?effort?of?the?three?periods?in?the?
previous?message?cycle.?Group?history?might?be?an?important?explanatory?variable?in?the?turnaround?
game,?since?history?dependence?is?a?well?studied?effect?(Van?Huyck?et?al.?1990;?Brandts?and?Cooper?
2006a,?Devetag? and?Ortmann? 2007).? Table? 3.6? contains? our? results.? A? one? unit? change? in? group?
history?indicates?a?change?of?10?effort?level?units,?for?example,?an?increase?from?effort?level?0?to?10.?
Group?history?has? its?strongest?effect?on? forty? (p?=?0.00).?A? leader? is?by?11?percent?more? likely? to?
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request? forty,? if? the? group? had? an? average?minimum? effort? increase? of? 10? in? the? previous? three?
periods.? For? an? average?minimum? effort? increase? from?0? to?40,?which? is? a? successful? turnaround?
history,?the?effect?size?would?be?44?percent.?However,?the?effect?size?of?group?history?decreases?for?
assertive?forty?and?forty?as?team.?An?assertive?message?is?sent?with?a?9?percent?higher?probability?if?
group?history?increases?by?10?effort?level?units,?whereas?forty?emphasizing?the?team?is?sent?with?a?6?
percent? lower?probability.?Finally,?group?history?has?no?significant?effect?on?relevant?messages.?We?
could?interpret?these?results?as?positive?group?history?boosting?leader?confidence?and?the?sending?of?
confident,? assertive?high? value?messages,?whereas? group?history?has?no? effect?on? the? sending?of?
relevant?messages,?leaving?leadership?styles?as?stable?traits?of?a?leader.?
Table?3.6? Explanatory?factors?of?message?content:?effects?of?group?history?
Dependent?
variable:?
n?=?198?
Forty? Assertive?forty? Forty?as?team? Relevant?message?
(1)? (2)? (3)? (4)? (5)? (6)? (7)? (8)?
Two?way? 0.15*?
(0.09)?
0.21?
(0.15)?
0.17?
(0.12)?
0.09?
(0.16)?
0.06?
(0.13)?
0.05?
(0.17)?
0.05?
(0.12)?
0.01?
(0.16)?
Female? ?0.04?
(0.12)?
?0.01?
(0.15)?
?0.22?
(0.14)?
?0.21?
(0.16)?
?0.09?
(0.14)?
?0.08?
(0.17)?
?0.13?
(0.12)?
?0.22?
(0.17)?
Two?way,?
female?
?0.01?
(0.13)?
? 0.04?
(0.17)?
? 0.06?
(0.18)?
? 0.06?
(0.17)?
?
Group?history? 0.11***?
(0.02)?
? 0.09***
(0.02)?
? ?0.06***
(0.02)?
? ?0.03?
(0.02)?
?
Group?history?interacted?with:?
One?way,?male? ? 0.14***?
(0.04)?
? 0.09**?
(0.04)?
? ?0.05?
(0.05)?
? ?0.05?
(0.05)?
One?way,?female? ? 0.11***?
(0.04)?
? 0.04?
(0.03)?
? ?0.08***?
(0.03)?
? ?0.05?
(0.03)?
Two?way,?male? ? 0.09***?
(0.03)?
? 0.08***
(0.03)?
? ?0.07**?
(0.04)?
? ?0.06?
(0.04)?
Two?way,?
female?
? 0.10***?
(0.03)?
? 0.13***
(0.03)?
? ?0.02?
(0.04)?
? 0.02?
(0.03)?
Constant? 0.45***?
(0.12)?
0.40***?
(0.14)?
0.46***
(0.12)?
0.52***
(0.16)?
0.44***
(0.14)?
0.46***?
(0.17)?
0.34***?
(0.12)?
0.44***
(0.17)?
Notes.? For? the? estimations?we? use? subject?level? random? effects?GLS? regressions.?We? collapse? the? data? by?
leader?and?three?period?message?cycles.?All?models?contain?198?observations?over?6?message?periods?and?33?
groups.? Standard? errors? (in? parentheses)? are? corrected? for? clustering? at? the? group? level.? ***Statistically?
significant?at?the?1%?level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?
When? group? history? is? interacted?with? treatment? conditions,?we? find? for? forty? that? the? effect? of?
group?history?is?stable?across?treatment?conditions.?After?running?pairwise?post?estimation?tests,?we?
find?no?differences?across? treatment?conditions,?neither? in? levels,?nor? in? the? coefficients?of?group?
history.? For? assertive? forty?we? find? that? group?history?has? a?quite? stable? effect? for?men,?but?not?
women,? across? treatment? conditions.? In? One?way,? the? post?estimation? test? comparing?men? and?
women?with?a? successful?history? reveals? that?men?are?more? likely? than?women? to? send?assertive?
forty?(p?=?0.06).?For?women,?the?result?of?the?post?estimation?test?comparing?the?effects?of?a?change?
in?group?history?under?different?communication?conditions?is?significant?at?the?5%?level.?In?One?way,?
group?history?has?no?significant?effect?on?women?sending?assertive?forty.?However,?in?Two?way,?the?
female? reaction? is? boosted? as? an? increase? of? group? history? by? 10? effort? level? units? increases? the?
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likelihood? that? a? female? leader? sends? assertive? forty? by? 13? percent.? For? forty? as? team? and? for?
relevant?messages,?we? find? that?group?history?has?a?stable?effect?across? treatment?conditions.?For?
relevant? messages,? the? pairwise? post?estimation? tests? reveal? only? one? significant? (p? =? 0.08)?
difference,?when?comparing?the?effects?of?a?change?in?group?history?between?genders?in?Two?way.?In?
Two?way,?men?are? slightly?more? likely? to? send? relevant?messages? if?group?history? is?negative? (p?=?
0.13),?so?that?they?tend?to?change?their? leadership?style?depending?on?the?circumstances,?whereas?
women? have? a? stable? trait? of? using? relevant?messages? and? the? corresponding? transformational?
leadership?style?(p?=?0.48).?
In?sum,?adding?group?history?to?the?basic?models?of?Table?3.5?did?not?alter?the?findings?of?the?basic?
regressions,?but?one?of? the?post?estimation? tests? confirmed?a?gender?difference? in?assertive? style?
also?in?One?way,?and?we?gained?some?new?insights?related?to?the?behavioral?reactions?of?leaders?to?a?
change?in?the?lagged?three?period?average?group?history.?
Table?3.7? Explanatory?factors?of?message?content:?effects?of?leader?beliefs?
Dependent?
variable:?
n?=?147?
Forty? Assertive?forty? Forty?as?team? Relevant?message?
(1)? (2)? (3)? (4)? (5)? (6)? (7)? (8)?
Two?way? 0.15?
(0.13)?
?0.34?
(0.26)?
0.21?
(0.15)?
0.26?
(0.24)?
?0.04?
(0.11)?
0.34?
(0.22)?
?0.01?
(0.11)?
0.36?
(0.24)?
Female? ?0.08?
(0.16)?
?0.73***?
(0.25)?
?0.24?
(0.18)?
?0.81***
(0.22)?
?0.16?
(0.12)?
?0.81*?
(0.46)?
?0.16?
(0.12)?
?0.82*?
(0.47)?
Two?way,?female? ?0.05?
(0.19)?
? ?0.02?
(0.23)?
? 0.21?
(0.16)?
? 0.16?
(0.15)?
?
Lagged?beliefs? 0.34?
(0.22)?
? 0.21?
(0.17)?
? 0.06?
(0.14)?
? ?0.01?
(0.15)?
?
Lagged?beliefs?interacted?with:?
One?way,?male? ? ?0.32?
(0.22)?
? ?0.14?
(0.14)?
? ?0.40?
(0.44)?
? ?0.45?
(0.45)?
One?way,?female? ? 0.29?
(0.26)?
? 0.46?
(0.35)?
? 0.30?
(0.20)?
? 0.26?
(0.19)?
Two?way,?male? ? 0.13?
(0.28)?
? ?0.21?
(0.25)?
? ?0.79?
(0.50)?
? ?0.84*?
(0.51)?
Two?way,?female? ? 0.84***?
(0.17)?
? 0.37***
(0.14)?
? 0.11?
(0.18)?
? 0.03?
(0.21)?
Constant? 0.47*?
(0.25)?
1.13***?
(0.20)?
0.54***
(0.22)?
0.88***
(0.13)?
0.22?
(0.17)?
0.66?
(0.46)?
0.25?
(0.17)?
0.68?
(0.46)?
Notes.? For? the? estimations?we? use? subject?level? random? effects?GLS? regressions.?We? collapse? the? data? by?
leader?and?three?period?message?cycles.?All?models?contain?147?observations?over?6?message?periods?and?33?
groups.?We?have?33?missing?values?for?lagged?variables?and?18?missing?values?in?cases?when?leaders?indicated?
that?the?belief?question? is?not?applicable.?Standard?errors?(in?parentheses)?are?corrected?for?clustering?at?the?
group? level.?***Statistically?significant?at?the?1%? level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%? level,?*statistically?
significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?
To?study?the?effect?of?leader?beliefs?about?being?followed,?we?use?the?leaders’?guess?about?the?share?
of?their?followers,?lagged?in?the?previous?message?period.?A?one?unit?increase?in?lagged?beliefs?equals?
an?increase?in?the?share?of?followers?from?0%?to?100%?and?represents?a?100%?increase?in?the?leaders’?
confidence? in? being? followed.? Since? successful? coordination? in? the? turnaround? game? is?mostly? a?
question?of?beliefs?about?others’?actions,?lagged?beliefs?might?be?an?important?explanatory?variable?
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of?leader?behavior?as?well.?The?original?number?of?observations,?198,?decreases?by?33?missing?values?
for? the? lagged? variable? and? 18? missing? values? in? cases? when? leaders? indicated? that? the? belief?
question?is?not?applicable.?Table?3.7?shows?that?although?the?effect?sizes?of?lagged?beliefs?are?large?
for?forty?and?assertive?forty,?the?huge?variance?in?the?belief?variable?makes?the?effects?insignificant.?
When?we? interact? lagged?belief?with? treatment?conditions,?we? find? for? forty? that? the?effect?of? the?
lagged?beliefs?varies?heavily?across?treatment?conditions.?In?One?way,?genders?differ?significantly?(p?
=? 0.03)? in? their? reactions? to? an? increase? in? lagged? beliefs.?Male? leaders?with? a? 100%? confidence?
increase?tend?to?request? less?often?forty,?whereas?their?female?counterparts?tend?to?request?more?
often?forty.?Although?the?coefficients?are?not?significant,?it?is?an?interesting?result,?that?male?leaders?
who?get?no?input?from?followers,?but?who?think?that?all?followers?follow?them,?tend?to?protect?their?
followers?from?individual?losses?due?to?coordination?failure,?whereas?their?female?counterparts?try?to?
use?the?increased?confidence?to?move?followers?to?the?group’s?best?outcome,?even?if?this?might?be?
risky?for?others.?Comparing?communication?conditions,?the?“open?door”?boosts?the?marginal?effects?
of? lagged? beliefs,? for? both? genders,? although? the? gender? difference? in? leader? reactions? remains?
similar? like? in?One?way? (p?=?0.01).? In?Two?way,?the?coefficient? for? lagged?beliefs?of?male? leaders? is?
small?and?not?significant,?as? if? they?are?not?very? impressed?by? their?own? increase? in?confidence.? It?
might? be? that? they? rather? focus? on? follower? input? through? the? “open? door”.? The? coefficient? for?
lagged?beliefs?of?female?leaders?is?large?and?highly?significant,?which?means?that?almost?every?female?
leader? with? 100%? confidence? and? an? “open? door”? requests? forty.? However,? if? a? 0%? confidence?
remains?unchanged,?women?are?significantly?less?likely?than?men?to?request?forty,?as?the?coefficient?
for?gender?tells.?
For?assertive?forty,?the?“open?door”?has?no?boosting?effect,?but?we?find?stable?gender?differences?in?
both?One?way?(p?=?0.06)?and?Two?way?(p?=?0.03).?Men?with?100%?confidence?tend?to?send?less?often?
assertive? forty? than?men?with?0%?confidence,?although? the?coefficients?are?not?significant.?On? the?
other?hand,?women?with?100%?confidence?tend?to?send?more?often?assertive?forty?than?women?with?
0%?confidence.?Thus,?women?with?increasing?confidence?are?more?likely?to?send?assertive?forty?than?
men?with?the?same?change? in?confidence.?Men?and?women?do?not?only?differ? in?their?reactions?to?
changes?in?their?beliefs,?but?also?in?their?behavior?if?a?0%?confidence?remains?unchanged.?However,?
the?behavioral?pattern?changes?to?the?opposite.?Women?with?a?0%?confidence?are?less?likely?to?send?
assertive?forty?than?men?with?the?same?confidence,?as?the?coefficient?for?gender?tells.?
For?forty?as?team,?we?find?only?one?notable?difference.?In?Two?way,?the?result?of?the?post?estimation?
test?comparing?the?reaction?of?men?and?women?with?maximally?increased?confidence?is?significant?(p?
=?0.07).?Men?with?an?increased?confidence?send?less?often?forty?as?team?(p?=?0.12),?whereas?women?
with? the? same? increase? in? their? confidence? show?no? reaction? in? their?message? sending?behavior.?
Women? with? a? 0%? confidence? are? less? likely? to? send? forty? as? team? than? men? with? the? same?
confidence? (p? =?0.08).? Thus,?men?with? a? low? confidence? in? followership? tend? to? emphasize? team?
spirit,?whereas?men?with?a?high?confidence?are?less?likely?to?do?so.?Women?with?a?low?confidence?do?
not?emphasize?team?spirit,?and?an?increase?in?their?confidence?has?no?effect?on?their?communication?
style.?
For?relevant?messages?we?find?a?similar?pattern.?Again,?the?only?notable?difference?that?we?find?is?in?
Two?way,?when? the?result?of? the?post?estimation? test?comparing? the?reaction?of?men?and?women?
with?maximally?increased?confidence?is?significant?(p?=?0.08).?Men?with?an?increased?confidence?send?
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less?often?relevant?messages?(p?=?0.10),?whereas?women?with?the?same?increase?in?their?confidence?
show?no?reaction?in?their?message?sending?behavior.?Women?with?a?0%?confidence?are?less?likely?to?
send? a? relevant?message? than?men?with? the? same? confidence? (p? =? 0.08).? Thus,?men?with? a? low?
confidence? in? followership? make? use? of? the? transformational? style,? whereas? men? with? a? high?
confidence?are? less? likely?to?do?so.?Women?with?a? low?confidence?do?not?use?the?transformational?
style,?and?an?increase?in?their?confidence?has?no?effect?on?their?leadership?style.?
In?sum,?adding?lagged?beliefs?to?the?basic?models?of?Table?3.5?did?not?alter?the?findings?of?the?basic?
regressions?and?post?estimation? tests,?but?we?gained?some?new? insights? related? to? the?behavioral?
reactions?of? leaders? to?a?change? in? their? lagged?beliefs.?High? confidence?boosts? female? leaders? to?
request?more?often? forty,?even? in?an?assertive?style,?whereas?male? leaders? take?back?and?become?
more?careful.?The?transformational?style?seems?to?be?a?stable?trait?for?women?and?a?tool?for?men,?
used?more?often?if?the?leader?perceives?a?lack?in?followership.?
Table?3.8? Explanatory?factors?of?message?content:?effects?of?consistency?
Dependent?
variable:?
n?=?165?
Forty? Assertive?forty? Forty?as?team? Relevant?message?
(1)? (2)? (3)? (4)? (5)? (6)? (7)? (8)?
Two?way? 0.04?
(0.08)?
?0.20?
(0.13)?
0.09?
(0.09)?
?0.08?
(0.20)?
0.00?
(0.09)?
?0.03?
(0.10)?
0.02?
(0.09)?
?0.03?
(0.09)?
Female? ?0.03?
(0.08)?
0.11?
(0.20)?
?0.12?
(0.09)?
?0.11?
(0.22)?
?0.08?
(0.09)?
?0.03?
(0.11)?
?0.07?
(0.08)?
?0.03?
(0.10)?
Two?way,?
female?
0.01?
(0.11)?
? 0.03?
(0.13)?
? 0.14?
(0.13)?
? 0.10?
(0.13)?
?
Lagged?content? 0.62***?
(0.09)?
? 0.53***
(0.09)?
? 0.17***
(0.05)?
? 0.16***?
(0.06)?
?
Lagged?content?interacted?with:?
One?way,?male? ? 0.73***?
(0.14)?
? 0.52**?
(0.26)?
? 0.20***?
(0.07)?
? 0.16?
(0.10)?
One?way,?female? ? 0.54***?
(0.17)?
? 0.49***
(0.10)?
? 0.00?
(0.12)?
? ?0.11*?
(0.06)?
Two?way,?male? ? 0.97***?
(0.03)?
? 0.72***
(0.03)?
? 0.28***?
(0.10)?
? 0.31***
(0.11)?
Two?way,?
female?
? 0.78***?
(0.21)?
? 0.71***
(0.23)?
? 0.28**?
(0.14)?
? 0.25*?
(0.14)?
Two?way,? female,?
no?consistency?
? 0.34?
(0.22)?
? 0.21?
(0.25)?
? 0.15?
(0.16)?
? 0.13?
(0.15)?
Constant? 0.29***?
(0.10)?
0.20?
(0.13)?
0.33***
(0.10)?
0.33*?
(0.20)?
0.17**?
(0.08)?
0.15**?
(0.08)?
0.15**?
(0.07)?
0.15**?
(0.07)?
Notes.? For? the? estimations?we? use? subject?level? random? effects?GLS? regressions.?We? collapse? the? data? by?
leader?and?three?period?message?cycles.?All?models?contain?165?observations?over?6?message?periods?and?33?
groups.?We?have?33?missing? values? for? lagged? variables.? Standard?errors? (in?parentheses)?are? corrected? for?
clustering?at? the? group? level.?***Statistically? significant? at? the?1%? level,?**statistically? significant? at? the?5%?
level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?
To?study?the?effects?of?previous?message?content,?we?lag?the?dependent?variable?in?each?regression?
and?add?it?as?an?explanatory?variable.?The?lagged?content?basically?analyzes?consistency?in?message?
use?from?one?message?period?to?the?next,?irrespective?of?the?successfulness?of?the?previous?message.?
The?original?number?of?observations,?198,?decreases?by?33?missing?values? for? the? lagged?variable.?
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Table?3.8?shows?that?the?effects?of?lagged?content?are?significant?at?the?1%?level?in?all?models,?which?
means?that?the?lagged?content?is?an?important?explanatory?variable?of?the?message?sending?behavior,?
no?matter?which?message? content? the?dependent? variable? is.? The?effect? size? is?more? than? three?
times?larger?if?the?dependent?variable?is?forty?or?assertive?forty,?rather?than?forty?as?team?or?relevant?
message.? Consistency? explains? a? high? share? of? 0.62? of? requesting? forty,?while? a? previously? sent?
assertive?suggestion?of?forty?has?a?similar?effect?of?0.53?on?assertive?forty.?
When?lagged?content?is?interacted?with?treatment?conditions,?we?find?for?forty?that?the?effect?of?an?
increase? in?the? lagged?content? is?slightly?higher?for?men?rather?than?women,?and?slightly?higher? in?
Two?way?rather? than?One?way.?Although?all? interaction?coefficients?are?significant?at?the?1%? level,?
we?find?only?one?significant?result?after?running?the?pairwise?post?estimation?tests?for?differences?in?
the?coefficients.?Men?who?previously?sent?forty?significantly?differ?across?communication?conditions?
(p?=?0.10).?In?One?way,?most?of?these?men?repeat?forty,?but?in?Two?way?almost?every?man?does?so.?
We?find?similar?results?for?assertive?forty.?The?coefficients?for?the?lagged?content?are?larger?in?Two?
way? rather? than?One?way,?but? this?difference? is?not? significant?based?on? the?post?estimation? test.?
Moreover,?men?and?women?do?not?differ?in?their?consistency?across?communication?conditions.?For?
forty?as?team,?we?find?no?significant?gender?difference?in?consistency,?neither?in?One?way,?nor?Two?
way.?Women?are?significantly?more?likely?to?repeat?forty?as?team?in?Two?way?rather?than?One?way?(p?
=?0.08).?For?relevant?messages,?we?find?a?significant?gender?difference?in?consistency?in?One?way?(p?=?
0.02),?with?men? repeating? relevant?messages?more?often? than?women.?However,? in?Two?way,? the?
gender?difference?disappears?as?women? significantly?change? their?behavior?across?communication?
conditions?(p?=?0.01).?
In?sum,?adding?lagged?content?to?the?basic?models?of?Table?3.5?weakened?the?size?of?the?treatment?
coefficients? and?magnified? some? differences? across? communication? conditions.? The? “open? door”?
increases?the?consistency?of?men?requesting?forty?and?women?sending?relevant?messages.?It?might?
be?that?the?“open?door”? increases?the? female?perception?of?being?part?of?a?team,?which?they?also?
express?in?their?messages.?However,?men?and?women?in?Two?way?do?not?differ?in?consistency.?
To? study?persistence,?we?extend? the?basic?models?of?Table?3.5?with? the?variable? “lagged? failure”.?
Lagged?failure?is?a?binary?variable,?which?takes?the?value?of?1?if?the?previously?sent?message?content?
was? not? followed? and? the? group? experienced? coordination? failure,? and? 0? if? the? previously? sent?
message?content,?or?some?other?message?content,?resulted?in?successful?followership.?Followership?
is?successful? if? the? lagged?average?of? the?group?minimum?effort? in? the?previous? three?periods?was?
forty.?Lagged?failure?basically?analyzes?persistence? in?message?use?from?one?message?period?to?the?
next,? with? respect? to? the? successfulness? of? the? previous? message.? Lagged? failure? indicates? the?
likelihood?of?a?leader?to?suggest?the?same?message?again?after?a?failure?history.?The?original?number?
of?observations,?198,?decreases?by?33?missing?values? for?the? lagged?variable.?Table?3.9?shows?that?
lagged?failure?has?a?negative?effect?on?the?dependent?variable,?meaning?that?leaders?who?previously?
failed?with?a?certain?message?are?less?likely?to?repeat?persistently?that?previous?message.?The?effect?
size?is?larger?in?case?of?assertive?forty?and?relevant?messages,?and?only?these?effects?are?significant.?
When?we? interact? lagged? failure?with? treatment? conditions,?we? find? for? forty? that? the? interaction?
coefficients?vary?a?lot?across?treatment?conditions.?In?One?way,?men?decrease,?while?women?slightly?
increase?persistence,?and?this?gender?difference?of?coefficients?is?significant?(p?=?0.00).?In?Two?way,?
men?increase,?while?women?decrease?persistence,?and?again,?the?gender?difference?of?coefficients?is?
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significant? (p? =? 0.07).? Thus,? the? “open? door”? causes? a? change? in? leader? behavior? to? its? opposite.?
Women,?who?are?persistent? if? they?do?not? receive? follower? input,?become? less?persistent?with?an?
“open?door”,?whereas?men,?who?are? less?persistent? if? they?do?not?receive? follower? input,?become?
more?persistent?with?an?“open?door”.?The?change?in?male?behavior?across?communication?conditions?
is?significant?(p?=?0.00)?based?on?the?results?of?the?post?estimation?tests.?For?assertive?forty,?we?find?
that?women?are?more?persistently? sending?assertive? forty? than?men,?especially? in?One?way,?when?
the?result?of?the?post?estimation?test?for?the?gender?difference?is?significant?(p?=?0.00).?In?One?way,?
the? likelihood?that?men?who?previously?sent?assertive?forty?and?failed?repeat?forty?decreases?by?35?
percent? (p?=?0.00),?whereas? for?women? the?same? likelihood? increases?by?32?percent? (p?=?0.00).? In?
Two?way,? leaders? are? less? persistently? assertive.? The? change? in? leaders’? behavior? across?
communication?conditions?is?significant?in?case?of?women?(p?=?0.06).?For?forty?as?team?and?relevant?
messages,? there? are? either? no? or? not? enough? observations,? and? thus? we? cannot? compare? the?
behavior?of?leaders?under?the?different?treatment?conditions.?
Table?3.9? Explanatory?factors?of?message?content:?effects?of?persistence?
Dependent?
variable:?
n?=?165?
Forty? Assertive?forty? Forty?as?team? Relevant?message?
(1)? (2)? (3)? (4)? (5)? (6)? (7)? (8)?
Two?way? 0.15?
(0.17)?
0.13?
(0.18)?
0.20?
(0.17)?
0.20?
(0.17)?
0.00?
(0.11)?
0.00?
(0.11)?
0.03?
(0.11)?
0.03?
(0.11)?
Female? ?0.07?
(0.19)?
?0.09?
(0.19)?
?0.25?
(0.19)?
?0.27?
(0.19)?
?0.10?
(0.11)?
?0.12?
(0.11)?
?0.10?
(0.10)?
?0.10?
(0.10)?
Two?way,?female? ?0.02?
(0.23)?
? 0.03?
(0.25)?
? 0.16?
(0.15)?
? 0.13?
(0.15)?
?
Lagged?failure? ?0.11?
(0.12)?
? ?0.16*?
(0.09)?
? ?0.03?
(0.15)?
? ?
0.20***?
(0.07)?
?
Lagged?failure?interacted?with:?
One?way,?male? ? ?0.36***?
(0.03)?
? ?0.35***
(0.03)?
? ??? ? ???
One?way,?female? ? 0.07**?
(0.03)?
? 0.32***
(0.03)?
? 0.33***?
(0.04)?
? ???
Two?way,?male? ? 0.26***?
(0.03)?
? ?0.40***
(0.02)?
? ?0.15***?
(0.04)?
? ???
Two?way,?female? ? ?0.24?
(0.28)?
? ?0.15?
(0.26)?
? ?0.09?
(0.13)?
? ?0.07?
(0.13)?
Two?way,? female,?
no?persistence?
? 0.04?
(0.24)?
? 0.04?
(0.24)?
? 0.19?
(0.15)?
? 0.13?
(0.15)?
Constant? 0.75***?
(0.14)?
0.76***?
(0.14)?
0.70***
(0.14)?
0.71***
(0.14)?
0.23**?
(0.09)?
0.23**?
(0.09)?
0.20**?
(0.09)?
0.20**?
(0.09)?
Notes.? For? the? estimations?we? use? subject?level? random? effects?GLS? regressions.?We? collapse? the? data? by?
leader?and?three?period?message?cycles.?All?models?contain?165?observations?over?6?message?periods?and?33?
groups.?We?have?33?missing? values? for? lagged? variables.? Standard?errors? (in?parentheses)?are? corrected? for?
clustering?at? the? group? level.?***Statistically? significant? at? the?1%? level,?**statistically? significant? at? the?5%?
level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?
In?sum,?adding?lagged?failure?to?the?basic?models?of?Table?3.5?did?not?alter?the?findings?of?the?basic?
regressions,?but?we?gained?some?new? insights?related?to?the?persistence?of? leaders?who?previously?
failed?with?a?certain?communication?style.?The?“open?door”?causes?women?to?become?less?persistent?
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in?requesting?forty?and?rather?more?conform?to?their?followers,?while?men?become?more?persistent,?
as?if?follower?input?would?boost?male?persistence.?However,?leaders?with?the?“open?door”?decrease?
persistence? in?case?of?assertive? forty,?as? if? the?conversation?with? followers?would?be?a?better? tool?
than?assertiveness?to?try?a?turnaround?after?a?failure?history.?
Next,?we?analyze?how? followers’?suggestions?of? forty? influence? leader?behavior? in?Two?way.?Based?
on?the?graphical?analysis?in?Figure?A1?in?Appendix?2A,?we?think?that?follower?messages?might?play?an?
important? role? in?explaining? leader?behavior,?especially? if? the? leader? lacks? “thick? skin”? to? follower?
messages? suggesting? less? than? forty.38?Initially,? in? period? 9,? followers? do? not? differentiate? their?
messages?due?to?the?gender?of?the? leader,?and? they?send?suggestions?around?35?on?average.?As?a?
reply,?leaders?send?suggestions?close?to?40.?In?period?12,?followers?start?to?follow?the?communication?
of?male? leaders,? and? their? suggestions? converge? to? 40? over? time,? just? in? line?with?male? leaders?
continuously?suggesting?40.?On?the?other?hand,?the?communication?of?female?leaders?is?not?followed?
that?easily.? In?period?12,? followers?suggest?on?average?30,?and? female? leaders?start? to?adapt? their?
suggestions?to?this?trend.?In?period?15,?as?if?followers?would?recognize?the?importance?of?their?input,?
they?start? to?send?higher?suggestions,?and? the?average?converges? to?35.?From?period?18?onwards,?
female? leaders? regain? trust? into? their? followers,? and? their? suggestions? converge? to? follower?
suggestions.?Although?female?leaders?initially?recognized?their?pivotal?role?and?ignored?low?follower?
suggestions,?it?seems?that?they?had?a?harder?time?to?gain?the?attention?of?their?followers.?
To?study?the?effect?of?followers’?suggestions?of?forty?on?leader?behavior?in?Two?way,?we?restrict?the?
basic?models?of?Table?3.5?to?the?two?way?communication?condition?and?extend?the?models?with?the?
variable?“follower?forty”.?Follower?forty?is?a?binary?variable,?which?takes?the?value?of?1?if?at?least?one?
of?the?followers?in?one?of?the?message?cycle?periods?sends?forty?to?the?leader,?and?0?if?none?of?the?
followers? in?none?of? the?message?cycle?periods?sends? forty? to? the? leader.?The?models?contain?102?
observations?over?6?message?periods?and?17?groups.?Table?3.10?contains?our?results.?The? indicator?
for?the?gender?of?the?leader?is?not?significant?for?none?of?the?dependent?variables,?which?means?that?
followers?do?not?differentiate?between? leaders?based?on? their?gender?when?suggesting?something?
else?than?forty.?Follower?forty?has?quite?high?effect?sizes?in?all?models,?and,?except?for?assertive?forty,?
the?effects?are?significant,?which?means?that?followers’?suggestions?of?forty?have?a?high?explanatory?
power?for?leaders’?message?content.?Follower?messages?explain?almost?half?of?the?leader?behavior.?
When?we?interact?follower?forty?with?the?gender?of?the?leader?and?run?post?estimation?tests?for?the?
differences? in?the?coefficients,?we?find?no?significant?gender?differences? in?the?effects?on?forty?(p?=?
0.84),?assertive?forty?(p?=?0.65),?forty?as?team?(p?=?0.33),?and?relevant?message?(p?=?0.64).?Even?if?the?
variance? in? leader?reactions? is?high,? for? forty?as?team?and?relevant?messages,?we? find? that?women?
who?receive?follower?forties?are?around?twice?more?likely?to?suggest?the?respective?message?content?
than?men?receiving?the?same?follower?messages,?and?the?opposite?is?true?for?assertive?forty.?If?they?
receive?follower?forties,?men?tend?to?use?an?assertive?style?and?women?tend?to?emphasize?the?team?
and?use?a?transformational?style.?In?sum,?we?gained?new?insights?that?underline?our?previous?results.?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
38?Using? random?effects? regressions,?we? thoroughly? test?whether? followers?differentiate? their?suggestions?of?
forty?based?on?the?gender?of?the?leader.?Our?results?are?negative?and?robust?to?additional?control?variables?like?
history?of?Part?1,?lagged?group?minimum?effort,?lagged?follower?beliefs,?diverse?lagged?leader?message?content,?
leader? persistence? and? gender? of? the? follower.? Although? female? followers? are? 20%? less? likely? to? send? a?
suggestion?of?forty,?neither?male,?nor?female?followers?differentiate?their?suggestions?due?to?the?gender?of?the?
leader.?
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Table?3.10? Explanatory?factors?of?message?content:?effects?of?follower?input?
Dependent?
variable:?
n?=?102?
Forty? Assertive?forty? Forty?as?team? Relevant?message?
(1)? (2)? (3)? (4)? (5)? (6)? (7)? (8)?
Female? ?0.06?
(0.07)?
?0.01?
(0.31)?
?0.20?
(0.12)?
?0.09?
(0.33)?
0.04?
(0.08)?
?0.15?
(0.21)?
?0.02?
(0.09)?
?0.12?
(0.22)?
Follower?forty? 0.55***?
(0.20)?
? 0.32?
(0.21)?
? 0.44***
(0.15)?
? 0.36**?
(0.16)?
?
Follower?forty?interacted?with:?
Male? ? 0.60*?
(0.35)?
? 0.43?
(0.27)?
? 0.24?
(0.24)?
? 0.26?
(0.26)?
Female? ? 0.51**?
(0.22)?
? 0.25?
(0.30)?
? 0.56***?
(0.20)?
? 0.42*?
(0.22)?
Constant? 0.57***?
(0.16)?
0.54**?
(0.26)?
0.69***
(0.19)?
0.62***
(0.24)?
0.06?
(0.10)?
0.18?
(0.15)?
0.09?
(0.11)?
0.15?
(0.17)?
Notes.? For? the? estimations?we? use? subject?level random? effects?GLS? regressions.?We? collapse? the? data? by?
leader?and? three?period?message? cycles.?After? restricting? for?Two?way,?all?models? contain?102?observations?
over?6?message?periods?and?17?groups.?Standard?errors? (in?parentheses)?are?corrected? for?clustering?at? the?
group? level.?***Statistically?significant?at?the?1%? level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%? level,?*statistically?
significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?
Finally,?we?analyze?whether?male?and?female?leaders?follow?their?own?messages?to?the?same?extent.?
Leaders?who?follow?their?own?messages?can?be?seen?to?act?as?role?models,?which?is?another?feature?
of? the? transformational? leadership? style? (Eagly? et? al.? 2003).?We? run? four? separate? subject?level?
random? effects? GLS? regressions?with? effort? as? the? dependent? variable.39?We? use? as? explanatory?
variables? the? communication? treatment,? the? gender? of? the? leader,? and? the? interaction? of? the?
treatment? indicators?and? the?message?content.?We?vary? the?message?content? in?each?of? the? four?
regressions?using?either? forty,?assertive? forty,? forty?as?team,?or?relevant?message.?We?collapse?the?
data? by? leader? and? three?period?message? cycles,? so? that? every?model? contains? 198? observations?
which?correspond?to?the? leaders? in?the?33?groups?over?all?the?6?periods?when?communication?was?
possible.?We?correct?standard?errors? for?clustering?at?the?group? level.?Treatment?coefficients? in?all?
models? are? far? from? significant,? and? none? of? the? pairwise? post?estimation? tests? has? a? significant?
result.? Men? and? women? follow? their? own? message? content? equally,? irrespective? of? the???
communication?condition,?which? is?one?more?piece?of?evidence? that?men?and?women?are?equally?
likely?to?act?as?transformational?leaders.?
We?conclude?this?section?with?a?summary?of?our?findings?on?leadership?styles.?Men?and?women?send?
equally?often?relevant?messages,?which?represent?the?transformational?leadership?style,?in?both?One?
way?and?Two?way.?The?transformational?style?seems?to?be?a?stable?trait?for?women,?while?men?use?it?
as?a?tool?if?necessary.?Men?are?more?likely?to?send?relevant?messages?if?group?history?is?negative,?or?
if?they?perceive?a?lack?in?followership.?Women?with?an?“open?door”?send?more?consistently?relevant?
messages?than?women?who?do?not?get?follower?input.?However,?both?men?and?women?become?less?
persistent?in?sending?relevant?messages?after?a?failure?history.?
? ?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
39?No?table?included?for?the?described?regressions.?
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Conclusion?2:?We?find?no?support?for?Prediction?3.?In?both?One?way?and?Two?way,?male?and?female?
leaders? request?equally?often? the?highest?effort? level.?We?confirm? the?main?points?of?Prediction?5.?
Male? leaders? are?more? likely? to? send? assertive?messages? than? their? female? counterparts.? Female?
leaders?in?Two?way,?rather?than?One?way,?send?more?often?content?emphasizing?that?the?leader?is?an?
equal?member?of?the?group.?In?contrast?to?our?prediction,?men?and?women?use?the?transformational?
leadership?style?equally?often,?in?both?One?way?and?Two?way.?
3.4.3?Follower?Behavior?
This? section? analyzes? leader? credibility,?which? is? the? followers’? reaction? to? the? leaders’?messages.?
Figure?3.3?compares?the?followers’?reactions,?measured?by?the?minimum?of?followers’?effort?choices,?
to? the? leaders’?message? content? in? each?period.? The?message? contents? are? forty,? assertive? forty,?
forty?as?team,?and?relevant?message.?We?are?interested?which?message?content?is?more?effective.?Is?
there?a?recipe?for?success??Forty?is?important?as?it? is?the?main?driver?of?leader?effectiveness?and?as?
such?it?is?part?of?the?combined?message?contents.?Graphically?we?find?that?the?assertive?style?and?the?
emphasis?of?being?part?of?the?group?both?add?to?the?effectiveness?of?the?message.?Since?the?relevant?
message?combines?forty,?assertiveness,?and?being?part?of?the?group,?it?is?the?most?effective?message,?
especially?in?early?periods,?before?groups?manage?to?coordinate?on?the?highest?effort.?
Figure?3.3? Comparison?of?followers’?reactions?by?leaders’?message?content?over?time?
?
Next,?we? analyze?whether? followers? differentiate? between? leaders? based? on? their? gender? or? the?
communication? treatment,?when?making? their?effort? choices.?Table?3.11?presents?estimates? from?
group?level? random?effects?GLS? regressions?with? the?minimum?of? followers’?effort? choices? as? the?
dependent? variable.? As? explanatory? variables? we? use? the? interaction? of? the? communication?
treatment?and? the?gender?of? the? leader.? In?all?regressions,?we?restrict? the?data? to?observations?of?
followers? in?each?period?of?Part?2?given? that?the? leader?sends? forty,?assertive? forty,? forty?as?team,?
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and?relevant?content?respectively.40?In?every?second?regression,?we?restrict?the?data?to?observations?
after? “failure? cycles”.? Previous? failure? cycles? indicate? whether? the? group? experienced? failure? to?
coordinate? on? the? efficient? equilibrium? in? the? previous?message? cycle? or? in? the? end? of? Part? 1.?
Specifically,?previous?failure?cycles?indicate?whether?the?group?minimum?effort?was?less?than?forty?in?
at?least?one?of?the?three?periods?of?the?previous?message?cycle,?and?one?of?the?last?three?periods?of?
Part? 1,? respectively.? Previous? failure? cycles?make? leader?messages? and? their? effectiveness?more?
meaningful? as? leaders? can? try? to? turnaround? a? previous? history? of? coordination? failure.? In? every?
second?regression,?we?drop?one?group? from?our?observations,?because? that?group?coordinated?on?
level? forty?by?period?4? already? and? continued?with? forty?until? the?end?of? the? session.?We? cluster?
standard?errors?on?groups.?
After? all? regressions,?we? run? post?estimation? tests? for? both?One?way? and? Two?way,? and? find? no?
differences? in? leader?effectiveness?by?the?gender?of?the? leader,?holding?constant?that? leaders?send?
forty? (p? >? 0.42),? assertive? forty? (p? >? 0.14),? and? forty? as? team? (p? >? 0.28),? respectively.? If?we?hold?
constant? that? leaders? send? relevant?messages,?we? find? in? Two?way? that?men? are? followed? to? a?
greater?extent?than?women?(in?any?case:?p?=?0.06,?after?a?failure?cycle:?p?=?0.02).?This?might?be?due?to?
our? finding?above,? saying? that?men? tend? to? increase? the?use?of? relevant?messages? if? the?previous?
group?coordination?was?unsuccessful.? In?One?way,?we?find?no?significant?difference? in?followership?
based? on? the? leaders’? gender? (p? >? 0.28).? However,? since? leaders? can? switch? between?message?
contents,?we?have?too?few?observations?if?we?hold?relevant?messages?constant,?and?thus?our?results?
shall? be? interpreted? carefully.? So? far,? our? analysis? supports? the? view? that?men? and?women? are?
followed?equally?in?both?One?way?and?Two?way,?irrespective?of?the?leader’s?communication?style.?
Table?3.11? Follower?behavior?
Dependent?
variable:?
minimum?of?
followers’?
effort?
Forty?held?constant? Assertive?forty?held?
constant?
Forty?as?team?
held?constant?
Relevant?message?
held?constant?
Any?case? After?
failure?
Any?case? After?
failure?
Any?
case?
After?
failure?
Any?
case?
After?
failure?
(1)? (2)? (3)? (4)? (5)? (6)? (7)? (8)?
n?=?468? n?=?117? n?=?402? n?=?87? n?=?
174?
n?=?84? n?=?147? n?=?63?
Two?way? 0.85?
(6.98)?
1.72?
(7.86)?
0.71?
(7.12)?
1.67?
(7.97)?
?4.46?
(4.31)?
?5.24?
(5.05)?
0.00***?
(0.00)?
0.00***
(0.00)?
Female? ?0.34?
(7.29)?
1.07?
(8.21)?
?1.28?
(8.10)?
0.03?
(8.92)?
?6.50?
(6.07)?
?6.63?
(6.24)?
?7.93?
(7.34)?
?7.93?
(7.49)?
Two?way,?
female?
?4.28?
(9.95)?
?6.74?
(10.80)?
?3.60?
(10.55)?
?12.53?
(12.26)?
2.80?
(8.76)?
2.57?
(9.82)?
?2.70?
(9.32)?
?12.21?
(11.35)?
Constant? 34.40***?
(5.30)?
33.33***?
(6.27)?
34.37***
(5.33)?
33.33***
(6.32)?
40***?
(0.00)?
40***?
(0.00)?
40?
???
40?
???
Notes.?For?the?estimations?we?use?group?level?random?effects?GLS?regressions.?We?restrict?the?data?to?follower?
observations? in?Part?2.?All?models?contain?594?observations?of?132?followers?over?18?periods?and?33?groups,?
restricted?based?on?the?leaders’?message?content?and?the?successful?coordination?history?of?the?previous?three?
periods.? Standard? errors? (in? parentheses)? are? corrected? for? clustering? at? the? group? level.? ***Statistically?
significant?at?the?1%?level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
40?This? analysis? enables? us? to? compare?whether? followers? react? differently? to? female? leaders? if? they? send?
message?content?that?might?be?considered?as?stereotypically?male,?for?example,?assertive?forty.?
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Finally,?we? analyze? the? explanatory? factors?of? follower?behavior.? Instead?of? analyzing? group?level?
data,?we?run?subject?level?random?effects?GLS?regressions?with?followers’?individual?effort?choices?in?
each? period? as? the? dependent? variable.? Table? 3.12? presents? the? estimates? using? different?
explanatory?variables.?In?all?regressions,?we?correct?standard?errors?for?clustering?at?the?group?level?
and?we?restrict?the?data?to?observations?of?followers?in?Part?2.?
Table?3.12? Explanatory?factors?of?follower?behavior?
? Model?1? Model?2? Model?3? Model?4?
n?=?2376? n?=?2376? n?=?2244? n?=?2043?
Two?way? 6.02?
(7.32)?
?3.06?
(5.38)?
1.34?
(4.54)?
1.42?
(4.48)?
Female? 1.41?
(7.81)?
11.96**?
(5.02)?
?3.85?
(4.48)?
4.42?
(7.75)?
One?way,?male,?
no?message?
? 3.79?
(2.54)?
?13.49**?
(6.59)?
?
One?way,?female,?
no?message?
8.12?
(10.08)?
?5.01**?
(2.24)?
Two?way,?male,?
no?message?
7.54?
(5.93)?
?11.95***?
(0.88)?
Two?way,?female,?
no?message?
?3.55*?
(2.10)?
?3.58***?
(0.34)?
? ? Forty?in?
interaction?with:?
Forty?in?
interaction?with?
lagged?failure?
and:?
Forty?in?
interaction?with?
follower?beliefs?
and:?
One?way,?male? ? 34.80***?
(2.76)?
?2.25?
(2.67)?
24.51***?
(7.32)?
One?way,?female? 20.72***?
(2.82)?
0.81**?
(0.35)?
20.74***?
(1.12)?
Two?way,?male? 37.94***?
(6.23)?
?1.18?
(1.23)?
24.80***?
(7.26)?
Two?way,?female? ?5.90?
(9.95)?
23.34***?
(3.53)?
0.19?
(1.04)?
17.83***?
(4.26)?
Constant? 29.46***?
(5.93)?
3.14?
(2.43)?
34.16***?
(4.06)?
11.51?
(7.92)?
Notes.? For? the?estimations?we?use? subject?level? random?effects?GLS? regressions.? The?dependent? variable? is?
followers’?effort.?We?restrict?the?data?to?follower?observations?in?Part?2.?All?models?contain?2376?observations?
of?132?followers?over?18?periods?and?33?groups.?We?have?132?missing?values?for?lagged?variables,?312?missing?
values? if? leaders?sent?no?message?and? thus? the?belief?question?was?not?applicable,?and?21?missing?values? if?
followers? indicated?that?the?belief?question? is?not?applicable.?Standard?errors? (in?parentheses)?are?corrected?
for?clustering?at?the?group?level.?***Statistically?significant?at?the?1%?level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?
level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?
In?Model?1,?we?use?as?explanatory?variables?the?interaction?of?the?communication?treatment?and?the?
gender? of? the? leader.? The? estimates? of? the? basic? model? and? the? results? of? the? pairwise? post?
estimation?tests?confirm?our?findings?so?far?that?men?and?women?are?followed?to?the?same?extent?in?
both?One?way?and?Two?way.?
In?Model?2,?we?use?as?explanatory?variables?the?communication?treatment,?the?gender?of?the?leader,?
the? interaction? of? the? treatment? indicators?with? sending? no?message,? and? the? interaction? of? the?
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treatment? indicators?with? forty.?“No?message”? is?a?binary?variable? that? takes? the?value?of?1? if? the?
leader?sent?no?message?and?0?otherwise.?“Forty”?is?a?binary?variable?too,?that?takes?the?value?of?1?if?
the?leader?requests?forty?and?0?otherwise.?The?coefficient?for?the?gender?of?the?leader?is?significant?
(p?=?0.02)?and?means? that? followers? increase? their?effort?by?almost?12?percent? if? the? leader,?who?
sends?any?suggestion?but?not?forty,? is?female.?In?Two?way,?women?are?penalized?significantly?more?
by?their?followers?for?a?change?to?not?sending?any?message?than?men?(p?=?0.03?based?on?the?post?
estimation?test).?Among?leaders?who?change?to?request?forty,?men?are?followed?to?a?greater?extent?
than?women?in?both?One?way?(p?=?0.00)?and?Two?way?(p?=?0.02).?However,?if?we?compare?the?total?
gender?effect?on?followers’?effort,?we?find?that?men?and?women?who?request?forty?are?followed?to?
the?same?extent?in?both?One?way?(p?=?0.53)?and?Two?way?(p?=?0.44).?
In?Model?3,?we?extend?Model?2,?and?add?lagged?failure?to?the?interaction?of?forty?with?the?treatment?
indicators.?Lagged?failure?is?a?binary?variable,?which?takes?the?value?of?1?if?the?previously?requested?
forty?was?not? followed,?and?0? if? the?previously? requested? forty,?or? some?other?message? content,?
resulted? in? successful? followership.? Followership? is? successful? if? the? lagged? average? of? the? group?
minimum?effort?in?the?previous?three?periods?was?forty.?Lagged?failure?basically?analyzes?persistence?
in?message? use? from? one?message? period? to? the? next,?with? respect? to? the? successfulness? of? the?
previous?message.? The? interaction? term?with? lagged? failure? indicates? the? likelihood? of? followers?
following?a? leader?who?requests?forty?again?after?the?group?experienced?coordination? failure.?Only?
the? increase? in? female?persistence? in?One?way?has?a? significant?positive?effect?on? follower?effort.?
However,?the?effect?size?is?rather?small?(0.81),?so?it?would?take?more?than?10?periods?to?increase?the?
effort?level?by?10.?Persistent?men?and?women?are?followed?to?the?same?extent?based?on?the?results?
of?the?post?estimation?tests?comparing?interaction?coefficients?in?both?One?way?and?Two?way.?
In?Model?4,?we?study?the?additional?effect?of?followers’?beliefs?about?others?following?the?leader.?We?
extend?Model?2,?and?add?“follower?beliefs”?to?the?interaction?of?forty?with?the?treatment?indicators.?
Follower?beliefs? indicate?the?followers’?guess?about?the?share?of?other?group?members?who?would?
follow? the? leader’s? suggestion? in? the? subsequent?effort?choice.?The?higher? the?guessed? share,? the?
more?credible?the? leader’s?message? is.?Follower?beliefs?about?others’?actions,?the?credibility?of?the?
leader,?might?be?an?important?explanatory?variable?of?follower?behavior.?The?interaction?coefficients?
indicate?the?change?in?followers’?effort?choice?if?their?beliefs?change?from?0%?to?100%?credibility?of?
the?leader?who?requests?forty.?All?interaction?coefficients?are?significant?at?the?1%?level,?irrespective?
of? the? gender?of? the? leader?or? the? communication? treatment.?Although? the? coefficients? for?male?
leaders?are?higher? than? for? female? leaders,? the? results?of? the?post?estimation? tests?comparing? the?
coefficients?are?far?from?significant?in?both?One?way?(p?=?0.60)?and?Two?way?(p?=?0.35).?Similarly,?we?
find? no? significant? differences? if? the? post?estimation? tests? compare? total? gender? effects? between?
equally?credible?leaders?requesting?forty?in?One?way?(p?=?0.85)?or?Two?way?(p?=?0.44).?We?conclude?
this?section?as?follows.?
Conclusion?3:?We?find?no?support?for?Prediction?2.?In?both?One?way?and?Two?way,?male?and?female?
leaders?are?followed?to?the?same?extent.?Despite?the?differences?in?leaders’?communication?paths,?we?
find? no? differences? in? followers’? reactions? related? to? the? gender? of? the? leader.? Relevant?message?
content,?which?represents?the?transformational?leadership?style,?is?the?most?effective?content.?
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3.4.4?Leader?Evaluations?
The?final?questionnaire?provides?data?about?leader?evaluations.?Figure?A3?in?Appendix?2A?depicts?the?
evaluations? of? the? leaders’? performance? in? percentages? by? treatment? conditions.? To? ease?
comprehension,?we?interpret?the?original?answer?keys?as?“very?poor”?for?1,?“poor”?for?2,?“average”?
for?3,?“good”?for?4,?and?“very?good”?for?5.?On?average,?male? leaders?get?an?evaluation?of?3.8,?and?
female?leaders?get?3.4.?With?3.2,?female?leaders?in?Two?way?get?the?lowest?average?evaluation.?If?we?
test?whether?these?differences?are?statistically?significant,?we?cannot?confirm?that?female?leaders?get?
worse?evaluations? than? their?male?counterparts,?neither? in?One?way? (p?=?0.79),?nor?Two?way? (p?=?
0.19).41?However,? if?we?restrict?the?estimation?to?successful?coordination?on? level?forty,?we?confirm?
that?female?leaders?in?Two?way,?who?requested?forty?and?whose?groups?succeeded?to?coordinate?on?
forty,? receive?by?0.68?points?worse? evaluations? than? their?male? counterparts? (p? =?0.03).? In?other?
words,?in?Two?way,?women?get?harsher?evaluations?than?men,?despite?a?successful?group?history.?
In?contrast,?if?we?restrict?the?estimation?to?unsuccessful?coordination,?we?find?that?female?leaders?in?
Two?way,?who? requested? forty? but?whose? groups? failed? to? coordinate? on? forty,? receive? by? 1.30?
points?better?evaluations?than?their?male?counterparts?(p?=?0.00).?In?other?words,?in?Two?way,?men?
get? blamed?more? for? a? failure? history? than?women.? If?we? restrict? the? estimation? to? cases?when?
leaders? sent?no?message?or? requested?an?effort? level?below? forty,?we? find? that? female? leaders? in?
Two?way? get?by? 1.63?points? better? evaluations? than? their?male? counterparts? (p? =? 0.00).? In?other?
words,?in?Two?way,?men?get?blamed?more?for?not?requesting?forty?than?women.?
In? sum,? followers? in? Two?way? do? not? acknowledge? successful? women? to? the? same? extent? as?
successful?men,?but? they?blame?women? less? than?men,? if? leaders?were?unsuccessful?or?missed? to?
request?the?highest?effort.?It?might?be?that?followers?perceive?a?greater?influence?on?women?rather?
than?men?if?leaders?have?an?“open?door”?for?follower?messages.?
3.5?Conclusion?and?Discussion?
Men?communicate?more?assertively?than?women.? If?women?have?an?“open?door”,?they?emphasize?
more?often?that?the?leader?is?an?equal?member?of?the?group.?Women?have?a?stable?trait?of?sending?
relevant?messages,?which? represent? the? transformational? leadership?style,?while?men?use? relevant?
messages?more? as? a? tool? if? necessary? for? the? improvement? of? group? coordination.? Despite? the?
differences?in?the?communication?paths?of?the?leaders,?men?and?women?are?equally?likely?to?use?the?
transformational? leadership? style,? in? that? they? send? relevant?messages,?which? relates?positively? to?
leader?effectiveness.?Men?and?women?are?equally?effective? leaders,?who?are?equally?credible?and?
equally? likely?to?request?forty.?We?find?a?weak?hint?that?women?with?an?“open?door”?might?have? it?
harder? to?make? their? followers? adapt? to? them,? as? followers?might? perceive? to? have? a? stronger?
influence?on?women?rather?than?men.?However,?over?time,?women?gain?credibility?and?their?groups?
become?successful.?As?one?of?the?female?leaders?expressed?it?“everyone?is?on?board?now”,?after?she?
finally?managed? in? the? last?periods? that?her?group? simultaneously? chose? the?most?efficient?effort?
level.? Initially,?before? followers? learn? that?women? can?be?as?effective? leaders?as?men,? they?might?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
41?We? use? OLS? regressions? for? the? leader’s? evaluation? as? the? dependent? variable,? and? interaction? of? the?
communication?treatment?and?the?gender?of?the? leader?as?the?explanatory?variables.?We?restrict?to?follower?
observations?in?Part?2?and?correct?standard?errors?for?clustering?at?the?group?level.?
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think?that?others?hold?stereotype?beliefs?against?female? leaders.?However,?they?are?willing?to? learn?
the?opposite?and?to?give?female?leaders?a?chance?to?let?them?lead.?What?speaks?for?this?speculation?
is? that?we? find?no?discrimination? in? followers’? effort,? in? followers’?messages,? in? aggregate? leader?
evaluations,?or?in?following?assertive,?masculine?acting?male?and?female?leaders,?although?literature?
reports?about?evidence?for?such?phenomena?(Ridgeway?2001;?Eagly?et?al.?2003;?Day?2014).?
One?shortcoming?of?our?data?is?the?relatively?low?number?of?observations?and?that?our?data?might?be?
over?fitted.?Except?for?one?male?leader?who?sent?once?a?suggestion?of?zero,?all?male?leaders?always?
requested? forty? if? they? sent? any?message.? Thus,? the? limitation? of? our? data? is? that? we? have? no?
variation? in?the?observations?for?male? leaders.?We?cannot?compare?the?whole?spectrum?of?male?to?
female? behavior,? or? the? impact? of?message? value?within? gender.?What?we? can? compare? is?male?
leaders? requesting? forty? to? female? leaders? requesting? forty,?and? follower?behavior? in? these? cases.?
Another?shortcoming?might?be?the?presence?of?a?negative?experimenter?demand?effect?(Zizzo?2010).?
Such? an? effect?would? go? into? the? opposite? direction? than? our? prediction? of?male? leaders? being?
followed?to?a?greater?extent?than?female?leaders,?thus?leaving?room?for?an?alternative?interpretation?
of?our?results?that?does?not?rule?out?that?men?might?be?more?effective?leaders?than?women.?
The?randomization?of?the? leader?position?might? involve?a?shortcoming?of?the?experimental?design,?
since? leaders? are? forced? into? leadership.? Followers? might? stereotypically? think? that? the? female?
leaders?in?the?laboratory?are?less?effective?leaders,?who?are?only?forced?into?the?position,?which?they?
would? not? hold? in? the? real? world.42?In? the? real? world,? leaders? rather? voluntarily? self?select? into?
leadership,? for? example,?when? starting? a? business,? or? they? self?select? at? least? into? candidacy? for?
leadership,?for?example,?when?competing?for?a?top?position.?Related?to?gender?and?leadership,?some?
studies?already?explored?factors?like?competition,?or?election?aversion?(Reuben?et?al.?2012;?Kanthak?
and?Woon?2014).?Brandts?et?al.?(2015)?study?the?democracy?effect?on? leader?effectiveness,?finding?
that?elected? leaders? are?more?effective? than? randomly? selected? leaders,?while? leaving? it? an?open?
question? for? future? research? whether? leaders? of? different? gender? would? be? equally? effective.?
Although?it?is?a?weak?control?for?whether?leaders?would?have?volunteered?in?our?study?anyway,?and?
whether?they?embraced?the?leader?position,?but?using?data?from?our?final?questionnaire,?we?find?no?
differences?in?the?preference?for?the?leader?role?by?the?gender?of?the?leader.?
As?pointed?out?in?Eagly?et?al.?(2003),?the?transformational?leadership?style? is? independent?from?the?
underlying? organizational? structure.? In? our? study,? the? organizational? structure? is? rather? flat.? The?
leader? is?closely? tied? to? the?group,?and? faces? the?same? incentives?as?other?group?members.?These?
circumstances?might?ease?the?use?of?the?transformational?leadership?style?for?both?men?and?women,?
and?therefore?might?not?bring?gender?differences?onto?the?surface.?A?more?competitive?setting?or?a?
stronger? hierarchy?might?magnify?male?dominated? leadership? qualities.?Nevertheless,? due? to? the?
findings?in?our?present?study?we?see?no?reason?why?women?should?not?be?empowered?to?the?same?
extent? like?men.?Women?have?a?different?style?to?communicate?and?to? lead,?and?since?we?showed?
that? followers?adapt?over? time? to? their? leaders,?we?have? reason? to?expect? that?an? increase? in? the?
number?of? female? leaders?could?also?affect? the?structure?of?organizations?on? the? long? run.?Such?a?
“feminine”?development?might? lead? to?more?balanced,?more? diverse,? and?more? effective? leader?
follower?interactions?within?organizations.? ?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
42?This? would? explain? the? leader? evaluation? results.? Unsuccessful? women? are? blamed? less,? but? successful?
women?are?evaluated?more?harshly?than?men.?
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Chapter?4?
A?Replication?of?the?Democracy?Effect?on?Leader?Effectiveness?in?the?
Turnaround?Game?
with?Ernesto?Reuben?
4.1?Introduction?
Economic?actors?are?interdependent?in?many?situations.?If?inputs?of?the?actors?are?complements,?the?
lowest?performing? actor? is? likely? to?determine? group?performance? (Brandts?et? al.?2015).?Globally,?
exerting?effort?to?reduce?emissions?would?be?efficient?for?everyone?if?others?act?in?the?same?way.?In?
a?small?organization,? like?a?project? team?or?a?start?up? team,?economic?actors? team?up? to?be?more?
successful? and? achieve? higher? outcomes? through? coordinated? action.? Leaders? can? be? useful?
“coordination?devices”?in?such?situations?(Kriss?and?Eil?2012).?
What?makes?some?leaders?more?effective?than?others??Leadership?is?one?of?the?most?widely?studied?
universal?phenomena?of?human?behavior? (Burns?1978;?Bass? and?Bass?2008).43?Our? interest? lies? in?
exploring? the? determinants? of? leader? effectiveness,? and? in? this? study?we? focus? on? the? selection?
process? of? leaders.?How? does? a?more? democratic? selection? procedure? alter? leader? effectiveness??
First,? democracy? can? have? a? selection? effect? on? the? leader’s? abilities,? as? democracy? attracts? and?
strongly?positively?selects?more?competent?leaders?(Dal?Bó?et?al.?2015b).?Dal?Bó?et?al.?(2015b)?show,?
using? Swedish? data,? “politicians? are? on? average? significantly? smarter? and? better? leaders? than? the?
population?they?represent”.?Earlier,?using?an?extensive?data?set,?Besley?et?al.?(2011)?show?that?more?
highly?educated?leaders?have?a?positive?effect?on?growth.?Second,?literature?on?the?democracy?effect?
shows?that,?besides?having?effects?through?the?choice?of?policies,?democratic?institutions?can?affect?
behavior? directly? (Dal? Bó? et? al.? 2010).44?Moreover,? employee? participation? in? decisions? has? been?
shown?to?have?an?enhancing?effect?on?productivity?(Levine?and?Tyson?1990;?Bonin?et?al.?1983;?Black?
and?Lynch?2001).?
Brandts?et?al.?(2015)?used?the?turnaround?game?to?study?the?role?of?the?leader?selection?process?on?
leaders’?effectiveness.?Their?treatment?design?has?3x2?factors,?varying?the?selection?of?the?leader?(no?
leader,?randomly?selected? leader,?elected? leader)?and?the? incentive?scheme? (no? incentive? increase,?
incentive?increase).?They?find?that?communication?from?a?leader?has?a?greater?effect?than?incentives,?
and?that?elected?leaders?are?more?effective?than?randomly?selected?leaders.?Further,?they?find?that?
elected? leaders?do?a?better? job?because?they?send?more?performance?relevant?messages,?and?thus?
the?election?effect?is?not?driven?by?a?difference?in?follower?reactions.?In?an?analogous?paper,?Brandts?
et?al.?(forthcoming)?show?that?internally?selected?leaders?are?more?legitimate?than?external?leaders.?
Internal? leaders?have?a? lower? social?distance? from? the?group,?which? grants? them? increased? social?
credibility,? so? that? followers? follow? them? to? a? greater? extent.? Additionally,? the? authors? compare?
randomly? selected? internal? leaders? with? internally? elected? leaders,? and,? after? controlling? for?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
43?Recent? reviews? of? studies? from? psychology,? political? science,? economics? and? management? provide? an?
overview?about?the?development?in?leadership?literature?(Avolio?et?al.?2009;?Ahlquist?and?Levi?2011).?
44?Dal? Bó? et? al.? (2015a)? even? validate? these? earlier? results? by? using? a? novel? analytical? approach? ruling? out?
selection?effects?under?certain?conditions.?
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observable? leader? characteristics? and? content? of? leader?messages,? they? find? that? the? increased?
effectiveness?of?elected?leaders?roots?in?follower?reactions.?
We?decided? to?replicate? the?paper?by?Brandts?et?al.? (2015),?since? the?context?and?methodology? in?
their? paper? comes? close? to? our? interests.?We? share? the? common? view? that? reproducibility? is? an?
important?principle? in? science:? if?a? result? is?valid,? then? it? is?possible? to? replicate? it? independently.?
Previewing?our? results,?our?main? contribution? is? that?we?are?able? to? replicate? the?main? finding? in?
Brandts? et? al.? (2015).?We? also? contribute? to? the? strand? of? literature? on? democratic? institutions?
solving? social? dilemmas? and? coordination? problems,? especially? in? the? context? of? organizational?
hierarchy?combined?with?employee?participation,?in?that?we?show?that?voting?has?a?direct?effect?on?
group?performance,?in?the?sense?that?followers?are?more?likely?to?follow?elected?leaders,?and?voting?
has?also?an?indirect?effect?mediated?by?elected?leaders?behaving?more?responsibly.?
The?turnaround?game?is?a?variation?of?the?minimum?effort?coordination?game?(Brandts?and?Cooper?
2007).? The? basic? minimum? effort? coordination? game? models? an? organization’s? production? with?
strong? complementarities? (Van? Huyck? et? al.? 1990).? Individuals? simultaneously? choose? among?
different?effort?levels?and?the?lowest?individual?effort?determines?group?performance.?The?game?has?
multiple?equilibria,?one?at?every?effort?level?that?is?simultaneously?chosen?by?all?group?members.?To?
choose? the?highest?effort? is? the?most?efficient,?payoff?dominant?outcome? for?all?group?members.?
Though?there?is?a?trade?off,?the?higher?the?individual?effort?choice?is,?the?riskier?it?becomes,?since?the?
possibility? increases?that?other?group?members?choose?a? lower?effort.?A?very?risk?averse? individual?
could?secure?the?lowest?equilibrium?payoff?by?choosing?the?lowest?effort,?and?thus?avoid?losses?from?
coordination? failure.? Coordination? on? the? lowest? effort? is? the? usual? outcome? if? pre?play?
communication? is? not? possible? (Blume? and? Ortmann? 2007).? The? turnaround? game? introduces?
organizational? hierarchy? to? the? minimum? effort? coordination? game,? but? only? after? a? failure? to?
coordinate?on?the?efficient?equilibrium?(Brandts?and?Cooper?2007).?Therefore,?the?turnaround?game?
has?two?parts.?In?the?first?part,?groups?of?players?have?to?coordinate?repeatedly?in?a?basic?minimum?
effort?coordination?game.?Usually?groups?establish?a?history?of?failure?and?converge?to?the?inefficient?
equilibrium,?which?makes?the?introduction?of?a?leader?more?meaningful?(Brandts?and?Cooper?2006a).?
In? the? second?part,? leadership? is? introduced.?The? task?of? the? leader? is? to? try? to? “turnaround”? the?
group,?which?requires?a?coordinated?change?from?the?inefficient?to?the?most?efficient?equilibrium.?A?
turnaround?is?harder?to?achieve?if?the?group?has?experienced?failure?(Devetag?and?Ortmann?2007).?
Compared?to?Brandts?et?al.?(2015),?our?focus?is?solely?on?the?selection?process,?and?thus?we?do?not?
vary? the? tools? leaders?can?use.?We?allow?selected? leaders?only? to?use?voluntary,?non?binding,? free?
form?pre?play?communication.?Effective? leaders? in? the?game?manage? to?convince?others? to? take?a?
certain?course?of?action,?but?this?is?more?than?pure?authority?over?others.?Orders?alone?would?not?be?
sufficient? to?move? followers.? To? be? effective,? leaders? have? to? create? the? belief? in? followers? that?
others?will? follow? the? leader? too.? Leaders?have? to?make? their? team?believe? in? success? in?order? to?
motivate?team?members?to?choose?their?maximum?effort.?
What?makes?leaders?credible??Credibility?refers?to?the?beliefs?of?the?followers?who?are?led.?Followers?
of?credible?leaders?believe?that?the?leadership?is?“appropriate,?proper?and?just”?(Tyler?2006),?so?that?
the? leader?has? legitimate?authority? to?make?decisions,? to? send?orders,?and? to?expect? followers? to?
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follow? her? orders.45 ?Moreover,? also? followers? expect? others? to? follow? the? leader.? Therefore,?
credibility? roots? in? the? legitimacy?of? the? leader.?A? leader? can?prove?her? legitimacy?by? sending? the?
relevant?message? content,? and? through? a? successful? group? history.? However,? besides? legitimacy?
rooting? in? competence,? the? selection?process? itself? can?be? important.?Election?might? increase? the?
legitimacy?of? the? leader,? and?Brandts? et? al.? (2015)? already? showed? that? election? increases? leader?
effectiveness.? In? their? study,?more? legitimate? leaders? send?more? relevant?messages? that? facilitate?
efficient? coordination.? Thus,? in? their?paper,? it? is?not? the?property?of?being? elected? that? improves?
leader? effectiveness.? Rather,? it? is? elected? leaders? who? become?more? active? in? influencing? their?
followers?by? sending?more? relevant?messages,? as? if? elected? leaders?would?be?more?motivated? to?
prove?that?they?deserved?the?followers’?trust,?and?that?the?result?of?the?election?was?“appropriate,?
proper?and?just”?(Tyler?2006).?
One? change? we?made? compared? to? the? design? in? Brandts? et? al.? (2015)? is? that? group?members?
volunteer? before? the? leader? selection? process? takes? place.? Volunteering? is? an? important? feature?
present?in?real?world?environments.?Not?everyone?has?a?preference?to?become?a?leader,?and?usually?
leaders? are? not? forced? into? a? leader? position.? Rather,? they? self?select? into? candidacy? and?
subsequently?or?simultaneously?get?selected?from?superiors?or?elected?from?employees.?Therefore,?
we?think?that?adding?volunteering?to?the?design?is?a?good?change,?reproducing?real?world?features?in?
more?detail?in?the?laboratory?game.?We?are?aware?that?voluntary?leadership?itself?already?enhances?
performance? compared? to? exogenous? leadership? (Rivas? and? Sutter? 2011).?However,? this? fact? just?
underlines? the? importance?of?our? findings:? the?democracy? effect? remains? valid? even? after? adding?
volunteering?to?the?design.?Our?findings?underline?the? importance?of?employee?participation? in?the?
leader?selection?process?which?has?performance?enhancing?effects?for?the?whole?organization.?
4.2?Related?Literature?
Dal? Bó? (2014)? reviews? studies? using? different? experimental? methods? to? study? the? effect? of?
institutional?change?to?overcome?social?dilemmas.?Many?contexts?have?already?been?studied,?such?as?
the? prisoner’s? dilemma? game? (Carpenter? 2000;?Dal? Bó? et? al.? 2010),? the? common?pool? resources?
game?(Margreiter?et?al.?2005;?Walker?et?al.?2000)?and?the?voluntary?contribution?mechanism?in?the?
public?good?game? (Kroll?et?al.?2007;?Putterman?et?al.?2010;?Sutter?et?al.?2010;?Kosfeld?et?al.?2009;?
Kamei?2011).? In?the?majority?of?these?studies,?election? increases?cooperation,?even?though,?with?a?
large?variation?across?game?settings?(Dal?Bó?2014).?In?Putterman?et?al.?2010,?participants?could?vote?
on? different? formal? sanction? schemes? related? to? the? free?rider? problem.? Through? voting,? groups?
quickly? converged? to? the? efficient? outcome.? In? Sutter? et? al.? (2010),? participants? under? the?
endogenous? institutional? choice? condition?had? the?options?of? rewarding?or?punishing?other?group?
members.? Although? groups? had? no? leaders,? the? authors? show? that? voting? on? institutions? has? a?
positive?effect?on?the?level?of?cooperation?compared?with?the?same?institutions?implemented?under?
the?exogenous?choice?condition.?Thus,?participation?rights?trigger?a?cooperation?premium.?Similarly,?
Kosfeld? et? al.? (2009)? studies? the? endogenous? formation?of? institutions,? and? the? authors? find? that?
participants? may? choose? sanctioning? institutions? to? overcome? social? dilemmas,? but? they? are?
reluctant?to?implement?equilibrium?institutions?in?which?free?riding?is?possible,?stressing?the?role?of?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
45?In?the?text,?we?use?the?personal?pronoun?“she”? if?we?refer?to?a? leader,?and?we?use?“he”? in?all?other?cases?
when?gender?is?not?specified.?
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fairness? in? the? institution? formation? process.?However,? the? endogenous? formation? of? institutions?
positively?affects? cooperation?and?group?welfare.? In?Kamei? (2011),? the?author? reports?about? spill?
over?effects?of?pro?social?behavior?to?an?external?environment?if?democratic?choice?of?institutions?is?
possible?in?one?environment.?
In?line?with?these?papers?but?focused?on?leadership?styles,?Kocher?et?al.?(2013)?compare?the?behavior?
of?randomly?selected?and?elected?leaders.?The?authors?study?how?the?other?regarding?preferences?of?
the? leader? affect? leadership? style.? In? their? experiment,? all? group?members,? including? the? leader,?
make?their?choices?between?risky?lotteries.?However,?the?leader?makes?the?final?and?binding?decision,?
which?either?confirms?or?contradicts?the?group?majority?decision.?The?authors?find?elected?leaders?to?
be?more?likely?to?let?their?other?regarding?preferences?guide?their?managerial?decisions,?in?the?sense?
that?their?choices?are?more?conform?to?preferences?of?other?group?members?even? if?this? is?against?
their?own?interest.?Another?paper?studying?variation?in?the?leader?selection?process,?in?the?context?of?
a? public? good? game? with? voluntary? contribution,? is? Levy? et? al.? (2011).? This? paper? shows? that?
democratically? elected? leaders? are?more? likely? to? be? followed? by? group?members? than? randomly?
selected? leaders.?Moreover,? elected? leaders? send?higher? suggestions,? and? as? a? consequence? they?
also? follow? their?own? contribution? suggestion?more? closely? than? randomly? selected? leaders.?Thus,?
Levy?et?al.?conclude?that?elected?leaders?might?feel?a?greater?responsibility?towards?their?group?and?
this?could?explain?why?they?are?more?likely?to?encourage?good?policy.?
In?Hamman? et? al.? (2011),?participants? could? delegate? the? contribution?decision? to? another? group?
member.?The?electoral?delegation? institution?proved?to?provide?the?public?good?most?efficiently.? In?
this?experiment?again,?it?is?the?democracy?effect?that?induces?groups?to?“elect?pro?social?leaders?and?
replace? those? who? do? not? implement? full? contribution? outcomes”.? Other? authors? focused? on?
individual? characteristics? explaining? effectiveness? of? endogenously? selected? leaders.? Arbak? and?
Villeval?(2013)?explored?three?relevant?channels?that?drive?people?to?lead?by?example?in?the?context?
of?a?public?good?game.?First,?leaders?can?be?driven?by?personal?gains?of?non?pecuniary?nature?if?they?
expect? others? to? follow? them.? Second,? some? leaders? are? altruistic? and? volunteer? even? if? this?
contradicts? their? personal? interest.? And? third,? some? leaders? derive? a? value? from? maintaining? a?
positive? social? image.? Although? the? authors? find? that? voluntary? leaders? contribute? more? than?
randomly? selected? leaders,? followers? follow? voluntary? leaders? less,? and? therefore? voluntary? and?
randomly?selected?leaders?are?equally?effective.?Cartwright?et?al.?(2013)?study?leadership?by?example?
using?a?minimum?effort?coordination?game.?The? leader? in?their?experiment?acts?publicly?before?the?
other? group? members.? The? authors? find? mixed? evidence? for? leadership? by? example? increasing?
efficiency,?despite?the?efforts?of?leaders.?Moreover,?and?in?line?with?the?results?in?Arbak?and?Villeval?
(2013),?the?authors?find?no?difference?between?voluntary?and?randomly?selected?leaders.?
4.3?Experimental?Design?and?Procedures?
The? experimental? design? and? procedures? overlap?much? with? the? design? and? procedures? of? the?
previous? study? in? Chapter? 3,? and? thus? we? describe? only? the? differences? in? more? detail.? Each?
experimental?session?consists?of?26?periods.?At?the?beginning?of?a?session,?participants?are?randomly?
matched? into? groups? of? five? and? are? informed? that? their? group’s? composition? will? not? change?
throughout? the? session.? In?each?period,?every?participant? i ?in?group? k ?simultaneously?chooses?an?
effort?level? ? ?0,10,20,30,40ieffort ? .?Participant? i ’s?earnings?in?a?period?are?equal?to:?
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where? minkeffort ?is?the?minimum?effort?chosen?in?the?group.?At?the?end?of?each?period,?participants?
are?informed?of?their?earnings?and?the?group’s?minimum?effort.?
Each?session?is?divided?into?two?parts.?Part?1?consists?of?periods?1?to?8?and?Part?2?of?periods?9?to?26.?
Participants?know?the?session?has?two?parts?but?are?not?given?the?specific?instructions?of?Part?2?until?
they?reach?that?part.?In?Part?1,?participants?play?the?game?without?a?leader.?
In? Part? 2,?we? introduce? leaders.? Every? three? periods,?which?we? refer? to? as? leadership? term,? one?
participant? in? each? group? is? selected? to? be? the? group’s? leader,? which? leaves? the? other? group?
members? as? followers.? The? leader? holds? the? position? until? the? end? of? the? third? period? of? the?
leadership?term.?After?the?three?period?leadership?term?the?leader?reverts?to?being?a?group?member,?
and? a? new? leader? is? selected.? Leaders? make? effort? decisions? and? face? the? same? incentives? as?
followers.?The?leader?has?the?option?to?send?a?written?message?visible?to?all?followers.?The?message?
is? sent? in? the? first? period? of? the? three?period? leadership? term,? before? effort? choices? are?made.?
Leaders? can?write? anything? they?wish,? including?nothing,? except? for? content? that? can? be? used? to?
identify?them.?Messages?are?non?binding.?
Compared?to?Brandts?et?al.? (2015),?our?design?differs? in?a? few?ways.?First,? in?Brandts?et?al.? (2015),?
leaders?are?selected?only?once?in?the?beginning?of?Part?2,?and?the?leader?holds?the?position?until?the?
end?of?the?session.?By?repeating?the?selection?process?every?three?periods,?we?can?analyze?dynamic?
effects?as?well.?The?repetition?of? leadership?terms?adds?a?new?feature?to?the?design?that?might?be?
relevant?in?real?world?environments,?where?leaders?often?change?and?might?be?reelected.?Second,?in?
Brandts?et?al.?(2015),?leaders?can?send?pre?play?messages?in?each?period.?We?allow?leaders?to?send?a?
pre?play?message?only? in? the? first?period?of? a? leadership? term.? Third,? in?Brandts?et? al.? (2015),? all?
group?members?participate?in?the?leader?selection?process,?so?someone?might?be?unwillingly?forced?
to?be?in?the?leader?position.?Our?design?introduces?volunteering?as?a?new?feature.?
Before?the?leader?is?selected,?participants?have?to?choose?among?two?options:?to?run,?or?not?to?run?
for?the?leader?position?and?play?a?lottery?instead.?Specifically,?participants?who?run?and?get?selected?
receive?a?bonus?of?50,?whereas?participants?who? run?and?do?not?get?selected? receive?0.?Similarly,?
participants?who?decide?not?to?run?and?play?a?lottery?instead,?receive?50?with?a?0.5?probability?and?0?
otherwise.?Whenever? a? participant? believes? that? his? chances? to? get? selected? are? higher? than? the?
benchmark?probability?of? the? lottery,?his?expected?payoff?will?be?higher? if?he? runs? for? the? leader?
position,?thus?we?expect?him?to?volunteer.?Volunteers?are?referred?to?as?candidates.?Candidates?are?
revealed?to?all?group?members?by?displaying?profile?pictures?and?group?internal?ID?numbers?for?the?
selection?process.?
4.3.1?Leader?Selection?Process?
The? selection? process? is? the? only? treatment? variation? in? this? study.? The? treatment? variation? is?
whether? the? leader? is? randomly? selected? or? elected? by? the? group? members.? Since? we? assign?
participants? randomly? to? one? of? the? two? treatment? conditions,? the? treatment? variation? has? a?
between?subjects?design.?
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In?Random,?one?of?the?candidates,?each?with?equal?probability,?is?randomly?selected?to?be?the?leader.?
If?none?of?the?group?members?ran?for?the?leader?position,?then?the?group?has?no?leader.?If?only?one?
group?member?ran,?then?that?candidate?automatically?becomes?the?leader.?
In?Election,?group?members?are?asked?to?rank?each?candidate.?The?ranks?range?from?most?preferred?
to? least?preferred.?For?example,? if?there?were?three?candidates,?each?group?member?has? to?assign?
one? candidate? the? rank? of? 1? (most? preferred),? another? candidate? the? rank? of? 2? (second? most?
preferred),?and?the?remaining?candidate?to?the?rank?of?3?(least?preferred).?Candidates?have?to?rank?
themselves?too.?The?candidate?with?the?best?average?rank?wins?the?election?and?becomes?the?leader.?
In? case?of?a? tie,? the?winner? is? chosen? randomly?among? the? tied? candidates.? If?none?of? the?group?
members?ran,?then?there?is?no?election?and?the?group?has?no?leader.?If?only?one?group?member?ran,?
then?that?candidate?automatically?wins?the?election?and?becomes?the?leader.?This?voting?procedure,?
the?Borda?Count,?is?a?consensual?voting?system?that?selects?the?leader?who?is?preferred?by?all?voters?
on?average? rather? than?a?majority?of?voters.? In? contrast,? the?voting? system?used? in?Brandts?et?al.?
(2015)? is?the?majority?rule.?We?decided?for?the?Borda?Count,?to?make?sure?that?elected? leaders?are?
broadly?accepted?by?their?followers.?
The?profile?picture?and?the?group?internal?ID?number?are?the?only?information?that?can?be?used?for?
the?election?of? the? leader.?Unlike? the?design? in?Brandts?et?al.? (2015),?we?have?no? trivia?quiz,?and?
neither?do?we?reveal?the?group?members’?previous?average?effort?level.?One?obvious?reason?to?do?so?
is?that?Brandts?et?al.?show?that?the?scores?on?the?trivia?quiz?and?previous?individual?performance?do?
not?matter? for? explaining? the? election? effect.? Since? re?selection? is? possible? in? our? design,? group?
members?can?easily?memorize?the?other?four?group?members’? ID?and? link?this? information?to?their?
relevant?performance?as?leaders?(messages?sent,?for?instance)?in?previous?leadership?terms.?
4.3.2?Procedures?
The? experiment?was? conducted? in?May? 2015? by? local? personnel? at? the? Vernon? Smith? Center? of?
Experimental?Economics? (VSCEE)?at?Francisco?Marroquín?University? in?Guatemala?City,?Guatemala.?
Participants?were? recruited? through?ORSEE? (Greiner? 2015)? and? the? experiment?was? programmed?
with?z?Tree?(Fischbacher?2007).?7?sessions?were?run?and?one?session?lasted?around?60?minutes.?We?
used?standard?experimental?procedures,?including?random?assignment?of?participants?to?treatments,?
anonymity,?detailed?instructions?with?control?questions,?dividers?between?the?participants’?cubicles,?
and?monetary? incentives.? Earnings?were? expressed? in? points? and?were? converted? to?Guatemalan?
quetzals?at?a?rate?of?10?quetzals?per?500?points.?Average?earnings?equaled?GTQ?100.23?($14.53).?
Appendix?3B?contains?the?procedures?in?more?detail.?Figure?B1?in?Appendix?3B?contains?the?profiles?
pictures?which?we?used?to?reveal?group?members,?candidates,?and?selected? leaders?to?every?group?
member.?Instructions?and?screenshots?can?also?be?found?in?Appendix?3B.?Table?4.1?summarizes?the?
sequence?of?events?in?the?experiment.?
? ?
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Table?4.1? Timeline?of?the?experiment?
Before?period?1? Demographics?and?choice?of?profile?picture?
? Instructions?for?Part?1?and?payoff?quiz?
Periods?1?8?(events?repeated?in?every?period)?
? Effort?choice
Feedback?screen?
Before?period?9? Instructions?for?Part?2?and?control?questions?
Periods?9?26?(events?repeated?in?every?third?period)?
? Selection?process? Volunteering?
Belief?question?on?volunteering?
Candidates?and?voting/no?voting?
Selection?results?
Leader?sends?message?(every?third?period)?
Periods?9?26?(events?repeated?in?every?period)?
? Effort?choice?
Belief?question?on?followership?(every?third?period)?
Feedback?screen?
?
4.4?Hypotheses?
Our?main?interest?in?this?study?is?to?show?whether?the?selection?process?creates?a?difference?in?the?
effectiveness? of? leaders.? Moreover,? we? are? curious? whether? the? selection? process? affects?
volunteering?for?the? leader?position?and?we?will?test?which?channels?mediate?the?effects?on? leader?
effectiveness:?a?difference?in?leader?behavior?or?a?difference?in?follower?behavior.?
Compared? to? Random,? Election? involves? group? members? into? the? selection? process? through?
collective?decision?making,?which?yields?more?legitimate?leaders?(Brandts?et?al.?2015).?The?difference?
in?legitimacy?may?affect?leader?effectiveness?in?the?same?direction.?This?gives?us?our?first?hypothesis.?
Hypothesis? 1:?Minimum? effort? in? Part? 2? is? higher?with? an? elected? rather? than? randomly? selected?
leader.?
When? making? the? volunteering? decision,? participants? face? two? monetary? incentives.? First,? they?
compare?the?chance?of?winning?the?lottery?with?the?chance?of?winning?the?leader?bonus.?In?Random,?
this? incentive?depends?only?on?the?number?of?other?candidates.?Second,?they?expect?the?benefit?of?
having? a? leader? in? the?next? three?periods,? taking? the?probability? into? account? that?nobody?might?
volunteer? for? the? leader?position.? If? the?expected?benefit? is?zero,?which? is? the?minimum?value,?we?
expect?1.78?candidates?to?run.?Similarly,?if?the?expected?benefit?is?40?in?all?three?periods,?which?is?the?
maximum? value,? we? expect? 2.61? candidates? to? run.? (Appendix? 3A? contains? more? detailed?
calculations.)?The?entry?of?more?than?2.61?candidates?is?not?justified?based?purely?on?the?monetary?
incentives.?
So?far?we?have?not?taken? into?account? individual?preferences?and?beliefs.?Participants?might?have?a?
preference?for?the? leadership?position,?a?so?called? intrinsic?value?of?authority?(Bartling?et?al.?2014).?
Such? a? preference?would? drive? the? volunteering? frequency? up? in? both? treatments.? Besides? being?
motivated? by? personal? gains? of? non?pecuniary? nature,? participants?might? also? have? strong? social?
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image?concerns?or?altruistic?preferences?(Arbak?and?Villeval?2013).?Participants?might?view?their?own?
volunteering?as?a? contribution? to? the?public?good?of?making? sure? that? there?will?be?a? leader?who?
establishes? the? payoff?dominant? equilibrium.? Such? willingness? to? contribute? would? drive? the?
volunteering?frequency?up?in?both?treatments.?Compared?to?Random,?elections?might?further?trigger?
other?regarding?preferences,?or?pro?social? spill?over?effects? leading? to?even?more?entry?above? the?
pecuniary?benefits?of? leadership? (Kocher?et?al.?2013;?Kamei?2011).?Moreover,?we?might?observe?a?
declining?dynamic?effect?on?the?volunteering?frequency?in?both?treatments,?which?would?be?similar?
like?the?decline?of?contribution?in?public?good?games?(Andreoni?1988).?
In?early?periods,?before?participants?learn?about?the?true?volunteering?frequency?in?their?group,?they?
might?volunteer?more? in?both?treatments?due?to?an?underestimation?of?the?number?of?candidates.?
Consequentially,?in?later?periods,?we?would?see?a?decline?in?the?volunteering?frequency.?In?Election,?
participants?might?hold?biased?beliefs?about?the?chances?to?win?the?election.?Irrespective?of?the?fact?
that?participants?might?underestimate? the? volunteering? frequency,? they?might?overestimate? their?
chances?to?win?the?election?(Merkle?and?Weber?2011).?Overconfidence?to?have?higher?chances?to?get?
elected?even? if?all?other?group?members?enter?could?cause?participants? to?volunteer? too?much.? In?
order?to?control?for?the?beliefs?participants?hold?about?the?volunteering?frequency,?we?added?belief?
elicitation?questions?to?our?design?(for?more?details?see?Appendix?3B).?The?variable?“guessed?share?of?
candidates”?reflects?beliefs?about?the?probabilities?that?others?volunteer.?
Initially,? we? expect? to? see? more? participants? volunteering? in? Election.? In? later? periods,? group?
members? can? observe? the? previous? leader’s? competence? and? effectiveness,? and? based? on? this?
information? they?can? form?beliefs? that?a?previous? leader?who? failed? is? less? likely? to?get? reelected,?
which?might?encourage?group?members? to? run? for? the?position.?On? the?other?hand,?beliefs?about?
loyalty?of?others?to?reelect?a?leader?with?a?successful?coordination?history?might?reduce?the?number?
of?candidates?over?time.?Since? in?Hypothesis?1?we?expect?to?see?more?successful? leaders?under?the?
election?regime,?we?also?predict?a?high? likelihood?for?reelections.?Hence,? in?Election,?reelection?will?
finally?cause?group?members?to?shy?away?from?volunteering.?
Hypothesis?2:?Compared?to?Random,?initially,?more?people?volunteer?for?the?elected?leader’s?position.?
In?later?periods,?there?is?a?steeper?decrease?in?volunteering?under?Election.?
There?can?be?two?channels?for?explaining?the?democracy?effect?on?minimum?effort.?First,?there?might?
be?a?difference? in? leader?behavior.?Elected? leaders?might? feel?a?greater? responsibility? towards? the?
followers?who?elected?them,?so?that?they?would?act?in?a?more?committed?way?(for?example,?sending?
more?relevant?messages,?requesting?more?often?the?highest?effort)?(Brandts?et?al.?2015).?They?might?
even?feel?that?they?got?credit?from?voters,?so?they?want?to?prove?themselves?and?avoid?disappointing?
the?voters.?Hence,?they?try?harder?to?achieve?the?most?efficient?outcome?for?everybody.?
In?Brandts?et?al.?(2015),?the? increased? legitimacy?of?the?elected? leader? improved?her?perception?of?
the?pivotal?role?and?her?actions.?While?we?expect?this?effect?to?be?at?work,?we?have?to?consider?that?
our?design?differs?by?two?important?features.?The?volunteering?in?our?design?already?preselects?more?
motivated,?more?goal?oriented,?or?more?other?regarding? candidates? in?both?Random?and?Election?
(Rivas? and? Sutter? 2011).?Moreover,? since? elections? are? repeated,? the? chance? of? reelection? after?
success?creates?an?incentive?for?elected?leaders?to?work?harder?and?to?keep?their?position.?
Hypothesis?3:?Elected?leaders?send?more?effective?messages?than?randomly?selected?leaders.?
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The?second?channel?for?explaining?the?democracy?effect?on?minimum?effort?might?be?a?difference?in?
follower?behavior.? It? is? the?votes?of? followers? that?create? the? increased? legitimacy? for? the?elected?
leaders,?thus,? if?followers?perceive?their? leaders?to?be?more?credible,?they?are?more? likely?to?follow?
the? elected? leader,? holding? the? content? of? leader? suggestions? constant.? In? Brandts? et? al.? (2015),?
authors?did?not?find?evidence?for?this?channel?to?be?at?work.?However,?since?we?repeat?the?selection?
process,?followers? in?Election?can?make?sure?that?successful? leaders?get?reelected?and?continue?the?
success?history,?increasing?follower?trust?and?reducing?uncertainty,?compared?to?Random,?when?the?
chances?are?high?that?a?new?leader?is?selected.?
Hypothesis? 4:? Elected? leaders? are? followed? to? a? greater? extent? than? randomly? selected? leaders?
(holding?constant?what?leaders?say).?
4.5?Results?
In?total,?145?participants?took?part?in?the?study.?In?Election,?we?had?70?participants?in?14?groups,?and?
in?Random,?we?had?75?participants?in?15?groups.?In?this?section?we?present?the?democracy?effect?on?
leader? effectiveness,? and? subsequently? we? analyze? the? volunteering? behavior? and? whether? the?
democracy?effect?roots?in?leader?behavior?or?in?followers’?reactions.?
4.5.1?Democracy?Effect?on?Minimum?Effort?
We?measure? leader? effectiveness?with? the? group?minimum? effort,?which? is? affected? both? by? the?
leader’s? effort? request? and? the? followers’? effort? choice.? Figure? 4.1? depicts? the? average?minimum?
effort?in?each?period?depending?on?whether?the?leader?is?elected?or?randomly?selected.?
Figure?4.1? Average?minimum?effort?by?treatment?
?
Periods? 1? to? 8? reliably? induced? the? failure? to? coordinate? on? the? efficient? equilibrium.?Without?
leadership?and?the?possibility?to?communicate,?28?out?of?29?groups?coordinate?on?effort?level?0?or?10?
in?the?first?period,?and?all?of?the?29?groups?converge?to?0?by?period?8.?The?introduction?of?leadership?
in?period?9?causes?a?jump?in?the?average?minimum?effort?curves.?With?randomly?selected?leaders?the?
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average?minimum?effort?increases?to?13.3,?and?with?elected?leaders?to?22.1?in?period?9.?Compared?to?
Random,? elections? have? a? stable? effect? of? size? 12.3? aggregated? over? all? periods? after? period? 9.?
Brandts?et?al.?(2015)?report?an?average?effect?size?of?7,?which?means?that?our?results?replicate?the?
democracy?effect?on?leader?effectiveness.?
Next,?we?test?whether?the?democracy?effect? is?statistically?significant.?Since?we?collected?repeated?
observations?over? time,?we?organize?our?data? as?panel?data.? To? fit?our? regression?models? to? the?
panel?data,?we? run? random?effects?generalized? least? square? (GLS)? regressions?on? the?group?level,?
presented?in?Table?4.2.?The?dependent?variable?is?the?minimum?effort?of?groups?over?periods?9?to?26.?
We?collapse?the?data?by?group?and?period,?and?cluster?standard?errors?on?groups.?Over?18?periods,?
the?29?groups?provide?us?with?522?observations?in?total.?
Table?4.2? Group?level?random?effects?GLS?analysis?of?democracy?effects?on?minimum?effort?
Variable? Model?1? Model?2? Model?3? Model?4? Model?5?
? n?=?522? n?=?522? n?=?522? n?=?522? n?=?522?
Elected?leader? 12.30**?
(5.95)?
12.05**?
(5.98)?
10.18*?
(5.44)?
6.74?
(5.51)?
12.88*?
(7.43)?
Number?of?candidates? ? ?0.58?
(0.77)?
? ? ?
Suggestion?of?40? ? ? 12.71***?
(2.95)?
? ?
Randomly?selected?leader?
suggesting?40?
? ? ? 10.79***?
(3.71)?
?
Elected?leader?suggesting?40? ? ? ? 15.30***?
(4.63)?
?
Guessed?share?of?followers,?
randomly?selected?leader?does?
not?suggest?forty?
? ? ? ? 3.68?
(3.27)?
Guessed?share?of?followers,?
randomly?selected?leader?
suggests?forty?
? ? ? ? 18.08***?
(3.95)?
Guessed?share?of?followers,?
elected?leader?does?not?suggest?
forty?
? ? ? ? ?7.98?
(7.58)?
Guessed?share?of?followers,?
elected?leader?suggests?forty?
? ? ? ? 13.83***?
(5.54)?
Constant? 16.07***?
(4.50)?
17.72***?
(5.34)?
7.60**?
(3.44)?
8.88***?
(3.18)?
5.74*?
(3.04)?
Notes.?Dependent? variable? is? group?minimum? effort? in? a?period.?Regressions? contain? 522?observations?
from?29?groups?over?18?periods.?Standard?errors?(in?parentheses)?are?corrected?for?clustering?at?the?group?
level.? ***Statistically? significant? at? the? 1%? level,? **statistically? significant? at? the? 5%? level,? *statistically?
significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?
In?Model?1,?we?use?as?explanatory?variable?an?indicator?for?the?Election?condition.?Compared?to?the?
analysis?in?Brandts?et?al.?(2015),?we?have?not?included?any?explanatory?variable?for?the?group?history?
in?period?1?to?8,?since?there?was?only?one?group?in?our?study?that?had?a?maximum?minimum?effort?of?
10?in?Part?1,?and?all?other?groups?coordinated?on?the?minimum?effort?level?of?0.?The?constant?of?the?
model?tells?us?the?size?of?the?minimum?effort?in?Random,?and?the?coefficient?for?the?elected?leader?
indicates? the? size? of? the? treatment? difference.?Model? 1? confirms? that? the? democracy? effect? on?
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minimum? effort? is? statistically? significant? (p? =? 0.04).46?Thus,? from?Model? 1?we? can? reach? to? the?
following?conclusion,?which?is?also?in?line?with?the?findings?in?Brandts?et?al.?(2015).?
Conclusion?1:?We?find?support?for?Hypothesis?1.?Minimum?effort? in?Part?2? is?higher?with?an?elected?
leader?than?with?a?randomly?selected?leader.?
In?Model?2?we? add? the?number?of? candidates? as? an? explanatory? variable? to? the?basic? regression?
model.?Whenever?the?number?of?candidates?was?high,?the? leader?faced?a?more?fierce?competition?
with?lower?chances?to?get?selected,?which?might?have?a?mediated?effect?through?leader?behavior.?In?
the?special?case?when?there?was?only?one?candidate,?no?selection?took?place,?which?might?have?an?
effect?on? follower?behavior,?especially? in? Election,?when? followers?practically? could?not? vote.?The?
overall?effect?of?adding?the?number?of?candidates?to?the?regression?model? is?not?notable?and?does?
not?change? the?size?and?significance?of? the?democracy?effect?on?minimum?effort.?The?same? result?
holds?if?we?interact?the?number?of?candidates?and?the?treatment.?
In?the?next?section?we?explore?the?volunteering?frequency?in?more?detail.?We?continue?to?explain?the?
results?of?Model?3?and?4?in?section?4.5.3?on?leader?behavior,?and?Model?5?in?section?4.5.4?on?follower?
behavior.?
4.5.2?Volunteering?Frequency?
Figure? 4.2? depicts? volunteering?measured? by? the?mean? number? of? candidates? in? each? selection?
period?and?depending?on?the?treatment.?Over?every?selection?period,?more?participants?volunteer?in?
Random? rather? than? Election,? and? this? difference? is? significant? at? the? 5%? level? using? the? non?
parametric?Wilcoxon?rank?sum?test?at?the?group? level,?or?using?a?subject?level?random?effects?GLS?
regression? with? volunteering? as? the? dependent? variable? and? clustering? on? groups.? In? the? early?
periods?9?and?12,?the?volunteering?frequency?is?almost?the?same?across?treatments.?From?period?15?
onwards,?the?volunteering?frequency?is?higher?in?Random,?and?the?significance?level?varies?between?
5%?and?20%?across?periods?using?rank?sum?tests.?
Do? participants? volunteer? too?much?? In? order? to? answer? this? question?we? calculate? the? rational?
amount?of?volunteering?in?each?treatment?given?the?incentives?for?the?volunteering?decision?and?the?
observed?effect?of? leadership.?For?the?observed?effect?of? leadership?we?calculate?the?difference? in?
average? earnings? between? Part? 1? and? Part? 2? in? each? treatment.? In? the? best? case? scenario,? the?
observed?effect?of?leadership?lasts?during?the?three?periods?of?the?leadership?term,?so?that?the?effect?
can?be?multiplied?by?3.?We? substitute? the? resulting?values? into?Equation?2? in?Appendix?3A,?which?
yields? the? rational? volunteering? frequencies.? The? pecuniary? benefits? benchmark? in? Election? is? 2.7?
candidates,?and? in?Random?2.55?candidates.47?In?period?9,?the?mean?number?of?candidates? is?3.8? in?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
46?Although?not?reported?in?Table?4.2,?we?also?used?“waste”?as?a?dependent?variable?to?see?whether?there?are?
treatment?differences? in? followership? (Brandts?et? al.?2015).?Waste? is? the?difference?between? the? individual?
effort?level?and?the?group?level?minimum?effort.?A?low?level?of?waste?corresponds?to?a?strong?convergence?to?
the?equilibrium,?and?strong?followership,?for?instance.?We?found?that?waste?is?not?significantly?different?across?
treatments.?
47?Alternatively,?we? calculated? the? observed? effect? of? leadership? using? the? difference? in? average? earnings?
between?the? last?three?periods?of?Part?1?and?all?periods?of?Part?2? in?each?treatment.?The?resulting?pecuniary?
benefits?benchmark? in?Election? is?2.5?candidates,?and? in?Random?2.3?candidates.?The?alternative?benchmark?
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Election?and?3.6?in?Random,?which?is?over?entry?by?40%?relative?to?the?reasonable?benchmarks.?Over?
all?periods,? the?mean?number?of? candidates? is?2.4? in?Election?and?2.8? in?Random.?We? can? clearly?
observe? a? common? learning? effect? across? treatments,? decreasing? initial? over?entry? over? time.? In?
Election,?participants?converge?towards?the?rational?volunteering?frequency,?and?even?go?below.?In?
Random,? participants? decrease? their? volunteering? frequency,? but? still? stay? above? the? rational?
volunteering? frequency.? Since? we? account? for? the? difference? in? the? leadership? benefits? and?
benchmarks,?the?treatment?difference?in?volunteering?due?to?non?monetary?reasons?is?stronger?than?
it? initially?appears.?We?cannot?rule?out?that?participants?have?different?preferences?for?the?elected?
and? the? randomly?selected? leader’s?position,?or? that? the?possibility?of? reelections?has?a? regulatory?
effect.?
Figure?4.2? Volunteering?by?treatment?and?over?time?
?
Initial? over?entry? could? be? justified?with? participants? having? very? strong? beliefs? about? their? own?
probability? to?win,? and? that? followers?would? vote? for? them,? for? instance.? If? such? overconfidence?
would? be? the? case,?we? would? expect? to? see? a? difference? in? the? volunteering? frequency? among?
treatments,?namely?more?candidates?in?Election.?Graphically,?we?do?not?observe?a?rational?behavior?
in? line?with?these?speculations.?There? is?a?slight?difference?with?more?volunteering? in?Election,?but?
3.6? candidates? in? Random? cannot? be? explained? by? overconfidence,? unless? participants? initially?
doubted?our?random?selection?procedure,?which?is?very?unlikely.?
If?candidates?would?have?a?preference?for?competing?for?the?leader?status?and?for?follower?votes,?we?
would? observe? more? entry? in? Election,? which? is? not? the? case.? Therefore,? the? only? reasonable?
explanations?for?the?volunteering?behavior?are?a?potential?preference?difference?across?treatments?
and?the?regulatory?effect?of?reelections.?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
values? are? lower? because? the? average? earnings? are? higher? in? the? last? three? periods? of? Part? 1,? due? to? less?
coordination?failure.?
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4.5.2.1?Democracy?Effect?for?Each?Number?of?Candidates?
Since?we? find? a? democracy? effect? on?minimum? effort,? in? this? section?we? explore? it?more? using?
variation?in?the?number?of?candidates.?Namely,?in?some?of?the?groups?there?was?only?one?candidate?
and?no?election? in?Election,?and?we?are?curious?about?the?democracy?effect? in?those?cases.?We?run?
regressions?analogous? to?Model?1? for?each?number?of?candidates,? to? test?whether? the?number?of?
candidates?alters?our?results.? In?Table?4.3,?we?report?the?cases?of?one? (Model?6)?and? two?or?more?
candidates?(Model?7).48?We?collapse?by?group,?to?get?group?level?effects,?and?we?cluster?on?groups?to?
correct?standard?errors?for?non?independence?of?individual?observations?from?same?groups.?For?the?
GLS?estimations,?we?use?random?effects?models?with?minimum?effort?as?the?dependent?variable?and?
an?indicator?for?Election?as?the?explanatory?variable.?
Table?4.3? Effect?of?volunteering?on?minimum?effort,?random?and?fixed?effects?
? Model?6? Model?7? Model?8? Model?9?
RE? RE? FE? FE?
Number?of?candidates? 1? 2?or?more? Random? Election?
n?=?96? n?=?411? n?=?270? n?=?252?
Elected?leader? 6.93?
(8.01)?
12.07**?
(5.85)?
? ?
0?candidates? ? ? ?5.06?
(2.98)?
0.22?
(1.10)?
2?or?more?candidates? ? ? ?1.73?
(1.54)?
0.44?
(2.21)?
Constant? 24***?
(6.38)?
15.99***?
(4.46)?
17.73***?
(1.36)?
28.05***?
(1.60)?
Notes.? Dependent? variable? is? group?minimum? effort? in? a? period.? All? regressions? are? GLS? regressions,?
Models?6?and?7?are?random?effects?(RE),?Models?8?and?9?are?fixed?effects?(FE)?models.?We?collapse?the?
data?by?group?and?period.?The?number?of?observations?in?Models?6?and?7?sums?up?to?507,?and?in?Models?8?
and?9? it?sums?up?to?522?observations? from?29?groups.?We?do?not?report? the?case?when?the?number?of?
candidates?was? zero,? since?we?had? too? few?observations? (n?=?15).? In?Models?8?and?9,?we?use? the?one?
candidate?case?as?a?base.?Standard?errors?(in?parentheses)?are?corrected?for?clustering?at?the?group?level.?
***Statistically?significant?at?the?1%?level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?
at?the?10%?level.?
?
In?Model? 6,? we? test? whether? the? democracy? effect? is? still? present? if? only? one? group? member?
volunteers?and? is? thus? selected?automatically.?For?Election? this?means? that? followers?do?not?vote.?
However,?followers?still?know?that?they?would?have?the?real?possibility?to?vote? if?there?were?more?
candidates.?We?find?that?the?democracy?effect?is?about?half?in?size?and?not?significant,?but?we?have?
too?few?independent?observations?to?draw?a?clear?cut?conclusion?from?this?result.?In?Model?7,?where?
the?number?of?candidates?is?two?or?more,?we?find?a?democracy?effect?similar?to?Model?1.?The?effect?
size?is?12.07?and?significant?at?the?5%?level.?
In?Models?8? and?9,?we? test?whether? the?number?of? candidates?has? an?effect?on?minimum?effort?
within? each? treatment,? since? we? were? curious? to? know? whether? followers? react? differently?
depending?on?the?number?of?candidates.?Again,?we?collapse?by?group?and?cluster?standard?errors?on?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
48?We?had?only?15?group?level?observations?for?the?case?of?nobody?volunteering,?which?was? insufficient?for?a?
test? of?whether? the? democracy? effect? is? still? present? if? the? group? has? no? leader? for? the? subsequent? three?
periods.?
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groups.? For? the? estimations,?we?use? fixed?effects?models?with?minimum?effort? as? the?dependent?
variable?and?the?number?of?candidates?as?the?explanatory?variable.?We?find?no?notable?effect?of?the?
number?of?candidates.?
4.5.2.2?Repeated?Volunteering?and?Reselection?
In? this? section?we? investigate?who? runs? for? the? leader?position:? Is? it?always? the? same?or?different?
people? in?the?group?who?volunteer??In?Panel?A?of?Figure?4.3,?we?depict?the?mean?number?of?times?
being? selected? by? the? number? of? times? volunteering.? The? figure? depicts? only? observations? of?
participants? who? volunteer? at? least? once? in? the? six? selection? periods.? In? both? treatments,? the?
likelihood?to?get?selected?again? increases?with?the?number?of?times?somebody?volunteers,?and?one?
obvious?reason?for?this?is?that?leaders?are?more?likely?to?volunteer?again.?In?Election,?the?likelihood?to?
get?selected?again?seems?to?increase?even?stronger?with?the?number?of?times?somebody?volunteers.?
For?example,?only?55%?of? the?participants?who?volunteered?six? times?are?selected?at? least?once? in?
Random,?whereas? in? Election? it? is? 69%.? The? reason? for? the? increasing? trend?might? be? reelection.?
Reelection?can?have? two?explanations.?First,?successful? leaders?are? likely? to?get? reelected.?Second,?
relatively? less?group?members? run? in?Election,?which?might?be?due? to?a?preference?difference.?Of?
course,? successful? leaders?who? volunteer?make? it? needless? for? others? to? volunteer? too,? so? that?
reelection? itself? can? cause? a? further? decrease? in? volunteering.49?The? likelihood? that? somebody? is?
selected? once? or? twice? is? higher? in? Random.? For? example,? only? 25%? of? the? participants? who?
volunteered?twice?are?selected?at?least?once?in?Election,?whereas?in?Random?it?is?45%.?This?finding?is?
obviously?explained?by?the?random?selection?procedure?distributing?leadership?more?equally?among?
candidates.?
Figure?4.3? Volunteering?by?treatment?
A.?Successful?volunteering? B.?Guessed?share?of?candidates?in?period?9?
?
Panel?B?displays? the?mean?guessed? share?of?candidates? in?period?9.?Especially? in?period?9,?before?
participants? learn? about? the? true? volunteering? frequency,? they?might? rely? on? their? beliefs? about?
others? volunteering.? These? beliefs? might? be? another? possible? explanation? for? the? volunteering?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
49?The?possibility?of?reelection?of?successful?leaders?can?make?others?shy?away?from?volunteering.?This?could?be?
explained?by?perceiving? less? chance? to?win? the?election,?or? simply?by?perceiving? that? it? is? less?necessary? to?
volunteer?in?order?to?have?leadership?and?maintain?high?effort?levels.?
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decision.?Given?that?the?expected?payoff?of?the?lottery?is?constant,?we?would?expect?that?the?lottery?
is? relatively?more? attractive? to? participants?who? expect? a? higher? number? of? candidates.? In? other?
words,?we?would?expect?in?both?treatments?that?participants?who?choose?the?lottery?do?so?because?
they? expect? more? candidates? than? participants? who? choose? to? volunteer.? Instead? we? find? that?
participants?who?volunteer?expect?that?around?70%?of?the?other?four?group?members?will?volunteer?
as?well,?while? participants?who? do? not? volunteer? expect? around? 60%? of? others? to? volunteer.? A?
rationale? for? these? beliefs?might? be? that? participants? simply? reflect? their? own? preferences? onto?
others,? thinking? that?others?are?alike? to? the? self,?and?hence,? the? somewhat? lower?guesses?among?
non?candidates.?In?psychology,?such?an?effect?is?called?a?“false?consensus?effect”?overestimating?the?
average? behavior? based? on? own? biased? perceptions.? Anyway,? participants? underestimated? the?
magnitude?of?the?true,?overly?high?entry?of?around?75%?of?all?group?members?in?period?9.?
What?does?the?correlation?between?beliefs?and?volunteering?tell?us??The?more?a?participant?thinks?
others?will?volunteer,?the?more?he?is?willing?to?volunteer?too.?This?means,?if?having?a?leader?is?viewed?
as?a?public?good?to?achieve?more?efficient?outcomes?for?all?group?members,?the? individual? is?more?
willing? to? contribute? if? others? contribute? too,? as? others? observe? candidacy.? Thus,? conditional?
cooperation?might?cause?the?excess?entry?above?the?pecuniary?benefits?in?both?treatments.?
To?put?our?analysis?on?firmer?statistical?ground,?we?run?subject?level?random?effects?GLS?regressions?
estimating?the?democracy?effect?on?volunteering?and?the?chance?of?being?selected?again.?Table?4.4?
presents?the?results.?
Using?Models? V1? and? V2,?we? analyze? the? effect? of? the? democratic? regime? on? volunteering.? The?
dependent?variable? indicates?whether?each?participant?volunteers? to?be?a? leader? in? the?particular?
group?and?selection?period.?Model?V1?contains?only?an?indicator?for?Election?as?explanatory?variable.?
The?model?confirms?that?more?volunteering?takes?place? in?Random,?and?this?result? is?significant?at?
the?5%?level.?In?Model?V2,?the?indicator?for?Election?is?separately?interacted?with?the?guessed?share?
of?candidates?and?the?lagged?average?group?minimum?effort?of?one?leadership?term.?We?are?curious?
whether? beliefs? about? the? share? of? candidates? or? group? history? have? different? effects? on?
volunteering?across? treatments.?The?effects?of?beliefs?are?significantly?positive? in?both? treatments.?
Participants,?who?expect?that?all?others?in?their?group?volunteer,?are?more?likely?to?volunteer?as?well.?
Compared? to? Random,? the? effect? of? beliefs? is? twice? as? large? in? Election,? and? this? difference? is?
significant? based? on? the? post?estimation? test? (p? =? 0.02).? The? effects? of? lagged? group? history? are?
significantly?negative?in?both?treatments.?If?groups?do?well,?participants?volunteer?less,?which?means?
that?they?contribute?to? leadership?more?only?as? long?as? it? is?necessary.?This? finding?speaks? for?our?
public?good?explanation?of?the?volunteering?behavior,?and? it? is?evidence?that?participants?take? into?
account? the?benefits?of? leadership? for? their?decision.?We? find?no?statistically?significant?difference?
between?the?effects?of?lagged?group?history?across?treatments.?However,?groups?do?better?under?the?
democratic? regime,? and? this? would? explain? the? lower? level? of? volunteering.? The? results? remain?
unchanged,?if?we?run?a?subject?level?fixed?effects?version?of?the?regression?in?Model?V2.?
Using?Models?L1?and?L2,?we?analyze? the?effects?of? the?democratic? regime?on? the?chance?of?being?
selected? again.? The? dependent? variable? is? whether? each? participant? becomes? a? leader? in? the?
particular?group?and?selection?period.?Model?L1?analyzes?sequential?re?selection?without?controlling?
for?the?previous?success?of?the? leader,?whereas?Model?L2?analyzes?re?selection?after?the?candidate?
has?been?a?successful? leader?at? least?for?the?first?period? in?any?of?her?previous? leadership?terms.?In?
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other?words,? in?Model?L2?we?control?for?the?previous?success?of?the? leader,?and?this?success?might?
have?been?one?or?more?leadership?terms?earlier.?Success?is?identified?as?achieving?a?group?minimum?
effort?of?forty.?
Table?4.4? Subject?level?GLS?analysis?of?democracy?effects?on?volunteering?and?chance?of?re?
selection?
Variable? Model?V1? Model?V2? Model?L1? Model?L2?
RE? RE? RE? RE?
? n?=?870? n?=?870? n?=?870? n?=?870?
Elected?leader? ?0.08**?
(0.04)?
?0.20*?
(0.12)?
?0.03?
(0.02)?
?0.04*?
(0.02)?
Guessed?share?of?candidates?in?Random? ? 0.31***?
(0.12)?
? ?
Guessed?share?of?candidates?in?Election? ? 0.65***?
(0.08)?
? ?
Lagged?history?in?Random? ? ?0.04***?
(0.01)?
? ?
Lagged?history?in?Election? ? ?0.05***?
(0.01)?
? ?
Leader?in?previous?term?in?Random? ? ? 0.12*?
(0.06)?
?
Leader?in?previous?term?in?Election? ? ? 0.29**?
(0.13)?
?
Successful?random?leader?in?any?previous?
term?
? ? ? 0.09***?
(0.03)?
Successful?elected?leader?in?any?previous?
term?
? ? ? 0.20***?
(0.04)?
Unsuccessful?random?leader?in?any?
previous?term?
? ? ? 0.05?
(0.04)?
Unsuccessful?elected?leader?in?any?
previous?term?
? ? ? 0.06?
(0.05)?
Constant? 0.56***?
(0.03)?
0.43***?
(0.10)?
0.17***?
(0.01)?
0.16***?
(0.01)?
Notes.?Dependent?variable?is?volunteering?in?Models?V1?and?V2,?and?being?a?leader?in?Models?L1?and?L2.?
All?models?are?random?effects?(RE)?models.?Regressions?contain?870?observations?from?145?subjects?over?6?
selection? periods.?We? divided? the? lagged? history? by? factor? 10.? Standard? errors? (in? parentheses)? are?
corrected? for? clustering? at? the? group? level.? ***Statistically? significant? at? the? 1%? level,? **statistically?
significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?
In?Model? L1,?we?use? as?explanatory? variables? an? indicator? for? Election? and? the? interaction?of? the?
indicator?for?Election?with?a?dummy?indicating?whether?each?participant?was?a?leader?in?the?previous?
leadership?term.?The?effect?of?having?been?a?leader?in?the?previous?term?is?positive?and?significant?in?
both?treatments,?which?means?that?reselection?is?an?important?phenomenon?under?both?regimes.?A?
leader? in?a?previous?term? in?Random?has?a?0.12?higher?probability?than?a?non?leader?to?become?a?
leader? in? the? current? term,? and? this? effect? increases? to? 0.29? in? Election.? Thus,? the? sequential?
reselection?effect? is?2.4? times? larger?under?democracy.?However,? the?post?estimation? test? reveals?
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that?this?difference?is?not?significant?(p?=?0.24).50?In?Model?L2,?the?indicator?for?Election?is?interacted?
separately?with?the?successful?and?the?unsuccessful?leadership?in?any?previous?term.?We?are?curious?
whether?success?has?different?effects?on?reselection?across?treatments.?The?effect?of?having?been?a?
successful?leader?is?positive?and?significant?in?both?treatments,?which?means?that?the?reselection?of?
successful? leaders? is? an? important? phenomenon? under? both? regimes.? A? leader?with? a? successful?
history?in?Random?has?a?0.09?higher?probability?than?a?non?leader?to?become?a?leader?in?the?current?
term,?and?this?effect?increases?to?0.20?in?Election.?Thus,?the?effect?of?reselecting?successful?leaders?is?
2.2?times?larger?under?democracy,?and?this?difference?is?significant?(p?=?0.02)?according?to?the?post?
estimation? test.?The?effect?of?having?been?an?unsuccessful? leader? in?any?of? the?previous? terms? is?
negligible?under?both?regimes?(p?=?0.78?according?to?the?post?estimation?test?comparing?treatments).?
In? sum,? we? can? say? that? the? volunteering? behavior? is? initially? driven? by? a? preference? for? the?
leadership?position?and?a?willingness? to?provide? the?public?good?of?having?a?beneficial? leader.? It? is?
rather?unlikely?that?the?volunteering?behavior? is?affected?by?biased?beliefs,? like?underestimation?of?
the?number?of?candidates?or?overconfidence? in?being?elected.? In? later?periods,? (successful)? leaders?
get?reselected?in?both?treatments,?and?this?occurs?partly?because?volunteering?decreases?over?time?
and?partly?because?participants?of?successful?groups?volunteer?less,?as?it?becomes?less?necessary?to?
contribute? to? the? public? good.? Since? groups?perform?better? under?democracy,?participants?might?
decrease?their?willingness?to?volunteer,?and?thus?we?observe?less?over?entry?and?volunteering?close?
to?and?even?below?the?pecuniary?benefits?benchmark.?
Even? though? less? participants? candidate? in? Election,? the? chance? of? getting? reelected? after? having?
been?a?successful?leader?is?only?0.20,?which?might?be?because?voters?are?egalitarian,?trying?to?give?a?
chance?to?new?leaders.?Our?data?does?not?allow?us?to?further?investigate?this?phenomenon,?but?one?
explanation?for?less?“totalitarian”?reelections?and?more?equal?distribution?of?the?leadership?position?
among?group?members?could?be?the?spill?over?effect?of?democracy?(Kamei,?2011).51?It?might?be?less?
the?chance?of?reelections,?and?more?the?better?group?history?that?drives?the?volunteering?decision?
and?thus?most?of?the?election?outcomes.?We?conclude?the?section?on?the?volunteering?behavior?as?
follows.?
Conclusion?2:?We? find?partial?support? for?Hypothesis?2.?The? initial?volunteering? frequency?does?not?
differ? across? treatments.? The? overall? volunteering? frequency? is? higher?when? leaders? are? randomly?
selected.?Better?group?history?and?the?possibility?of?reelections?under?democracy?regulate?the?number?
of?candidates?towards?the?pecuniary?benefits?benchmark.?Over?entry?can?be?explained?by?preferences?
for? the? leader?position?and?willingness? to?provide?beneficial? leadership.?Our?evidence? supports? the?
latter?explanation?most.?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
50?If?we?run?the?regression? in?Model?L1?with?a?variable?for?successful?previous? leadership? instead?of?previous?
leadership?only,?we?find?that?the?magnitude?of?the?coefficients?is?higher?for?both?conditions,?but?the?difference?
in?the?effects?remains?unchanged?(p?=?0.24).?
51?A? few? times? (repeatedly? in? two? out? of? fourteen? groups)?we? found?messages? in? Election? containing? the?
suggestion?to?take?turns? in? leadership,?and? let?every?group?member?at? least?once?be?a? leader.?We?think?that?
these?message?senders?had?strong?other?regarding?preferences,?triggered?probably?by?the?spill?over?effect?of?
elections,?and?they?tried?to?use?the?one?way?communication?channel?to?share?the?possibility?to?take?the?leader?
bonus?and?the?“premium”?for?being?an?elected? leader.?Of?course,?encouraging?others?to?manipulate?election?
results?might?take?all?the?joy,?which?would?explain?why?we?observed?in?later?periods?that?nobody?volunteered?
in?those?groups.?
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4.5.3?Leader?Behavior?
In? this? section,? we? examine? whether? the? treatment? affects? leader? behavior,? which? means? the?
leader’s? message? sending? behavior.? First,? we? analyze? democracy? effects? on? message? use,? and?
afterwards?we?will?argue?how?much?of?the?original?democracy?effect?on?minimum?effort?is?explained?
by?a?difference?in?leader?behavior.?
Table? 4.5? provides? an? overview? of? frequent?message? categories? that?we? coded? for? the? content?
analysis,? indicating?description?and?examples,?and? the?percentage? (frequency)?of?all?observations.?
The?content?analysis? includes?all?cases?when?the?group?had?a? leader,?even? if?no?message?was?sent,?
but?we?dropped?5?group?level?observations?when?nobody?volunteered.?All?variables?were?coded?as?
binary:? variables? take? the? value?of?1? if? the?message? contains?a? certain? category?and?0?otherwise.?
Table?A1? in?Appendix?4A?contains?the?full? list?of?all?coded?categories.?The?message?coding,?which? is?
available? upon? request,?was? carried? out? by? the? authors,? similarly? as? described? in?more? detail? in?
Chapter?3?and?based?on?the?scheme?in?Brandts?et?al.?(2015).?
Table?4.5? Categories?of?messages?for?content?analysis?
Category? Description?and?examples? Frequency?
Forty? Suggestion?to?choose?40? 0.769?
Positive?emotional?content? Commendation,?encouragement? 0.396?
Mutual?benefit?argument? Explanation?refers?to?mutual?benefit? 0.527?
Being?part?of?the?group? Using?the?pronoun?“we”,?“us”? 0.657?
Assertive?style? Confident,?not?aggressive,?not?passive? 0.799?
?
Figure? 4.4? depicts? those? categories? that?we? found? to? be?most? interesting? as? potential? channels?
explaining?the?democracy?effect?on?minimum?effort.?Compared?to?Random,?suggestions?of?forty?(p?=?
0.01),?positive?emotional?content?(p?=?0.00),?and?being?part?of?the?group?(p?=?0.01)?are?significantly?
more? likely? to? be? used? by? elected? leaders,? according? to?Wilcoxon? rank?sum? tests? by? treatment.?
Treatment?differences?in?the?mutual?benefit?argument?(p?=?0.39)?and?in?assertive?style?(p?=?0.18)?are?
not?significant.?Since?suggesting?forty?is?correlated?with?positive?emotional?content?and?being?part?of?
the?group,? these?categories?could?be?combined?as?“relevant?content”.52?Relevant?content?could?be?
used?in?the?further?analysis.53?However,?since?none?of?the?other?contents?has?an?effect?independent?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
52?To? filter? interesting? content,?we? ran?a? correlation?analysis?of? the?message? content? categories.?Suggesting?
forty? also? correlated? with? the? mutual? benefit? argument? and? assertive? style.? Moreover,? long? messages?
correlated?with?explanation,?excuses,?and?being?part?of?the?group,?since?leaders?who?tried?to?help?their?teams?
with? explanations? often? expressed? that? they? are? equally? part? of? the? group.? Surprisingly,? orders?were? not?
correlated?with?short?messages,?but?obviously?they?strongly?correlated?with?the?assertive?style.?
53?Though?not?reported,?we?ran?subject?level?OLS?regressions?on?message?use?clustered?on?groups,?similarly?to?
the?analysis? in?Brandts?et?al.? (2015).?Note,? that? their?data?contained?observations?only? from? the? first?period?
after?the?introduction?of?leaders,?which?was?their?only?selection?period.?Our?data?contains?observations?of?all?
the? six? selection? periods.? If? the? dependent? variable? indicates?whether? the? leader? suggested? forty? and? the?
indicator?for?Election?is?the?only?explanatory?variable,?we?find?that?elected?leaders?are?by?16?percentage?points?
more? likely? to?suggest? forty?than?randomly?selected? leaders? (p?=?0.07).?Brandts?et?al.? (2015)?also?control? for?
history? effects?using? lagged?minimum? effort.?Although?history? is? likely? to? affect? subsequent? leaders,? in?our?
design?history?effects?are?mixed?up?with? the?effects?of?new? selection? cycles.?As? suggested? in?Brandts?et?al.?
(2015),?we?repeated?the?estimations?for?the?relevant?message?content?as?dependent?variable.?For?the?relevant?
content?we?used?the?sum?of?the?codings?of?the?categories?forty,?positive?emotional?content,?and?being?part?of?
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from? forty,?we?will? focus?our? subsequent? analysis? on? treatment?differences? in? forty,? as? the?main?
driver?for?differences?in?leader?effectiveness.?
Figure?4.4? Frequency?of?relevant?messages?and?categories?by?leader?type?
Suggestions?of?forty? Positive?emotions?
Mutual?benefit?argument? Being?part?of?the?group?
?
We?turn?back?to?the?analysis?of?the?democracy?effect?on?minimum?effort?in?Table?4.2.?We?are?curious?
how?much?of?the?democracy?effect?can?be?explained?by?elected?leaders?requesting?more?often?forty.?
Model?3?extends?Model?1?by?including?an?indicator?variable,?which?takes?the?value?of?1?if?the?leader?
requested?forty?and?0?otherwise.54?Forty?is?significant?at?the?1%?level?and?has?a?positive?effect?of?size?
12.71? on?minimum? effort.? Forty? explains? about? 20%? of? the? democracy? effect? by? decreasing? its?
coefficient?from?12.30?in?Model?1?to?10.18?effort?units.?The?remaining?80%?of?the?democracy?effect?is?
still?significant?at? the?10%? level?and?supports?Hypothesis?4?of?a?difference? in? follower?reactions.? In?
Model?4,?we?include?the?interaction?of?the?treatment?and?forty.?Now,?the?coefficient?for?Election?tells?
that?having?an?elected?leader?suggesting?something?else?than?forty?increases?the?minimum?effort?by?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the?group.?Compared?to?Random,?elected? leaders?are?by?0.33?percentage?points?more? likely?to?send?relevant?
messages?(p?=?0.00).?The?choice?of?the?dependent?variable?did?not?change?the?pattern?in?the?basic?model:?the?
overall?democracy?effect?on?leader?behavior?remains?robustly?significant.?
54?Similar? to?Brandts?et?al.? (2015),?we?also?experimented?with? including?additional?coding? information? to? the?
message?content? indicator?variable.?We?added?codings?separately?for?positive?emotional?content?and?mutual?
benefit,?for?positive?emotional?content?and?being?part?of?the?group,?for?assertiveness,?and?for?being?part?of?the?
group.?However,?extending?the?coding?information?in?the?indicator?variable?does?not?change?the?main?findings?
in?Models?3?and?4.?
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6.74,? although? this? effect? is? not? significant.? Suggesting? forty? has? a? significant? positive? effect? on?
minimum?effort?in?both?Random?and?Election.?The?difference?in?the?magnitude?of?the?coefficients?for?
elected?and?randomly?selected?leaders?suggesting?forty?is?4.51.?However,?since?this?difference?almost?
entirely?overlaps?with?standard?errors,?it?is?far?from?significant?(p?=?0.45).?We?conclude?as?follows.?
Conclusion? 3:?We? find? support? for?Hypothesis? 3.? Elected? leaders? are?more? likely? to? send? effective?
messages?in?the?sense?that?they?request?more?often?forty?than?randomly?selected?leaders.?However,?
the?difference?in?leader?behavior?is?not?the?only?channel?explaining?the?democracy?effect?on?minimum?
effort.?
4.5.4?Follower?Behavior?
A?huge?part?of?the?democracy?effect?on?minimum?effort?seems?to?root?in?the?treatment?differences?
of?the?followers’?reactions.?Unlike?the?findings? in?Brandts?et?al.?(2015),?we?can?observe?an?effect? in?
follower?behavior,?graphically?in?Figure?4.5?and?statistically?more?soundly?analyzed?below.?
The? figure? depicts? followers’?minimum? effort? depending? on? the? treatment? and? holding? constant?
whether?the? leader?requests?forty?or?not.?We? include?data?of?each?period? if?the?average?minimum?
effort? in? the?previous? leadership? term?was? less? than? forty.? In? such?periods,? the? leader’s?ability? to?
affect?outcomes? is?more? important? than? in?periods?with?a?successful?group?history?when?all?group?
members? already? coordinated?on? the? efficient? equilibrium.?We? exclude? effort? choices?of? leaders.?
Note,? that? Brandts? et? al.? (2015)? included? only? observations? from? the? first? period? after? the? only?
selection?process?they? implemented,?but?we? include?observations? from? later?periods?as?well,?since?
we?have?new?selections?every?three?periods.?
Figure?4.5? Effect?of?suggested?play?of?level?40?by?treatment?
?
Note.?Observations?include?all?periods?with?lagged?three?periodic?average?minimum?effort?less?than?
level?40.?
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From?the?figure?it?gets?clear?that?the?effect?of?suggesting?forty?is?stronger?in?Election.?This?speaks?for?
a?treatment?difference?in?the?effects?of?follower?behavior?on?leader?effectiveness,?and?thus?supports?
Hypothesis?4.?If?we?test?whether?the?visual?difference?in?effects?is?statistically?significant,?we?confirm?
that? elected? leaders? are? followed? to? a? greater? extent? than? randomly? selected? leaders,? holding?
constant?what?leaders?say?(p?=?0.07).55?
Next,?we? jump?back? to?Model?5? in?Table?4.2,?where?we?extend?Model?1?with?another?explanatory?
variable,?the?interaction?of?the?guessed?share?of?followers?with?suggesting?forty?and?the?indicator?for?
Election.? The? interaction? terms? reflect? the? effect? of? beliefs? about? others? following? the? leader’s?
suggestion?of? forty?or? another?numeric? content? in?each? treatment.? If? a? randomly? selected? leader?
suggests?forty?and?followers?expect?all?others?to?follow,?the?minimum?effort?significantly?increases?by?
18.08?units?compared?to?a?randomly?selected?leader?who?suggests?forty?and?followers?expect?will?not?
be?followed?by?others.?If?an?elected? leader?suggests?forty?and?followers?expect?all?others?to?follow,?
the? minimum? effort? significantly? increases? by? 13.83? units? compared? to? an? elected? leader? who?
suggests?forty?and?followers?expect?will?not?be?followed?by?others.?The?post?estimation?test?reveals?
that,? after? a? suggestion? of? forty,? the? effects? of? an? increase? in? beliefs? on?minimum? effort? do? not?
significantly?differ?(p?=?0.53)?across?treatments.?Beliefs?about?others’?reactions?after?a?suggestion?of?
forty?have?a?high?and?significant?impact?on?group?performance?and?the?effectiveness?of?the?message.?
If?the?randomly?selected?or?elected?leader?suggested?something?else?than?forty?and?followers?expect?
all?others? to? follow,? then? the?minimum? effort? increases?by?3.68? and? ?7.98?units? respectively,?but?
without?being?significant.?In?other?words,?beliefs?of?followers?matter?only?when?a?message?of?forty?is?
sent,?and?beliefs?matter?in?the?same?way?in?both?Random?and?Election.?
Table?4.6?presents? a?multilevel?mediation? analysis? to? estimate? the? size?of? the?direct? and? indirect?
components? of? the? total? democracy? effect? on? minimum? effort? (Krull? and? MacKinnon? 2001;?
MacKinnon?et?al.?2007;?Shatnawi?et?al.?2011).?The?total?effect?decomposition?is?useful?in?case?of?our?
data,?since? the? treatment?variation?has?direct?effects?on? leader?and? follower?behavior,?and? leader?
behavior?also?mediates?the?democracy?effect? indirectly?towards?followers’?choices.?Thus,?there?are?
two?behavioral? channels? for? the?democracy?effect,? and? the?destination?of? the?democracy?effect’s?
direct? and? indirect? paths? is? leader? effectiveness,?our?main?outcome? variable? of? interest.? In?other?
words,?the?selection?process?has?a?direct?effect?on?suggesting?forty?and?group?minimum?effort,?and?it?
has?an?indirect?effect?on?group?minimum?effort?(see?Figure?4.6).?
Figure?4.6? The?path?model?
?
?
?
?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
55?Post?estimation? test? results? after? a? random? effects?GLS? regression? for? followers’?minimum? effort? in? each?
period.?The? regressions?use? the? indicator? for?Election?and? the? interaction?of? the? indicator? for?Election?and?a?
dummy?for?suggesting?forty?as?explanatory?variables,?and?cluster?standard?errors?on?groups?(not?reported?in?a?
table).?
Selection?process?
Leader’s?suggestion?
Minimum?effort?
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We?run?the?multilevel?mediation?analysis?using?mixed?effects?restricted?maximum?likelihood?(REML)?
estimations?with?group?minimum?effort?as?the?dependent?variable,?an? indicator?for?Election?as?the?
independent?variable,?suggesting?forty?as?the?mediating?variable,?and?clustering?at?the?group? level.?
The?output?of?this?analysis?consists?of?the?estimation?of?three?equations?with?following?results:?1)?the?
treatment?has?a?significant?effect?on?minimum?effort?at?the?5%?significance? level,?2)?the?treatment?
has?a?significant?effect?on?suggesting?forty?at?the?5%?significance?level,?and?3)?both?suggesting?forty?
and? treatment? have? significant? effects? on?minimum? effort? at? the? 1%? and? 10%? significance? level,?
respectively.? The? effect? size?of? the? treatment?decreases?when? the? regression? contains? suggesting?
forty.?The?output? further? shows? indirect,?direct?and? total?effects,?but? it?does?not?provide?us?with?
standard?errors?or? confidence? intervals.?Therefore,?we? could?use? several?approaches? that? confirm?
the?mediation?effect?statistically,?such?as?the?causal?steps?approach?(the?democracy?effect?decreases?
in?Equation?3),?the?difference?in?coefficients?approach,?and?the?product?of?coefficients?approach?both?
yielding?a? significant? indirect?effect?of? the? treatment? (MacKinnon?et?el.?2007).?Complementary? to?
these?manual?approaches,?we?bootstrap?the? indirect,?direct?and? total?effects?with?500?replications?
(reps),?which?yield?us?standard?errors?and?significance?levels.?
Table?4.6? Decomposition?of?the?total?democracy?effect?on?leader?effectiveness?
? Equation?1? Equation?2? Equation?3? Bootstrap?
Dependent?variable? Minimum?effort? Suggesting?forty? Minimum?effort? ?
? n?=?522? n?=?522? n?=?522? n?=?522?
reps?=?500?
Elected?leader? 12.30**?
(6.09)?
0.17**?
(0.08)?
10.20*?
(5.41)?
?
Suggesting?forty? ? ? 12.58***?
(1.03)?
?
Constant? 16.07***?
(4.23)?
0.67***?
(0.06)?
? ?
Indirect?effect? ? ? 2.10? 2.10**?
(1.05)?
Direct?effect? ? ? 10.20? 10.20**?
(5.25)?
Total?effect? 12.30? ? ? 12.30**?
(5.78)?
Notes.?Equations?1?to?3?are?estimated?by?mixed?effects?REML?regressions?and?contain?522?observations?from?29?
groups? over? 18? periods.? Standard? errors? (in? parentheses)? are? corrected? for? clustering? at? the? group? level.?
***Statistically?significant?at?the?1%? level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%? level,?*statistically?significant?at?
the?10%?level.?
?
The? size? of? the? total? democracy? effect? is? 12.30?with? a? bootstrap? standard? error? of? 5.78,? and? is?
significant?at?the?5%?level.?The?total?effect?can?be?decomposed?into?a?direct?effect?which?makes?83%?
of?the?total?effect,?and? into?an? indirect?effect?which?makes?17%?of?the?total?effect.?Both?the?direct?
and?indirect?effects?are?significant?at?the?5%?level.?Put?differently,?around?80%?of?the?total?selection?
process?effect?is?a?direct?effect?on?follower?behavior,?and?only?around?20%?of?the?total?effect?can?be?
attributed?to?a?difference?in?leader?behavior?affecting?leader?effectiveness.?We?conclude?as?follows.?
Conclusion?4:?We?find?confirmation?for?Hypothesis?4.?Elected?leaders?are?followed?to?a?greater?extent?
than?randomly?selected?leaders?(holding?constant?what?leaders?say),?and?this?channel?explains?most?
of?the?total?democracy?effect.?
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4.6?Conclusion?and?Discussion?
We?reproduce?the?treatment?effect?of?the?selection?process?on?leader?effectiveness?as?found?earlier?
by?Brandts?et?al.?(2015).?Groups?with?elected?leaders?coordinate?on?higher?effort?levels?than?groups?
with?randomly?selected?leaders.?However,?instead?of?finding?a?rationale?for?the?democracy?effect?in?a?
change?of? leaders’?behavior,?our? results? are?mainly?driven?by? a?difference? in? followers’?behavior.?
Followers?follow?elected?leaders’?messages?with?a?higher?probability?than?randomly?selected?leaders’?
messages,? holding? constant?what? leaders? say.? Thus,? followers? perceive? elected? leaders? as?more?
credible?than?randomly?selected?leaders.?In?our?study,?only?around?20%?of?the?democracy?effect?can?
be?attributed?to?a?change? in? leader?behavior,?according?to?the?total?effect?decomposition?analysis.?
Elected? leaders? are?more? active? in? the? sense? that? they? suggest?more? often? to? choose? forty? than?
randomly?selected?leaders.?
Volunteering?is?a?new?feature,?which?we?added?to?the?experimental?design.?Volunteering?might?have?
pre?selected?motivated? leaders,?which?might? explain?why? the? difference? in? leader? behavior?was?
rather? small? across? treatment? conditions.? If? this? were? true,? then? our? results? are? important? in?
understanding?the?drivers?of?the?democracy?effect.?Our?design?might?magnify?the?direct?channel?of?
the? democracy? effect? on? follower? behavior.? Our? replication? study? confirms? earlier? findings,? and?
underlines?the?importance?of?employee?participation?in?choosing?group?leaders.?
With?respect?to?volunteering,?we?find?that?the? initial?volunteering?frequency?does?not?differ?across?
treatments,?and?participants?clearly?volunteer?more?than?what?would?be?economically?reasonable.?
The? overall? volunteering? frequency? is? higher?when? leaders? are? randomly? selected.? Better? group?
performance?and?the?possibility?of?reelections?under?democracy?regulate?the?number?of?candidates?
towards?the?benchmark.?We?find?that?over?entry?cannot?be?fully?explained?by?biased?beliefs?to?win?
the?selection?process.?Hence,?other?explanations?such?as?preferences?for?the? leader?position?or?the?
willingness?to?contribute?to?leadership?as?a?public?good?must?be?at?play.?
Another?difference?between?the?study? in?Brandts?et?al.? (2015)?and?our?study? is?the? location?of?the?
experiment?execution.?Authors?of?Brandts?et?al.?(2015)?ran?their?study? in?Florida,?while?we?ran?our?
study? in?Guatemala.?Cultural?and?historical?differences?across? the? subject?pools?might?partially?be?
involved? in?explaining?our?differing? findings.?Guatemalan?people?support?their?political?system?and?
are? satisfied? with? democracy? at? a? similar? rate? than? the? average? of? countries? on? the? American?
continent.?The?political?tolerance?and?support?for?democracy?is?lower,?victimization?by?corruption?is?
higher? than? the?average? in? the? comparative?perspective,?based?on?data? from?2010? (Azpuru?et?al.?
2011).? The? country? has? a? geographically? advantageous? position? with? seaports? on? two? oceans,?
strategically? ideal?for?trade?and?outsourcing.?Due?to?survey?reports?by?the?Global?Entrepreneurship?
Monitor?(GEM),?around?40%?of?Guatemalan?people?would?like?to?become?entrepreneurs?in?the?next?
three?years?compared? to?12%? in? the?US,?while?the?established?business?ownership?rate? is?similarly?
around?7%?in?both?countries,?64%?of?the?people?think?that?they?have?the?right?capabilities?compared?
to?53%?in?the?US,?and?the?fear?of?failure?is?around?33%?compared?to?30%?in?the?US.?Guatemalans?are?
optimistic,?and?experience?a?necessity?driven?self?employment?wave?and?an?increase?in?the?number?
of?social?enterprises.? In? line?with? this? information?and?using?data? from?our? final?questionnaire,?we?
found?that?80%?of?the?participants?prefers?the?leader?role,?the?average?participant?considers?himself?
to?be?a?better? leader?(average? is?1.5?scores?on?a?scale?from?1?to?5),?and?the?average?willingness?to?
take? risks? is?very?high? (8?on?a? scale? from?0? to?10).?We? found?no?difference?by? treatment? in? these?
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variables?even?if?we?restricted?the?data?summary?to?candidates?or?to?leaders.?These?facts?support?the?
validity?of?our?results:? the?democracy?effect?on?group?performance?roots?mainly? in?a?difference? in?
follower?reactions,?rather?than?a?difference?in?leader?behavior,?attitudes?or?traits.?Nevertheless,?the?
high?willingness?to?take?risks?might?play?a?role? in?explaining?differing? leader?behavior?compared?to?
the?findings?in?Brandts?et?al.?(2015).?The?authors?find?that?around?50%?of?all?observations?contain?a?
suggestion?of? forty,?whereas?we? find? this? frequency? to?be?almost?80%.?This?means,? that?nearly?all?
leaders?in?our?experiment?suggested?the?highest?effort?level,?which?is?risky?to?follow,?and?risky?if?we?
assume?that?leaders?followed?their?own?suggestions,?which?they?really?do?in?most?of?the?cases?(mean?
leader? effort? is? 33? if? the? leader? suggested? forty).? Studies? comparing? the?willingness? to? take? risks?
across?countries?confirm?that?Guatemalan?people?have?a?higher?risk?tolerance?than?people?in?the?US,?
which? is?negatively?correlated? to?GDP?per?capita? (Vieider?et?al.?2016).? It?might?be? that? the?higher?
willingness? to? take? risks?drives? the?uniformly?high? suggestions,? leaving? less? room? for?a?democracy?
effect?on?leader?behavior.?
Independent? of? the? channel,? democracy? has? a? positive? effect? on? leader? effectiveness? and? group?
outcomes,?and?this?result?holds?across?countries.?
? ?
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Chapter?5?
Are?Elected?Men?and?Women?Equally?Effective?Leaders??
with?Ernesto?Reuben?
5.1?Introduction?
Whenever? a? common? goal? requires? coordinated? action? of? a? team,? leadership? can? facilitate? the?
endeavor.?Historically,?men?have?held?most?of?the?leadership?positions,?and?up?to?the?present?date,?
women?are?rare?in?top?decision?making?positions.?Could?it?be?that?the?reason?for?this?phenomenon?is?
simply?that?men?are?more?effective?leaders?than?women??In?a?controlled?laboratory?experiment?we?
investigate? whether? men? and? women? are? equally? effective? leaders? under? two? different? leader?
selection?procedures.?The?random?selection?procedure? is?a?top?down?procedure,?where?employees?
cannot? influence? who? becomes? their? leader.? The? election? procedure? represents? a? bottom?up?
procedure,?when?employees?get? involved? in?choosing?their?group? leaders.?As?a?real?world?example,?
one? could? think? of? a? start?up? team? that? democratically? assigns? the? leader? position? among? the?
candidates,? or? organizations? operating? project?by?project? that? might? have? the? possibility? to? let?
project? teams? decide?who?will? be? the? project? leader.?Our? study? contributes? to? the? literature? on?
laboratory? experiments?using? the? turnaround? game?which?models? leadership.?We? confirm? earlier?
findings?when?we? compare? randomly? selected? to? elected? leaders,? and?we? extend? the? insights? by?
descriptive?results?on?gender?differences?(Brandts?et?al.?2015).?Our?main?interest?is?twofold.?First,?we?
are? interested? in?gender?differences? in? leader?effectiveness.?Second,?we?also?aim? to? shed? light?on?
gender?differences?in?preferences?for?the?leadership?position.?To?our?knowledge,?only?a?few?papers?
investigated?gender?issues?in?the?context?of?the?weak?link?game?(Grossman?et?al.?2016;?Dufwenberg?
and?Gneezy?2005).?
The? weak?link? game,? or? minimum? effort? coordination? game,? models? production? situations? in?
organizations,? where? individuals? are? interdependent,? and? the? lowest? performing? individual?
determines? group? performance? (Van? Huyck? et? al.? 1990).? Individuals? can? choose? among? different?
effort? levels.?However,? in?equilibrium,? all? group?members? choose? the? same? effort? level.? Thus? the?
game?has?multiple?equilibria,?one?at?every?effort?level.?To?choose?the?highest?effort?level?is?the?most?
efficient,?payoff?dominant?outcome?for?all?group?members.?Though,?the?higher?the?individual?effort?
level? choice? is,? the? riskier? it? becomes,? since? the? payoff? loss? one? incurs? if? other? group?members?
choose?a?lower?effort?level?increases.?Strategic?uncertainty?can?therefore?undermine?efficiency?(Van?
Huyck?et?al.?1990)?as? risk?averse? individuals?could?decide? to?secure? themselves?a?certain,?but? low,?
payoff?by? choosing? the? lowest?effort? level?and?avoid? the? risk?of?a?bigger? loss?due? to? coordination?
failure.?Coordination?failure?and?realization?of?the?most?inefficient?equilibrium?is?the?usual?outcome?
in?weak?link?games?if?communication?is?not?possible?(Kriss?and?Eil?2012).?
The?turnaround?game?is?a?special?weak?link?game?where?the?experimental?session?is?divided?into?two?
parts?(Brandts?et?al.?2015).? In?the?first?part,?group?members?cannot?communicate?with?each?other,?
which?usually? results? in? the? group? failing? to? coordinate? at?high? effort? levels? (Brandts? and?Cooper?
2006a).? In? the? second?part,? the?game? introduces? leadership.?The? task?of? the? leader? is? to? lead? the?
group? from? the? inefficient? low?effort?equilibrium? to? the?efficient?high?effort?equilibrium,?which? is?
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harder?to?achieve?if?the?group?previously?experienced?a?coordination?failure?(Devetag?and?Ortmann?
2007).? Leaders? are? allowed? to?use? voluntary,?non?binding,? free? form?pre?play? communication.56?If?
leaders? are? credible,? they? can? use? communication? as? a? tool? to?move? group?members? to? choose?
higher?effort? levels,?and? to? reach? the?most?efficient?equilibrium? through?a? coordinated? change,?a?
“turnaround”?(Brandts?and?Cooper?2007).?
Leader?credibility?refers?to?the?beliefs?of?the?followers?who?are? led.?Specifically,?whether?followers?
expect? others?will? follow? the? leader.? A? leader? can? prove? her? credibility? by? sending? the? relevant?
message?content,?and? through?a?successful?group?history.57?However,?besides?credibility? rooting? in?
competence,?the?selection?process? itself?can?be? important.?Election? increases?the?credibility?of?the?
leader,?and?Brandts?et?al.? (2015)?already?showed? that?election?also? increases? leader?effectiveness.?
Further,? since?we? reveal? the? gender? of? the? leader,? credibility?might? be? influenced? by? the? gender?
information.? Followers? might? have? stereotype? beliefs? that? consider? men? to? be? better,? more?
competent,?and?more? credible? leaders,?despite? the? fact? that?both?genders?might?perform?equally?
well? (Ridgeway? 2001;? Day? 2014;? Goldin? 2002;? Akerlof? and? Kranton? 2005;? Reuben? et? al.? 2014).?
Moreover,?even?if?a?follower?does?not?believe?the?stereotype,?he?would?still?act?according?to?it?if?he?
thinks?others?do?believe?it.?
Volunteering? to? be? a? leader? is? an? important? feature? present? in? real?world? environments.? Not?
everyone?wants? to?become?a? leader?and? leaders?are?usually?not? forced? into?a? leader?position.?We?
introduce? this? important? feature? to? the? turnaround?game?by?giving?group?members? the?choice? to?
volunteer?to?run?for?the?leader?position?before?they?are?either?randomly?selected?or?democratically?
elected.?We?think?that?adding?volunteering?to?the?design? is?a?good?change,?reproducing?real?world?
features? in? more? detail? in? the? laboratory? game.58?Independently? of? whether? leaders? differ? in?
effectiveness?or?not,?there?might?be?a?gender?difference? in?the?preference? for?the? leader?position.?
Such? a? potential? gender? difference? might? simply? root? in? differing? preferences? for? authority,?
regardless? of? followership? and? credibility? concerns.? Bartling? et? al.? (2014)? show? that? agents? value?
authority,?the?right?to?make?decisions,?and?if?the?value?for?the?right?to?make?decisions?is?rooted?in?a?
more? general? preference? to? have? more? control? over? an? outcome,? then? we? should? expect? that?
participants?run?more?often?for?the?leader?position?than?would?be?expected?based?on?the?pecuniary?
benefits?of? leadership.?Kanthak?and?Woon? (2014)?show? that?women?are? less? likely? to?volunteer?as?
candidates?in?an?election,?which?suggests?in?a?different?context?that?women?might?be?more?averse?to?
authority,?so?that?we?should?expect?that?men?run?more?often?for?the?leader?position?than?women.?
Bertrand? (2011)? reviews? the? literature?on? factors? that?potentially?explain? the?gender?gap? in? labor?
market? outcomes.? The? author? reports? about? stable? differences? in? some? psychological? attributes,?
such?as?risk?attitudes,?attitudes?towards?competition?and?negotiation,?social?preferences,?and?other?
personality? traits.? Some? of? these? factors? might? be? relevant? for? explaining? a? potential? gender?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
56?Cheap? talk?between?players? improves?coordination?and?efficiency? (Blume?and?Ortmann?2007).?Centralized?
communication?by?a? leader?decreases? the?costs?of?communication?and? is?more?effective? than?expert?advice?
(Brandts?and?Cooper?2007;?Brandts?et?al.?2014).?
57?In?the?text,?we?use?the?personal?pronoun?“she”? if?we?refer?to?a? leader,?and?we?use?“he”? in?all?other?cases?
when?gender?is?not?specified.?
58?Although,?we? are? aware? that? voluntary? leadership?might? enhance? performance? compared? to? exogenous?
leadership?(Rivas?and?Sutter?2011).?
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difference? in? running? for? the? leader?position.59?On? the?other?hand,? it?might?be? that? followers?drive?
leader?behavior.?If?followers?hold?stereotype?beliefs?that?women?are?worse?leaders?than?men,?then?
this?might?lead?to?lower?leader?effectiveness?and?therefore?less?volunteering?of?women.?
Our?main?contributions?are?the?following.?Women?are?less?likely?to?volunteer?for?the?leader?position?
when? they?are? randomly? selected.?Women?are?elected?at?a?similar? rate? than?men.?Elected? female?
leaders? are? marginally? less? effective? than? their? male? counterparts,? especially? in? early? periods.?
However,?followers? learn,?and?the?gender?differences?disappear?with?history.?Since?elected? leaders?
are?more?effective?than?randomly?selected? leaders,?organizations?can?benefit? from?both?employee?
participation?in?choosing?group?leaders?and?reconsidering?gender?imbalance?in?top?level?positions.?
5.2?Related?Literature?
There?are?a?few?papers?that?are?closely?related?to?ours.?Recently,?Kanthak?and?Woon?(2014)?show?in?
a?political?science?study?that?women?succumb?to?“election?aversion”?already?at?the?time?of?candidate?
emergence,? and? this? election? aversion? is? part? of? the? explanation? for? the? underrepresentation? of?
women? in? legislative? bodies? and? top? political? positions.? In? the? study? by? Kanthak? and?Woon,? the?
abilities?of?participants?were?measured?using?a?problem?solving? task,?and?subsequently?candidates?
were? facing?an?electoral?competition.?Due? to? the?competitive?context,?women?might?have?had?an?
aversion?to?beat?others,?or?might?have?been?reluctant?to?enter?if?they?were?not?self?assured?to?win.?
The?authors? find?that?the?election?aversion?disappears? if?the?campaign? is?costless?and?transparent,?
thus?if?private?costs?are?reduced.?On?the?other?hand,?voters?do?not?seem?to?be?biased?when?voting?
for?the?best?performing?candidate.?Once?women?run,?they?get?elected?with?the?same?frequency?like?
men,?which?is?in?line?with?earlier?findings?in?literature?(Darcy?et?al.?1994;?Lau?and?Redlawsk?1997).?In?
our?study,?we?do?not?have?campaign?costs,?campaigns?are?transparent,?and?participants?prove?their?
abilities?through?the?leadership?task?which?is?to?send?a?message?to?the?group?and?get?followed.?With?
respect?to?the?campaign,?we?do?not?expect?to?find?any?gender?differences.?However,?other?factors?
might?affect?the?decision?to?volunteer,?like?the?responsibility?towards?the?group.?
Studying? leadership? by? example,? and? voluntary? contributions? in? a? public? good? game,? Arbak? and?
Villeval? (2013)? find? that?although?men?are?more? likely? to? lead,?women?with?high?contributions?are?
most? likely? to? volunteer? for? leadership? if? leader? selection? is? endogenous? and? attributes,? like?
generosity?and?gender,?are?hidden.?Kocher?et?al.?(2013)?find?that?leaders?who?focus?on?efficiency?are?
more? likely? to?exert? an? autocratic? leader? style,?while?elected? leaders? are?more? likely? to? lead? in? a?
democratic?style,?accommodating?other?regarding?preferences?even?if?the?preferences?of?others?are?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
59?More? recently,? gender? identity? models? have? been? used? as? theoretical? foundations.? According? to? the?
preference?based?discrimination?model?by?Akerlof?and?Kranton?(2000),?women?might?derive?a?disutility?from?
choosing?a?position?which? is? in?conflict?with?stereotype?behavioral?prescriptions?for?being?a?woman,? like,? for?
example,?only?men,?not?women?are? leaders.? If? such? thinking?exists?among?women,?we? should?observe? less?
women?running?for?the? leader?position.?According?to?the?pollution?theory?of?discrimination?by?Goldin?(2002),?
men?might?derive?utility?not?only?from?their?wages,?but?also?from?the?prestige?of?their?workplace?and?whom?
they?work?with.?If?female?participation?increases?in?a?male?dominated?field,?like?leadership,?this?would?reduce?
the?occupational?prestige?men?have?in?that?certain?field,?especially?if?productivity?is?not?directly?observable?by?
outsiders? whose? opinion? drives? stereotype? beliefs.? However,? in? our? study,? followers? can? observe? leader?
effectiveness,?which? can? help? in? overcoming? the? pollution? effect? of? stereotyping? as? productive? individuals?
might?not?shy?away? from?segregated?occupations?and? less?productive? individuals?would?not?enter?and?enter?
too?much?only?to?fulfill?stereotype?expectations.?
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at? odds? with? the? preferences? of? the? leader.? The? authors? also? find? that? male? leaders? use? the?
democratic?style?more?often? than? their? female?counterparts.? In?contrast,?Eagly?et?al.? (2003)?argue?
that? the? democratic?autocratic? classification? of? leadership? style? does? not? describe? the? leader’s?
behavior,? and? that? the? implications? for? leader? effectiveness? depend?more? on? the? organizational?
structure,?for?example,?whether?participation?in?decision?making?is?feasible?and?allowed?(Foels?et?al.?
2000;?Gastil?1994;?Vroom?and?Yetton?1973).?
Instead,? based? on? their? meta?analysis,? Eagly? et? al.? (2003)? classify? three? leadership? styles:?
transformational,? transactional,? and? laissez?faire? leadership? style.? Transformational? leaders? are?
future?oriented,? innovative? leaders,?who? empower? their? followers? to? contribute?more? capably? to?
their? organization.? They? often? act? as? role? models,? they? emphasize? the? importance? of? the?
organization’s?mission,?and?they?attend?to?the? individual?needs?of?their?followers,?focusing?on?their?
development?and?mentoring.60?Transformational? leaders,? in?our? context,?would?emphasize?mutual?
benefits?along?with?requesting?high?effort.?Transactional? leaders?appeal?to?the?self?interest?of?their?
followers? in?that?they?establish?exchange?relationships?with?them:?the?transactional? leader?clarifies?
the? followers’? responsibilities? and? rewards? followers? if? they?meet?objectives?or? corrects? them? for?
failing?to?meet?objectives.?In?the?context?of?our?study,?transactional?leaders?would?often?give?positive?
or?negative?feedback?and?attend?to?followers?more?often? if?coordination?fails.?Laissez?faire? leaders?
generally?fail?to?recognize?their?pivotal?role?and?fail?to?take?responsibility?for?managing.?In?our?study,?
this?type?would?either?send?no?message?or?only?banter,?without?trying?a?turnaround.?Eagly?et?al.?find?
that? leader? effectiveness? relates? positively? to? the? transformational? leadership? style? and? some?
components? of? the? transactional? leadership? style.? The? authors? show? small? gender? differences? in?
leadership?styles:?female?leaders?are?more?transformational?than?men.?These?findings?are?in?line?with?
earlier?research?findings?and?claims?of?a?female?leadership?advantage?(Sharpe?2000;?Bass?et?al.?1996;?
Lowe?et?al.?1996).?Later,?meta?analytic?reviews?of?Eagly?and?Johannesen?Schmidt?(2007)?and?Wang?et?
al.?(2011)?find?that?even?if?gender?differences?in?leadership?styles?are?small,?they?are?important:?the?
transformational? leadership? style? is? effective? in?most? organizational? contexts,? and? women,? who?
engage?in?such?leader?behavior,?gain?at?least?some?advantage.?
The?decision? to?volunteer? could?also?be?affected?by? the?attitude? towards? competitions,?especially?
under? the? election? procedure? when? voters? compare? candidates? to? each? other.61?According? to?
Niederle?and?Vesterlund? (2007),?men?might?prefer?competitions?more?than?women,?and? thus?they?
might? run? too? often? for? the? leader? position,? while? women? might? shy? away? from? the? more?
competitive?environment?under?the?election?procedure?even?though?that?volunteering?has?pecuniary?
benefits.?Using?an?experiment? in?which?group? leaders?compete?against?each?other? in?a? real?effort?
task?that?they?performed?in?the?past,?and?leader?selection?is?based?on?a?group?decision,?Reuben?et?al.?
(2012)? demonstrate? that? women? are? selected? less? often? as? leaders? than? is? suggested? by? their?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
60?Many?features?of?the?transformational?leadership?style?are?in?common?with?charismatic?leadership?(Conger?
and? Kanungo? 1998).? Antonakis? et? al.? (2015)? show? in? a? field? experiment? that? charismatic? speeches? have? a?
performance?effect:?workers?increase?their?costly?effort?input?and?generate?higher?firm?output.?
61?Irrespective? of? whether? there? are? more? candidates? under? the? election? procedure,? elections? might? be?
perceived?as?more?competitive?environments?due?to?the?social?interaction?between?leaders?and?the?“jury”?of?
voters.?
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individual?past?performance.?The?authors?find?that?the?overconfidence?of?men?drives?the?emergence?
of?male?leadership?in?competitive?environments.62?
We? start? our? analysis?with? the?main? election? effect? on?minimum? effort.? In? section? 5.5.1,?we?will?
decompose?the?election?effect?into?leader?and?follower?behavior.?After?this,?in?section?5.5.2,?we?will?
analyze?the?volunteering?behavior?and?the?chances?to?get?elected.?In?section?5.5.3?and?5.5.4,?we?will?
focus?on?voting?behavior?and?whether?any?saboteurs?are?among?followers.?
5.3?Experimental?Design?and?Procedures?
The?experimental?design?and?procedures?are?exactly?the?same?as?in?Chapter?4,?since?we?collected?the?
gender?data?during?the?same?experiment,?and?thus?we?do?not?repeat?the?description?of?the?design?
and?procedures.?
The?leader?selection?process?is?the?only?treatment?variation?in?this?study.?The?treatment?variation?is?
whether? the? leader? is? randomly? selected? (Random)? or? elected? by? the? group?members? (Election).?
Since? we? assign? participants? randomly? to? one? of? the? two? selection? procedures,? the? treatment?
variation?has?a?between?subjects?design.?Moreover,?we?study?the?gender?of?the?leader.?The?gender?
of? the? leader? is?used?as?an?additional?explanatory?variable.?However,? it? is?not?a?second? treatment?
variation,? since? leadership? positions? in? Election? are? assigned? endogenously? and? thus? the? leader’s?
gender?does?not?randomly?vary?across?the?groups.?
To? reveal? information? about? gender,?participants?have? to? choose? a?profile?picture? they? identified?
with.? This? occurred? after? they? consented? to? take? part? in? the? study? but? before? they? read? the?
instructions? to?avoid?strategic?selection?of?profile?pictures? (see?Figure?B1? in?Appendix?3B).?We?use?
profile? pictures? to? preserve? anonymity?whilst? revealing? gender.?We? opted? for? pictures? that? also?
contain?other?cues?such?as?race?and?hairstyles?to?distract?participants?from?discerning?the?purpose?of?
the?study?(Zizzo?2010),?which?can?potentially?lead?to?intentional?changes?in?behavior?(Camerer?2011).??
The?profile?pictures?and?the?group?internal?ID?numbers?were?the?only?information?that?could?be?used?
for? the?election?of? the? leader.? Importantly,?we?decided? to?provide?participants? in?both? treatments?
the? same? information:? in? both? Random? and? Election,? we? show? all? the? group?members’? profile?
pictures?to?everybody?in?the?group.?Participants?knew?from?the?instructions?of?Part?2?that?the?profile?
pictures?will?be?displayed.?
5.4?Predictions?
Our?main?interest?is?to?study?gender?differences?in?the?effectiveness?of?leaders,?in?the?chance?to?get?
elected,?and?in?the?volunteering?frequency.?We?propose?the?following?predictions:?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
62?Glass? and? Cook? (2016)? focus? their? study? on? the? conditions? under? which? women? are? promoted? to? top?
positions.? The? authors? find? that,? compared? to?men,?women? are?more? likely? to? be? promoted? if? the? leader?
position? is?highly? risky,? and? that? is,? if?previously? a?male? leader? failed? and? left? a?bad?history? for?his? female?
successor.?Consequentially,?the?female?leader?often?lacks?the?support?by?followers,?or?she?lacks?the?authority?
to?reach?her?strategic?goals,?which?in?turn?often?leads?to?repeated?failure.?
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Prediction?1:?Minimum?effort?in?Part?2?is?higher?with?male?leaders?than?with?female?leaders,?in?both?
Random?and?Election.?
Leader? effectiveness? has? two? channels:? leader? behavior? and? follower? behavior.? Earlier? laboratory?
experiments?using?the?weak?link?game?and?the?turnaround?game?already?show?that?communication?
from? the? leader? improves? coordination? (Blume? and? Ortmann? 2007;? Brandts? and? Cooper? 2007).?
Without?communication,? it? is? risky? to?choose? the?highest?effort? level,?and?groups? rarely? reach? the?
payoff?dominant?outcome?desired?by?everyone.?Communication?can?put? the?desired?outcome? into?
the?focus?of?all?group?members,?creating?the?expectation?that?the?highest?effort?level?will?be?chosen?
by? every? group?member,? and? consequentially? group?members? indeed? reliably? often? choose? level?
forty.?More?overconfident? leaders?will?tend?to?overestimate?the?number?of?their?followers?and?the?
success? of? their?messages,? and? therefore? they?will?more? often? use? their?messages? to? create? the?
highest?expectations.?Since?we?assume?that?men?are?more?overconfident,?as?evidence? in? literature?
proved?(Reuben?et?al.?2012),?we?expect?men?to?request?more?often?forty?than?women.63?
Concerning?follower?behavior,?we?assume?that?followers?might?attribute?more?leader?competence?to?
men,?or? think? that?others?might?be?more? likely? to? follow?men? rather? than?women,?or? both.?Our?
assumption?is?based?on?literature?that?revealed?evidence?about?biased?stereotype?beliefs?related?to?
leadership?and?gender.?According?to?Day? (2014)?and?Goldin? (2002),?some?of?the?stereotype?beliefs?
root? in?history,?since? leader?positions?have?traditionally?been?held?by?men,?and?thus? leadership?can?
be?considered?to?be?a?masculine?domain.?Moreover,?according?to?Grossman?et?al.?(2016),?followers?
are?more?likely?to?follow?men?than?women,?holding?leader?messages?constant.?Even?if?followers?do?
not? hold? biased? beliefs? themselves,? the? incentives? of? the? game? might? cause? them? to? act? in?
accordance?to?the?supposed?gender?bias?in?leader?credibility.?Based?on?this,?we?expect?followers?to?
follow?men?more? than?women,?especially? in?Random.? In?Election,?we?expect? the?gender?gap? to?be?
smaller,?since?elections?might?boost?leader?credibility?(Brandts?et?al.?2015)?irrespective?of?the?elected?
leader’s?gender?or?other?attributes?(Darcy?et?al.?1994;?Lau?and?Redlawsk?1997).?
Summing?up?our? expectations? about? leader? and? follower?behavior,?men?might?be?more? effective?
leaders,?measured?by?group?minimum?effort,?than?women,?in?both?Random?and?Election.?
Prediction?2:?Conditional?on?the?gender?rate?in?the?candidate?pool,?men?get?elected?more?often?than?
women.?
If?we? assume,? like? above,? that? followers? initially? attribute?more? leadership? competence? to?men?
rather?than?women,?men?will?initially?be?elected?more?often?than?women.?Moreover,?if?Prediction?1?
holds?and?men?are?more?effective? leaders?than?women,?men?will?be?continued?to?be?elected?more?
often?than?women?in?later?periods.?
Prediction?3:?Men?volunteer? for? the? leader?position?more?often? than?women,? in?both?Random?and?
Election.?The?gender?gap?in?volunteering?is?larger?in?Election.?
Initially,?if?we?assume?that?the?identity?theory?by?Akerlof?and?Kranton?(2000)?holds,?suggesting?that?
men?might?have?a?stronger?preference?for?the?leader?position?in?order?to?preserve?their?identity,?we?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
63?Based?on?earlier? results?by?Brandts?et?al.? (2015),?we?expect? that?elected? leaders?will?be?more?active? than?
randomly? selected? leaders,? that? is,? elected? leaders?will? send?more? often?messages?with? relevant? content,?
requesting?the?highest?effort.?
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expect?men?to?volunteer?more?often?than?women.?Since?elections?create?a?competitive?context,?we?
might?even?see?a?larger?gender?gap?in?volunteering? in?Election,?due?to?men?volunteering?too?much,?
or?women?acting?election?averse,?or?both?(Niederle?and?Vesterlund?2007;?Kanthak?and?Woon?2014).?
Similarly? in?later?periods,?if?we?assume?that?Prediction?1?holds,?men?will?volunteer?more?often?than?
women,?in?both?Random?and?Election.?
5.5?Results?
In? total,?145?participants? took?part? in? the? study,?of?which?70?were?male? and?75?were? female.? In?
Election,?we?had?70?participants,?of?which?34?were?male?and?36?were?female,?equally?balanced?in?14?
groups.? In?Random,?we?had?75?participants,?of?which?36?were?male?and?39?were? female,?equally?
balanced?in?15?groups.?For?the?gender?of?the?leader,?we?had?174?observations?in?total?from?repeated?
measurement?on?the?29?groups?in?6?selection?periods.?In?Election,?45?leader?positions?were?filled?by?
men,?37?by?women,?and?2?were?not?filled.?In?Random,?52?were?filled?by?men,?35?by?women,?and?3?
were?not?filled.?
First,?we?analyze?the?treatment?and?gender?effects?on?minimum?effort?and?its?channels,?leader?and?
follower?behavior.?Subsequently,?we?analyze?the?treatment?and?gender?effects?on?the?volunteering?
behavior,? the? chance? of? getting? elected,? the? voting? behavior,? and? whether? followers? sabotage?
leaders?they?did?not?vote?for.?
5.5.1?Election?Effect?on?Minimum?Effort?
Part? 1? of? the? game? reliably? induced? coordination? on? the? inefficient? equilibrium,? without? any?
difference?across?treatments.64?Figure?5.1?depicts?the?average?minimum?effort?in?each?period?of?Part?
2?by?treatment?and?gender?of?the?leader.?Graphically,?the?treatment?effect?is?larger?than?the?gender?
effect.?
Complementary? to? the? figure,? Table? 5.1? presents? the? regression? results? of? group?level? random?
effects?GLS?estimations?for?minimum?effort?in?each?period?from?9?to?26?as?the?dependent?variable,?
and? indicators? for?Election,?having?a? female? leader,?and?having?no? leader?as?explanatory?variables.?
Standard? errors? are? clustered? on? groups.?According? to?Model? 1,? compared? to? Random,? elections?
have?a?significant?average?effect?of?12.42.?On?average,?male?leaders?are?significantly?more?effective?
by?2.95?effort?units,?compared?to?female?leaders.?In?Model?2,?the?indicator?for?Election?is?interacted?
with? having? a? female? leader? and? having? no? leader.? In? Random,? the? gender? difference? in? leader?
effectiveness?diminishes?and?becomes? insignificant? (p?=?0.68).? In?Election,?men?are?by?5.93?effort?
units?significantly?more?effective?leaders?than?women?(p?=?0.04).?Compared?to?Random,?elected?men?
significantly? improve? in? leader?effectiveness?by?14.64?effort?units? (p?=?0.02),?while?elected?women?
improve?by?only?9.33?units,?which?is?only?close?to?significant?according?to?the?post?estimation?test?(p?
=?0.14).?Our?findings?remain?robust?if?we?use?fixed?effects?estimation.?
? ?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
64?Every?group?converged? to?zero?until?period?8.?Figure?5.1?does?not?contain?observations?prior? to?period?9,?
because?then?groups?had?no?leader?and?the?division?by?the?gender?of?the?leader?is?not?reasonable.?
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Figure?5.1? Average?minimum?effort?by?treatment?and?gender?of?the?leader?
?
?
Table?5.1? Election?effect?on?minimum?effort?and?gender?differences?
? Model?1? Model?2?
Without?interactions? With?interactions?
n?=?522? n?=?522?
Dependent?variable? Minimum?effort? Minimum?effort?
Elections? 12.42**?
(6.02)?
14.64**?
(6.20)?
Female?leader? ?2.95*?
(1.59)?
?
No?leader? ?3.25*?
(1.70)?
?
Random?female?leader? ? ?0.62?
(1.49)?
Elected?female?leader? ? ?5.93**?
(2.81)?
Random?no?leader? ? ?3.74?
(2.52)?
Elected?no?leader? ? ?3.87?
(2.48)?
Constant? 17.33***?
(4.62)?
16.44***?
(4.59)?
Notes.?For?the?estimations?we?use?group?level?random?effects?GLS?regressions?after?collapsing?the?
data?by?group?and?period.?Both?models?contain?522?observations?over?18?periods?and?29?groups.?
The? control? variable? for? no? leader? controls? for? the? cases? when? nobody? volunteered,? which?
happened? 3? times? in? Random,? and? 2? times? in? Election.? Standard? errors? (in? parentheses)? are?
corrected? for? clustering? at? the? group? level.? ***Statistically? significant? at? the? 1%? level,?
**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?
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Taking? a? closer? look? at? the? figure,?we?wondered?whether? the? difference? in? leader? effectiveness?
among? elected? men? and? women? is? driven? by? early? periods.?We? can? see? a? huge? difference? in?
minimum? effort? in? the? first? leadership? term,?but? in? later?periods? there?does?not? seem? to?be? any?
gender?difference.?We?repeatedly?ran?the?estimation?of?Model?2,?restricting?to?periods?after?period?
11.?We? indeed?find?that?gender?differences?diminish?and?become?insignificant.?In? later?periods,?the?
effectiveness?of?both?men?and?women?is?boosted?equally?by?elections.?We?conclude?as?follows.65?
Conclusion? 1:?We? find? partial? support? for? Prediction? 1.? Randomly? selected?men? and?women? are?
equally? effective? leaders.? Elected? men? are? initially? more? effective? leaders? than? elected? women?
because?elections?boost?the?effectiveness?of?male?leaders?more?in?initial?periods.?
5.5.1.1?Message?Sending?Behavior?
In? this? and? the? following? subsection,?we? decompose? the? treatment? and? gender? effects? by? their?
channels.?In?this?subsection?we?examine?the?leader?behavior?channel,?and?in?the?next?subsection?the?
follower? behavior? channel.? Leaders? could? send? free? form?message? content,?which?we? coded? as?
described? in?Chapter?4.?The? frequent?message?categories?of?our? interest?are:? forty,?assertive?style,?
being?part?of?the?group,?the?mutual?benefit?argument,?and?positive?emotional?content.?Table?A1? in?
Appendix?4A?contains?the?full?list?of?all?categories,?which?we?coded?as?binary:?variables?take?the?value?
of?1?if?the?message?contains?a?certain?category?and?0?otherwise.?
Men?and?women?are?equally?likely?to?request?forty?(in?Random:?p?=?0.72,?in?Election:?p?=?0.37),?to?use?
the?assertive?style?(in?Random:?p?=?0.71,?in?Election:?p?=?0.40),?to?express?being?part?of?the?group?(in?
Random:? p? =? 0.83,? in? Election:? p? =? 0.58),? to? argue?with?mutual? benefit? (in? Random:? p? =? 0.63,? in?
Election:?p?=?0.78),?and? to? send?positive?emotional? content? (in?Random:?p?=?0.39,? in?Election:?p?=?
0.64),? according? to? random? effects? GLS? regressions? on? message? content? with? treatment? and?
treatment?in?interaction?with?leader’s?gender?and?standard?errors?clustered?on?groups.?
Since? forty? is? correlated? with? the? other?message? content? variables,? we? could? combine? relevant?
categories?that?have?been?found?earlier?to?be?prerequisites?for?leaders’?success,?such?as?the?mutual?
benefit?argument?(Cooper?2007;?Brandts?et?al.?2015),?being?part?of?the?group,?and?positive?emotional?
content?(Eagly?et?al.?2003).66?Accordingly,?we?use?the?sum?of?the?codings?for?categories?forty,?mutual?
benefit?argument,?being?part?of? the?group,?and?positive?emotional?content?when?constructing? the?
variable? “relevant? content”.? Figure? 5.2? depicts? the? frequencies? of? suggesting? forty? and? relevant?
messages?in?each?selection?period?by?treatment?and?leader’s?gender.?Graphically,?elected?leaders?are?
more?active? than? randomly? selected? leaders,? in? the? sense? that? they? request?more?often? forty?and?
send? more? often? relevant? messages.? Gender? differences? are? not? consistent? across? treatments.?
Initially,?men?request?more?often? forty? than?women,?and? this?difference?seems? to?be?magnified? in?
Election,?when?women?request?forty?outstandingly?rarely.?On?the?other?hand,?elected?women?send?
relevant?messages?more?frequently?than?their?male?counterparts.?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
65?Since? participants? knew? the? gender? composition? of? their? groups,? we? also? tested? whether? the? gender?
composition? in? interaction?with?the?gender?of?the? leader?has?any?consistent?effect?on?minimum?effort?across?
treatments,?but?our?findings?were?negative.?
66?In?accordance?to?Eagly?et?al.?(2003),?we?could?interpret?expressions?of?being?part?of?the?group?as?a?feature?of?
the? transformational? leadership? style? and? positive? emotional? content? as? a? feature? of? the? transactional?
leadership?style.?
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Figure?5.2? Frequency?of?suggesting?forty?and?relevant?messages?by?leader?type?
Suggestions?of?forty? Relevant?message?
?
Using?random?effects?GLS?regressions,?we?analyze?the?treatment?and?gender?effects?on?message?use.?
Model? 3? in? Table? 5.2? presents? the? estimation? results.? The? dependent? variable? is? forty? and? the?
explanatory? variables? are? the? indicator? for? Election? and? the? interaction? of? Election? and? leader’s?
gender.?We?cluster?standard?errors?on?groups.?The?graphically?observed?difference?between?elected?
and?randomly?selected?leaders?suggesting?forty?is?driven?by?elected?male?leaders?reacting?stronger?to?
elections?than?female?leaders.?The?difference?between?elected?and?randomly?selected?male?leaders?
is?22?percentage?points? and? significant? (p? =?0.02).? The?difference?between? elected? and? randomly?
selected?female? leaders? is?only?8?percentage?points?and?not?significant? (p?=?0.56),?according?to?the?
post?estimation? test.? Graphically? we? can? see? that,? except? for? period? 9,? both? curves? for? elected?
leaders?are?strictly?above?the?two?curves?for?randomly?selected?leaders,?thus?both?elected?men?and?
women?react?quite?similarly?to?elections,?and?they?improve?with?the?increasing?credibility.67?
Although?not?reported?in?the?table,?we?repeat?the?same?analysis?from?above?for?relevant?messages?
as?the?dependent?variable.?Compared?to?Random,?both?male?and?female? leaders?are?more? likely?to?
send?relevant?messages?in?Election,?and?leaders?improve?to?the?same?extent.?The?difference?between?
elected?and?randomly?selected?male? leaders? is?15?percentage?points?and?significant?(p?=?0.07).?The?
difference? between? elected? and? randomly? selected? female? leaders? is? 17? percentage? points? and?
marginally?significant?(p?=?0.14),?according?to?the?post?estimation?test.68?Since?the?analyses?for?forty?
and? for? relevant? messages? yield? similar? results,? we? narrow? down? our? focus? in? the? subsequent?
sections?to?forty.?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
67?In?a?further?analysis,?we?extend?the?interaction?term?in?Model?3?with?additional?explanatory?variables?to?test?
possible? explanations? of? the? differences? in? suggesting? forty.?We? add? lagged? suggestions? of? forty? to? test?
whether?male?and?female?leaders?differ?in?their?persistence,?but?we?find?no?differences?in?effects.?If?we?extend?
the? interaction? terms?with? the? persistence? of? suggesting? forty? after? a? previous? failure,?we? find? no? gender?
differences?either.?Neither?does? the?gender?of? the?previous? leader,?nor? lagged?beliefs?about? the?number?of?
followers?distort?our?results.?We?only?find?that,?in?Random,?the?effects?of?beliefs?on?forty?are?significant?at?the?
10%?level,?without?any?gender?difference?and?with?coefficients?of?0.23?for?men?and?0.30?for?women,?whereas?
in?Election?beliefs?do?not?matter.?One?obvious?reason?for?this?might?be?that?elections?already?confirm?to?the?
leader?that?she?will?be?followed.?However,?it?remains?puzzling,?why?elected?women?do?not?request?forty?more?
often?in?period?9.?
68?The? further?analysis? for? relevant?messages?yields?similar? results? than? the?extended?analysis?conducted? for?
forty?(see?the?previous?footnote).?
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Table?5.2? Leader?behavior?and?its?effects?
? Model?3? Model?4?
n?=?169? n?=?522?
Dependent?variable? Forty? Minimum?effort?
Elections? 0.22**?
(0.10)?
5.76?
(6.69)?
Random?female?leader? 0.04?
(0.11)?
?
Elected?female?leader? ?0.10?
(0.11)?
?
Random?male?leader?
suggesting?forty?
? 11.03***?
(3.74)?
Random?female?leader?
suggesting?forty?
? 10.19***?
(3.94)?
Random?female?leader?
suggesting?else?than?forty?
? ?4.62?
(4.36)?
Elected?male?leader?
suggesting?forty?
? 16.82***?
(6.58)?
Elected?female?leader?
suggesting?forty?
? 14.75**?
(6.74)?
Elected?female?leader?
suggesting?else?than?forty?
? ?4.02?
(8.02)?
Random?no?leader? ? 6.35*?
(3.71)?
Elected?no?leader? ? 15.73**?
(6.56)?
Constant? 0.66***?
(0.08)?
9.30***?
(3.61)?
Notes.?For?the?estimation?of?Model?3?we?use?a?subject?level?random?effects?GLS?regression?after?
collapsing? the?data?by? subject?and? leadership? term.?For?Model?4?we?use?a?group?level? random?
effects? GLS? regression? after? collapsing? the? data? by? group? and? period.?Model? 3? contains? 169?
observations? of? leaders? over? 6? selection? periods? and? 29? groups.? Model? 4? contains? 522?
observations?over?18?periods?and?29?groups.?The?control?variable?for?no? leader?controls?for?the?
cases?when?nobody?volunteered,?which?happened?3?times?in?Random,?and?2?times?in?Election.?We?
excluded?these?cases?in?Model?3.?Standard?errors?(in?parentheses)?are?corrected?for?clustering?at?
the? group? level.? ***Statistically? significant? at? the?1%? level,? **statistically? significant? at? the? 5%?
level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?
5.5.1.2?Follower?Behavior?
This? section? analyzes? follower? behavior,? and?we? estimate? how?much? of? the? original? election? and?
gender?effect?on?minimum?effort? in?Model?1? is?explained?by? a?difference? in? leader?behavior? and?
follower?behavior? respectively.?Model?4? in?Table?5.2?estimates? the?effects?on?minimum?effort?and?
extends?the?interaction?term?in?Model?2?with?a?dummy?for?forty.?According?to?the?results?of?the?post?
estimation?tests,?we?find?no?differences?in?the?effects?of?forty?on?leader?effectiveness?depending?on?
the? leader’s?gender,?neither? in?Random? (p?=?0.76),?nor? in?Election? (p?=?0.33).?Men?and?women?are?
equally?credible?leaders.?
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Although?not?reported?in?the?table,?we?repeat?the?estimation?of?Model?4?to?analyze?dynamic?effects.?
If?we?restrict?the?estimation?to?periods?after?period?11,?we?find?that?the?above?results?remain?robust.?
For?periods?9?to?11,?we?find?that?our?results?remain?robust?for?Random,?but?they?differ?for?Election.?
Initially,?elected?male? leaders,?who? suggest? forty,? increase? the?group?minimum?effort?by?40?units,?
whereas?elected?female?leaders,?who?also?suggest?forty,?increase?the?group?minimum?effort?by?only?
21.11?units.?In?other?words,?initially?every?elected?male?leader,?who?suggests?forty,?is?followed?by?his?
group,? whereas? only? every? second? elected? female? leader,? who? suggests? forty,? is? followed.? The?
difference,?20?effort?units,? is? large?and?significant?(p?=?0.02).?Elections?boost?the?credibility?of?male?
leaders? initially?more?than?that?of?their?female?counterparts.?Holding?constant?that? leaders?suggest?
forty,?followers?initially?differentiate?between?their?leaders?based?on?gender.?
Next,?we?analyze?whether? followers?differentiate?between? their? leaders?based?on?gender? in? later?
periods,?but?after?a?previous?failure?period.?Effectiveness?of?a? leader?becomes? important?especially?
after?the?failure?of?a?previous? leader.?We?are?curious,?whether?followers?still?differentiate?between?
their? leaders,? if? the? previous? leader?was?unsuccessful? to? lead? the? group? to? the?highest? outcome,?
holding?constant?that?leaders?suggest?forty.?Figure?5.3?depicts?the?mean?minimum?effort?of?follower?
choices?by?treatment?and?gender?of?the?leader,?excluding?the?choices?of?leaders.?We?depict?the?cases?
when? leaders? suggested? forty,?versus?all?other?cases?when? leaders? sent?other? suggestions? than? to?
pick?forty.?We?exclude?cases?when?groups?had?no?leader,?and?we?restrict?the?analysis?to?cases?when?
previous?leaders?failed?to?achieve?the?highest?group?outcome?in?any?of?the?three?periods?during?their?
leadership?term.?
Figure?5.3? Effect?of?suggesting?forty?by?treatment?and?gender?of?the?leader?
Random?selection? Election?
Note.?Observations?include?all?periods?with?lagged?three?periodic?average?minimum?effort?less?than?
level?40.?
?
The?figure?shows?a?gender?gap?in?credibility?in?case?of?elected?leaders?who?suggest?forty.?In?Election,?
male?leaders,?who?suggest?forty,?are?followed?to?an?extent?significantly?greater?by?7.63?effort?units,?
compared? to? their? female? counterparts? (p? =? 0.08).69?In? Random,?male? and? female? leaders,? who?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
69?Post?estimation?test?results?after?group?level?random?effects?GLS?regression?for?followers’?minimum?effort.?
The?regression?uses? the? indicator? for?Election,? the? interaction?of?Election,? leader’s?gender,?and?a?dummy? for?
forty,?and?the?interaction?of?Election?and?a?dummy?for?having?no?leader?as?explanatory?variables.?We?exclude?
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suggest? forty,?are? followed? to? the? same?extent? (p?=?0.32).? In?a? further?analysis,?we?add? followers’?
beliefs? about? the? number? of? other? group? members? following? the? leader? to? the? explanatory?
interaction?term?(not?reported?in?a?table).70?Holding?follower?beliefs?and?leader?suggestions?constant,?
the?gender?gap?in?Election?loses?significance,?suggesting?that?it?might?be?followers’?beliefs?about?the?
action?of?others?that?drives?the?gender?effect?in?credibility.?
To? estimate?how?much?of? the? total? gender? effect? in? Election? is? explained?by? leader? and? follower?
behavior?respectively,?we?run?a?total?effect?decomposition?analysis?based?on?the?random?effects?GLS?
estimation?of?Model?1.?We?bootstrap?our?results?to?estimate?standard?errors?and?significances?of?the?
effect?sizes.?The?total?effect?size?is??5.31,?with?a?bootstrapped?standard?error?of?2.61,?and?a?p?value?
of?0.04.?This?means?that?compared?to?women,?elections?significantly?boost?the?leader?effectiveness?
of?men?by?5.31?effort?units.?Nearly?half?of?the?total?effect?is?a?direct?effect?on?follower?behavior.?The?
direct?effect?has?a?size?of??2.51,?with?a?bootstrapped?standard?error?of?2.65,?and?a?p?value?of?0.34.?
Seemingly,? followers?do?not?believe? that? female? leaders?suggesting? forty?succeed? likewise? to?male?
leaders?suggesting?the?same,?and?thus?they?follow?female?leaders?less.?
A?little?bit?more?than?half?(53%)?of?the?total?effect?is?mediated?through?leader?behavior.?The?size?of?
the?indirect?effect?is??2.80,?with?a?bootstrapped?standard?error?of?2.86,?and?a?p?value?of?0.33.?Initially,?
elected?women?react?in?a?strong?negative?direction?to?their?electoral?success:?they?suggest?forty?less?
often?than?their?male?counterparts.?It?remains?an?open?question?why?women?behave?like?this.?They?
might?have?experienced?a?negative?arousal?during?the?election?procedure,?which?might?have?had?an?
effect?still?after?they?won,?so?that?they?became?less?confident?when?making?suggestions.?In?period?9,?
the?average?number?of?candidates?was?3.7,?so?that?competition?has?rather?high.?If?such?an?elevated?
arousal? was? present,? the? body? reaction? is? easily? measurable.71?Alternatively,? women? might? be?
positively?aroused?after?winning,?and?as?a?consequence,?they?might?feel?an? increased?responsibility?
towards?each?individual?in?their?group.?Instead?of?governing?the?group?as?a?whole?towards?the?most?
efficient?equilibrium,?they?might?try?more?often?to?lower?the?risk?of?each?individual?by?suggesting?an?
effort? level?below?forty.?Anyway,?over?time,?elected?male?and?female? leaders?do?not?differ? in?their?
message?sending?behavior.?
Over?time?followers?differentiate?less?between?their?leaders?based?on?gender,?so?that?we?observe?a?
learning? effect,? despite? the? strong? history? dependence? of? the? turnaround? game.? Still,? it? remains?
puzzling?why?followers?initially?differentiate?between?leaders,?especially?if?we?take?into?account?that?
leaders?were?elected?exactly?by?the?same?followers?who?later?differentiate?between?them.?In?section?
5.5.4?we?investigate?whether?followers?use?sabotage?against?leaders?they?did?not?vote?for.?
5.5.2?Volunteering?and?Chance?of?Getting?Elected?
This? section? investigates? the? volunteering? frequency? of? participants? and? selection? outcomes? by?
treatment? and? gender.? Figure? 5.4? shows? the? results? at? a? glance.? First,?we? calculate? the? rational?
amount?of?volunteering?in?each?treatment?given?the?incentives?for?the?volunteering?decision?and?the?
observed?effect?of? leadership.?For?the?observed?effect?of? leadership?we?calculate?the?difference? in?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
cases?when? the? group?minimum?effort?was? less? than? forty? in? any?of? the? three?periods?during? the?previous?
leadership?term.?Standard?errors?are?clustered?on?groups?(not?reported?in?a?table).?
70?For?more?details?about?the?belief?elicitation?see?the?procedures?in?Appendix?3B.?
71?Measurement?is?possible,?for?example,?using?skin?conductance?or?heart?rate?variability?measures.?
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average? earnings? between? Part? 1? and? Part? 2? in? each? treatment.? In? the? best? case? scenario,? the?
observed?effect?of?leadership?lasts?during?the?three?periods?of?the?leadership?term,?so?that?the?effect?
can?be?multiplied?by?3.?We? substitute? the? resulting?values? into?Equation?2? in?Appendix?3A,?which?
yields? the? rational? volunteering? frequencies? 0.54? in? Election? and? 0.51? in? Random.? Expressed? in?
number? of? candidates,? the? pecuniary? benefits? benchmark? in? Election? is? 2.7? candidates? and? in?
Random?2.55?candidates.?Entry?for?the?leader?position?above?the?pecuniary?benefits?is?more?likely?in?
Random,? and? it? is? driven? by?men? entering? too?much.? Initial? entry? above? the? pecuniary? benefits?
decreases? over? time? for? both? men? and? women? in? both? Random? and? Election,? and? the? curves?
approach?the?respective?benchmarks.?Except? in?case?of?men? in?Random,?the?curves?even?go?below?
the? respective? benchmarks.? Selection? outcomes? vary?more? over? time? in? Election,? and?men? and?
women?seem?to?have?equal?chances?to?win?elections,?conditional?on?volunteering.?
Figure?5.4? Volunteering?frequency?and?selection?outcomes?by?treatment?and?gender?
Volunteering?frequency? Selection?outcomes?
Note.?Selection?outcomes?are?depicted?conditional?on?volunteering.?
?
Additionally,?we?look?at?the?gender?distribution?of?selection?outcomes?by?treatment?and?irrespective?
of?volunteering,?since?we?are?curious?whether?elections?increase?the?proportion?of?female?leaders.?In?
Election,?44%?of?all?leader?positions?are?filled?by?women,?whereas?in?Random,?slightly?less,?only?39%?
of?all?leader?positions?are?filled?by?women.72?
To? put? our? graphical? analysis? on? a? statistically?more? solid? ground,? we? run? random? effects? GLS?
regressions?for?volunteering?and?being?a?leader?respectively.?Explanatory?variables?are?the?indicator?
for?Election?and?the?interaction?of?Election?and?gender?of?the?subject.?Standard?errors?are?clustered?
on?groups.?Table?5.3?presents? the?estimations.?Volunteering,? in?Model?5,? is?a?binary?variable? that?
takes?the?value?of?1?if?the?subject?runs?for?the?leader?position?and?0?otherwise.?We?find?that?men?in?
Random?volunteer?by?0.16?significantly?more?often?than?men? in?Election? (p?=?0.02).? In?Election,?we?
find?no?difference?in?volunteering?between?men?and?women,?neither?in?magnitude,?nor?in?terms?of?
significance?(p?=?0.92).?In?contrast,?in?Random,?men?are?by?0.15?significantly?more?likely?to?run?than?
women?(p?=?0.01).?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
72?During? the?6?selection?periods,? the?14?groups? in?Election?had?84?open? leader?positions,?of?which?45?were?
filled?by?men,?37?by?women,?and?2?were?not?filled.?The?15?groups?in?Random?had?90?open?leader?positions,?of?
which?52?were? filled?by?men,?35?by?women,? and? 3?were?not? filled.? In?period? 9,? the? gender?distribution? in?
Election?was?balanced:?7?female?and?7?male?leaders?were?elected.?
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Table?5.3? Volunteering?frequency?and?selection?outcomes?
? Model?5? Model?6?
n?=?870? n?=?456?
Dependent?variable? Volunteering? Being?leader?
(conditional?on?volunteering)?
Elections? ?0.16**?
(0.07)?
0.07?
(0.07)?
Female?in?Random? ?0.15***?
(0.06)?
?0.08?
(0.07)?
Female?in?Election? ?0.01?
(0.08)?
?0.10?
(0.11)?
Constant? 0.64***?
(0.04)?
0.37***?
(0.04)?
Notes.?For? the?estimations?we?use?subject?level? random?effects?GLS? regressions?after?collapsing? the?data?by?
subject?and?leadership?term.?Both?models?are?clustered?into?29?groups.?Model?5?contains?870?observations?of?
145?subjects?over?6?selection?periods.?Model?6?contains?456?observations?over?6?selection?periods?of?subjects?
who? volunteered.? Standard? errors? (in? parentheses)? are? corrected? for? clustering? at? the? group? level.?
***Statistically?significant?at?the?1%?level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?
the?10%?level.?
?
How? can?we? explain? the? observed? volunteering? behavior?? Originally?we? hypothesized? that?men?
might?have?a?stronger?preference? for? the? leader?position,?but?we?do?not?observe?an? initial?gender?
difference? in?the?volunteering?frequency?between?men?and?women.?Thus,?we?rule?this?explanation?
out.?We? also? hypothesized? that? women? would? shy? away? from? volunteering,? while? men? would?
volunteer?too?much?in?Election,?but?in?fact?we?find?no?gender?difference.?Thus,?we?also?rule?out?this?
second?explanation?related?to?underlying?gender?differences?in?preferences.73?Our?third?expectation?
was?that?gender?differences? in? leader?effectiveness?might?drive?the?decisions?to?run?for?the? leader?
position.?We?find?support?for?this?expectation?in?Election,?as?the?overall?gender?difference?in?leader?
effectiveness? is? small? and?men? and? women? are? equally? likely? to? volunteer.? However,? this? third?
expectation?does?not?apply?in?Random,?when?men?and?women?are?equally?effective?leaders?and?we?
still?find?a?gender?difference?in?volunteering.?
Another?possible?explanation?for?men?entering?above?the?pecuniary?benefits?benchmark?in?Random?
is? that? they?might? underestimate? the? number? of? competing? candidates.? Since?we? elicited? beliefs?
about?the?number?of?candidates,?we?can?test?this?possibility?by?adding?beliefs?to?the?interaction?term?
in?Model?5.74?Model?5A? in?Table?A2? in?Appendix?4A?contains?our?estimation?using?a?random?effects?
GLS? regression?clustering?standard?errors?on?groups.?We? find? that?beliefs?have?positive?and?highly?
significant?effects?on?the?decision?to?volunteer.?The?more?a?participant?believes?others?will?volunteer,?
the?more?he?is?willing?to?volunteer?too.?In?other?words,?the?participant?might?view?volunteering?as?a?
contribution? to? the? public? good?of?having? a? leader?who? achieves?more? efficient?outcomes? for? all?
group?members,?and?the?more?others?contribute?too,?the?more?willing?he?is?to?contribute?as?well,?as?
others?observe?candidacy.?When? looking?at?the?differences? in?the?effects?of?beliefs?on?volunteering?
between? men? and? women,? we? find? almost? equal? effects? in? Election,? which? is? in? line? with? the?
observed?volunteering?behavior?(p?=?0.97).?Men?and?women?seem?to?be?equally?willing?to?contribute?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
73?When?asked?directly? in? the? final?questionnaire,?men?and?women?do?not?differ? in? their?preference? for? the?
leader?position?across?treatments.?
74?For?more?details?about?the?belief?elicitation?see?the?procedures?in?Appendix?3B.?
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to? the? public? good? of? having? a? beneficial? leader.? In? contrast,? in? Random,? the? effect? of? beliefs? in?
volunteering? is? 0.42? for?men? and? 0.25? for?women,? and? the? result? of? the? post?estimation? test? is?
significant?(p?=?0.02).?In?other?words,?men?are?more?willing?than?women?to?contribute?to?the?public?
good.?These? findings?are? in? line?with? literature.?Kocher?et?al.? (2013)? find? that?elected? leaders?are?
more? likely? to?accommodate?other?regarding?preferences?even? if? the?preferences?of?others?are?at?
odds?with?the?preferences?of?the?leader.?Moreover,?the?authors?also?find?that?this?holds?stronger?for?
male? leaders? compared? to? female? leaders.?Our? findings? support? the? view? that? initially?men? and?
women? are? equally?willing? to? contribute? to? the? public? good,? even? above? the? pecuniary? benefits?
benchmark.? In? later?periods,? repeated?elections?or?better?group?performance? in?Election?decrease?
the?willingness?to?contribute?to?the?public?good.?In?Random,?men?keep?their?willingness?to?volunteer,?
while?the?willingness?of?women?decreases?below?the?pecuniary?benefits?benchmark?after?observing?
the?overall?high?volunteering?frequency.?
What? remains? is? to?disentangle?whether? the?volunteering?behavior?decreases?due? to?an? improved?
group? history,?which?makes? it? less? necessary? to? contribute? to? the? public? good,? or? reelections? of?
successful? leaders.?The? latter?we?are?going?to?analyze?after?Conclusion?2? in?this?section.?We?extend?
Model? 5? by? adding? group? history? to? the? interaction? term.?Model? 5B? in? Table?A2? in?Appendix? 4A?
contains?our?estimation?using?a?random?effects?GLS?regression?clustering?standard?errors?on?groups.?
For?group?history?we?use? the?average?group?minimum?effort?of? the? three?periods? in? the?previous?
leadership?term.?A?one?unit?change? in?group?history? indicates?a?change?of?10?effort? level?units,?for?
example,? an? increase? from? effort? level? 0? to? 10.?Group? history? has? significant? negative? effects? on?
volunteering.?The?more?the?group?history? improves,?the?fewer?participants?volunteer.?For?example,?
the? coefficient? of? the? history? effect? for? men? in? Election? means? that? a? participant? decreases?
volunteering?by?0.08? if? the? group?had? an? average?minimum?effort? increase?of?10? in? the?previous?
three?periods.?The?history?effects?in?Random?are?almost?identical?for?men?and?women,?so?the?result?
of?the?post?estimation?test?is?far?from?significant?(p?=?0.93).?The?same?holds?for?the?history?effects?in?
Election? (p? =? 0.78).? Thus,? the? effect? of? group? history? has? the? same? impact? on? the? volunteering?
decision?of?men?and?women,?and?does?not?help?us?understanding?the?gender?difference?in?Random.?
At? least? we? find? that? the? history? effects? are? slightly? larger? in? Election,? the? result? of? the? post?
estimation?test?comparing?treatments?is?close?to?significance?(p?=?0.17).?Combined?with?better?group?
history? in? Election,? this? might? be? a? hint? that? group? history? has? a? regulatory? effect? driving? the?
volunteering?frequency?closer?to?the?pecuniary?benefits?benchmark.?
We? complete? our? analysis? by? investigating? the? volunteering? behavior? of? previous? leaders? and?
followers.?Do?female? leaders?volunteer?repeatedly?or?do?they?give?up?more?easily?after?failure??We?
are?curious?whether?women?give?up?more?easily? than?men?after? they?have?not?been?selected?and?
remained?followers,?or?after?they?failed?as?leaders?previously.?First,?we?extend?Model?5?by?adding?to?
the? interaction? term? the?previous?volunteering,? the?previous? leadership,?and? the?previous?success.?
For?this,?we?use?dummies?whether?the?subject?volunteered?in?the?previous?selection?period,?whether?
the? subject?was?a? leader? in? the?previous? term,?and?whether? the?group?was? successful? in? the? first?
period? of? the? previous? term.? Table? A3? in? Appendix? 4A? contains? post?estimation? test? results? and?
estimation?results?using?a?random?effects?GLS?regression?clustering?standard?errors?on?groups.?
For? Random? we? find? the? following:? Men? and? women,? who? did? not? volunteer? previously,? will?
volunteer? less? if? the?group?became? successful.?There? is?no?gender?difference? in? the?proportion?of?
“passive”? followers.? If? the?group? failed,?women?who?did?not?volunteer?previously?are?by?0.38? less?
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likely?to?volunteer?than?men?who?did?not?volunteer?previously?(p?=?0.00).?This?means?that?“passive”?
men,? compared? to? “passive”?women,?will? increase?more? their? contribution? to? the?public? good?of?
having? a? leader? who? might? turn? around? the? bad? group? history.? If? the? group? failed,? men? who?
volunteered?previously,?but?were?not?selected,?will?not?change?their?volunteering?behavior?and?thus?
volunteer?again,?while? their? female?counterparts?will?volunteer? somewhat? less? from?one? selection?
period? to? the? next.? This? gender? difference? is? close? to? significance? (p? =? 0.11).? If? the? group? was?
successful,?men?and?women?who?volunteered?previously?but?did?not?get?selected?will?volunteer?less.?
The? gender? difference? between? them? is? negligible? and? not? significant.? Previous? leaders? do? not?
change?their?volunteering?behavior.?No?matter? if?they?failed?or?were?successful,?they?will?volunteer?
again,?and?men?and?women?do?not?differ?in?this?respect.?
For?Election?we?find?the?following:?Men?and?women,?who?did?not?volunteer?previously,?will?volunteer?
slightly? less? if? the?group?became?successful,?without?any?gender?difference? in?effects.? If? the?group?
failed,?women?who?did?not?volunteer?previously?are?by?0.16?less?likely?to?volunteer?than?their?male?
counterparts? (p? =? 0.04).? However,? this? gender? difference? is? smaller? and? less? significant? than? in?
Random.?This?means?that?elections?make?“passive”?women?relatively?more?willing?to?contribute?to?
the?public?good?of?having?a?leader?who?might?turn?around?the?bad?group?history.?If?the?group?failed,?
both? men? and? women? who? volunteered? previously,? but? were? not? selected,? will? increase? their?
volunteering? frequency? significantly?and?without?any?gender?difference.?This?means? that?elections?
increase?the?willingness?to?contribute?to? leadership,?especially?after?groups?fail?and?the?need?for?a?
good?leader?increases.?If?the?group?was?successful,?men?and?women?who?volunteered?previously?but?
did?not?get?selected?do?not?alter?their?volunteering?behavior,?and?there? is?no?gender?difference? in?
this? respect?between? them.?Previous? leaders,?who?became? successful,? increase? their?volunteering?
behavior,?without?any?gender?difference? in?this?respect.?Previous? leaders,?who?failed,?also? increase?
their? volunteering? behavior,? but?men? and? women? differ? significantly? (p? =? 0.06)? in? this? respect.?
Women?increase?their?volunteering?frequency?by?0.45,?which?is?significant?at?the?1%?level,?whereas?
men?increase?by?only?0.16,?which?is?not?significant.?
Second,?we?extend?Model?5?by?adding?to?the?interaction?term?the?gender?of?the?previous?leader?and?
the?previous?success.?For?this?we?use?dummies?for?the?gender?of?the?leader?in?the?previous?term?and?
whether?the?group?was?successful?in?the?first?period?of?the?previous?term.?Table?A4?in?Appendix?4A?
contains?post?estimation? test?results?and?estimation?results?using?a?random?effects?GLS?regression?
clustering? standard?errors?on?groups.?We?are? curious,?whether? the?gender?of? the?previous? leader?
influences?the?volunteering?behavior,?especially?when?the?previous? leader?failed.?Further,?we?focus?
on?Election,?because?voters?can?have?some?influence?on?who?becomes?a?leader,?thus?beliefs?related?
to?this?fact?might?affect?the?decision?to?volunteer.?
If?the?subject?was?a?man,?he?does?not?change?his?volunteering?behavior?based?on?the?gender?of?the?
previous? leader,? if? this? leader? failed.? If? the? previous? leader? became? successful,?men? significantly?
decrease?their?volunteering?frequency,?as?it?becomes?less?necessary?to?contribute?to?the?public?good?
of?leadership.?On?top?of?that,?men?seem?to?be?chivalrous?to?previously?successful?female?leaders,?as?
they? decrease? their? volunteering? significantly?more? than? in? case? of? successful?male? leaders.? The?
coefficient?in?case?of?a?previously?successful?female?leader?is??0.49,?significant?at?the?1%?level,?and?in?
case?of?similar?male? leaders? it? is??0.20,?significant?at?the?10%? level.?The?result?of?the?corresponding?
post?estimation?test?is?significant?at?the?1%?level.?
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If?the?subject?was?a?woman,?she?does?not?change?her?volunteering?behavior?if?the?previously?failed?
leader?was?male.?However,?if?the?previously?failed?leader?was?female,?women?slightly?decrease?their?
volunteering? frequency? by? 0.13.? Although? this? coefficient? is? not? significant,? the? effects? differ?
significantly?at?the?10%? level.? It?seems?that?women?who?observed?or?experienced?failure?of?female?
leadership?become?slightly?reluctant?to?run?for?the?leadership?position.?
In? sum,? elections? relatively? boost? the?willingness? of?women? to? contribute? to? the? public? good? of?
having?a?leader,?especially?after?failure?periods.?Elected?female?leaders,?whose?groups?decreased?in?
performance,? seem? to? take? responsibility? and? volunteer? again? more? often? than? their? male?
counterparts,?although?women?who?observed?or?experienced? failure?of? female? leadership?become?
slightly?reluctant?to?run?for?the?leadership?position.?We?conclude?as?follows.?
Conclusion? 2:?We? find? support? for?Prediction?3? in?Random.?Men? run? for? the? leader?position?more?
often? than?women.? Since?men? volunteer?more?often? than? the?pecuniary?benefits?benchmark,? they?
might?be?more?willing? to?contribute? to? the?public?good?of?having?a?beneficial? leader,?compared? to?
others?who?contribute? less?over? time.?We? find?no? support? for?Prediction?3? in?Election,?as?men?and?
women? volunteer? equally? often.? The? higher? leader? effectiveness? in? Election? is? likely? to? drive? the?
volunteering?frequency?close?to?and?even?below?the?pecuniary?benefits?benchmark.?
Next,?we?analyze?the?chance?of?getting?elected.?Do?men?and?women?have?different?chances?to?get?
elected??Originally,?we?predicted?that?conditional?on?the?gender?rate?in?the?candidate?pool,?men?will?
be? elected? more? often? than? women.? For? the? estimation? we? restrict? our? data? to? subjects? who?
volunteered?and?use?a?random?effects?GLS?regression?clustering?standard?errors?on?groups.?Model?6?
in?Table?5.3?contains?the?estimation?of?being?a?leader,?conditional?on?volunteering,?as?the?dependent?
variable.?Being?a? leader? is?a?binary?variable?that?takes?the?value?of?1? if?the?subject? is?elected?as?the?
leader?and?0?otherwise.?Explanatory?variables?are? the? indicator? for?Election?and? the? interaction?of?
Election?and?gender?of? the?subject.?We? find?no?significant?differences? in? the?effects?of?becoming?a?
leader? between?men? and?women? across? treatments.?Women? are? slightly? less? likely? than?men? to?
become?a?leader,?but?these?results?are?far?from?significant?in?both?Random?(p?=?0.30),?and?Election?(p?
=?0.37).?Men?and?women?are?equally?likely?to?become?leaders?in?both?treatments.?
The?results?of?the?chance?to?become?a?leader?are?not?surprising?for?Random.?In?case?of?Election,?we?
originally?speculated?about? two?possible?explanations?of? the?outcomes.?First,?voters?might? initially?
attribute? more? leadership? competence? to? men? than? to? women,? and? second,? if? men? are? more?
effective?leaders,?then?men?will?be?continued?to?be?elected?more?often?than?women?in?later?periods.?
Although?we?find?that?elected?male?leaders?are?slightly?more?effective?than?elected?female?leaders,?
this?difference?does?not?seem?to?matter?for?voters?and?the?election?outcomes.?If?we?extend?Model?6?
by?adding?group?history,?the?results?remain?unchanged.?An? improving?group?history?does?not?alter?
differently?the?chances?of?men?and?women?to?become?a? leader.?Further,?based?on?our?results,?we?
also?rule?out?that?voters?might?hold?stereotype?beliefs?about?men?being?more?competent.75?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
75?In?the?final?questionnaire,?we?asked?participants?to?rate?the?chance?of?hypothetical?group?members?to?win?
elections? (see? the? procedures? in?Appendix? 3B).?We?had? three? different? scenarios.? In? the? first? scenario,?we?
showed?one?female?and?two?male?candidates.?Subjects?rated?that?the?candidates?have?equal?chances?to?win?an?
election:?the?chance?that?the?leader?would?be?female?was?rated?as?30%,?and?the?chance?to?have?a?male?leader?
was? rated?as?70%.? In? the? second? scenario,?we? showed? two? female?and?one?male? candidate.?Subjects? rated?
higher?chances?for?the?sole?male?candidate?to?win?an?election:?they?rated?40%?for?a?male?leader?and?60%?for?a?
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Are?women? challenged?more? during? elections??We? investigate?whether? persistent?women,?who?
repeatedly?volunteer?after?not?having?been?elected,?or?after?unsuccessful?leadership,?are?challenged?
more? than?men?during?elections.?We? extend?Model?6,? and? add? to? the? interaction? term?dummies?
whether?the?subject?volunteered? in?the?previous?selection?period,?whether?the?subject?was?elected?
in?the?previous?selection?period,?whether?the?previous?leader?was?female,?and?whether?the?previous?
leader?was? successful.? Thus,?we? analyze? sequential? reelection? from? one? selection? period? to? the?
next.76?Table? A5? in? Appendix? 4A? contains? post?estimation? test? results? and? estimation? results? of?
random?effects?GLS?regressions?clustering?standard?errors?on?groups.?We?focus?on?Election.?
Among? followers,? both?men? and?women? have? decreasing? chances? to? get? elected? during? a? new?
selection? period? after? the? group?was? lead? by? a?male? or? female? leader?who? failed? or? succeeded.?
Gender? differences? in? these? effects? are? far? from? significant.? Seemingly,? voters? do? not? connect? a?
change? in? the? gender? of? the? leader?with? a? change? in? equilibrium? outcomes.77?Among? successful?
leaders,?the?chance?to?get?reelected?does?not?change,?neither?for?men,?nor?women.?The?only?gender?
difference? that? we? reveal? is? among? unsuccessful? leaders.? Both? male? and? female? leaders? have?
decreasing? chances? to? get? reelected? after? they? failed,?but? the? effect? is?much? stronger? for? female?
leaders,?who? are? less? likely? to? get? reelected? than? their?male? counterparts.? The?magnitude?of? the?
difference?is?0.43?and?significant?(p?=?0.03).?
If?we?interpret?votes?as?evaluations?of?previous?leader?performance,?then?our?results?point?to?voters?
evaluating? female? leaders?who? failed?harsher? than?male? leaders?who? failed.?Of?course,? in?order? to?
make?such?a?statement,?we?have?to?decompose?the?observed?effects?by?the?messages?sent.?Table?A5?
in?Appendix?4A?contains? the?modified?estimation.?The?new?explanatory?variables?are? the? indicator?
for? Election? and? the? interaction? of? Election?with? the? subject’s? gender? and? dummies?whether? the?
subject?was?elected? in? the?previous? selection?period,?whether? the?previous? leader?was? successful,?
and?whether?the?suggestion?was?forty.?We?find,? if?the?failed? leaders?suggested?forty,?the?chance?to?
get?reelected?still?increases?for?men?(0.12),?whereas?women?lose?much?of?their?reelection?chance?(?
0.34),?and? the?difference?between? these?effects? is? significant?at? the?1%? level.? If? the? failed? leaders?
suggested?to?choose?an?effort?level?else?than?forty,?men?do?not?lose?of?their?reelection?chance?(0.01),?
but?women?do?(?0.32),?although,?the?difference?between?these?effects?is?not?significant?any?more.?It?
seems?that?unsuccessful?women?are?evaluated?more?harshly,?even?if?the?coordination?failure?cannot?
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female? leader.?There?were?no?differences? in? the? ratings?by?subject?gender.?Opinions?suggest? that?men?have?
better?chances?to?get?elected,?especially?if?there?are?fewer?men?in?the?candidate?pool.?In?the?third?scenario,?we?
showed?one? female?and?one?male? candidate.?Women? rated?equal? chances? for?both? candidates.?Men? rated?
higher?chances?for?the?male?candidate:?they?rated?60%? for?a?male? leader?and?40%? for?a?female? leader.?Men?
think? that? they?have? slightly?higher?chances? to?win?elections? than?women,?whereas?women? think? that?both?
genders? have? equal? chances.? Of? course,? we? cannot? know? how? subject? responses? and? perceptions? are?
influenced?by?their?experience?in?the?game.?However,?the?stereotype?beliefs?do?not?seem?to?be?strongly?biased,?
which? is? in? line?with?men?and?women?volunteering?equally?often? in?Election?and?having?equal?chances?to?get?
elected.?
76?We? also? analyze? reelection? in? any? period,? taking? into? account? any? previous? leadership? position? and?
successfulness?of?the?leader.?For?example,?it?might?be?that?the?successor?of?a?successful?leader?“A”?was?leader?
“B”? in?the?subsequent? term,?and?two?terms? later? leader?“A”?was?reelected.?Although?we?ran? this?analysis,? it?
does?not?add?much?additional?insights.?
77?Glass? and? Cook? (2016)? find? that? the? opposite? gender? of? the? leader? can? signal? a? higher? possibility? of?
implementing? a? change? in? outcomes? as? well,? especially? after? a? previously? failed? leadership,? when? the?
turnaround?is?more?risky.?
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be?attributed? to? their? leader?behavior,?but? rather? to? followers?who?prove? the?stereotype?belief?of?
men?being?better?leaders?(Ridgeway?2001;?Glass?and?Cook?2016;?Grossman?et?al.?2016).78?
Conclusion?3:?We?find?no?support?for?Prediction?2.?Conditional?on?the?gender?rate? in?the?candidate?
pool,?men?and?women?have?equal? chances? to?get?elected.? In?general,? followers?do?not? stereotype?
between? genders?when? voting.? The? slight? difference? in? leader? effectiveness? does? not? give? rise? for?
voters? to? differentiate? among? candidates? based? on? their? gender.? We? find? some? traces? of?
discrimination? concerning? reelection?of?unsuccessful? leaders:?men?are?more? likely? to?get?a? second?
chance,?whereas?women?seem?to?reinforce?negative?stereotype?beliefs,? irrespective?of?the?message?
sent.?
5.5.3?Voting?Behavior?
In?the?previous?section?we?got?the?hint?that?women?might?get?fewer?votes?than?men,?especially?after?
a? previous? leadership? failure.?We? are? curious,?whether? there? is? a? bias? in? the? voting? behavior? of?
subjects.?Who?does? the? subject? vote? for,? given? the? gender?of? the? subject?? Is? loyalty? to? a? leader,?
reelection? dependent? on? subject? gender?? Since? group? members? could? observe? the? gender?
composition? of? the? group,? the? gender? of? voters? might? matter? for? election? outcomes.79?Since?
candidates?are?likely?to?vote?for?themselves,?who?do?non?candidates?vote?for??
In? this? section,?we? take? a? closer? look? at? the? voting?behavior? in? Election.? For? our? analysis?we?use?
figures? and? corresponding? subject?level? random? effects?GLS? estimations? clustered?on? groups? (not?
reported?in?a?table).?The?graphical?analysis?can?be?found?in?Appendix?4A,?and?it?contains?Figures?A2,?
A3,?and?A4.?The?dependent?variables?are?always?features?of?the?voting?behavior,?which?tell?us?whom?
the?subject?gave?the?best?rank.?Rank?voting?is?only?used?when?the?number?of?candidates?is?more?than?
two.?Out?of?the?84?open?leader?positions?in?14?groups?over?6?selection?periods,?only?2?were?not?filled?
after?the?groups?had?no?candidates.?12?positions?were?automatically?filled?with?women?and?10?with?
men,?after?only?one?candidate?ran.? In?the?remaining?cases,?the?gender?distribution?of?two?or?more?
candidates?was:? 49? times?mixed? candidates,? 6? times? only? female? candidates,? 5? times? only?male?
candidates.?
In?Figure?A2,?the?dependent?variable?is?the?best?rank?for?the?self,?conditional?on?volunteering.?Almost?
every? second? subject? runs? for? the? leader?position.?Men?and?women?are?equally? likely? to? vote? for?
themselves.? In?more? than? 80%? of? all? observations,? candidates? vote? for? themselves.? Over? time,?
women?are?less?likely?than?men?to?vote?for?the?self.?
In?Figure?A3,?the?dependent?variable?is?the?best?rank?for?the?previous?leader,?conditional?on?success.?
In?Panel?B,? if?the?previous? leader?was?successful,?men?are?more? likely?than?women?to?vote? for?the?
same? candidate.? The? difference? is? 8? percentage? points,? with? a? robust? standard? error? of? 0.05,?
significant?at? the?10%? level,?and? consistently?above? the? curve?of? female?voters.? In?Panel?A,? if? the?
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78?According?to?our?study,?we?confirm?one?of?the?findings?in?Glass?and?Cook?(2016),?stating?that?female?leaders?
have?shorter?tenures?than?their?male?counterparts.?Moreover,?we?confirm?findings?in?Grossman?et?al.?(2016),?
that?male?leaders?get?better?evaluations?than?female?leaders?for?given?a?given?group?performance.?
79?We?invited?subjects?of?both?genders?to?all?sessions,?and?the?computer?program?assigned?group?membership?
taking?gender?into?account.?Therefore,?we?had?only?gender?mixed?groups?in?our?study,?and?the?profile?pictures?
revealed?gender?to?all.?See?Figure?A1?in?Appendix?4A?for?details?about?the?gender?composition?of?the?groups.?
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previous? leader?failed,?women?are?slightly?more? likely?than?men?to?vote?again?for?the?failed? leader,?
but?this?result?is?not?significant.?The?difference? is?5?percentage?points,?with?a?robust?standard?error?
of?0.04,?a?p?value?of?0.18,?and?quite?a? lot?variance? in? the?curve.?Over? time,?men?seem? to? increase?
their?willingness?to?give?a?second?chance?to?leaders?who?failed.?
In?Figure?A4,?the?dependent?variable?is?the?best?rank?for?a?female?leader.?Panel?A?shows?that?women?
are?more?likely?than?men?to?vote?for?a?female?leader.?The?difference?of?31?percentage?points?is,?with?
a?robust?standard?error?of?0.05,?significant?at?the?1%?level.?Initially,?female?voters?vote?in?80%?of?the?
cases? for?a? female? leader,?but?over? time,? they?decrease? this?high? frequency?down? to?around?40%.?
Male?voters?quite?constantly?vote,?in?20%?of?the?cases,?for?female?leaders.?Since?candidates?are?likely?
to?vote? for? themselves,?we?exclude? candidates? in?Panel?B.?Among?non?candidates,?men?are?more?
likely? than?women? to? vote? for?a? female? leader.?The?difference?of?18?percentage?points? is,?with? a?
robust?standard?error?of?0.06,?significant?at?the?1%? level.?Women?quite?constantly?vote,? in?20%?of?
the?cases,?for?female?leaders.80?In?contrast,?initially,?men?vote?in?any?case?for?a?female?leader.?Over?
time,?men?decrease? this? high? voting? frequency? down? to? 20%,? similar? to? the? frequency? of? female?
voters.?We? speculate? that?non?volunteering?men?might?be? chivalrous? to? female? candidates? in? the?
first?selection?period:?they?are?more? likely?to?accept?the?offer?of?becoming?a? leader?from?a?female?
rather?than?a?male?candidate.81?Eckel?and?Grossman?(2001)?termed?this?phenomenon?“chivalry”.?Of?
course,?the?chivalry?might?root?in?the?fact?that?men?think?the?leader?task?is?risky,?which?might?also?be?
the?reason?why?those?men?did?not?volunteer?themselves.?
Do?male?or?female?non?candidates?differentiate?between?male?and?female?candidates?when?voting?
after?a?previous? leader?failed??To?answer?this?question,?we?conduct?the?following?analysis,?which? is?
not?reported?separately?in?a?table.?We?restrict?our?sample?to?cases?when?the?number?of?candidates?
was?two?or?more,?to?make?sure?that?the?election?actually?took?place.?We?also?restrict?to?cases?when?
the? candidates?were? of?mixed? gender.?We? end? up?with? 245? subject?level? observations? from? 14?
groups?over?6?selection?periods.?We? run?a? random?effects?GLS? regression? for? the?“best? rank? for?a?
female? leader”?as? the?dependent?variable?and?cluster? standard?errors?on?groups.?The?explanatory?
variables? are? interaction? terms? of? the? voter’s? gender? with? indicators? of? whether? the? subject?
volunteered?and?whether?the?subject?gave?the?best?rank?for?the?self,?and?separately?with?indicators?
of?whether?the?subject?volunteered,?whether?the?subject?gave?the?best?rank?for?the?previous?leader,?
whether?the?previous?leader?was?female,?and?whether?the?group?was?previously?successful.?
First,?among?non?candidates,?we?test?who?votes?more?often?for?a?female?leader?if?previously?a?male?
leader?failed.?We?find?that?non?candidate?women?are?less?likely?than?men?to?vote?for?a?female?leader?
after?a?previously?male?leader?failed.?The?difference?in?effects?is?0.55?and?significant?at?the?1%?level.?
Second,?among?non?candidates,?we?test?who?votes?more?often?for?a?new?female?leader?if?previously?
a?female?leader?failed.?Again,?we?find?that?non?candidate?women?are?less?likely?than?men?to?vote?for?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
80?In? the? section? on? volunteering? behavior? above,? we? could? observe? that? elections? relatively? boost? the?
willingness? of?women? to? contribute? to? the? public? good? of? having? a? leader,? especially? after? failure? periods.?
However,? the? non?candidate?women?who? seemingly? lack? this?willingness?might? vote?more? often? for?men?
because?(a)?they?do?not?believe?in?the?competence?of?female?leaders,?or?(b)?they?lack?confidence?to?volunteer,?
but?still?view?other?female?candidates?as?competitors,?while?they?do?not?mind?if?a?man?becomes?the?leader.?
81?In?the?section?on?volunteering?behavior?above,?we?already?found?another?piece?of?evidence?for?chivalry?(see?
also?Table?A4?in?Appendix?4A).?Men?decrease?their?volunteering?frequency?significantly?more?if?female,?rather?
than?male,? leaders?were?successful? in?the?previous?selection?cycle,?as? if?men?would?not?want?to?compete?for?
the?leadership?position?against?those?women.?
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a?new? female? leader?after?a?previously? female? leader? failed.?The?difference? is?0.29?and,?with?a?p?
value? of? 0.14,? close? to? significance.? These? findings? reinforce? the? corresponding? statements? in?
Conclusion? 3,? and? they? show? that? discrimination? against? female? leaders?might? be? driven? by? non?
candidate?women?who?are?more?reluctant?to?vote?for?a?female?leader?after?a?previous?leader?failed.?
After?a?previous? coordination? failure,? the? leader? task?becomes? riskier? if? the? leader? is?expected? to?
coordinate? the? group? towards? the? most? efficient? equilibrium.? Our? results? suggest? that,? after?
experiencing?coordination?failure,?women,?who?do?not?volunteer?themselves,?might?magnify?default?
stereotype? beliefs? about? higher? leadership? competence? of? men.? These? women? are? even? more?
reluctant? to?vote? for?a? female? leader? if?a?male,? rather? than? female,? leader? failed,?as? if? this?would?
signal?that?the?leader?task?is?even?more?challenging.?
We?sum?up?as?follows.?If?the?previous?leader?was?successful,?men?are?more?likely?than?women?to?vote?
persistently.?Among?non?candidates,?men?are?more?likely?than?women?to?vote?for?a?female?leader.?
On?the?group?level,?the?gender?composition?of?groups?might?matter.?Without?going?into?detail,?after?
extending?the? interaction?term? in?Model?2?by?adding?a?dummy?for?female?majority?groups,?we?find?
that? female?majority? groups? with?male? leaders? achieve? higher? coordination? equilibria? than? with?
female? leaders.?The?difference?between? the?effects? is?7.28?effort?units? significant?at? the?5%? level,?
according? to? the? corresponding? post?estimation? test.? Thus,? the? aggregate? behavior? of? female?
majority?groups?takes?part?in?explaining?the?puzzling?gender?effect?that?we?find?in?follower?behavior?
in?Election.?
5.5.4?Sabotage?
This? section? investigates? sabotage,? since?we? found? that?elections?boost? the?effectiveness?of?male?
leaders?more,? compared? to? female? leader? effectiveness,? although?men? and? women? have? equal?
chances?to?get?elected.?It?puzzled?us,?why?we?find?a?difference?in?effectiveness?once?followers?were?
the? ones?who? gave? credibility? to? their? leaders.? Leader? credibility? roots? in? consensual? rank? voting?
(Borda?Count).?However,?in?the?coordination?game?followers,?who?voted?for?somebody?else?than?the?
elected? leader,? could? sabotage? the? elected? leader? by? simply? acting? as? a?weak? link.? To? test? this?
speculation,?we?estimate?the?effect?of?“voting?for?a?candidate?who?wins”?on?“subject?effort”? in?the?
first? period? of? the? leadership? term.? Thus,? the? estimation? tells? us? how? subject? effort? depends? on?
whether? the?candidate,?whom? the?subject?voted? for,?won?or?not.?We?predict? that?subject?effort? is?
higher,? if? the?candidate,?whom?the?subject?gave?the?best?rank,?won?the?election.?We? focus?on?the?
happenings? in? the? first? period? of? the? three?periodic? leadership? term,? because? this? is? the? most?
relevant?period? to? trace? sabotage.? In? the? second? period,?other? subjects?might? already? follow? the?
saboteur,?which?would?mix?up?the?interpretation?of?our?results.?
In?the?basic?estimation,?we?use?only?the?indicator?variable?for?“voting?for?a?candidate?who?wins”?as?
explanatory?variable,?without?taking?gender?into?account.?For?the?estimation?we?run?random?effects?
GLS? regressions? clustered? on? groups,? and? restricted? to? followers.?We? exclude? leaders,? since?we?
assume? that? leaders?gave? the?best?rank? for? the?self?and? they?are?unlikely? to?sabotage? themselves.?
Table?A6? in?Appendix? 4A? contains? the? estimation? results.? The? basic? estimation,?Model? 7,? has? no?
significant?result:?we?find?no?sabotage.?
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Next,?we?extend?the?basic?model?by?interacting?the?indicator?for?“voting?for?a?candidate?who?wins”?
with?the?subject’s?gender?and?the?leader’s?gender.?Model?8?contains?the?estimation?results.?Among?
women?who?voted?for?an?unsuccessful?candidate,?we?find?weak?signals?of?those?women?supporting?a?
male?leader?more?than?a?female?leader?(p?=?0.17?according?to?the?post?estimation?test).?The?subject?
effort?of?those?women?is?significantly?higher?by?2.78?effort?units?if?the?leader?is?male?(p?=?0.05),?and?
the?effort? is? lower?by?2.28?units? if? the? leader? is? female,?but? this? latter?effect? is?not?significant? (p?=?
0.55).?We? interpret? this? result,? as? women? not? directly? sabotaging? female? leaders,? but? also? not?
supporting?them.?Women?support?a?male?leader?more?than?a?female?leader.?Further,?we?run?a?set?of?
post?estimation? tests,? combining? gender? information.?When?we? compare? the?behavior?of?women?
who?voted?for?a?man?who?was?elected?to?women?who?voted?for?a?man,?but?a?woman?was?elected,?
we? find?a? significant?difference?of?7.11?effort?units? (p?=?0.01).?Women? significantly? increase? their?
effort?by?4.83?units? if?the?man?they?voted?for?wins?(p?=?0.08),?whereas?they?tend?to?decrease?their?
effort?by?2.28?units? if?a?woman?wins? instead?of? the?man? they?voted? for? (p?=?0.55).?Again,?not? the?
sabotage?act?against? female? leaders? is? significant,?but? rather? the?positive? support?of?male? leaders?
drives?the?difference.?None?of?the?other?post?estimation?tests?is?significant.?
Finally,?we?repeat?our?estimation?and?the?post?estimation?tests?while?restricting?to?cases?when?the?
elected? leader? fails? in? the? first?period?of? the? leadership? term.?We?do? this? in?order? to? test?whether?
sabotage? explains? coordination? failure,? but? we? find? no? significant? results.? (The? results? are? not?
included?in?the?table.)?
We?sum?up?as?follows.?We?do?not?find?sabotage?acts,?but?women?support?female? leaders? less?than?
male?leaders,?which?takes?part,?in?the?form?of?follower?behavior,?in?explaining?the?difference?in?leader?
effectiveness.?
5.6?Conclusion?and?Discussion?
Our? study? shows? that? elected? men? are? slightly? more? effective? leaders? than? elected? women.?
Compared? to? female? leaders,?elections?boost? the?effectiveness?of?male? leaders?more.?Half?of? the?
total?gender?effect?can?be?attributed?to?leader?behavior,?and?the?other?half?to?follower?behavior.?The?
gender?effect?is?small,?both?in?magnitude?and?significance,?and?thus?it?might?drive?the?gender?equal?
election? outcomes.? The? higher? effectiveness? of? elected? leaders? might? drive? the? willingness? to?
contribute? to? the? public? good? of? having? an? effective? leader? down,? and? thus? men? and? women?
volunteer? equally? often? for? the? leader? position,? close? to? and? even? below? the? pecuniary? benefits?
benchmark.?Randomly?selected?men?and?women?are?equally?effective? leaders,?which? is? in? line?with?
findings? of? our? earlier? studies? with? a? similar? topic.? By? nature,? the? random? selection? procedure?
provides?gender?equal?chances? to?become?a? leader.?Nevertheless,?we?observe? that?men?volunteer?
more?than?women,?and?their?volunteering?frequency?is?above?the?pecuniary?benefits?benchmark.?
In? general,? followers?do?not?differentiate?between?genders?when? voting.?However,?we? find? some?
traces?of?the?possible?existence?of?stereotype?beliefs,?such?as?men?being?more?competent,?or?more?
credible,?or?simply?better?leaders?than?women.?It?is?women?who?reinforce?such?or?similar?stereotype?
beliefs,?especially?after?failure?experiences,?drawbacks,?and? in?risky?situations.? In?hard?situations,? it?
might?be?challenging?to?override?default?stereotype?beliefs.?Women?support?female?leaders?less?than?
male?leaders,?which?is?in?line?with?findings?in?Bagues?and?Esteve?Volart?(2010),?showing?that?female?
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majority?groups?overestimate? the?quality?of?male? candidates.82?Women?are? the?ones?who? stick? to?
male?leaders,?even?if?those?male?leaders?have?been?unsuccessful.?If?a?previous?male?leader?failed,?we?
observe?that?women?volunteer?more?often.?But?then?again,? it? is?women?who?do?not?support?other?
women?who?volunteer?and?might?bring?a?positive?change? in?group?outcomes.?Although,?both?Glass?
and?Cook? (2016)? and? Eagly? et? al.? (2003)?name? the? lack?of? support? as?one?of? the?biggest?barriers?
female? leaders?and?emerging? female? leaders?have? to?overcome.83?On? top?of? that,?Glass?and?Cook?
point?out,?that?women?usually?only?get?top?positions?if?those?positions?are?risky?and?hard?to?manage.?
Consequentially,?support?of?followers?would?be?even?more? important?for?those?female? leaders.?If?a?
female?leader?fails,?she?is?likely?considered?to?reinforce?a?stereotype?expectation,?irrespective?of?the?
message?sent,?irrespective?of?her?performance?as?a?leader.?Unsuccessful?male?leaders?are?more?likely?
to?get?a?second?chance,?in?form?of?a?reelection,?which?is?also?in?line?with?the?findings?in?Grossman?et?
al.?(2016).?
Even?though?that?we?find?some?examples?of?negative?stereotyping,?we?also?find?counterexamples.?In?
literature,?men?have?already?been? found? to?be?more? task?oriented,?and? in?our?study?as?well,? they?
seem? to? focus? on? successfulness,? rather? than? being? influenced? by? the? gender? of? the? leader? and?
stereotype?beliefs? (Bem?1974;?Bem?1993;?Merchant?2012).? If? the?previous? leader?was? successful,?
men?are?more?likely?than?women?to?vote?persistently.?Overall,?women?are?more?likely?than?men?to?
vote? for?a? female? leader,?which? could? falsely?be? interpreted?as? “solidarity”?among?women,?when?
comparing? our? findings? to? the? findings? in? Eckel? and? Grossman? (2001)? who? report? about? true?
“solidarity”? and? “chivalry”.?We? have? to? take? into? account? that? candidates? are? likely? to? vote? for?
themselves,?and?that?we?found?that?elections?relatively?boost?the?female?willingness?to?contribute?to?
the?public?good?of?leadership,?especially?after?failure?to?coordinate?on?the?most?efficient?equilibrium.?
Among?non?candidates,?men?are?more? likely? than?women? to?vote? for?a? female? leader.?Of? course,?
seemingly? “chivalrous”? acts? might? root? is? beliefs? about? the? difficulty? of? the? leader? task,? since?
otherwise?non?volunteering?men?might?have?run?for?the?leader?position?themselves.?
Thus,? we? observe? both? support? and? lack? of? support? for? women? who? volunteer? and? fill? leader?
positions.?Our? study? shows? that?a? learning? tendency?drives? initially?more?differentiated?outcomes?
towards? more? equality? in? followership? and? effectiveness.? In? period? 9,? elected? women? are? less?
effective?leaders?than?elected?men,?and?the?difference?is?bigger?than?10?effort?units.?Later,?in?period?
12?already,?women?and?men?are?equally?effective? leaders.?One?plausible?explanation?might?be?that?
women?overtake?groups?previously? led?by?men,?and?vice?versa.84?It? seems? that?men?are?better?at?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
82?Recently,?Bagues?et?al.?(forthcoming)?study?the?effect?of?the?gender?composition?of?scientific?committees?on?
the?assessment?of?applications?to?associate?and?full?professorships,?using?a?data?set?from?Italy?and?Spain.?The?
authors? find? that?“female?evaluators?are?not?significantly?more? favorable? towards? female?candidates”,?while?
“male?evaluators?become? less? favorable? towards? female?candidates?as?soon?as?a? female?evaluator? joins? the?
committee”.?
83?In?Eagly?et?al.?(2003),?authors?state?that?a?huge?barrier?to?female?careers?is?that?men?are?reluctant?to?support?
women,?even?if?they?perform?well.?This?statement?is?in?a?context?of?top?down?support.?In?our?study,?follower?
support?has?a?bottom?up?direction,?and?actually?we?think?that?the?bottom?up?process?of?elections?can?solve?the?
problem?of? lacking?support,?since? the? increase? in?credibility? is?much?greater? than? the?gender?effect.?Besides?
increasing? leader?effectiveness,?another?advantage?of?elections? is?that?the?pool?of?candidates?gets?filled?with?
more?skilled?and?more?diverse?people,?and?more?women?get?naturally?into?leadership?positions.?
84?Out?the?14?groups,?7?had?a?male,?and?7?had?a?female? leader? in?period?9.? Initially,?5?of?the?male?led?groups?
and?3?of?the?female?led?groups?reached?a?high?minimum?effort?level.?In?period?12,?2?successful?male?led?groups?
were?overtaken?by?women,?and?1?successful?female?led?group?was?overtaken?by?a?man.?Among?unsuccessful?
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initiating?a?turnaround?in?initial?periods,?and?we?could?call?them?“initiators”.?Indeed,?it?is?commonly?
known? that? men? are? represented? more? among? innovators,? start?up? entrepreneurs,? or? serial?
entrepreneurs.? In? contrast,? from? period? 18? onwards,? women? develop? their? groups? even? more?
effectively? than?men.?We? basically? observe? that?women? are? the? better? “developers”? and? perfect?
candidates? to? overtake? inherited? leadership,? for? example,? mature? enterprises? from? serial?
entrepreneurs,?or?second?generation?leadership?in?family?businesses.85?Cohoon?et?al.?(2010)?show?in?
their? study? about? female? entrepreneurs? that? women? believe? prior? experience? is? crucial? for?
entrepreneurial?success,?and? that?women?value?more? the?encouragement?and? financial?support?of?
their?business?partners?when?they?start?a?business.?Thus,?women?do?not?start?from?zero,?but?rather?
learn?from?their?mentors?already,?and?this?fits?to?our?observations.?Additionally,?we?speculate?along?
this?line?that?men?might?be?more?aroused?by?the?initial?challenge?of?a?turnaround,?and?maintaining?a?
successful? history? in? later? periods? is? less? motivating? to? them.86 ?Of? course,? another? possible?
explanation?for?the?decreasing?gender?gap?in?leader?effectiveness?might?be?that?followers?learn?with?
evolving?group?history?that?a?female?leader?can?be?as?credible?as?a?male?leader.87?In?that?case,?female?
leaders?would?have?an?improving?effect?on?their?environment.?Recent?political?science?studies,?using?
data?from?Italy?and?Sweden,?respectively,?already?showed?that?gender?quotas?in?election?campaigns?
increased?the?quality?of?elected?politicians?(Baltrunaite?et?al.?2014;?Besley?et?al.?2013).?Besley?et?al.?
showed?that?the?Swedish?“zipper?quota”?increased?both?the?competence?of?male?politicians?and?the?
female?representation,?causing?the?so?called?“crisis?of?the?mediocre?man”.?
One? limitation? of? our? study? might? be? the? flat? organizational? structure? that? we? model? in? the?
turnaround?game.?The?game?design?does?not?account?for?possible?“turf?wars”,?competition?between?
divisions,?what?might?have?been?a?reason?that?we?did?not?observe?a?gender?gap?in?the?volunteering?
frequency,? in? election?outcomes,? and? leader? effectiveness? (Herrera? et? al.? (forthcoming)).? In? a? flat?
hierarchy? the? leader? is? closer? to? the? group,? and? elections? decrease? social? distance? between? the?
leader? and? the? followers? even? more,? which? increases? credibility? of? the? leader? (Brandts? et? al.?
(forthcoming);?Akerlof?1997).? In?our?study,? leader?effectiveness? increases? to?a?greater?extent? than?
the?gender?effect,?and?thus?the?organizational?structure?might?matter?for?the?size?of?the?gender?gap.?
Political?science?studies,?using?panel?data,?for?example?showed?that,?even?if?gender?quotas?increase?
female?representation?among?politicians?in?general,?women?are?still?underrepresented?in?influential?
positions? (Folke?and?Rickne?2012;?Esteve?Volart?and?Bagues?2012).?Using?data? from?Sweden,?Folke?
and?Rickne?show?that?women?are?less?likely?to?be?reelected,?which?is?a?precondition?for?rising?in?the?
political? hierarchy.? The? authors? show? that? “competition? between? political? parties? substantially?
improves?women’s? relative?performance”,?yet? they?also? find?“evidence? for?a?negative?bias?against?
women?in?the?recruitment?process?being?a?major?contributor?to?women’s?high?turnover?rate”.?Using?
data?from?Spain,?Esteve?Volart?and?Bagues?show?that?women?are?strategically?nominated?to?poorer?
positions? in?election?campaigns,?and? they? find?evidence? that? this? is?due? to?party?bias,? rather? than?
voter? bias.? The? authors? also? show? that? women? get? nominated? to? better? positions? if? political?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
female?led?groups,?1?never?made? the? turnaround,?2?made? the? turnaround?with?male? leaders,?and?1?made? it?
with?a?female?leader.?None?of?the?2?unsuccessful?male?led?groups?made?a?stable?turnaround.?
85?In?a?panel?data?investigation?of?U.S.?corporations,?Dezs??and?Ross?(2012)?find?a?positive?performance?effect?
of?female?representation?in?top?management?teams,?yet,?only?in?firms,?whose?strategies?focused?on?innovation,?
facing?complex?challenges.?Innovative?development?of?an?inherited?firm?could?be?seen?as?such?a?challenge.?
86?Every? third? elected?men? in? our? study? started? to? send?messages? containing? banter? in? period? 15.? Elected?
women?never?sent?banter.?
87?Among?4?unsuccessful?female?led?groups,?1?made?the?turnaround?with?a?female?leader?in?period?12.?
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competition?increases.?These?findings?are?in?line?with?the?results?by?Glass?and?Cook?(2016):?women?
are?more?likely?to?get?promoted?to?higher?positions,?if?those?assignments?are?more?risky.?According?
to?these?studies,?women?are?expendable?players,?and?a?more?complex?organizational?structure?might?
eliminate?the?basic?election?effect?that?decreases?the?gender?gap.?
Another?limitation?of?our?study?might?root?in?our?subject?pool.?We?recruited?the?participants?of?our?
study?at?a?business?oriented?school? in?Guatemala?City,?and?there?might?be?a?school?effect?towards?
gender?equality? in? leadership?positions.?According? to? the? final?questionnaire,?our?participants? are?
very?risk?taking,?overconfident,?and?they?have?a?strong?preference?for?the? leader?position,?without?
any?gender?differences.88?Besides?the?obvious?school?effect,?the?location,?Guatemala?City,?might?also?
play? a? role? in? explaining? our? gender?neutral? results.? According? to? a? survey? by? the? Global?
Entrepreneurship? Monitor? (GEM),? around? 40%? of? Guatemalan? people? would? like? to? become?
entrepreneurs?in?the?next?three?years,?64%?of?the?people?think?that?they?have?the?right?capabilities,?
and? the? fear? of? failure? is? around? 33%.? Guatemalans? are? optimistic,? and? experience? a? self?
employment?wave.?To?this?adds?that?–?in?line?with?trends?in?Central?and?South?America?–?Guatemala?
ranks?on?place? 8?with?women? filling? 45%?of?managerial?positions? according? to? a? study? by? Expert?
Market.?
The? low?number?of?observations? limits? the?explanatory?power?of?our? study.?We? can? replicate? the?
previously?studied?election?effect? (Brandts?et?al.?2015),?and?we?can?show?a? less? important?gender?
gap?in?effectiveness?among?elected?leaders.?However,?our?study?revealed?a?row?of?interesting?open?
questions? for? future? research.?What? implications?do?our? findings? suggest??Our? control? treatment,?
random? selection,? represents? the? case? of? appointing? a? leader? externally,? whereas? the? election?
condition? represents? promoting? a? leader? within? the? organization.? If? the? leader? gets? randomly?
selected,? slightly? less?women?will? become? leaders,? but? only? because? the? candidate? pool? has? less?
women?to?offer?for?the?selection?process.?If?the?leader?gets?elected,?both?the?volunteering?frequency?
and? election? outcomes? will? be? gender? balanced.? Therefore,? elections? result? in? a? more? gender?
balanced?distribution?of? top?positions.?As?a? consequence,?employee?participation? in? the? selection?
process? of? a? leader? can? be? a? useful? tool? in? decreasing? gender? imbalance? of? top? positions? in?
organizations.? Is? there?any? room? for? sabotage??There?might?be?a?difference? in? the? support?of? the?
leader,?but?sabotage?acts?are?less?likely,?since?employees?had?the?chance?to?let?their?voice?be?heard,?
and? consequentially,? credibility? increases,? which? has? a? strong? and? robust? effect? on? leader?
effectiveness.?
? ?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
88?For?both?men? and?women?on? average,? the?willingness? to? take? risks? is?8?on? a? scale? from?0? to?10,? leader?
competence?is?1.5?on?a?scale?from?0?to?5,?and?the?preference?for?the?leader?position?is?0.8?on?a?scale?from?0?to?
1.?
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Appendix?1A?
Table?A1? Descriptive?statistics,?for?all?20?periods?
?
Gender?Not?Revealed Gender?Revealed?
Male?leader?
n?=?8,?n?=?64?
Female?leader
n?=?8,?n?=?64?
Male?leader
n?=?7,?n?=?56?
Female?leader
n?=?7,?n?=?56?
No?message?sent?
0.03?
(0.05)?
0.11?
(0.14)?
0.06?
(0.11)?
0.10?
(0.13)?
p?=?0.10? p?=?0.55?
Males:?p?=?0.77;?Females:?p?=?0.81?
Suggestion?
3.84?
(2.27)?
5.68?
(2.03)?
3.92?
(2.93)?
4.72?
(2.18)?
p?=?0.07? p?=?0.47?
Males:?p?=?0.95;?Females:?p?=?0.40?
Mean?effort?
(group?average)?
3.55?
(2.47)?
4.51?
(2.33)?
3.79?
(2.82)?
4.06?
(2.73)?
p?=?0.22? p?=?0.52?
Males:?p?=?0.95;?Females:?p?=?0.48?
Mean?effort?
(leader)?
3.45?
(2.49)?
4.63?
(2.28)?
3.80?
(2.75)?
4.31?
(2.52)?
p?=?0.22? p?=?0.61?
Males:?p?=?0.95;?Females:?p?=?0.56?
Min.?effort?
3.06?
(2.78)?
3.69?
(2.91)?
3.26?
(2.90)?
3.54?
(3.17)?
p?=?0.47? p?=?0.83?
Males:?p?=?0.95;?Females:?p?=?0.62?
Mean?earnings?
0.47?
(0.10)?
0.46?
(0.13)?
0.47?
(0.09)?
0.48?
(0.11)?
p?=?0.87? p?=?0.80?
Males:?p?=?0.77;?Females:?p?=?0.91?
Share?of?
followers?
0.82?
(0.20)?
0.69?
(0.29)?
0.92?
(0.09)?
0.84?
(0.16)?
p?=?0.56? p?=?0.33?
Males:?p?=?0.38;?Females:?p?=?0.41?
Guessed?share?of?
followers?(group?
average)?
0.79?
(0.22)?
0.72?
(0.26)?
0.92?
(0.09)?
0.85?
(0.12)?
p?=?0.87? p?=?0.23?
Males:?p?=?0.30;?Females:?p?=?0.56?
Guessed?share?of?
followers?(leader)?
0.82?
(0.17)?
0.78?
(0.24)?
0.95?
(0.08)?
0.85?
(0.13)?
p?=?0.96? p?=?0.04?
Males:?p?=?0.06;?Females:?p?=?0.77?
Overestimation?
(group?average)?
?0.22?
(0.40)?
0.18?
(0.49)?
?0.03?
(0.09)?
0.08?
(0.36)?
p?=?0.10? p?=?0.57?
Males:?p?=?0.32;?Females:?p?=?0.49?
Overestimation?
(leader)?
0.05?
(0.76)?
0.61?
(0.98)?
0.23?
(0.38)?
0.06?
(0.38)?
p?=?0.46? p?=?0.40?
Males:?p?=?0.52;?Females:?p?=?0.26?
Notes.? The? table? reports? the?mean,? standard?deviation? (in?parentheses),? and?p?values?of?non?parametric?
Wilcoxon? rank?sum? test? results.?We? test? for? treatment?differences?with? the?null?hypothesis? that? the? two?
samples? come? from? the? same? population.? The? suggestion? variable? contains? only? positive? numeric?
suggestions?and?has?missing?values?if?no?message?was?sent.?The?belief?variables?contain?missing?values?if?the?
question?was?omitted?during?the?experiment?due?to?leaders?who?sent?no?message.?Overestimation?refers?to?
the?number?of?followers,?instead?of?the?share.?Since?the?data?is?history?dependent,?we?collapsed?by?group.?
? ?
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Figure?A1? Distribution?of?messages?in?all?20?periods,?by?treatment?conditions?
?
Figure?A2? Share?of?followers?by?treatment?conditions?in?all?20?periods,?averaged?into?quartiles?
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Figure?A3? Minimum?effort?by?treatment?conditions?in?quartiles?of?all?20?periods?
?
Figure?A4? Mean?earnings?by?treatment?conditions?in?quartiles?of?all?20?periods.?If?all?group?
members?coordinate?on?level?7?(1),?they?can?earn?0.6?(0.45).?
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Table?A2? Messages?and?minimum?effort?by?groups?and?gender?of?the?leader,?for?Part?1?
Groups? Period? Average?
T?=?1? 1? 2? 3? 4? 5? 6? 7? 8? 9? 10? ?
Female? 6? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 6,9?
? 6? 7*? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 6*? 6,8?
Female? 4? 1? 1? 1? 4? 4? 2? 1? 1? 1? 2?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Male? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
Female? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
Male? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Female? 7? 7? 4? 0? 1? 1? 1? 0? 0? 7? 4?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Male? 3? 1? 7? 1? 1? 1? 1? 7? 1? 0? 2,6?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
T?=?0? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Male? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
Female? 7? 7? 7? 0? 1? 3? 7? 0? 0? 0? 5,3?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Female? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
? 4? 3*? 1*? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1,5?
Male? 7? 1? 0? 2? 2? 2? 2? 2? 2? 2? 2,4?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Female? 7? 7? 7? 7? 0? 7? 7? 5? 7? 7? 6,8?
? 4? 4? 4? 4? 4? 4? 4? 4? 4? 4? 4?
Male? 1? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 6,4?
? 1? 7*? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 6,4?
Female? 7? 7? 7? 0? 7? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 3,7?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Male? 1? 1? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 5,8?
? 1? 1? 7*? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 5,8?
Notes.?T?=?1?stands?for?Gender?Revealed,?and?T?=?0?for?Gender?Not?Revealed.?First?row?is?the?message?sent?by?
the? leader,?second?row?contains?the?minimum?effort?value.?Shaded?rows? indicate?groups?for?which?minimum?
effort?was?greater?than?1?in?at?least?one?period.?An?asterisk?(*)?indicates?a?change?in?minimum?effort?from?the?
previous?period.?There? is?not?much?group? level?heterogeneity? in? terms?of?outcomes,?and?only?one?middling?
group?playing?the?game?on?a?medium?level?of?4?for?all?10?periods.?
? ?
144?
?
Table?A3? Messages?and?minimum?effort?by?groups?and?gender?of?the?leader,?for?Part?2?
Groups? Period? Average?
T?=?1? 11? 12? 13? 14? 15? 16? 17? 18? 19? 20? ?
Male? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 4*? 1*? 1? 1? 4,9?
Male? 7? 1? 0? 1? 1? 0? 0? 1? 1? 1? 1,9?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Female? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
Male? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 6*? 7*? 7? 7? 6,9?
Female? 7? 7? 0? 0? 1? 1? 1? 1? 7? 1? 3,3?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Male? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Female? 7? 4? 1? 0? 0? 7? 1? 1? 1? 1? 2,9?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
T?=?0? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Female? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
Male? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Male? 1? 7? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1,6?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Female? 0? 2? 1? 1? 2? 2? 0? 1? 2? 2? 1,6?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Male? 7? 1? 7? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 7? 7? 3,4?
? 4? 1*? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1,3?
Female? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
Male? 7? 1? 1? 1? 1? 0? 4? 6? 5? 2? 3,1?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Female? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 0? 7?
? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
Notes.?T?=?1?stands?for?Gender?Revealed,?and?T?=?0?for?Gender?Not?Revealed.?First?row?is?the?message?sent?by?
the? leader,?second?row?contains?the?minimum?effort?value.?Shaded?rows? indicate?groups?for?which?minimum?
effort?was?greater?than?1?in?at?least?one?period.?An?asterisk?(*)?indicates?a?change?in?minimum?effort?from?the?
previous?period.?There?is?not?much?group?level?heterogeneity?in?terms?of?outcomes,?and?the?only?one?middling?
group?from?Part?1?collapses?to?the?lowest?effort?level?after?the?11th?period.?
? ?
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Table?A4? Evaluation?of?the?leader?and?role?preference?
? Gender?Not?Revealed? Gender?Revealed?
Male?leader?
n?=?64?
Female?leader?
n?=?64?
Male?leader?
n?=?56?
Female?leader?
n?=?56?
Evaluation?of?the?
leader?
2.98?
(1.36)?
2.45?
(1.54)?
2.95?
(1.42)?
2.54?
(1.36)?
p?=?0.03? p?=?0.12?
Males:?p?=?0.89,?Females:?p?=?0.56?
? Male?subject?
n?=?33?
Female?subject?
n?=?31?
Male?subject?
n?=?27?
Female?subject?
n?=?29?
Role?preference? 1.33?
(0.48)?
1.48?
(0.51)?
1.30?
(0.47)?
1.31?
(0.47)?
p?=?0.22? p?=?0.91?
Males:?p?=?0.76,?Females:?p?=?0.17?
Notes.? The? table? reports? the?mean,? standard?deviation? (in?parentheses),? and?p?values? from? the? test?
results.?We?test?for?treatment?differences?using?the?non?parametric?Wilcoxon?rank?sum?test,?with?the?
null?hypothesis?that?the?two?samples?come?from?the?same?population.?Answer?key?for?evaluations?is?a?
five?point? scale? from? 1? for? “completely? disagree”? to? 5? for? “completely? agree”? that? the? group’s?
performance?is?mostly?due?to?the?judgment?of?the?leader.?Answer?key?for?the?role?preference?is:?1?for?
“Message?Sender”,?2?for?“Group?Member”.?
?
Figure?A5? Role?preference?by?revelation?conditions?and?gender?of?the?participant?
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Appendix?1B?
Instructions?
Thank?you? for?participating? in? this? session.?You?are?participating? in?a? study?on?economic?decision?
making?and?will?be?asked?to?make?a?number?of?decisions.?For?your?participation?you?will?receive?a?
show?up? fee? of? $5.? Please? read? these? instructions? carefully? as? they? describe? how? you? can? earn?
additional?money.?
All? the? interaction?between?you?and?other?participants?will? take?place? through? the? computers.?
Please?do?not?talk?or?communicate?in?any?other?way?with?other?participants.?If?you?have?a?question,?
raise?your?hand?and?one?of?us?will?help?you.?The?study?is?anonymous:?that?is,?your?identity?will?not?be?
revealed?to?others?and?the?identity?of?others?will?not?be?revealed?to?you.?
During?the?study?your?earnings?will?be?expressed? in?dollars.?The?study? is?divided? into?two?parts.?
You?will?read?the?instructions?for?Part?1?below.?You?will?read?the?instructions?for?Part?2?once?Part?1?
has?been?completed.?Your? total?earnings? today?will?equal? the?show?up? fee?plus? the?earnings? from?
each?part.?Upon?completion?of?the?session?you?will?be?paid?your?total?earnings?in?cash.?
Part?1?
In?Part?1?you?will?interact?in?a?group?of?eight?people.?Group?members?will?be?matched?randomly.?One?
person?in?your?group?will?be?randomly?selected?to?be?the?Message?Sender.?After?the?instructions?are?
finished,?you?will?see?whether?you?have?been?assigned?the?role?of?the?Message?Sender?or?the?role?of?
a?Group?Member.?
There?will?be?10?periods?in?Part?1.?You?will?interact?with?the?same?group?members?throughout?the?
10? periods.? In? each? period,? every? group?member,? including? the?Message? Sender,? will? choose? a?
number?between?1?and?7.?The?number?you?choose?and?the?smallest?number?chosen?in?the?group?will?
determine?your?earnings?in?that?period.?
?
EARNINGS?TABLE?
Smallest?number?chosen?in?the?group?
7? 6? 5? 4? 3? 2? 1?
Your?
number?
7? $0.60? $0.50? $0.40? $0.30? $0.20? $0.10? $0.00?
6? $0.575? $0.475? $0.375? $0.275? $0.175? $0.075?
5? $0.55? $0.45? $0.35? $0.25? $0.15?
4? $0.525? $0.425? $0.325? $0.225?
3? $0.50? $0.40? $0.30?
2? $0.475? $0.375?
1? $0.45?
? ?
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The?Earnings?Table?shows?how?your?earnings?are?determined.?Note? that? the?Earnings?Table? is? the?
same? for? every? participant.? Your? earnings? in? each? period? are? found? by? looking? across? from? the?
number?you? chose?on? the? left?hand? side?and?down? from? the? smallest?number? chosen?by?a?group?
member.?For?example,? if?you?choose?4?and? the? smallest?number? in? the?group? is?4,? then?you?earn?
$0.525.?
Before?everyone? chooses?a?number,? there?will?be?a?message? stage.? In? the?message? stage,? the?
Message?Sender?will?have?the?option?to?suggest?a?number?to?all?the?group?members.?The?Message?
Sender?can?suggest?a?number?between?1?and?7,?or?alternatively,?he/she?can?decide?not?to?suggest?a?
number.?
After? the?message? stage,? every? group?member?will? see? the?Message? Sender’s? suggestion.? In?
addition,?the?Message?Sender’s?profile?picture?will?be?shown?alongside?his/her?suggestion.??
After? all? group?members? have? seen? the? suggestion,? each? group?member? enters? the? number?
he/she?wishes?to?choose.?Note? that? the?suggested?number?does?not?commit?you?to?any?particular?
choice.?That? is,?neither?the?Message?Sender?nor?the?other?Group?Members?are?required?to?choose?
the?number?that?corresponds?to?the?suggested?number.?
Interim?questions?
At? the?end?of?each?period?we?will?ask?you?one?short? interim?question.?Namely,?we?will?ask?you? to?
guess?how?many?of?the?seven?other?group?members?follow?the?number?suggested?by?the?Message?
Sender.?If?your?guess?is?correct,?you?will?earn?$0.05?per?question?at?the?end?of?the?experiment.?
To?ensure? your?understanding?of? these? instructions,? click? the? “READY”?button?and?answer? the?
questions?that?will?appear?on?your?screen.?
Part?2?
Part?1?has?ended.?Please?read?the? instructions?for?Part?2?below?and?click?on?READY?once?you?have?
finished?reading.?
Part?2?is?very?similar?to?Part?1.?As?in?Part?1,?there?will?be?10?periods?in?Part?2.?In?each?period,?the?
Message?Sender? first?has? the?opportunity? to? suggest?a?number? to?all?group?members.?Thereafter,?
every? group?member,? including? the?Message? Sender,? chooses? a? number? between? 1? and? 7.? The?
number?you?choose?and?the?smallest?number?chosen? in?the?group?will?determine?your?earnings? in?
that?period.?The?Earnings?Table? is?also?the?same?as? in?Part?1.?Finally,?your?group’s?composition?has?
not?changed.? In?other?words,? in?Part?2?you?will? interact?with?the?same?group?of?eight?people?as? in?
Part?1.?
The?only?difference?between?Part?1?and?Part?2? is? that? someone?else? in?your?group?will?be? the?
Message?Sender.?Specifically,?one?of?the?group?members?who?was?not?the?Message?Sender?in?Part?1?
will?be?selected?at?random?to?be?the?Message?Sender?throughout?Part?2.?The?Message?Sender?from?
Part?1?becomes?a? regular?group?member? for?Part?2.?On? the?next?screen?you?will?see?whether?you?
have?been?assigned?the?role?of?the?Message?Sender?or?the?role?of?a?Group?Member?for?Part?2.?
? ?
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Screenshots?
?
?
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Appendix?2A?
Table?A1? Descriptive?statistics?by?treatment?conditions?
? One?way?communication? Two?way?communication?
? Male?leader?
n?=?8?
Female?leader
n?=?8?
Male?leader
n?=?8?
Female?leader
n?=?9?
Sent?no?
message?
0.25?
(0.37)?
0.19?
(0.26)?
0.08?
(0.24)?
0.02?
(0.06)?
p?=?0.82? p?=?0.86?
Males:?p?=?0.12;?Females:?p?=?0.07?
Message?value?
35?
(14.14)?
34.58?
(10.07)?
40?
(0)?
34.59?
(8.11)?
p?=?0.64? p?=?0.04?
Males:?p?=?0.32;?Females:?p?=?0.65?
Forty?
0.73?
(0.41)?
0.69?
(0.37)?
0.92?
(0.24)?
0.81?
(0.26)?
p?=?0.70? p?=?0.23?
Males:?p?=?0.13;?Females:?p?=?0.44?
Average?
follower?
message?value?
?
37.11?
(5.82)?
32.79?
(10.47)?
p?=?0.49?
Conover?squared?rank?variance?test:?p?=?0.05?
Mean?effort?
(group?
average)?
29.57?
(17.68)?
31.22?
(14.64)?
35.50?
(12.73)?
31.38?
(13.32)?
p?=?0.78? p?=?0.06?
Males:?p?=?0.24;?Females:?p?=?0.88?
Mean?effort?
(leader)?
30.83?
(17.07)?
34.79?
(9.65)?
36.67?
(9.43)?
35?
(8.66)?
p?=?0.78? p?=?0.26?
Males:?p?=?0.44;?Females:?p?=?0.57?
Minimum?effort?
29.17?
(18.15)?
29.03?
(17.20)?
35.07?
(13.95)?
29.20?
(15.44)?
p?=?0.74? p?=?0.06?
Males:?p?=?0.24;?Females:?p?=?0.88?
Minimum?effort?
in?Part?1?
6.56?
(11.27)?
5.16?
(10.16)?
0?
(0)?
1.81?
(3.49)?
p?=?0.96? p?=?0.08?
Males:?p?=?0.03;?Females:?p?=?0.32?
Mean?earnings?
227.15?
(20.69)?
218.06?
(30.33)?
232.92?
(20.03)?
218.27?
(27.27)?
p?=?0.40? ?p?=?0.05?
Males:?p?=?0.37;?Females:?p?=?0.88?
Guessed?share?
of?followers?
(group?
average)?
0.89?
(0.16)?
0.89?
(0.20)?
0.96?
(0.08)?
0.92?
(0.13)?
p?=?0.83? p?=?0.59?
Males:?p?=?0.29;?Females:?p?=?0.70?
Guessed?share?
of?followers?
(leader)?
0.97?
(0.05)?
0.85?
(0.28)?
0.96?
(0.05)?
0.92?
(0.19)?
p?=?0.26? p?=?0.71?
Males:?p?=?0.73;?Females:?p?=?0.27?
Notes.? The? table? contains? descriptive? statistics? for? all? 18? periods? of? Part? 2.? The? table? shows? the?mean,? the?
standard?deviation?in?brackets?and?p?values?from?test?results,?containing?observations?for?all?18?periods?of?Part?2,?
and?only?every?third?period?in?case?of?message?variables?and?belief?variables?respectively.?Leader?specific?data?is?
shaded? grey.?We? are? testing? for? gender? and? communication? treatment? differences? using? the? non?parametric?
Wilcoxon? rank?sum? test,?with? the?null?hypothesis? that? the? two? samples? come? from? the? same?population.?The?
message?value?variable?contains?only?numeric?suggestions?and?has?missing?values? if?no?message?was?sent.?The?
belief?variables?contain?missing?values? if?participants? indicated? that? the?question?was?not?applicable.?Since? the?
data?is?history?dependent,?we?collapse?by?group.?
151?
?
Figure?A1? Distribution?of?numeric?message?content?by?treatment?conditions?
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Table?A2? Categories?of?messages?for?content?analysis?
Category? Description?and?examples? Frequency?in?
leader?
messages?
Frequency?in?
follower?
messages?
n?=?198? n?=?408?
No?message?sent? ? 0.131? 0.331?
Forty? Suggestion?to?choose?40? 0.788? 0.586?
Conditional?strategy? Choose?40?in?first?period,?and?switch?to?0?
if?group?fails?in?first?period.?
0.056? 0.034?
Ambiguous?to?interpret? E.g.?“raise?the?number?of?hours”? 0.015? 0.022?
Indecisive,?questioning? E.g.?“choose?at?least?20”,?“maybe?we?can?
do?40”?
0.025? 0.015?
Positive?emotional?
content?
Commendation,?encouragement? 0.465? 0.279?
Negative?emotional?
content?
Blaming,?scolding?others? 0.040? 0.047?
Explanation? Explanation?for?suggested?effort?(e.g.?refer?
to?history,?repeat?rules?of?the?game)?
0.308? ?
Mutual?benefit?argument? Explanation?refers?to?mutual?benefit? 0.182?
Being?part?of?the?group? Using?the?pronoun?“we”,?“us”? 0.323?
Assertive?style? Confident,?not?aggressive,?not?passive? 0.687?
Order? Clear?order,?no?reasoning,?no?explanations? 0.429?
Asking? Asking?the?group?desperately?(e.g.?“I?beg?
you”,?strong?“please”)?
0.030?
Excuse? Blaming?others?or?history? 0.035?
Referring?to?followers? Refer?to?what?followers?suggested? 0.245?
Laissez?faire?style? E.g.?“you?know?what?to?do”? 0.066?
Social?banter? Unrelated?to?the?game?(e.g.?jokes)? 0.106? 0.071?
Follower?order? Followers?tell?the?leader?what?to?do,?as?an?
order?(e.g.?“say”,?“tell”,?but?not?“let’s?
choose”)?
? 0.152?
Note.?The?variable?“referring?to?followers”?is?only?coded?in?Two?way?and?contains?102?observations.?
?
Table?A3? Correlation?of?message?content?variables?
n?=?198? Forty? Positive?
emotions?
Mutual?
benefit?
Being?part? Assertive?
style?
Order?
Forty? 1.00? ? ? ? ? ?
Positive?emotions? 0.46? 1.00?
Mutual?benefit? 0.18? ?0.12? 1.00?
Being?part? 0.20? 0.16? 0.49? 1.00?
Assertive?style? 0.72? 0.32? 0.12? 0.14? 1.00?
Order? 0.30? 0.11? ?0.38? ?0.49? 0.45? 1.00?
?
? ?
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Figure?A2? Relevant?messages?of?leaders?by?treatment?conditions?
?
?
Figure?A3? Evaluation?of?the?leader?
?
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Appendix?2B?
Instructions?
Thank?you? for?participating? in? this? session.?You?are?participating? in?a? study?on?economic?decision?
making?and?will?be?asked?to?make?a?number?of?decisions.?Please?read?these?instructions?carefully?as?
they?describe?how?you?can?earn?money.?
All? the? interaction?between?you?and?other?participants?will? take?place? through? the? computers.?
Please?do?not?talk?or?communicate?in?any?other?way?with?other?participants.?If?you?have?a?question,?
raise?your?hand?and?one?of?us?will?help?you.?The?study?is?anonymous:?that?is,?your?identity?will?not?be?
revealed?to?others?and?the?identity?of?others?will?not?be?revealed?to?you.??
During?the?study?your?earnings?will?be?expressed?in?points.?Upon?completion?of?the?session,?your?
accumulated?earnings?will?be?converted?from?points?to?dollars?at?a?rate?of?$1?per?345?points.?You?will?
be?paid?these?converted?earnings?in?cash.?
The?study?is?divided?into?two?parts.?Your?earnings?today?will?equal?the?sum?of?earnings?from?each?
part.?You?will?be?randomly?assigned?to?a?firm?of?five?participants.?You?will?be?grouped?with?the?same?
five?participants?throughout?Part?1?and?Part?2.?Part?1?consists?of?8?periods?and?Part?2?consists?of?18?
periods.?You?will?read?the? instructions?for?Part?1?below.?You?will?receive?the? instructions?for?Part?2?
once?Part?1?has?been?completed.?
Part?1?
You?are?one?out?of? five?employees? in?a? firm.?Each?period?can?be? thought?of?as?a?workweek.?Each?
employee?spends?40?hours?per?week?at?their?firm.?In?each?period,?every?employee?will?be?asked?to?
choose?how?many?hours?to?devote?to?the?firm’s?bonus?project.?The?available?choices?are?0?hours,?10?
hours,?20?hours,?30?hours,?and?40?hours.?
The?earnings?for?an?employee?are?determined?in?each?period?by?how?many?hours?that?employee?
spends?on?the?bonus?project,?and?the?minimum?number?of?hours?employees?in?his?or?her?firm?spend?
on?the?bonus?project.?Specifically,?the?employee’s?earnings?are?reduced?by?5?points?per?hour?that?he?
or?she?spends?on? the?bonus?project.? In?addition,? the?employee?also?receives?a?bonus?equal? to? the?
minimum?number?of?hours?any?employee?in?his?or?her?firm?spends?on?the?bonus?project?multiplied?
by?6?points.?Each?employee?also?gets?a?flat?payoff?of?200?points?in?each?period.?In?other?words,?your?
earnings?are?given?by?the?formula?below:?
200?–?5?×?your?hours?in?bonus?project?+?6?×?minimum?hours?in?bonus?project?by?any?employee?
To?facilitate?your?calculations,?the?following?Earnings?Table?shows?how?your?earnings?depend?on?
your?choice?and?the?minimum?choice?in?your?firm.?
Your?earnings?in?each?period?are?found?by?looking?across?from?the?number?of?hours?you?chose?on?
the? left?hand? side? and? down? from? the? minimum? number? of? hours? chosen? in? the? firm? by? any?
employee.?For?example,?suppose?you?spend?10?hours?on?the?bonus?project.?Suppose?the?other?four?
employees? in? the? firm? spend? 20,? 30,? 40? and? 40? hours.? The?minimum? hours? spent? on? the? bonus?
project?is?10?hours.?Then?your?payoff?equals:?200???5×10?+?6×10?=?210?points.?
?
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EARNINGS?TABLE?
Minimum?number?of?hours?chosen?in?the?firm?
40? 30? 20? 10? 0?
Your?
hours?
40? 240? 180? 120? 60? 0?
30? 230? 170? 110? 50?
20? 220? 160? 100?
10? 210? 150?
0? 200?
?
At?the?end?of?each?period?you?will?receive?a?summary?of?what?happened?in?the?period?including?the?
number?of?hours?you?spent?on?the?bonus?project,?the?minimum?number?of?hours?chosen?in?the?firm,?
your?payoff?for?the?latest?period,?and?your?accumulated?payoffs?for?the?current?part.?The?computer?
also? provides? a? summary? of? this? information? for? preceding? periods.? At? no? point? in? time?will?we?
identify?the? identity?of?any?employees? in?the?firm.?In?other?words,?the?actions?you?take?will?remain?
confidential.? To? ensure? your? understanding? of? these? instructions,? click? the? “READY”? button? and?
answer?the?questions?that?will?appear?on?your?screen.?
Part?2?
Part?1?has?ended.?Read?the?instructions?for?Part?2?and?click?on?READY?once?you?are?done.?
Part?2?is?similar?to?Part?1.?Now?there?will?be?18?periods?in?Part?2.?In?each?period,?every?employee?
will?choose?how?many?hours?to?devote?to?the?firm’s?bonus?project.?Available?choices?are?0,?10,?20,?30?
and?40?hours.?The?number?of?hours?you?choose?and?the?minimum?number?of?hours?chosen? in?the?
firm?will?determine?your?earnings?in?that?period.?The?Earnings?Table?is?the?same?as?in?Part?1.?Finally,?
your?firm’s?composition?has?not?changed.? In?other?words,? in?Part?2?you?will? interact?with?the?same?
firm?of?five?people?as?in?Part?1.?
The? difference? between? Part? 1? and? Part? 2? is? that? one? person? in? your? firm?will? be? randomly?
selected? to? be? the?Manager.? In? the? next? screen,? you?will? be? informed?whether? you? have? been?
assigned?the?role?of?the?Manager?or?the?role?of?an?Employee?for?all?of?Part?2.?Throughout?Part?2,?the?
Manager’s?profile?picture?will?be?displayed?on?the?computer?screen.?
Every?3?periods,?before?everyone?chooses?a?number?of?hours,?there?will?be?a?message?stage.? In?
the?message? stage,? first? the?employees?will?be?able? to?send?a?written?suggestion? to? the?Manager.?
Only? the?Manager?will?be?able? to? see? these? suggestions,?other?employees?will?not?be?able? to? see?
them.?After?the?employees?made?their?suggestions?to?the?Manager,?the?Manager?will?be?able?to?send?
a?written?suggestion?to?all?employees.?Both?employees?and?Managers?can?alternatively?decide?not?to?
send? any? suggestion.? The? suggestion? cannot? contain? information? that? can? be? used? to? identify?
participants,? such?as?a?name,?nickname,?or?any?other? identifying? feature? like?clothing,?or? the?desk?
number.?Other?than?these?restrictions,?participants?may?write?anything?that?they?wish.?
After?the?message?stage,?every?employee?will?see?the?Manager’s?suggestion.?Subsequently,?each?
employee? and? the? Manager? enter? the? number? of? hours? they? wish? to? choose.? Note? that? the?
suggestion?does?not?commit?you?to?any?particular?choice.?That?is,?neither?the?Manager?nor?the?other?
employees?are?required?to?choose?the?number?of?hours?indicated?in?the?suggestion.?
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Screenshots?
?
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Appendix?3A?
Calculations?for?the?benefits?of?volunteering?
One?obvious?payoff?from?running?for?the?leader?position?is?to?increase?group?member?earnings?in?the?
next?three?periods.?From?Part?1?of?the?study,?participants?will?easily?see?that?having?no?leader?and?no?
possibility? to? communicate? yields,?with?a?high?probability,? low? individual?earnings? close? to?200? in?
each? period.? An? effective? leader? can? reach? high? individual? earnings? of? 240? in? each? period.? Not?
running? for? the? leader? position? yields? a? lottery? bonus? of? 50?with? the? probability? of? 0.5,?whereas?
running?for?the? leader?position?yields?a? leader?bonus?of?50? if?the?candidate?gets?selected.?Selection?
depends?on?the?number?of?other?candidates.?
??=?probability?that?participant???enters?
??=?expected?benefit?of?having?a?leader?for?the?next?three?periods?
Expected?payoff?from?choosing?the?lottery:?
???? ?
?
? ?? ? ??? ? ?? ? ??
???
Expected?payoff?from?choosing?to?volunteer:?
??? ? ??? ? ??? ? ???? ? ??? ? ????? ? ??? ? ???? ? ?? ?
?
? ?
?? ?? ? ??
For?any?value?of??,?we?can?then?solve?for?the?value?of???that?makes?both?choice?options?equal:?
? ???? ? ???? (1)?
? ?? ? ???? ? ??? ? ??? ? ??? ? ?? ? ?? ? ??? ? ?? ? ???????? ? ?? (2)?
For?example,?if?? ? ?,?which?is?the?minimum?value?for?the?expected?benefit,?the?equation?becomes:?
? ? ? ??? ? ?? ? ??? ? ?? ? ?????? (3)?
The?value?of???that?solves?the?above?equality? is?? ? ?????,?which? implies?that?on?a?given?period?an?
average?of?1.78?group?members?volunteer?to?become?the?leader.?
Similarly,?if?? ? ???,?which?is?the?maximum?value?for?the?expected?benefit,?40?for?each?of?the?next?
three?periods,?the?equation?becomes:?
? ? ? ??? ? ???? ? ????? ? ????? ? ?????? (4)?
The?value?of???that?solves?the?above?equality? is?? ? ?????,?which? implies?that?on?a?given?period?an?
average?of?2.61?group?members?volunteer?to?become?the?leader.?
? ?
? ?
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Appendix?3B?
Procedures?
After?their?arrival?to?the? laboratory,?participants?were?assigned?randomly?to?seats.?Before?period?1,?
and? before? reading? the? instructions,? everybody? answered? a? short? general? questionnaire? about?
gender,? race,? age,? years? of? study,? and?major? field? of? studies.?Next,? participants? had? to? choose? a?
profile?picture.?We?used? the?profile?pictures?along?with?group?internal? ID?numbers? from?1? to?5? to?
display?on?the?computer?screens?all?group?members,?candidates,?and?selected?leaders?to?every?group?
member.?Participants?knew?from?the?instructions?of?Part?2?that?the?profile?pictures?will?be?displayed.?
We?created?12?generic?profiles?for?each?gender?using?the?profile?creator?website?pickaface.net.?All?
pictures?had? the?same?clothing,? facial?expression,? face? form,?and?eye?color.?We?varied?hair? length,?
hair? color,? skin? color,? and? did? small?modifications? to? the? lips,? nose,? eyes,? and? hairstyle? to?match?
generic?racial?features.?Figure?B1?contains?the?24?profiles?pictures.?
Figure?B1? Profile?pictures?
?
We?had?separate?instructions?for?Part?1?and?Part?2,?and?participants?read?the?instructions?only?prior?
to?each?part.?To? facilitate?calculations? for? the?participants,?we?handed?out?printed?versions?of? the?
instructions?for?Part?1,?which?contained?the?Earnings?Table?showing?how?earnings?were?determined?
in? each? period.? The? same? table? applied? in? Part? 2.? Instructions?were? displayed? on? the? computer?
screens? and? were? read? aloud? by? the? experimenter.? After? reading? the? instructions? for? Part? 1,?
participants? completed? a?payoff?quiz? to? check?whether? everybody?understood? the? game’s?payoff?
structure.?After?reading?the?instructions?for?Part?2,?participants?completed?a?questionnaire?about?the?
volunteering?and?selection?process.?Instructions?and?screenshots?can?be?found?below.?
The? game? was? described? using? a? workplace? context? to? be? in? line? with? earlier? papers,? ease?
comprehension?of?the?task,?and?enrich?the?wording?and?analysis?of?the?free?form?messages?(Cooper?
2007;?Brandts?et?al.?2015).?As?in?Brandts?et?al.?(2015),?individual?group?members?were?referred?to?as?
“employees”,?and? they?were? told? that? they?were?working? for?a? “firm”.?The? leader?was? called? the?
“manager”.?Following?Brandts?et?al.? (2015),?we?did?not?use?the?term?“effort”?because?of? its?strong?
connotation.?Instead?we?asked?participants?to?think?of?each?period?as?a?“workweek”?lasting?40?hours?
and?choose?how?many?hours?to?devote?to?the?firm’s?“bonus?project”.?
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Leaders?could?enter?their?messages?into?a?chat?box,?and?they?could?either?click?on?a?button?to?send?
the?message?or?click?on?a?button?labeled?as?“Send?no?suggestion”.?The?leader’s?message,?along?with?
the? leader’s?profile?picture?and?group?internal? ID?number,?was?displayed?on?all?screens?throughout?
the?three?periods?of?a?leadership?term.?
In?Part?2,?after?participants?made?their?volunteering?decision,?we?elicited?their?belief?concerning?the?
number?of?other?group?members?who?will? run? for? the? leader?position?by?asking? “Out?of? the? four?
other?participants? in? your? firm,?how?many?will? run? for? the?Manager?position?”?Participants? could?
enter?guesses?from?0?to?4.?Also?in?Part?2,?after?participants?made?their?effort?choice,?we?elicited?their?
belief? concerning? the? number? of? other? group?members?who?will? follow? the? leader’s?message? by?
asking? “Out? of? the? four? other? participants? in? your? firm,? how? many? will? follow? the? Manager’s?
suggestion?”?Participants?could?enter?guesses?from?0?to?4,?or?they?could?indicate?“Not?applicable”?for?
cases?where? the? leader?did?not?make?any?suggestion.?Belief?questions?were?only?asked? in? the? first?
period?of?each?leadership?term.?
At? the? end? of? each? period,? participants? saw? their? effort? choice,? the? group?minimum? effort,? their?
earnings? in? that?period,?and? their?accumulated?earnings.?Participants?could?not?observe? individual?
effort?choices.?At?the?end?of?each?selection?process,?participants?saw?the?selection?results,?including?
the?selected? leader’s?profile?picture?and? ID?number,? their?own? role?assignment,? their?volunteering?
decision,?and?any?leader?and?lottery?bonuses.?
At?the?end?of?the?experiment?participants?filled?in?a?final?questionnaire.?Our?main?goal?was?to?elicit?
gender?stereotyped?beliefs.?We?asked?one?question?related?to?the?probabilities?of?men?and?women?
volunteering.?We?showed?the?same?five?profile?pictures?and?ID?numbers?to?all?participants,?depicting?
a?hypothetical?group,?along?with?the?text?“Suppose?that?the?firm?has?the?following?five?employees”.?
Specifically,?we? asked? “In? your? opinion,?what? is? the? probability? that? each? employee? runs? for? the?
manager? position?”? Participants? could? enter? a? number? between? 0? and? 100? next? to? the? text?
“Employee? ‘ID1’?will? run? for? the?manager?position?with?a?probability?of? (in?%)”.?We?had? five? such?
answer?lines,?one?for?each?group?member.?We?also?asked?three?questions?related?to?the?probabilities?
of?men? and?women?winning? elections.? The? questions?were? the? same? for? all? participants.? In? the?
questions?we? varied? the? number? and? composition? of? candidates.? In? question? 1,?we? showed? one?
female?and?two?male?candidates,?along?with?the?text?“Suppose?that?these?are?the?candidates?who?
ran?for?the?manager?position”.?Specifically,?we?asked?“What? is?the?probability?(in?%)?that?Candidate?
‘ID?1’?wins?the?election?”?Next?to?this?question,?participants?could?enter?a?number?between?0?and?
100.?We?had? three? such?question? lines,?one? for?each?depicted? candidate.?The?program? controlled?
whether?the?sum?of?the?answers? is?exactly?100,?since?one?of?the?candidates? is?getting?selected?for?
sure.?In?question?2,?we?showed?two?female?and?one?male?candidate,?and?in?question?3,?one?male?and?
one?female?candidate.?
Further,?we?asked?which? role?assignment? (“Manager”?or? “Employee”)?participants?would?prefer? if?
they?could?choose?(“Imagine?you?can?appoint?someone?for?the?manager?position.?Whom?would?you?
choose?? Yourself? or? someone? else? who? is? equally? capable.”).? Next,? we? asked? their? subjective?
evaluation? about? their? own? leader? competences? on? a? five?point? scale? (“Suppose? that? you? are?
appointed? to? be? the?manager.? Compared? to? the? average?manager,? is? your? performance? as? the?
manager?much?better,?a?little?bit?better,?equal,?a?little?bit?worse,?much?worse.”).?Finally,?we?asked?a?
general? risk?attitude?question? (“How?do?you? see?yourself:?are?you?generally?a?person?who? is? fully?
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prepared?to?take?risks?or?do?you?try?to?avoid?taking?risks?”),?where?participants?could?indicate?their?
willingness?to?take?risks?on?a?scale?from?0?for?“not?at?all?willing?to?take?risks”?to?10?for?“very?willing?to?
take?risks”?(Dohmen?et?al.?2011).?
Upon?completion?of? the? final?questionnaire,?participants?were?shown? their?earnings?separately? for?
each? part? and? in? total? including? leader? and? lottery? bonuses.? Participants?were? thanked? and? paid?
individually?for?their?participation.?
Instructions?
Thank?you? for?participating? in? this? session.?You?are?participating? in?a? study?on?economic?decision?
making?and?will?be?asked?to?make?a?number?of?decisions.?Please?read?these?instructions?carefully?as?
they?describe?how?you?can?earn?money.?
All? the? interaction?between?you?and?other?participants?will? take?place? through? the? computers.?
Please?do?not?talk?or?communicate?in?any?other?way?with?other?participants.?If?you?have?a?question,?
raise?your?hand?and?one?of?us?will?help?you.?The?study?is?anonymous:?that?is,?your?identity?will?not?be?
revealed?to?others?and?the?identity?of?others?will?not?be?revealed?to?you.?
During? the? study?your?earnings?will?be?expressed? in?points.?Upon?completion?of? the? session,?your?
accumulated?earnings?will?be? converted? from?points? to?dollars?at?a? rate?of?$1?per?345?points? [10?
quetzals?per?500?points].?You?will?be?paid?these?converted?earnings?in?cash.?
The?study?is?divided?into?two?parts.?Your?earnings?today?will?equal?the?sum?of?earnings?from?each?
part.?You?will?be?randomly?assigned?to?a?firm?of?five?participants.?You?will?be?grouped?with?the?same?
five?participants?throughout?Part?1?and?Part?2.?Part?1?consists?of?8?periods?and?Part?2?consists?of?18?
periods.?You?will?read?the? instructions?for?Part?1?below.?You?will?receive?the? instructions?for?Part?2?
once?Part?1?has?been?completed.?
Part?1?
You?are?one?out?of? five?employees? in?a? firm.?Each?period?can?be? thought?of?as?a?workweek.?Each?
employee?spends?40?hours?per?week?at?their?firm.?In?each?period,?every?employee?will?be?asked?to?
choose?how?many?hours?to?devote?to?the?firm’s?bonus?project.?The?available?choices?are?0?hours,?10?
hours,?20?hours,?30?hours,?and?40?hours.?
The?earnings?for?an?employee?are?determined?in?each?period?by?how?many?hours?that?employee?
spends?on?the?bonus?project,?and?the?minimum?number?of?hours?employees?in?his?or?her?firm?spend?
on?the?bonus?project.?Specifically,?the?employee’s?earnings?are?reduced?by?5?points?per?hour?that?he?
or?she?spends?on? the?bonus?project.? In?addition,? the?employee?also?receives?a?bonus?equal? to? the?
minimum?number?of?hours?any?employee?in?his?or?her?firm?spends?on?the?bonus?project?multiplied?
by?6?points.?Each?employee?also?gets?a?flat?payoff?of?200?points?in?each?period.?In?other?words,?your?
earnings?are?given?by?the?formula?below:?
200?–?5?×?your?hours?in?bonus?project?+?6?×?minimum?hours?in?bonus?project?by?any?employee?
To? facilitate? your? calculations,? the? following? Earnings? Table? shows?how? your? earnings? depend?on?
your?choice?and?the?minimum?choice?in?your?firm.?
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EARNINGS?TABLE?
Minimum?number?of?hours?chosen?in?the?firm?
40? 30? 20? 10? 0?
Your?
hours?
40? 240? 180? 120? 60? 0?
30? 230? 170? 110? 50?
20? 220? 160? 100?
10? 210? 150?
0? 200?
?
Your?earnings?in?each?period?are?found?by?looking?across?from?the?number?of?hours?you?chose?on?the?
left?hand?side?and?down?from?the?minimum?number?of?hours?chosen? in?the?firm?by?any?employee.?
For?example,?suppose?you?spend?10?hours?on?the?bonus?project.?Suppose?the?other?four?employees?
in? the? firm? spend?20,?30,?40?and?40?hours.?The?minimum?hours? spent?on? the?bonus?project? is?10?
hours.?Then?your?payoff?equals:?200???5×10?+?6×10?=?210?points.?
At?the?end?of?each?period?you?will?receive?a?summary?of?what?happened?in?the?period?including?
the?number?of?hours?you?spent?on?the?bonus?project,?the?minimum?number?of?hours?chosen?in?the?
firm,? your? payoff? for? the? latest? period,? and? your? accumulated? payoffs? for? the? current? part.? The?
computer?also?provides?a?summary?of?this?information?for?preceding?periods.?At?no?point?in?time?will?
we? identify? the? identity? of? any? employees? in? the? firm.? In? other?words,? the? actions? you? take?will?
remain?confidential.?To?ensure?your?understanding?of? these? instructions,?click? the?“READY”?button?
and?answer?the?questions?that?will?appear?on?your?screen.?
Part?2?
Part?1?has?ended.?Read?the? instructions?for?Part?2?and?click?on?READY?once?you?are?done.?Part?2? is?
similar?to?Part?1.?Now?there?will?be?18?periods?in?Part?2.?In?each?period,?every?employee?will?choose?
how?many?hours? to?devote? to? the? firm’s?bonus?project.?Available?choices?are?0,?10,?20,?30?and?40?
hours.?The?number?of?hours?you?choose?and?the?minimum?number?of?hours?chosen?in?the?firm?will?
determine?your?earnings? in? that?period.?The?Earnings?Table? is? the? same?as? in?Part?1.?Finally,?your?
firm’s?composition?has?not?changed.?In?other?words,?in?Part?2?you?will?interact?with?the?same?firm?of?
five?people?as?in?Part?1.?
The?difference?between?Part?1?and?Part?2?is?that?in?every?3?periods?there?will?be?a?selection?and?a?
message?stage.?
Selection?stage?[Instructions?contained?this?text?in?case?of?the?Election?condition.]?
In?the?selection?stage?one?person?in?your?firm?will?be?selected?to?be?the?Manager.?The?selection?stage?
goes?as?follows:?
? First,?all?employees?decide?whether?they?wish? to?run? for?the?manager?position.?Employees?
who?run?are?referred?to?as?candidates.?
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? Thereafter,? all?employees? (both? candidates? and?non?candidates)? vote? to?elect? a?manager.?
During?the?vote,?employees?can?identify?the?candidates?by?a?randomly?assigned?id?(a?number?
between?1?and?5)?and?their?chosen?profile?picture.?
? Employees? vote? by? ranking? the? candidates? from?most? preferred? to? least? preferred.? For?
example,?if?there?are?three?candidates,?each?employee?has?to?assign?one?candidate?the?rank?
of?1? (most?preferred),? another? candidate? the? rank?of?2? (second?most?preferred),? and? the?
remaining?candidate?to?the?rank?of?3?(least?preferred).?Note?that?candidates?must?also?rank?
themselves?when?they?vote.?
? The?candidate?with? the?best?average?rank?wins? the?election?and?becomes? the?manager.? In?
case?of?a?tie,?the?winner?will?be?chosen?randomly?among?the?tied?candidates.?
? If? none? of? the? employees? runs,? then? there? is? no? election? and? the? firm? will? not? have? a?
manager.?
? If?only?one?employee?runs,?then?that?employee?automatically?wins?the?election?and?becomes?
the?manager.?
Selection?stage?[Instructions?contained?this?text?in?case?of?the?Random?condition.]?
In?the?selection?stage?one?person?in?your?firm?will?be?selected?to?be?the?Manager.?The?selection?stage?
goes?as?follows:?
? First,?all?employees?decide?whether?they?wish? to?run? for?the?manager?position.?Employees?
who?run?are?referred?to?as?candidates.?
? The? candidates?will?be? shown?on? the? screen.? Employees? can? identify? the? candidates?by? a?
randomly?assigned?id?(a?number?between?1?and?5)?and?their?chosen?profile?picture.?
? Thereafter,?one?of?the?candidates?will?be?chosen?randomly?by?the?computer?to?be?the?winner?
and?becomes?the?manager.?Each?candidate?has?the?same?probability?of?winning.?
? If?none?of?the?employees?runs,?then?the?firm?will?not?have?a?manager.?
? If? only? one? employee? runs,? then? that? employee? automatically? wins? and? becomes? the?
manager.?
Earnings?from?the?selection?stage?
You?can?earn?additional?money?in?the?selection?stage.?Additional?earnings?will?be?added?to?your?total?
earnings?at?the?end?of?the?experiment.?
? Employees?who? run? for? the?manager?position?will?earn?50?points? if? they?win? the?election?
[text?for?random?selection?condition:?“if?they?win?and?become?the?manager”]?and?0?points?if?
they?lose?the?election?[no?text].?
? Employees?do?not?to?run?for?the?manager?position?will?earn?50?points?with?50%?probability?
and?0?points?otherwise.?Whether?you?earn?50?points?or?0?points?is?determined?randomly?by?
the?computer.?
You?will?be?informed?of?the?selection?stage?earnings?immediately?after?the?election.?
Message?stage?
After? the? vote? [selection],? you?will?be? informed?whether? you?have?been? assigned? the? role?of? the?
Manager? or? the? role? of? an? Employee.? The? Manager’s? profile? picture? will? be? displayed? on? the?
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computer?screen.?In?the?message?stage,?the?Manager?will?be?able?to?send?a?written?suggestion?to?all?
employees,?or?alternatively,?he/she?can?decide?not?to?send?any?suggestion.?The?suggestion?cannot?
contain? information? that? can?be?used? to? identify? the?Manager,? such?as?a?name,?nickname,?or?any?
other? identifying? feature? like? clothing,? or? the? desk? number.? Other? than? these? restrictions,? the?
Manager?may?write?anything?that?he/she?wishes.?After?the?message?stage,?every?employee?will?see?
the?Manager’s?suggestion.?
Subsequently,?employees?and?managers?play? for?3?periods.? In?each?period,?each?employee?and?
the?Manager?enter? the?number?of?hours? they?wish? to? choose.?Note? that? the? suggestion?does?not?
commit? you? to? any? particular? choice.? That? is,? neither? the?Manager? nor? the? other? employees? are?
required?to?choose?the?number?of?hours?indicated?in?the?suggestion.?
After?3?periods,? the?manager? reverts? to?being?employee?and? there?will?be?a?new?selection?and?
message?stage.?Employees?will?make?new?decisions?about?candidacy?and?voting?[and?there?will?be?a?
new?random?assignment?among?candidates].?Note?that?ids?are?fixed?throughout?Part?2.?
Screenshots?
?
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Appendix?4A?
Table?A1? Categories?of?messages?for?content?analysis?
Category? Description?and?examples? Frequency?
Sent?any?message? ? 0.923?
Forty? Suggestion?to?choose?40? 0.769?
Thirty? ? 0.012?
Twenty? ? 0.012?
Ten? ? 0.030?
Zero? ? 0.107?
Conditional?strategy? Choose?40?in?first?period,?and?switch?to?0?if?group?
fails?in?first?period.?
0.024?
Indecisive,?ambiguous? E.g.?“work?more?hours”,?“choose?at?least?20”? 0.036?
Positive?emotional?content? Commendation,?encouragement? 0.396?
Negative?emotional?content? Blaming,?scolding?others? 0.089?
Explanation? Explanation?for?suggested?effort?(e.g.?refer?to?
history,?repeat?rules?of?the?game)?
0.621?
Mutual?benefit?argument? Explanation?refers?to?mutual?benefit? 0.527?
Being?part?of?the?group? Using?the?pronoun?“we”,?“us”? 0.657?
Assertive?style? Confident,?not?aggressive,?not?passive? 0.799?
Order? Clear?order,?no?reasoning,?no?explanations? 0.716?
Asking? Asking?the?group?desperately?(e.g.?“I?beg?you”,?
strong?“please”)?
0.065?
Excuse? Blaming?others?or?history? 0.047?
Taking?turns? Suggestion?to?take?turns?in?leadership? 0.024?
Social?banter? Unrelated?to?the?game?(e.g.?jokes)? 0.053?
Short?message? Count?of?characters?shorter?than?median? 0.503?
Long?message? Count?of?characters?one?standard?deviation?longer?
than?the?mean?
0.136?
?
? ?
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Table?A2? Volunteering?frequency,?extensions?
? Model?5A? Model?5B?
n?=?870? n?=?870?
Dependent?variable? Volunteering? Volunteering?
Elections? ?0.30***?
(0.09)?
0.02?
(0.06)?
Beliefs?of?men?in?Random? 0.42***?
(0.13)?
?
Beliefs?of?women?in?Random? 0.25**?
(0.10)?
?
Beliefs?of?men?in?Election? 0.73***?
(0.08)?
?
Beliefs?of?women?in?Election? 0.74***?
(0.08)?
?
History?effect?for?men?in?
Random?
? ?0.05*?
(0.02)?
History?effect?for?women?in?
Random?
? ?0.05***?
(0.02)?
History?effect?for?men?in?
Election?
? ?0.08***?
(0.02)?
History?effect?for?women?in?
Election?
? ?0.07***?
(0.02)?
Constant? 0.36***?
(0.08)?
0.63***?
(0.04)?
Notes.?For? the?estimations?we?use?subject?level? random?effects?GLS? regressions?after?collapsing? the?data?by?
subject?and?leadership?term.?Both?models?are?clustered?into?29?groups.?The?models?contain?870?observations?
of?145?subjects?over?6?selection?periods.?Standard?errors?(in?parentheses)?are?corrected?for?clustering?at?the?
group? level.?***Statistically?significant?at?the?1%? level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%? level,?*statistically?
significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?
? ?
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Table?A3? Volunteering?behavior?1?
? Extension?of?Model?5? Post?estimation?tests?
n?=?725? ?
Dependent?variable? Volunteering?
Elections? ?0.30***?
(0.10)?
Random?selection?
Man?who?did?not?volunteer,?and?group?was?successful? ?0.34**?
(0.16)?
p?=?0.98?
Woman?who?did?not?volunteer,?and?group?was?
successful?
?0.34***?
(0.10)?
Woman?who?did?not?volunteer,?and?group?failed? ?0.38***?
(0.08)? p?=?0.00?
Male?follower?who?volunteered,?and?group?failed? 0.04?
(0.09)?
p?=?0.11?
Female?follower?who?volunteered,?and?group?failed? ?0.11?
(0.07)?
Male?follower?who?volunteered,?and?group?was?
successful?
?0.18*?
(0.11)?
p?=?0.50?
Female?follower?who?volunteered,?and?group?was?
successful?
?0.12?
(0.08)?
Male?leader,?successful? ?0.07?
(0.19)?
p?=?0.91?
Female?leader,?successful? ?0.05?
(0.18)?
Male?leader,?failed? ?0.02?
(0.10)?
p?=?0.91?
Female?leader,?failed? 0.00?
(0.12)?
Election?
Man?who?did?not?volunteer,?and?group?was?successful? ?0.12?
(0.09)?
p?=?0.94?
Woman?who?did?not?volunteer,?and?group?was?
successful?
?0.11?
(0.08)?
Woman?who?did?not?volunteer,?and?group?failed? ?0.16**?
(0.08)? p?=?0.04?
Male?follower?who?volunteered,?and?group?failed? 0.39***?
(0.13)?
p?=?0.70?
Female?follower?who?volunteered,?and?group?failed? 0.33***?
(0.10)?
Male?follower?who?volunteered,?and?group?was?
successful?
?0.06?
(0.13)?
p?=?0.61?
Female?follower?who?volunteered,?and?group?was?
successful?
0.01?
(0.10)?
Male?leader,?successful? 0.27*?
(0.15)?
p?=?0.85?
Female?leader,?successful? 0.30?
(0.19)?
Male?leader,?failed? 0.16?
(0.12)?
p?=?0.06?
Female?leader,?failed? 0.45***?
(0.12)?
Constant? 0.68***?
(0.06)?
?
Notes.?For? the?estimation?we?use?a?subject?level?random?effects?GLS?regression?after?collapsing? the?data?by?subject?and?
leadership?term.?The?model?contains?725?observations?of?145?subjects?over?5?selection?periods?and?29?groups?(in?the?first?
selection?period?we?have?no?lagged?volunteering?data).?Standard?errors?(in?parentheses)?are?corrected?for?clustering?at?the?
group?level.?***Statistically?significant?at?the?1%?level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?
the?10%?level.?
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Table?A4? Volunteering?behavior?2?
? Extension?of?Model?5? Post?estimation?tests?
n?=?870? ?
Dependent?variable? Volunteering?
Elections? ?0.09?
(0.08)?
Random?selection?
Man,?previous?female?leader?failed? ?0.10?
(0.06)?
p?=?0.26?
Man,?previous?female?leader?succeeded? ?0.23***?
(0.09)?
Man,?previous?male?leader?succeeded? ?0.34***?
(0.10)? p?=?0.00?
Woman,?previous?male?leader?failed? ?0.21***?
(0.06)?
p?=?0.21?
Woman,?previous?male?leader?succeeded? ?0.32***?
(0.06)?
Woman,?previous?female?leader?failed? ?0.27***?
(0.07)?
p?=?0.51?
Woman,?previous?female?leader?succeeded? ?0.35***?
(0.09)?
Election?
Man,?previous?female?leader?failed? 0.00?
(0.08)?
p?=?0.00?
Man,?previous?female?leader?succeeded? ?0.49***?
(0.08)?
Man,?previous?male?leader?succeeded? ?0.20*?
(0.11)? p?=?0.06?
Woman,?previous?male?leader?failed? ?0.01?
(0.11)?
p?=?0.00?
Woman,?previous?male?leader?succeeded? ?0.35***?
(0.10)?
Woman,?previous?female?leader?failed? ?0.13?
(0.14)?
p?=?0.53?
Woman,?previous?female?leader?succeeded? ?0.22*?
(0.12)?
Constant? 0.75***?
(0.03)?
?
Notes.?For?the?estimation?we?use?a?subject?level?random?effects?GLS?regression?after?collapsing?the?data?by?subject?
and?leadership?term.?The?model?contains?870?observations?of?145?subjects?over?5?selection?periods?and?29?groups.?
Standard?errors?(in?parentheses)?are?corrected?for?clustering?at?the?group?level.?***Statistically?significant?at?the?1%?
level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
? ?
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Table?A5? Chance?of?being?elected?and?reelected?
? Extension?of?Model?6? Post?estimation?tests?
n?=?321? ?
Dependent?variable? Being?leader?(conditional?on?
volunteering)?
Elections? 0.43***?
(0.16)?
Elections?
Man?who?was?not?elected?previously,?and?a?male?
leader?failed?previously?
?0.42?
(0.30)?
p?=?0.69?
Woman?who?was?not?elected?previously,?and?a?male?
leader?failed?previously?
?0.29?
(0.18)?
Man?who?was?not?elected?previously,?and?a?female?
leader?failed?previously?
?0.35?
(0.23)?
p?=?0.24?
Woman?who?was?not?elected?previously,?and?a?female?
leader?failed?previously?
?0.51**?
(0.25)?
Man?who?was?not?elected?previously,?and?a?male?
leader?succeeded?previously?
?0.54***?
(0.21)?
p?=?0.91?
Woman?who?was?not?elected?previously,?and?a?male?
leader?succeeded?previously?
?0.51**?
(0.22)?
Man?who?was?not?elected?previously,?and?a?female?
leader?succeeded?previously?
?0.36?
(0.32)?
p?=?0.56?
Woman?who?was?not?elected?previously,?and?a?female?
leader?succeeded?previously?
?0.46?
(0.30)?
Man?who?was?leader?previously,?and?failed? ?0.20?
(0.23)?
p?=?0.03?
Woman?who?was?leader?previously,?and?failed? ?0.63***?
(0.15)?
Man?who?was?leader?previously,?and?succeeded?
(17?observations)?
?0.02?
(0.18)?
p?=?0.89?
Woman?who?was?leader?previously,?and?succeeded?
(12?observations)?
Omitted,?collinearity89?
Constant? 0.37***?
(0.02)?
?
Separate?control?for?message?content?
Elections? 0.11***?
(0.04)?
?
Elections?
Man?who?failed?as?leader?previously,?and?suggested?
forty?
0.12?
(0.17)?
p?=?0.01?
Woman?who?failed?as?leader?previously,?and?suggested?
forty?
?0.34**?
(0.15)?
Man?who?failed?as?leader?previously,?and?suggested?
else?than?forty?
0.01?
(0.23)?
p?=?0.24?
Woman?who?failed?as?leader?previously,?and?suggested?
else?than?forty?
?0.32**?
(0.15)?
Constant? 0.36***?
(0.02)?
?
Notes.?For?the?estimation?we?use?a?subject?level?random?effects?GLS?regression?after?collapsing?the?data?by?subject?
and?leadership?term.?The?model?contains?321?observations?over?5?selection?periods?and?29?groups,?of?subjects?who?
volunteered?(in?the?first?selection?period?we?have?no?lagged?volunteering?data).?Standard?errors?(in?parentheses)?are?
corrected?for?clustering?at?the?group?level.?***Statistically?significant?at?the?1%?level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?
5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
? ?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
89?If?we?simplify?the?estimation?by?dropping?the?information?about?the?gender?of?the?previous?leader?from?the?
interaction?term,?we?get?a?clear?result?for?the?chance?of?reelection?of?successful?leaders.?The?reelection?effect?
for?successful?women?is?3?percentage?points?higher?compared?to?men,?and?the?difference?is?not?significant.?
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Figure?A1? Gender?composition?of?groups?
?
?
Figure?A2? Over?time,?who?gives?the?best?rank?for?the?self??
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Figure?A3? Over?time,?who?gives?the?best?rank?for?the?previous?leader??
A.?Previous?leader?failed? B.?Previously?successful?leader?
?
?
Figure?A4? Over?time,?who?gives?the?best?rank?for?a?female?leader??
A.?Over?all?observations? B.?Among?non?candidates?only?
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Table?A6? Sabotage?
? Model?7? Model?8?
n?=?338? n?=?338?
Dependent?variable? Effort? Effort?
Voting?for?a?candidate?who?
wins?
1.54?
(1.66)?
Man?vote?for?somebody?else,?
leader?is?female??
? ?1.48?
(3.10)?
Man?vote?for?elected?male?
leader?
? 0.14?
(4.16)?
Man?vote?for?elected?female?
leader?
? 0.09?
(2.27)?
Woman?vote?for?somebody?
else,?leader?is?male?
? 2.78**?
(1.40)?
Woman?vote?for?somebody?
else,?leader?is?female?
? ?2.28?
(3.78)?
Woman?vote?for?elected?male?
leader?
? 4.83*?
(2.74)?
Woman?vote?for?elected?female?
leader?
? ?1.48?
(4.55)?
Constant? 32.99***?
(2.47)?
32.82***?
(2.99)?
Notes.?For? the?estimations?we?use?subject?level? random?effects?GLS? regressions?after?collapsing? the?data?by?
subject?and?leadership?term?and?restricting?to?observations?of?followers?in?Election.?Both?models?are?clustered?
into?14?groups.?The?models?contain?338?observations?of?70?subjects?over?6?selection?periods.?Standard?errors?
(in? parentheses)? are? corrected? for? clustering? at? the? group? level.? ***Statistically? significant? at? the? 1%? level,?
**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?

